Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Leads to Dismissal of Church Property Dispute

In Atlantic Korean American Presbytery v. Shalom Presbyterian Church of Washington, Inc., (VA App., March 11, 2025), a Virginia state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred civil courts from hearing a church property dispute where the church involved had previously invoked jurisdiction of the Presbyterian Church Synod in the church's controversy with the Korean American Presbytery. The church went to a civil court only when it was unhappy with the Synod's ruling. At issue was whether the church's property was held in trust for either of the church's parent bodies-- the Atlantic Korean American Presbytery or the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.  The court said in part:

AKAP asserts that because the PCUSA Synod previously adjudicated part of this dispute after Shalom invoked the Synod’s authority to prevent AKAP from assuming control of its assets, Shalom’s decision to seek a decision from the PCUSA Synod deprived the circuit court (and by extension, this Court) of jurisdiction to hear the matter.  Since we find the Synod’s decision deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction to hear this matter under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, we agree that the circuit court could not reach this matter because it lacked jurisdiction even to hear Shalom’s claim as pleaded. ...

By filing the instant complaint in the circuit court, Shalom is collaterally attacking the decision of the PCUSA’s Synod, whose jurisdiction Shalom had previously submitted to before ever initiating the current civil litigation.  Moreover, when initiating its opposition to AKAP’s attempt to seize control over its assets and operations by an Administrative Commission, Shalom filed an ecclesiastical complaint before the Synod while asserting standing to do so as a member of PCUSA and, thus, per PCUSA’s Book of Order, stating it was also a member of AKAP.  When the Synod subsequently denied their ecclesiastical complaint, instead of appealing that decision to the PCUSA General Assembly, Shalom “terminated [its] connection” with AKAP, and filed a civil complaint in the circuit court that sought a declaration that Shalom was not a member of AKAP.  And this complaint did not assert that the Synod’s decision was fraught with fraud or collusion.  Hence, by filing this civil complaint, Shalom effectively collaterally attacked the Synod’s decision (instead of appealing it) and entirely reversed the position it took on its PCUSA membership status before the ecclesiastical tribunal....  For us to find it permissible for Shalom to undertake a litigation strategy of first filing an ecclesiastical complaint in the ecclesiastical bodies of the Presbyterian Church USA, and then, instead of appealing an adverse judgment within that forum—immediately filing a civil complaint in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County to attack the judgment of the Synod—would violate both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States Constitution.

The court's 43-page opinion includes a lengthy review of the development of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Virginia.

Civil Courts Can Decide Dispute Over Catholic Organization's Bylaws

In Foundation for the Advancement of Catholic Schools, Inc. v. Blair, (CT App., Feb. 25, 2025), a Connecticut state appellate court held that a controversy over interpretation of the Foundation's bylaws can be adjudicated by civil courts.  At issue is whether under the Foundation's bylaws, the archbishop can appoint Board members who are not nominated by the Foundation's Governance Committee. The court said in part:

We need not decide whether FACS is a religious organization because, even if we assume, without deciding, that it qualifies as such, we conclude that the claims raised in the plaintiffs’ action can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law.....

We ...must review the plaintiffs’ requested relief and the relevant language of FACS’ bylaws to determine whether resolving this dispute requires an inquiry into purely ecclesiastical questions of religious doctrine or practice or the governance, administration or policies of a church....

Read plainly, the relevant language in the bylaws concerning the procedure for appointments to the board is entirely secular and cannot reasonably be interpreted as implicating issues of religious doctrine or practice or of church government, policy or administration. Put another way, nothing in the pertinent bylaw provision indicates that an analysis of the claims raised by the plaintiffs would require a court to go beyond the secular legal principles governing corporations and the interpretation of bylaws and to resolve impermissible ecclesiastical issues....

Indeed, the defendants concede that the plaintiffs’ claims do not require resolution of doctrinal issues but argue, nonetheless, that because of the archbishop’s status in the [Archdiocese of Hartford], he exercises his ‘‘religious discretion’’ when making decisions as to board appointments, which constitutes a matter of church governance and the governance of a presumably religious organization that a civil court cannot review. This argument fails because the dispositive question is whether the bylaws authorize the board to limit the universe of individuals who may be appointed to the board by the archbishop to only those individuals submitted for nomination by the committee. That question can be determined by applying secular legal principles.

