In Spencer v. World Vision Inc., (9th Cir., Aug. 23, 2010), Judge O'Scannlain, writing the opinion for the court, formulated the test for the exemption as follows:
a nonprofit entity qualifies for the section 2000e-1 exemption if it establishes that it 1) is organized for a self-identified religious purpose (as evidenced by Articles of Incorporation or similar foundational documents), 2) is engaged in activity consistent with, and in furtherance of, those religious purposes, and 3) holds itself out to the public as religious.Judge Kleinfeld concurring formulated the test somewhat differently:
To determine whether an entity is a “religious corporation, association, or society,” determine whether it is organized for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying out that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as an entity for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts.Judge Berzon, dissenting, wrote:
Section 2000e-1(a) reflects Congress’s recognition that for a small group of employers—organizations devoted to prayer and religious instruction—the requirement to accommodate employees of different faiths could represent an unwarranted intrusion into the organizations’ own freedom of religion. For those groups, on balance, the restriction of the relatively few affected jobs to those with approved religious beliefs is tolerable.[Thanks to Ted Olsen via Religionlaw for the lead.]
My colleagues may wish to expand that narrow exemption to nonprofits that assert they are motivated by religious principles. But that interpretation would severely tip the balance away from the pluralistic vision Congress incorporated in Title VII, toward a society in which employers could self declare as religious enclaves from which dissenters can be excluded despite their ability to do the assigned secular work as well as religiously acceptable employees.
