A concurring opinion by Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Murphy, engaged in a lengthy analysis of the free exercise issues involved in the case-- rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim-- while nevertheless saying that the majority was correct in not reaching the constitutional issues. The concurrence concluded that:
the judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motions to postpone the trial was the judicial analog to a generally-applicable legislative act, in that there is no evidence in the record from which one could conclude that the judge’s ruling would have been any different if faced with nonreligious justifications for the requested postponement.... Petitioner was free to celebrate Shavuot as he deemed fit; the trial court did not compel his presence in court in violation of the Jewish faith. Accordingly ... I do not think a "substantial burden" was placed upon his Free Exercise rights.The concurrence went on however to find an abuse of discretion because "the facts in evidence ... do not support the proffered rationales for denying Petitioner's motions to postpone the trial."
A second concurrence by Judge Adkins argues that the court should reach the constitutional issues presented and should conclude that because the trial court's action was neutral and of general applicability, no heightened scrutiny was called for. She agreed, however, with the majority's analysis of the trial court's abuse of discretion. She added: "I would not address the intriguing issue Judge Harrell raises of whether the Free Exercise clause is 'applicable with equal force to the judicial branch.'" (See prior related posting.) The Baltimore Sun reports on the decision.