Title VII Applies to Liberty University's Firing of Transgender Employee

In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, Feb. 21, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. In an extensively reasoned 70-page opinion, the court rejected several defenses asserted by the University. First the University contended that §§702 and 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of transgender status when that is consistent with the employer’s religious belief. Those section allow a religious employer to discriminate "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." The court said in part:

Having determined that no source of law—from statutory text to legislative history to precedent—answers the question before us, the Court is left to weigh the imperfect arguments above, alongside the potential legal and social consequences of our decision. Drawing upon all of these considerations, we conclude that Sections 702 and 703 must be narrowly construed so as to permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s espoused religious belief or practice, such that religious employers have no license to discriminate on the basis of any other protected class. Where a religious employer discriminates on the basis of any other protected class in a but-for fashion, a statutory violation occurs, even if the decision was religiously motivated....

To decide that sex discrimination is acceptable so long as it is religiously motivated would allow employers to achieve all manner of discrimination under the banner of religion. So long as the religious institution can show that its view—despite directly implicating sex, race, or national origin—is a sincerely held religious belief, the religious institution would have free license to discriminate at will and evade the scrutiny of civil law. Not only would this subject potentially thousands of people to discrimination..., but it would supply religious institutions with a power not afforded to secular institutions, thereby generating favorites under the law and raising Establishment Clause questions....

The court also rejected the University's RFRA defense, concluding first that RFRA applies only to suits in which the government is a party. It added:

And even if Liberty were entitled to raise RFRA as a defense, we find that Title VII likely passes strict scrutiny....

On the record before us, enforcing this statute in Zinksi’s case merely requires Liberty to maintain an employee who has not followed the university’s Doctrinal Statement to the letter, i.e., an employee who has sinned. It does not require Liberty to change its belief, to endorse Zinksi’s behavior, or to allow Zinksi to spread a new message within the organization.... The minimal inroad on religious liberty here is easily justified by the exceedingly compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we find that Liberty’s brief argument as to burden is insufficient to show substantial burden at this stage of litigation. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply, and our analysis can come to an end.....

The court rejected the ministerial exception defense, saying in part that "nothing in the record suggests that Zinski was a minister." The court also rejected the University's freedom of expressive association claim, saying in part:

... [W]e must defer Liberty’s claim that it opposes transgender identification and seeks to avoid any promotion of transgender status as an appropriate form of behavior. However,... we cannot conclude that Zinksi’s presence at Liberty would “force the organization to send a message” that Liberty accepts transgender conduct as a “legitimate form of behavior.”... Zinksi is an IT employee who has limited to no interactions with students, has no role in influencing or promoting Liberty’s value system, and has no role in Liberty’s religious curriculum or programming. The only inference that we can draw for Liberty is that Liberty may be seen as a hypocrite for employing a transgender person when it opposes transgender identity; but the same could be said for Liberty’s employment of any other type of person who “sins” despite Liberty’s opposition to sin in general....

Finally, the court rejected the University's ecclesiastical abstention defense, saying in part:

Zinski’s complaint asks the Court to determine whether Title VII prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution, like Liberty, has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law and must be fired.

9th Circuit En Banc Affirms Dismissal of James Huntsman's Fraud Claims Against LDS Church

In Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (9th Cir., Jan. 31, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a fraud claim brought by James Huntsman, a prominent former member of and large contributor to the LDS Church.  Huntsman charged the Church with fraudulently misrepresenting the manner in which funds from tithes would be used, saying that that the Church falsely represented that the funds would not be used for commercial projects. The en banc court said in part:

No reasonable juror could conclude that the Church misrepresented the source of funds for the City Creek project.  Although the Church stated that no tithing funds would be used to fund City Creek, it also clarified that earnings on invested reserve funds would be used....

Huntsman’s claim with respect to the $600 million allegedly transferred to Beneficial Life also fails.  Huntsman does not identify any specific statements made by the Church about the source of funds for Beneficial Life....

Because nothing in our analysis of Huntsman’s fraud claims delves into matters of Church doctrine or policy, our decision in this case does not run afoul of the church autonomy doctrine.

