Friday, February 25, 2011

Refusal To Delay Civil Trail For Plaintiff's Religious Observance Was Abuse of Discretion

In Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, Inc., (MD Ct. App., Feb. 24, 2011), Maryland's Court of Appeals-- the state's highest court-- held that a trial court abused its discretion when it refused to suspend a civil medical malpractice trial for two days when plaintiff and his attorney could not attend because of religious obligations imposed by the Jewish holiday of Shavuot.  During their absence, defendant  put on its entire case in chief. The majority opinion, without reaching constitutional free exercise claims, held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff a reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs to permit him to participate in his trial. While plaintiff had delayed informing the trial court of the scheduling conflict, the majority held that plaintiff was not so untimely as to indicate an utter lack of diligence.

A concurring opinion by Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Murphy, engaged in a lengthy analysis of the free exercise issues involved in the case-- rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim-- while nevertheless saying that the majority was correct in not reaching the constitutional issues.  The concurrence concluded that:
the judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial was the judicial analog to a generally-applicable legislative act, in that there is no evidence in the record from which one could conclude that the judge’s ruling would have been any different if faced with nonreligious justifications for the requested postponement.... Petitioner was free to celebrate Shavuot as he deemed fit; the trial court did not compel his presence in court in violation of the Jewish faith. Accordingly ... I do not think a "substantial burden" was placed upon his Free Exercise rights.
The concurrence went on however to find an abuse of discretion because "the facts in evidence ... do not support the proffered rationales for denying Petitioner's motions to postpone the trial."

A second concurrence by Judge Adkins argues that the court should reach the constitutional issues presented and should conclude that because the trial court's action was neutral and of general applicability, no heightened scrutiny was called for.  She agreed, however, with the majority's analysis of the trial court's abuse of discretion. She added: "I would not address the intriguing issue Judge Harrell raises of whether the Free Exercise clause is 'applicable with equal force to the judicial branch.'" (See prior related posting.) The Baltimore Sun reports on the decision.