We imagine that what the university wants is an order forbidding Aetna and Meritain to provide any contraceptive coverage to Notre Dame staff or students pending final judgment in the district court. But we can’t issue such an order; neither Aetna nor Meritain is a defendant (the university’s failure to join them as defendants puzzles us)..... Furthermore, while a religious institution has a broad immunity from being required to engage in acts that violate the tenets of its faith, it has no right to prevent other institutions, whether the government or a health insurance company, from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution..
If the government is entitled to require that female contraceptives be provided to women free of charge, we have trouble understanding how signing the form that declares Notre Dame’s authorized refusal to pay for contraceptives for its students or staff, and mailing the authorization document to those companies, which under federal law are obligated to pick up the tab, could be thought to “trigger” the provision of female contraceptives....
The novelty of Notre Dame’s claim—not for the exemption, which it has, but for the right to have it without having to ask for it—deserves emphasis. United States law and public policy have a history of accommodating religious beliefs.... What makes this case and others like it involving the contraception exemption paradoxical and virtually unprecedented is that the beneficiaries of the religious exemption are claiming that the exemption process itself imposes a substantial burden on their religious faiths. The closest analogues we have found are cases in which churches seeking rezoning or variances claim that the process for obtaining permission is so cumbersome as to constitute a substantial burden on religious practice....
The process of claiming one’s exemption from the duty to provide contraceptive coverage is the opposite of cumbersome. It amounts to signing one’s name and mailing the signed form to two addresses. Notre Dame may consider the process a substantial burden, but substantiality—like compelling governmental interest—is for the court to decide.The majority also rejected Notre Dame's establishment clause challenge, and left its free speech challenge for further development in the district court.
Judge Flaum dissenting said in part:
Having to submit the EBSA Form 700, Notre Dame maintains, makes it “complicit in a grave moral wrong” by involving it with a system that delivers contraceptive products and services to its employees and students.
The majority has trouble accepting this position, in part due to the university’s statement that its signature will “trigger” contraceptive coverage, because the majority understands federal law to require contraceptive coverage regardless of what Notre Dame signs or does not sign.... Yet we are judges, not moral philosophers or theologians; this is not a question of legal causation but of religious faith. Notre Dame tells us that Catholic doctrine prohibits the action that the government requires it to take. So long as that belief is sincerely held, I believe we should defer to Notre Dame’s understanding.Wall Street Journal reports on the decision.