While I usually refrain from personal commentary on developments, what follows is my initial analysis of yesterday's JFS decision in Britian (--HMF):
Yesterday Britain's new Supreme Court issued a ruling on racial and religious discrimination (see prior posting) whose lessons are broader than so far has generally been suggested. The case involved JFS, a government-funded Jewish school which under British law, as a faith school, is allowed to favor members of the sponsor religion in admissions (but is barred from discriminating on racial grounds).
The nine justices, immersed in a framework in which "religion" is marked by issues of belief and practice, were in a sense bewildered by Jewish religious law that in effect insists that to be Jewish, one must be a member of the Jewish people, either by birth (one's mother was Jewish) or by choice. British law had no good pigeonhole into which to fit this notion of peoplehood. The best it could do was to treat it as "ethnicity," which for purposes of British law meant that a "racial" classification was involved. The Court found it simpler to reach that conclusion because of a 1983 House of Lords decision, Mandla v. Dowell Lee, which created a broad definition of ethnicity to protect a Sikh student who wished to enroll in a non-religious private school, but wanted a waiver of the uniform requirement so he could wear his religiously mandated turban.
At the core of the JFS litigation was a dispute within the Jewish community between Orthodox Jews and Jews who belong to one of the more "liberal" branches of Judaism-- Conservative and Reform in the U.S. (Masorti, Liberal and Reform in Britain). Orthodox rabbis refuse to recognize conversions performed by rabbis from other movements. JFS stuck to the Orthodox position on this issue, and aggrieved parents who felt they were also Jewish went to the civil courts. The Court's decision requires Jewish schools to move to criteria of belief and practice to determine who is Jewish. What happens when a child from a Messianic Jewish family applies for admission? Will the courts again find themselves in the unenviable position of having to decide whether Messianics, who are considered non-Jewish by all streams of conventional Judaism, are Jews because they consider their beliefs to be Jewish? What about members of Humanistic Jewish synagogues who are Jewish by criteria of matrilineal descent, but whose beliefs focus on Jewish identity and culture, not on belief in God?
Second, this decision forces us again to consider what is meant by "race" and "religion." At least in the U.S., we are hesitant to treat race as a biological notion in reaction to our own historical anti-miscegination laws and racial criteria created in Nazi Germany. Instead, contemporary Americans treat race more as a cultural construct. The British courts were faced with a definition of Jewish identity that was at least largely biological. The majority of the Justices seemed unable to conclude that biological criteria could be anything other than racial.
