10th Circuit En Banc Gives Big Win To Hobby Lobby In Challenge To Contraceptive Coverage Mandate

Yesterday an 8-judge en banc panel of the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals gave an important win in a high profile case to for-profit businesses challenging the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive coverage mandate. In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, (10th Cir., June 27, 2013), in six separate opinions spanning 165 pages, the court held that two related family-owned corporate businesses, Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel, Inc., had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that their free exercise rights were substantially burdened in violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The corporations and their owners objected to providing coverage for those contraceptives they regard as abortifacients.  Four of the 8 judges would have remanded with instructions for the district court to issue a preliminary injunction, but lacking a 5th vote for that, the court instead remanded for the district court to resolve two other issues as to whether an injunction should issue-- the balance of equities and the public interest-- before issuing the injunction.

Five of the 8 judges (those who joined Part V of Judge Tymkovich's opinion) held that corporations have free exercise rights, and that here they were substantially burdened without a compelling governmental interest.  Judge Tymkovich said in part:

... Congress did not exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA’s protections. Such corporations can be “persons” exercising religion for purposes of the statute.  ....  It is beyond question that associations—not just individuals—have Free Exercise rights: “An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.” ....

[T]he protections of the Religion Clauses extend beyond the walls of a church, synagogue, or mosque to religiously motivated conduct, as well as religious belief.... The distinction gains force here because religious conduct includes religious expression, which can be communicated by individuals and for-profit corporations alike......

... [S]incerely religious persons could find a connection between the exercise of religion and the pursuit of profit. Would an incorporated kosher butcher really have no claim to challenge a regulation mandating non-kosher butchering practices? The kosher butcher, of course, might directly serve a religious community—as Mardel, a Christian bookstore, does here. But we see no reason why one must orient one’s business toward a religious community to preserve Free Exercise protections. A religious individual may enter the for profit realm intending to demonstrate to the marketplace that a corporation can succeed financially while adhering to religious values. As a court, we do not see how we can distinguish this form of evangelism from any other.....

Judge Tymkovich went on to find that the corporation's religious beliefs were substantially burdened. Saying that "substantial burden" is a question of the intensity of coercion, not the theological merit of the belief, and explaining:

It is not the employees’ health care decisions that burden the corporations’ religious beliefs, but the government’s demand that Hobby Lobby and Mardel enable access to contraceptives that Hobby Lobby and Mardel deem morally problematic.... [W]e must accept Hobby Lobby and Mardel’s beliefs.

Judge Tymkovich then rejected the argument that the government has a compelling interest in imposing the mandate. The asserted interests in public health and gender equality are broadly formulated and do not justify refusal to grant exemptions for religious objectors. Moreover, tens of millions of people are already exempt from the mandate because they are insured under grandfathered plans or work for small employers.

Four, but only 4, of the 8 judges also concluded that the individual shareholders have standing to assert claims here as well. The other judges concluded that they need not reach that issue. Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision. AP reports on the decision.

Religious Leaders React To Same-Sex Marriage Decisions

Religion News Service has an extensive compilation of reactions by religious leaders to yesterday's Supreme Court decisions on same-sex marriage. They range from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops statement that "Today is a tragic day for marriage and our nation", to the statement by head of The Episcopal Church's House of Deputies that: "I join with millions of Christians across the country in celebrating today’s Supreme Court rulings that extend equal protection under federal law to all marriages...."

In Broad Win, Small Business Gets Preliminary Injunction Against Required ACA Emergency Contraception Coverage

In Beckwith Electric Company, Inc. v. Sebelius, (MD FL, June 25, 2013), a Florida federal district court granted a for-profit small business and its owner a preliminary injunction barring the government from enforcing the contraceptive coverage mandate to require plaintiffs to cover emergency contraceptives for the company's 168 employees. Plaintiffs claim these operate as abortifacients. Siding with plaintiffs on virtually all issues, the court held both  that corporations have the right to exercise religion under the free exercise clause and RFRA, and that closely held corporations can also assert the free exercise rights of their owners. The court held broadly:

When an individual is acting through an incorporeal form, whether secular or religious, nonprofit or for-profit, incorporated or a partnership, the individual does not shed his right to exercise religion merely because of the "corporate identity" he assumed.

The court also concluded that plaintiffs' religious beliefs are substantially burdened by the mandate:

It is not within the province of the Court to question the soundness or validity of a religious belief; it is enough that plaintiffs say they have the belief.... Plaintiffs are not objecting to the use of emergency contraceptives by Beckwith Electric's employees. Rather, the particular burden to which plaintiffs object is the provision of group insurance premiums that covers emergency contraception.

