First, there was some uncertainty as to how broadly the Court would rule. (See prior posting.) In its actual decision, the Court resolved both the narrow issue of the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction under RFRA, and broader substantive issues of the meaning of RFRA. On the issue of the standard for a preliminary injunction, the Court ruled clearly "that the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial." It is the government's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits at trial. It is not up to the challengers to prove that the government would likely fail at trial.
On the broader issue, the Court made it clear that when RFRA requires the government to show a compelling interest in order to substantially burden a person's exercise of religion; generalized interests are insufficient:
RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the person' -- the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.This does not mean that there can never be a compelling interest in uniformly applying a law to everyone. The Court says that if religious accommodations would seriously compromise the Government's ability to administer a law, that could be a compelling interest. The Court points to cases holding that exemptions to paying Social Security taxes could undermine the tax system, and exemptions to Sunday blue laws could undermine the need for a uniform day of rest. But the Court thought that O Centro was different:
Here the Government's argument for uniformity is different; it rests not so much on the particular statutory program at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a generally applicable law. The Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test, of exceptions to 'rule[s] of general applicability.'This reasoning would seem to extend beyond RFRA and apply also to cases under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
The Court does not totally preclude the possibility that at trial, the Government will eventually be able to carry its burden of showing a compelling interest and that the Controlled Substances Act was the narrowest means of furthering that interest. It seems to particularly leave open that possibility in connection with the government's argument that it had a compelling interest in complying with the 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances. But so far the government has not, in the Court's view, made a persuasive case.
Finally, the Court did not accept the invitation of at least one amicus brief to focus on the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government. The opinion's language, however, suggests that while the Court previously struck down the application of RFRA to the states, it has little doubt about the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal regulations that impinge upon religious practices.
