In Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., (KY Sup. Ct., Feb. 16, 2023), the Kentucky Supreme Court considered challenges by abortion providers to two Kentucky statutes banning abortions. The "trigger ban" prohibits all abortions, except when necessary to preserve the life of the mother or prevent permanent impairment of a life-sustaining organ. The "heartbeat ban" bars abortions after there is a detectable human heartbeat, with a similar exception for preserving the life of the mother or preventing irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of both laws. The state Court of Appeals granted emergency relief and dissolved the injunction, and then transferred the case to the state Supreme Court. In this opinion, the state Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals dissolution of the injunction, holding that abortion providers lack third-party standing to challenge the laws on behalf of their patients. However, they held that abortion providers do have standing to challenge the "trigger ban" on their own behalf, and remanded the case to the trial court on that issue. Justice Lambert, joined by Justice Conley, said in part:
[T]he abortion providers’ arguments that the trigger ban improperly delegates legislative authority and that becomes effective on the authority of an entity other than the General Assembly remain live issues. If the abortion providers were to receive a favorable ruling on those issues, the statute would be invalidated if the offending enactment provision could not be severed. This in turn would provide the abortion providers with the relief they seek, satisfying the redressability prong of constitutional standing.
However, although the abortion providers have constitutional standing to challenge the trigger ban on the foregoing two grounds, they made no arguments concerning their own rights in relation to the heartbeat ban. Their only assertion against the heartbeat ban was that it violated their patients’ constitutional rights to privacy and self-determination....
[T]he personal harm asserted by the abortion providers, the harm to their business, is not considered an irreparable injury for the purposes issuing a temporary injunction.
The circuit court also erred when balancing the equities involved....
To be clear, this opinion does not in any way determine whether the Kentucky Constitution protects or does not protect the right to receive an abortion, as no appropriate party to raise that issue is before us. Nothing in this opinion shall be construed to prevent an appropriate party from filing suit at a later date....
This matter is accordingly remanded to the circuit court for the determination of the first-party constitutional claims of the abortion providers as to the trigger ban. Specifically, whether the trigger ban was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority in violation of Sections 27, 28, and 29 of the Kentucky Constitution and if the trigger ban became effective upon the authority of an entity other than the General Assembly in violation of Section 60 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Chief Justice VanMeter concurred only in the result.
Four other Justices each filed separate opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Bisig, joined by Justice Keller, said in part:
Thus, while I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have first-party standing to challenge the Trigger Ban and with their recognition of third-party standing for purposes of Kentucky law, I respectfully dissent from the remainder of their Opinion. I would reverse the Court of Appeals, affirm the trial court, and direct reinstatement of the temporary injunction....
Because the statutes infringe upon a pregnant patient’s fundamental rights to pursue safety and to self-determination and are likely not sufficiently narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest, I would hold that EMG presented a substantial question on the merits of the case below.
Justice Keller, joined by Justics Bisig, concurred in part, saying in part:
I concur with the Majority’s holding that the physicians have first-party standing to assert their claims in the case at bar. However, I dissent from the remainder of the Majority’s Opinion. Further, I join Justice Bisig’s separate opinion, as I also believe that the physicians have third-party standing to assert the claims of their patients and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the temporary injunction.
Nickell, J. concurred in part and dissented in part, saying in part:
I concur with the view that the trial court abused its discretion by enjoining the enforcement of the abortion bans. However, I respectfully dissent from any conclusion that Appellees have first-party standing or third-party standing to assert this pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. There should not be one set of procedural rules for abortion providers and another for everyone else.
Thompson, J. concurred in part, saying in part:
I concur in the majority opinion that first party standing was established for the abortion providers and dissent from its conclusion that they lacked third party standing. I believe we should err on the side of finding standing when at all possible, so that parties can gain needed review.
Accordingly, I urge the trial court to fully exercise its authority on remand by freely allowing intervention by all interested parties so that first party standing may be established for all issues....
Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the decision. CNN reports on the decision.