In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, (5th Cir., Feb. 5, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, by a vote of 11-6, denied an en banc rehearing in a RLUIPA suit seeking damages from officials in their individual capacities. Judge Clement, joined by 8 other judges, filed an opinion concurring in the denial, saying in part:
Officials at the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center knowingly violated Damon Landor’s rights in a stark and egregious manner, literally throwing in the trash our opinion holding that Louisiana’s policy of cutting Rastafarians’ hair violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act before pinning Landor down and shaving his head. Landor clearly suffered a grave legal wrong. The question is whether a damages remedy is available to him under RLUIPA. That is a question only the Supreme Court can answer.
Judge Ho, joined by Judge Elrod, filed a dissent to the denial. Judge Oldham, joined in whole or part by 5 other judges, also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
The panel held RLUIPA does not allow prisoners to sue state prison officials in their individual capacities for money damages. With all due respect to my esteemed and learned colleagues, that result cannot be squared with Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020). Tanzin held that individuals can sue for money damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). The operative provisions of RFRA and RLUIPA are in haec verba, and both the Supreme Court and ours routinely interpret the statutes in parallel. Today, unfortunately for Landor, our court pits the statutes against one another. I respectfully dissent.
