The court also concluded that under the state's Religious Freedom Act (Sec. 52-571b), the legislature did not intend that construction of a place of worship would constitute "religious exercise" nor did it intend that the non-discriminatory application of land use regulations would be subject to strict scrutiny under the Act. Yesterday's Hartford Courant reports on the decision and the facts behind it. (See prior related posting.) [Thanks to Jeffrey Struski for the lead.]the substantial burden provision of RLUIPA does not apply to neutral and generally applicable land use regulations that are intended to protect the public health and safety, such as those at issue in the present case.....
[T]he provisions of the town’s regulations allowing religious facilities to be built in a residential zone by special exception treat such uses more, not less, favorably than certain other nonresidential uses that are not allowed by special exception. Moreover, although the commission has some discretion to determine whether a proposed specially permitted use is consistent with residential use, the regulations do not grant the commission the discretion to apply the standards differently to religious facilities than it applies them to the other uses allowed by special exception, such as clubs, private schools, seasonal camps, certain public utility buildings, hospitals, sanitary landfills, nurseries and horse boarding stables.
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Thursday, January 31, 2008
Connecticut Supreme Court Rejects Buddhist Temple's RLUIPA Appeal
Yesterday, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Newtown, (CT Sup. Ct., official release date Feb. 12, 2008), upheld the denial of a building permit to a Buddhist Temple. It rejected a RLUIPA and state law challenge to the denial of a special exception sought so the Temple could be built on 10 acres near Newtown (CT). The court held that