In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.
The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.
Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:
Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community. Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.” In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel. With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same: the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.
Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part:
In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception. Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....
Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case. But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself. The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.
Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.