Judge Bress, joined by Judges Smith and Nguyen and in part by Judge Vandyke, concurred in the judgment saying in part:

... [W]e should not indulge in the illusion that this is merely a secular lawsuit about civil fraud.  Under the First Amendment, the plaintiff’s challenge to the Church’s understanding of tithing is not susceptible to resolution in a court of law, lest the judiciary wrest control from religious authorities over matters of theological concern.  

It would have been straightforward and preferable for the court to recognize that plaintiff’s unprecedented theory encounters overwhelming First Amendment impediments.  While every judge on this panel agrees that the plaintiff’s claims fail, I write separately to explain why a suit like this could never succeed under the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine. 

Judge Bumatay filed an opinion concurring in the judgement, saying in part:

In deciding religious matters, the Constitution strictly limits our authority.  Simply put, the church autonomy doctrine bars federal courts from resolving matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.  So we can’t just sidestep the doctrine and jump straight to the merits.  Nor can the doctrine be assumed away, considered an afterthought, or serve as a convenient alternative ruling.  Rather, it’s a threshold structural bar that must be reckoned with.  Otherwise, we violate the restraints the Constitution places on our power.

Negligence Claim Against Army Chaplain Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Winder v. United States, (ND TX, Jan. 17, 2025), a Texas federal district court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires dismissal of a negligence lawsuit filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act growing out of advice given by an Army Chaplain.  The Chaplain was consulted by Latrisha Winder, an Army National Guard member, about her husband's suicide threat which her husband conveyed by phone to her from Texas while she was in Virginia. The Chaplain advised Winder to have local law enforcement conduct a welfare check. When Ms. Winder objected, the Chaplain threatened to call local law enforcement himself if she did not.  This led Ms. Winder to call law enforcement. The welfare check led to a confrontation and to the fatal shooting of Winder's husband by a sheriff's deputy conducting the check. The court said in part:

Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, this action is not "simply a civil dispute in which a religious official happens to be involved." Based on the Complaint's allegations and its reference to Army regulations and training materials, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that this action "entails[] no inquiry into [the Chaplain's] religious doctrine."...

Plaintiffs argue the Chaplain threatened to breach his duty of confidentiality by telling Latrisha "he would call law enforcement if she did not call," which they contend "is wholly secular and a neutral principle that the Court can apply without inquiring into and applying [the Chaplain's] religious training, faith, and beliefs."...

The existence of this tension—whether the Chaplain's duty of confidentiality is religious or secular in nature—is precisely why free exercise principles mandate the Court abstain from adjudication here. Indeed, "[i]t is a core tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that, in resolving civil claims, courts must be careful not to intrude upon internal matters of" religious doctrine.... It is not for the Court to adjudicate, or even question, the Chaplain's duty of confidentiality, given that Plaintiffs have admitted, and Army regulations make clear, there is a religious component to this inquiry.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply To Pastor's Defamation Suit

In Garner v. Southern Baptist Convention, (TN App., Jan. 8. 2025), a Tennessee state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to a defamation suit brought by a Baptist pastor against the Southern Baptist Convention and various of its officials and staff. At issue are oral conversations and a letter from an SBC staff member suggesting that allegations of sexual misconduct had been made against Preston Garner, a pastor at Everett Hills Baptist Church. The court said in part:

The conduct at issue is the Appellants’ purported publication of written and oral statements that Mr. Garner was “an individual with an alleged history of abuse” and that the allegation was credible, while failing to also state that “the allegation[ was] made through an anonymous online portal” and that the Appellants “had not made any inquiry into the veracity of the anonymous report, or that no evidence supported the anonymous report.”  ... [T]he Appellants in this case have not raised any argument that their conduct resulted from the application or interpretation of any religious canon.  Moreover, any argument by the Appellants that the Letter was sent as part of a pastoral disciplinary process is undercut by the concession of the SBC and the Credentials Committee that “[t]he Credentials Committee does not ‘investigate what occurred or judge the culpability of an accused individual,’ but rather only reviews ‘how the SBC church responded to sexual abuse allegations and make[s] recommendations as to whether those actions or inactions are consistent with the SBC’s beliefs regarding sexual abuse.’”

