However on a broader equal protection issue, the court seemed to hold that it is permissible for the government to engage in religious (as well as racial) profiling in its enforcement of the immigration laws. Relying on language from a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court case, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the judge wrote:
This is, of course, an extraordinarily rough and overbroad sort of distinction of which, if applied to citizens, our courts would be highly suspicious. Yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the political branches, "[i]n the exercise of [their] broad power over naturalization and immigration ... regularly make[] rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976);....Today's New York Times reports on the decision, quoting Georgetown law professor David Cole's take on the decision: "What this decision says is the next time there is a terror attack, the government is free to round up every Muslim immigrant in the U.S. based solely on their ethnic and religious identity, and hold them on immigration pretexts for as long as it desires."[Thanks to How Appealing for the case link.]Similarly, I do not believe the plaintiffs’ claims of selective enforcement on the basis of their race and religion provide any cause to depart from the general rule laid out in AADC. In the investigation into the September 11 attacks, the government learned that the attacks had been carried out at the direction of Osama bin Laden, leader of al Queda, a fundamentalist Islamist group; some of the hijackers were in violation of the terms of their visas at the time of the attacks. In the immediate aftermath of these events, when the government had only the barest of information about the hijackers to aid its efforts to prevent further terrorist attacks, it determined to subject to greater scrutiny aliens who shared characteristics with the hijackers, such as violating their visas and national origin and/or religion. Investigating these aliens’ backgrounds prolonged their detention, delaying the date when they would be removed.
As a tool fashioned by the executive branch to ferret out information to prevent additional terrorist attacks, this approach may have been crude, but it was not so irrational or outrageous as to warrant judicial intrusion into an area in which courts have little experience and less expertise.
