South African Appeals Court Says Minister Must Arbitrate Dispute With Church

In De Lange v. Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, (S, Afr. Sup. Ct, App., Sept. 29, 2014), the South African Supreme Court of Appeal refused to set aside an arbitration agreement under which a minister was required to arbitrate her dispute with the church that suspended her as a minister after she announced she would enter a same-sex civil union.  The court said in part:

As the main dispute in the instant matter concerns the internal rules adopted by the Church, such a dispute, as far as is possible, should be left to the Church to be determined domestically and without interference from a court. A court should only become involved in a dispute of this kind where it is strictly necessary for it to do so. Even then it should refrain from determining doctrinal issues in order to avoid entanglement. It would thus seem that a proper respect for freedom of religion precludes our courts from pronouncing on matters of religious doctrine, which fall within the exclusive realm of the Church.

The court also issued a press release describing its decision.  IOL News reports on the decision.

Dispute Over Suspension of Methodist Bishop Dismissed As Ecclesiastical Dispute

In Clark v. Moore, (SC Sup. Ct., Aug. 20 2014), the South Carolina Supreme Court in an unpublished (i.e. non-precedential) decision dismissed a suit growing out of a dispute between the Bishop of the Reformed Methodist Union Episcopal Church (RMUE) and the Church's General Officers.  The General Officers suspended Moore as bishop after finding that he had stolen Church funds.  Bishop Moore disputed their authority, removed the General Officers and cancelled the election for bishop that had been scheduled.  The Court dismissed the suit because it is "an ongoing ecclesiastical dispute which cannot be resolved by neutral principles of law."  Chief Justice Tole filed a concurring opinion urging that the case be remanded to the lower court for further factual findings on which party is the highest decision-making body of the RMUE so that the Court could then defer to its decision.

Dispute Over Authority To Fire Minister Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Anderson v. Truelove, (TX App., July 31, 2014), a Texas appellate court invoked the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to dismiss a lawsuit brought by Jamall Anderson, the minister of a small 16-member church.  At issue was whether two members who claimed to be a majority of the trustees of the church could dismiss Anderson as minister for taking church funds in order to pay expenses for his sick mother. Two meetings of members-- called without the required days advance notice-- had agreed to forgive Anderson and retain him. The court held that it could not apply the neutral principles approach to decide the dispute because the church's bylaws do not contain any provisions regarding removal of the minister.

British Supreme Court: Civil Courts May Decide Religious Doctrine To Settle Legal Disputes

In Shergill & Ors v Khaira & Ors, (UK Sup. Ct., June 11, 2014) the United Kingdom Supreme Court held that British courts should not treat religious disputes as non-justiciable "where the determination of the dispute is necessary in order to decide a matter of disputed legal right...."  The case involves a dispute over who are the proper trustees in three Sikh temples and the powers which trustees may exercise.  The Supreme Court held in part:

... courts do not adjudicate on the truth of religious beliefs or on the validity of particular rites. But where a claimant asks the court to enforce private rights and obligations which depend on religious issues, the judge may have to determine such religious issues as are capable of objective ascertainment. The court addresses questions of religious belief and practice where its jurisdiction is invoked either to enforce the contractual rights of members of a community against other members or its governing body or to ensure that property held on trust is used for the purposes of the trust....

... the court may have to adjudicate upon matters of religious doctrine and practice in order to determine who are the trustees entitled to administer the trusts. Subject to further amendment of the parties’ cases, the question whether Sant Jeet Singh has power to appoint and dismiss trustees may depend on issues such as (i) what are the fundamental tenets of the First Holy Saint and the Nirmal sect, (ii) what is the nature of the institution at Nirmal Kutia in India, (iii) what steps or formalities were needed for a person to become the successor of the First Holy Saint, and (iv) in relation to the fourth issue whether the teachings and personal qualities of Sant Jeet Singh comply with the fundamental religious aims and purposes of the trust....

[Thanks to Law & Religion UK for the lead.]

Korean Court Says It Cannot Review Church Disciplinary Actions

Inside Korea reports that last Friday, a Korean appellate court held that civil courts cannot review church disciplinary actions. The Seoul High Court dismissed a suit by a former priest, identified only as Kim, who was suspended in 2005 after allegedly embezzling funds of the Samsungsan Cathedral.  He was defrocked after he filed civil suits against the Cathedral in protest of his suspension. The court said in part:

Our Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion and strictly separates the church and state. The freedom of managing and organizing religious councils must be provided for to the utmost.

Separately Kim is facing criminal charges over misappropriation of $74,000 in Cathedral funds.

