In United States v. Windsor today, the Supreme Court in a majority decision by Justice Kennedy held that DOMA's refusal to recognize a New York couple's same-sex marriage under federal law is unconstitutional. One important element of the majority's opinion is the court's continued development of a unique equal protection test for cases involving discrimination against gays and lesbians. The majority said in part:
DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.... The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group.... The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States....
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency.... By creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect....
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.As in other cases involving sexual orientation, the Court does not attempt to decide if gays and lesbians fit the traditional "suspect classification" test. Nor does it make fine distinctions regarding the level of scrutiny that must be applied in assessing the government's justifications for its actions. Instead, the majority asks more simply merely whether the legislative body's principal purpose was to harm or discriminate against gays and lesbians. In the past, this kind of "discriminatory purpose" analysis was used primarily in cases involving statutes that were facially neutral but had a disparate impact on a class of individuals. Where, as here, the discrimination was clear, traditionally the analysis was different. It focused on the government's justification for the disparate treatment. Justice Scalia makes this point in dissent:
even setting aside traditional moral disapproval of same-sex marriage (or indeed same-sex sex), there are many perfectly valid—indeed, downright boring—justifying rationales for this legislation. Their existence ought to be the end of this case. For they give the lie to the Court’s conclusion that only those with hateful hearts could have voted “aye” on this Act....
[The majority] makes only a passing mention of the “arguments put forward” by the Act’s defenders, and does not even trouble to paraphrase or describe them.... I imagine that this is because it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views as they see them...
In the majority’s telling, this story is black-and-white: Hate your neighbor or come along with us. The truth is more complicated. It is hard to admit that one’s political opponents are not monsters, especially in a struggle like this one, and the challenge in the end proves more than today’s Court can handle. Too bad. A reminder that disagreement over something so fundamental as marriage can still be politically legitimate would have been a fit task for what in earlier times was called the judicial temperament. We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising all sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would respect their resolution. We might have let the People decide.
But that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better.In rejecting an overarching equal protection paradigm, and instead developing separate tests for separate kinds of equal protection cases, the Court follows an earlier history of 1st Amendment free expression jurisprudence. The Court has often attempted to create an overarching 1st Amendment theory-- be it prior restraints, or "clear-and-present danger," or viewpoint neutrality. However the Court in the end has moved to a Balkanized free expression jurisprudence-- separate tests for subversive speech, obscenity, symbolic expression, defamation, speech in the classroom... and more. We are perhaps witnessing the same development in equal protection cases.