Finally the court held that the government has not shown it has a compelling interest in enforcing the mandate, both because of the large number of individuals that are exempt from the mandate and because:

there is no empirical data or other evidence... that would support the conclusion that the provision of the FDA-approved emergency contraceptives (in addition to the contraceptives to which plaintiffs do not object) would result in fewer unintended pregnancies, an increased propensity to seek prenatal care, or a lower frequency of risky behavior endangering unborn babies.

The Tampa Tribune reports on the decision. [Thanks to Hillary Byrnes for the lead.]

Analysis of Today's Same-Sex Marriage Decisions-- Installment 3: The Amazing Power of A Decision Based On Standing

In Hollingsworth v. Perry today, the U.S. Supreme Court was able to reach a result which, but for the case's odd procedural posture, would seem impossible.  Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority handed down an opinion which has the effect of re-instituting same-sex marriage in California, but only there.  By avoiding any broader holding, the Court escaped the risk of creating the same kind of religiously-grounded political controversy that has extended for decades after Roe v. Wade. At the same time, it places no barriers in the way of supporters of marriage equality elsewhere who may now litigate the broader constitutional issues. Indeed, as Justice Scalia suggested, in United States v. Windsor the majority opinion gave potent ammunition to proponents of marriage equality who will likely press the constitutional issue if the political process in state legislatures bogs down.

In California, from the beginning state executive officials refused to defend Proposition 8-- a state constitutional amendment adopted by voters through the initiative process.  However when Proposition 8 was challenged in federal district court, the court permitted the official initiative proponents to intervene as defendants.  Reaching the merits, the district court enjoined enforcement of Proposition 8. That placed the initiative proponents in the posture of appellants, and it is that role the U.S. Supreme Court held they could not assume:

We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline to do so for the first time here.

The Supreme Court vacated the 9th Circuit's opinion, remanded the case and instructed the 9th Circuit to dismiss the appeal from the district court for lack of jurisdiction. Thus the district court's opinion invalidating Proposition 8 stands as the operative one on the merits.  The Supreme Court was silent as to whether it was error for the district court to allow initiative proponents to intervene as defendants.  If they had not intervened. presumably the court would still have invalidated Proposition 8 since no one would have been defending it.

Hollingsworth was a 5-4 decision, but with an odd alignment of justices.  The dissent arguing in favor of standing was written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices Thomas, Alito and Sotomayor.  It seems likely that if the Court had reached the merits of the Proposition 8 challenge, these 4 justices would have been equally divided on opposite sides.

The case raises the broader question of when it is appropriate for state officials to refuse to defend the constitutionality of a state law, or a state constitutional provision.  Their oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States presumably obligates them to refuse to defend unconstitutional provisions. However, in states like California with broad initiative provisions, this case suggests a route by which initiatives adopted by popular vote can be effectively eliminated by a legislature and executive who disagree with the initiative.  An opponent of the initiative need merely file a federal lawsuit challenging its constitutionality under federal law, and existing state officials need merely to refuse to defend the initiative's legality. That spectre is reflected in the dissent's observation:

In the end, what the Court fails to grasp or accept is the basic premise of the initiative process. And it is this. The essence of democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government, not the other way around.

Analysis of Today's Same-Sex Marriage Decisions-- Installment 2: What About Section 2 of DOMA?

Today's Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act which provided that same-sex marriages valid under state laws would not be recognized for purposes of federal law.  The majority in its opinion says nothing about Section 2 of DOMA that provides:

No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.

However, can Section 2 escape the majority's broad-brush conclusion that DOMA's "purpose and effect [is] to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity"?  Indeed, it is interesting to note that in most of the passages in which Justice Kennedy attributes discriminatory motivations to Congress, he refers broadly to "DOMA", and not just to Section 3.

Even if Section 2 of DOMA is also unconstitutional, this does not automatically mean that other states must give full faith an credit to same-sex marriages performed elsewhere.  There is a long-standing notion that states need not recognize foreign marriages that violate a strong public policy of the state.  The more difficult question, however, is whether after today's decision, a state's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages from other states can be seen as reflecting a constitutionally permissible strong public policy. Justice Kennedy, in referring to states' interest in defining marriage makes a point of adding that this power is "subject to constitutional guarantees."

