Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination by labor unions as well as by employers. In Reed v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, (6th Cir., May 7, 2009), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals faced the question of how to apply to unions the religious accommodation standards it has developed in employer cases. In cases charging an employer with failure to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, the employee must prove a prima facie case by showing he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with an employment requirement that conflicts with his religious beliefs. Only then does the issue of the reasonableness of any accommodation come into play.
In Reed, an employee who had religious objections to union membership was accommodated by allowing him to contribute the full amount of union dues to charity. The employee, however, argued that he should be allowed to contribute to charity $10 per month less-- the smaller amount that equals the agency fee charged by the union in lieu of dues to those who object to the union's political stances. The lead opinion written by Judge Batchelder held that the employee, Jeffrey Reed, had suffered no discipline or adverse employment action other than the accommodation itself. Thus he had not proven a critical element of his claim.
Judge Guy, concurring in the result, concluded that Reed's claim fails because the accommodation offered by the union was reasonable. Judge McKeague, dissenting, argued that Reed had established his prima facie case by showing that he was subjected to adverse employment action. He was required to pay more as a religious objector than he would have had to pay as a secular objector to union membership. Judge McKeague went on to hold that the accommodation offered by the union was unreasonable and discriminatory. [Thanks to Jonathan Adler via Joe Slater for the lead.]
