Court Analyzes Elements of RLUIPA vs. Free Exercise Claim

A recent decision by Wisconsin federal district judge Barbara Crabb contained an interesting discussion of an issue that presents itself in many religious rights cases brought by prisoners-- the difference between the elements of a free exercise claim and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The case is Perez v. Frank, (WD WI, April 11, 2007), granting a Muslim prisoner summary judgment on claims that various correctional officials violated his rights when they prevented him from attending learning sessions, Friday prayer and group prayer during festivals; prevented him from eating dates during Ramadan and having Halal foods during festivals; and deprived him of a digital Qur'an player. Summary judgment was denied on various other claims. Here is Judge Crabb's analysis:

Although both the free exercise clause and RLUIPA protect religious "exercise," each defines religious exercise in a slightly different way. Under RLUIPA, a "religious exercise" is "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."... In other words, RLUIPA protects individual acts of piety, regardless of their centrality. By contrast, the free exercise clause is concerned with the macrocosm of belief: so long as a believer's ability to freely practice his faith (rather than engage in all possible expressions of his faith) is not substantially burdened, the free exercise clause is not violated (hence the requirement that a belief be "central" before it can fall within the ambit of the free exercise clause....

Despite the technical differences between the types of religious exercise protected by each law, courts frequently fail to differentiate between the central practices protected by the free exercise clause and the wider variety of practices protected by statutes such as RLUIPA. The reason for this is fairly apparent. Courts are poorly positioned to decide which religious practices are "central" to any given faith tradition or any given believer; therefore, increasingly free exercise jurisprudence has emphasized deference to individuals' professed beliefs, so long as there is no reason to doubt their sincerity.....

So what, then, is the practical difference between a free exercise claim and a claim arising under RLUIPA? It appears that the answer is "not much," at least insofar as the "substantial burden" requirement is concerned.

(See prior related posting.)