To the extent that states are still permitted to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed elsewhere, difficult questions arise, particularly when a same-sex couple moves to a state which refuses to recognize their marriage.  As Justice Scalia suggests in dissent:

Imagine a pair of women who marry in Albany and then move to Alabama, which does not “recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex.”... When the couple files their next federal tax return, may it be a joint one? Which State’s law controls, for federal-law purposes: their State of celebration (which recognizes the marriage) or their State of domicile (which does not)? (Does the answer depend on whether they were just visiting in Albany?) Are these questions to be answered as a matter of federal common law, or perhaps by borrowing a State’s choice-of-law rules?

Must the federal government continue to respect the marriage valid in the state in which it was performed, even though the state in which the couple now lives refuses to do so? That leads to the "two contradictory marriage regimes" applicable to the same marriage that the Court said it was attempting to avoid by its decision today.

Analysis of Today's Same-Sex Marriage Cases-- Installment 1: A Separate Test For LGBT Discrimination?

[This is the first in what will be a series of posts discussing the holdings in today's same-sex marriage cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. This post focuses on the Court's invalidation of Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act.]

In United States v. Windsor today, the Supreme Court in a majority decision by Justice Kennedy held that DOMA's refusal to recognize a New York couple's same-sex marriage under federal law is unconstitutional. One important element of the majority's opinion is the court's continued development of a unique equal protection test for cases involving discrimination against gays and lesbians. The majority said in part:

DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government....  The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group.... The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States....

DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency.... By creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect....

DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.  By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.

As in other cases involving sexual orientation, the Court does not attempt to decide if gays and lesbians fit the traditional "suspect classification" test. Nor does it make fine distinctions regarding the level of scrutiny that must be applied in assessing the government's justifications for its actions. Instead, the majority asks more simply merely whether the legislative body's principal purpose was to harm or discriminate against gays and lesbians. In the past, this kind of "discriminatory purpose" analysis was used primarily in cases involving statutes that were facially neutral but had a disparate impact on a class of individuals. Where, as here, the discrimination was clear, traditionally the analysis was different.  It focused on the government's justification for the disparate treatment. Justice Scalia makes this point in dissent:

even setting aside traditional moral disapproval of same-sex marriage (or indeed same-sex sex), there are many perfectly valid—indeed, downright boring—justifying rationales for this legislation. Their existence ought to be the end of this case. For they give the lie to the Court’s conclusion that only those with hateful hearts could have voted “aye” on this Act....

[The majority] makes only a passing mention of the “arguments put forward” by the Act’s defenders, and does not even trouble to paraphrase or describe them.... I imagine that this is because it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views as they see them...

In the majority’s telling, this story is black-and-white: Hate your neighbor or come along with us. The truth is more complicated. It is hard to admit that one’s political opponents are not monsters, especially in a struggle like this one, and the challenge in the end proves more than today’s Court can handle. Too bad. A reminder that disagreement over something so fundamental as marriage can still be politically legitimate would have been a fit task for what in earlier times was called the judicial temperament. We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising all sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would respect their resolution. We might have let the People decide.

But that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. 

In rejecting an overarching equal protection paradigm, and instead developing separate tests for separate kinds of equal protection cases, the Court follows an earlier history of 1st Amendment free expression jurisprudence. The Court has often attempted to create an overarching 1st Amendment theory-- be it prior restraints, or "clear-and-present danger," or viewpoint neutrality.  However the Court in the end has moved to a Balkanized free expression jurisprudence-- separate tests for subversive speech, obscenity, symbolic expression, defamation, speech in the classroom... and more. We are perhaps witnessing the same development in equal protection cases.

Supreme Court Will Issue Same-Sex Marriage Decisions This Morning [UPDATED-Decisions In]

The Supreme Court in its session that begins at 10:00 am this morning will issue opinions in the two same-sex marriage cases argued earlier this year-- Hollingsworth v. Perry, the challenge to California's Proposition 8, and United States v. Windsor, the challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act. The opinions will be available here on the Supreme Court's website as soon as they are issued. I will post analysis of the decisions on Religion Clause later today. The Wall Street Journal has a preview of the decisions.

UPDATE: In United States v. Windsor today, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the challenge to California's Proposition 8, the Court in a 5-4 decision held that the initiative's proponents lacked standing to appeal the district court's decision declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional. Postings later today will provide analysis of the decisions.

Suit Challenges Display of Crosses On Indiana Riverfront

The ACLU of Indiana announced yesterday that it has filed a lawsuit challenging the decision of the Evansville, Indiana Board of Public Works to allow a Christian church to display 30 eight-foot tall plastic crosses on riverfront public land.  According to AP, the crosses are to be decorated by students in the church's vacation Bible school. The case is Cabral v. City of Evansville, Indiana, (SD IN, filed 6/25/2013).