Defamation Claim Between Hindu Temple Members Dismissed

In Thiagarajan v. Tadepalli, (TX App., April 30, 2014), a three-judge panel of the Texas Court of Appeals dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine both a defamation action against the secretary of the board of directors of a Hindu temple, and (by a 2-1 vote) a claim by the secretary against the Temple for indemnification for the costs of defending the action.  At issue were the alleged defamatory content of e-mails sent out by Sharma Tadepalli objecting to the DVDs available for purchase or rental from the Temple's library.  Thiagarajan, plaintiff in the defamation action, oversaw operation of the temple’s library.  Tadepalli claimed that some of the DVDs were non-religious and included X-rated Indian movies. The court held:

allowing Thiagarajan’s defamation claim to proceed unavoidably would lead a civil court into the forbidden territory of litigating “‘conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.... Subject matter jurisdiction is foreclosed when defamation claims are bound up with ecclesiastical implications such as those present in this case.

The majority also concluded that:

Having pleaded that MTS [the Temple] should indemnify him precisely because the statements at issue “concerned  matters related to the conduct and governance of MTS and to other ecclesiastical matters,” Tadepalli cannot plausibly contend that a determination as to whether MTS should indemnify him nonetheless will avoid determination of “ecclesiastical matters.”

A concurring and dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Frost agreed that the defamation claim should be dismissed, but argued that the claim for indemnification can be decided using neutral principles of law and without resolving religious controversies.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Leads To Dismissal of Suit Over Church's Board

In Ivanov v. Notzkov, 2014 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 577 (IL App., March 25, 2014), an Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's reliance on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in dismissing a lawsuit  between two factions of St. John of Rila Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church.  The court refused to order a membership meeting to elect a new board, relying on the trial court's findings that St. John's is governed by the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church which gave the parish priest and archbishop authority to determine who are members in good standing that may vote in an election for the church's board. The trial court had concluded that passing on plaintiffs' claim that the clergy did not have the power to appoint members to the board of trustees would require it to decide matters of religious doctrine and polity.

Trial Court Erred In Allowing Police To Remove Pastor At Request of Dissident Group

As reported by the Colorado Springs Gazette, in St. John’s Baptist Church Governing Body v. Sutton a Colorado state court of appeals on Thursday held that a state trial court judge acted improperly when he issued an order allowing police to remove a pastor from his pulpit.  The order came at the request of a dissident group in St. John's Baptist Church which formed a separate Governing Board in 2011 and ordered the pastor out. The Court of Appeals said in part:

The [trial] court made a decision regarding ecclesiastical internal governance and organization; it determined for the church who represented its interest, a governing decision belonging only to the church.

The Court of Appeals said that ownership of the church's property should be determined by the trial court through an examination of  deeds, articles of incorporation, bylaws and other documents. (Note: because of policies of the Colorado Court of Appeals, the full text of its unpublished opinions may not be posted on any electronic database.)

Court Dismisses Pastor's Contract Claim On 1st Amendment Grounds

In Reese v. General Assembly of Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in America, (TX App., March 14, 2014), a Texas appellate court dismissed on 1st Amendment grounds a lawsuit brought by a pastor who was fired less than two years into his 5-year employment contract with a Presbyterian congregation.  Pastor Charles Reese sued the church for damages alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court said in part:

To determine the efficacy of his claims, the courts would have to decide whether the termination of his employment was wrongful or premature. The free exercise clause of the Constitution prohibits the courts from reviewing employment decisions regarding ministers....

Here, if the Court were to second guess the Church’s decision to terminate Reese it would deprive the Church of its right “to shape its own faith and mission” by “imposing an unwanted minister.” Further, Reese is seeking damages nearly identical to those sought by the respondent in Hosanna-Tabor. As such, any monetary award by the Court would “operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister.” Clearly, failure to extend the crux of Hosanna-Tabor to the instant case would result in the untenable consequence of the Court establishing religion and preventing the free exercise thereof in violation of the First Amendment.

Ohio Appeals Court: Congregants' Claims For Accounting for Church Funds Properly Dismissed

Smith v. White, (OH App., Jan. 17, 2014) is a suit by 36 members of the Mt. Carmel Baptist Missionary Church (including deacons and trustees) charging the pastor with breach of fiduciary duty and charging the pastor along with other church officials with conversion; civil conspiracy; unjust enrichment; fraud; and breach of contract. The suit alleged  wrongful concealment of the misappropriation of church funds, including those in the pastor's retirement account, and sought an accounting. In this opinion by an Ohio appellate court the majority affirmed the trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims because of 1st Amendment considerations, saying:

Although we have some doubt that a request for an accounting of finances necessarily implicates whether a pastor should be removed for misconduct, we are required to follow our prior decision on the basis of stare decisis, which “is designed to provide continuity and predictability in our legal system.” ...Matters of ecclesiastical abstention are often not clear-cut, and the depositions of the parties (although not cited by the trial court) do indicate a desire to remove the pastor – which implicates an ecclesiastical decision.

The majority also refused to apply a fraud or collusion exception, and concluded as well that plaintiffs had failed to follow internal church procedures to deal with their complaints.

Judge Froelich dissented in part concluding that the court should hear the claims for fraud and for an accounting because "an accounting and whether certain defendants subjectively sought to defraud the plaintiffs are impartial, objective concepts, detached from any ecclesiastical concerns."