Another Contraceptive Coverage Mandate Challenge Filed By Small Business

New lawsuits by small for-profit businesses challenging on religious freedom grounds the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive coverage mandate are still being filed.  As reported by the Charleston (WV) Daily Mail, the latest lawsuit was brought in federal court this week by a West Virginia auto dealership and its born-again Christian owner who claim that some of the emergency contraceptives required to be covered are abortifacients. The complaint (full text) in Holland v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, (SD WV, filed 6/24/2013), contends that required coverage for ella and Plan B, along with related counseling, violates plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment and RFRA:

Plaintiffs believe it would violate the Sixth Commandment for them to engage in any manner in the facilitation or endorsement of abortion.

Claiming that the incorporated auto dealership has its own free exercise rights, the complaint alleges:

Holland Chevrolet, as a cognizable legal person, embraces and conducts itself in accordance with the same religious principles that animate its president, chairman of the board, and principal stockholder. In Mr. Holland's view, his right to free exercise of religion should not be limited by the form in which he elects to do business.

Israel's Supreme Court Says Large Grocery Chains Must Close On Saturdays

Israel's Supreme Court yesterday ruled that the municipality of Tel Aviv must enforce the Saturday Sabbath closing laws against two supermarket chains.  According to YNet News, the court, in a case filed by small grocery stores, held that the city must find a way to force the chains to close, and not permit them to continue to merely pay a fine and stay open on the Sabbath.

Jesus Statue On Federal Land Leased To Ski Resort Survives Establishment Clause Challenge

In Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Weber, (D MT, June 24, 2013), a Montana federal district court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the U.S. Forest Service's renewal of  of a Special Use Permit issued to the Knights of Columbus to allow the organization to continue to maintain a statue of Jesus near a ski slope on Montana's Big Mountain. The land, owned by the federal government, is leased to a private ski resort.  The statue was originally placed on Big Mountain in 1954. Patterned after similar statues on ski slopes in Italy, it was intended to mark the memory of those who had died in World War II.  In reaching its conclusion, the court said in part:

Big Mountain Jesus has been the subject of much frivolity over the years.  In addition to serving as a meeting place on the mountain for skiers, and a site for weddings, it has not infrequently been observed adorned with ski poles, goggles, ski hats, mardi gras beads, and other attire, all secular in nature. In fact, frequent repairs have been made to the outstretched hands of Big Mountain Jesus which have been dislodged by passing skiers and snowboarders who have given a "high five" to the statue.

To the extent Big Mountain Jesus may have had some religious significance at the time of its construction by the Knights of Columbus, and may have provided from time to time spiritual inspiration or offense to some, over the course of the last 60 years the statue has become more of an historical landmark and a curiosity.

The Becket fund issued a press release announcing the decision. (See prior related posting.)

Suit Seeks Release of Records of Accused Priests

In Bemidji, Minnesota yesterday, a woman identified only as Jane Doe 4 filed a lawsuit against the Catholic Diocese of Crookston (MN) seeking release of files compiled by the diocese in 2002 listing the names of suspected child sexual abuse offenders.  According to yesterday's Bemidji Pioneer, the plaintiff was abused over 40 years ago when she was 9 years old by priest James Porter. Porter also abused some 20 boys in 1969-70.

Dearborn McDonald's Drop Halal Offerings After Settling Lawsuit

As previously reported, in April McDonald's settled for $700,000 a class action alleging that two of its restaurants in Dearborn, Michigan that advertised Halal chicken sometimes sold non-Halal meat. Now, according to AP, the two restaurants have completely stopped offering Halal products. Plaintiffs' attorney in the case said that this is a positive development, and that there are plenty of Halal options for consumers in Dearborn.

Department of Education To Collect Data On Religious and Sexual Orientation Bullying

The U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights announced this month in a Paperwork Reduction Act Submission that it is expanding its civil rights data collection to include the number of allegations received by schools of bullying/harassment on the basis of religion and sexual orientation. Since 2009, the Department has collected data on bullying on the basis of sex, race, national origin and disability. In justifying the added data collection, the Department said:

The NIH’s Health Behavior in School -Aged Children Survey reported that 8.5% ofstudents (grades 6-10) are bullied about their religion. Another survey found that, of those whohad been subjected to religious slurs and degrading language in school, Jewish and Muslim students were more commonly targeted. Likewise, despite the lack of nationally representative or uniform school-level harassment data, bullying and harassment in educational settings of those perceived to be lesbian, gay or bisexual is reportedly common and has a negative impact on those students.

Today's San Francisco Examiner reports on the change. [Thanks to Michael Lieberman for the lead.]

Suit Challenges State Construction Grants To Religious Higher Education Entities

The ACLU yesterday announced the filing of a state court lawsuit seeking to prevent the state of New Jersey from providing construction grants to two sectarian religious institutions of higher education --an Orthodox Jewish rabbinical school and a Presbyterian seminary. The complaint (full text) in American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Hendricks, (NJ Super. Ct., filed 6/24/2013),  claims that the grants violate three provisions of the New Jersey Constitution that ban taxing to support religious institutions, ban spending government funds on private entities and prohibit the establishment of religion. The suit also claims that in making the grant to the rabbinical school New Jersey is violating the state law against discrimination because it is supporting an all-male institution and thus conferring special benefits on an organization that discriminates on the basis of sex. Beth Medrash Govoha, the rabbinical school, is scheduled to receive a $10.5 million grant for construction of a new library and academic space in an existing building. Princeton Theological Seminary is in line for a much smaller grant, just over $645,000, from technology infrastructure funds. The state legislature has until June 28 to reject the grants proposed by the governor's office.

Supreme Court Defines "Supervisor" For Title VII Workplace Harassment Cases; Causation In Retaliation Cases

Today in Vance v. Ball State University, (Sup. Ct., June 24, 2013), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision clarified who will be considered a "supervisor" in Title VII claims for workplace harassment that creates a discriminatory work environment. Employers may be vicariously liable where the harassment has been by a supervisor rather than by a co-worker. The Court held that an employee is a "supervisor" for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.

In a second Title VII case, University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, (Sup. Ct., June 24, 2013), the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that Title VII retaliation (as opposed to discrimination) claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not by the lessened mixed-motive causation test that applies to discrimination cases under Title VII. Washington Post reports on the decisions.

Supreme Court Agrees To Review Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Law

The U.S. Supreme Court today granted certiorari in McCullen v. Coakley, (Docket No. 12-1168, cert. granted 6/24/2013) (Order List). In the case, the 1st Circuit (full text of 1st Circuit opinion) upheld a Massachusetts law that creates a 35-foot buffer zone around reproductive health care facilities from which demonstrators and sidewalk counselors are excluded. Only employees , emergency workers, persons passing by to other places and persons going to and from the facility are permitted. The Boston Globe reports on the Court's decision to review the case.

Israeli Cabinet Approves Extension of Daylight Savings Time Over Religious Opposition

The Jerusalem Post reported yesterday that Israel's cabinet has approved and sent to the Knesset for passage a bill that would extend daylight savings time until the end of October, conforming the country to the practice in Europe which ends daylight savings time on Nov. 1.  In Israel, daylight savings time has been an issue of contention between religiously observant Jews and the secular Jewish population. (See prior posting.) In the past the country ended daylight savings time in September on the weekend before Yom Kippur to make it easier to observe the 25-hour holy day fast.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Caroline Mala Corbin & Steven Douglas Smith, Debate: The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, (University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online, Vol. 161, No. 261, 2013).
• Michael Brody, Team Prayer in Sports: Why an Action-Based Inquiry into a Coach’s Conduct Should Prevent Courts from Following Borden’s Confusion About the Reasonable Observer, (May 21, 2013).
• Erik James Girvan & Grace M. Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological Case for Abandoning the 'Discriminatory Motive' under Title VII, (Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 60, 1057 (2013)).
• Debbie Psihountas, Richard John Dippel & George Slusarz, Federal Discrimination of Married Same-Sex Couples, (June 18, 2013).
• Máiréad Enright, Preferring the Stranger? Towards an Irish Approach to Muslim Divorce Practice, ((2013) 49 Irish Jurist 65-97).

School Board Settles Claim of Religious Bias In Guidance Counselor Dismissal

Five Towns Patch reported Friday that the Lawrence, New York School District has settled for $145,000 a lawsuit brought by a former school guidance counselor who claimed that he was denied tenure and fired from his $140,000 per year job because school board members, most of whom are Orthodox Jews, thought plaintiff was anti-Orthodox. Based on the settlement, the federal case was closed on June 19. Plaintiff Jay Silverstein, who is Jewish but non-practicing, claimed his dismissal was part of the ongoing tension between Orthodox Jews who took control of the Lawrence school board in 2006 and the community's non-Orthodox residents. (See prior posting.)