... [C]onsidering the Garners’ claims will not require the trial court to resolve any religious disputes or to rely on religious doctrine. 

The court also concluded that the Tennessee Public Participation Act applies to the lawsuit, but that plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof needed to avoid early dismissal of the case.

Church's Claims Against Parent Body Can Largely Be Decided on Neutral Principles of Secular Law

 In Fifth Avenue United Methodist Church of Wilmington v. North Carolina Conference, Southeastern Jurisdiction, of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (NC App., Dec. 31, 2024), a North Carolina appellate court, in a 2-1 decision, held that the trial court had improperly dismissed a number of claims by a church whose parent body closed its down and seized its property while the church was seeking to disaffiliate from the parent body. The majority said in part:

... Fifth Avenue contends that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider its property and trust claims because there remains a genuine, secular question of whether it was in a connectional relationship with the UMC concerning the Property.  Fifth Avenue maintains as such because none of the deeds pertaining to the Property refer to the trust clauses contained in the BOD [Book of Discipline], “save one green space parcel conveyed in 1986.”  After carefully considering our precedents resolving similar disputes, we agree....

Fifth Avenue next argues that even if the Property is subject to a trust under the BOD, the trial court erred in dismissing its claim arising from its right to disaffiliate and retain the Property free of the trust clause under paragraph 2553.  Fifth Avenue contends that its breach of contract claim survives dismissal at this stage because it does not require a determination of ecclesiastical issues and can be settled by neutral principles of contract law.  Fifth Avenue maintains that Defendants failed to follow the disaffiliation procedures set out in paragraph 2553 by not allowing a church conference vote within 120 days...  [W]e agree and hold that the trial court committed error by dismissing Fifth Avenue’s breach of contract claim because determining whether Defendants “acted within the scope of their authority” and “observed the organization’s own organic forms and rules is founded in neutral principles of secular law.” ...

Fifth Avenue next submits that the trial court committed error by dismissing its claims for fraud and constructive fraud because they do not require the court to examine or determine ecclesiastical issues.  More precisely, Fifth Avenue contends that whether Defendants colluded to take the Property “under the guise of legitimate action can be determined without delving into the validity of the reasons” provided for closure.  After scrutinizing the record and applicable law, we agree....

 Judge Arrowood filed an opinion dissenting from much of the majority's holdings, saying in part:

I believe the trial court is permitted to assess whether Fifth Avenue is contractually entitled to disaffiliate following closure, as this can be decided under neutral principles of law.  However, I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion.  I believe the First Amendment church doctrine warrants dismissal of Fifth Avenue’s claims apart from the breach of contract claim and would affirm the trial court’s judgment in those respects.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Pastor's Allegations of Sham Investigation to Oust Him

 In Weems v. Association of Related Churches, (MD FL, Dec. 19, 2024), a Florida federal district court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a suit alleging tortious interference and conspiracy brought by Charles Weems, the former senior pastor and co-founder of Celebration Church and by his wife, the other co-founder. Plaintiffs allege that defendants hatched a plan to oust him as senior pastor because his vision for the church would lead to reduced financial contributions to defendant's church planting activities. Weems alleged that, based on manufactured evidence, the church initiated a sham investigation of him to determine if he had engaged in improper financial practices and had failed to fulfill his duties as Senior Pastor. Targeting of Weems eventually led to his resigning. The court said in part:

... [W]hile Plaintiffs frame their claims as tortious interference and conspiracy, these claims cannot be decided without resolving whether Celebration Church investigated Pastor Weems for legitimate religious reasons, or because of the tortious conduct of Defendants.... Such an inquiry would result in the Court entangling itself in matters of “theological controversy, church discipline, [and] ecclesiastical government,” which the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine squarely prohibits....

Suit Against Church for Negligent Retention of Pastor Can Move Ahead

 In Exum v. St. Andrews-Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc., (NC App, Nov. 19, 2024), a North Carolina state appellate court held that claims for negligent retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty brought against a church do not need to be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because they can be decided using neutral principles of law. Plaintiff and his wife attended St. Andrews-Covenant Church.  The church's pastor, Derek Macleod, entered a romantic relationship with plaintiff's wife. After plaintiff and his wife were divorced, Plaintiff sued the church and its parent bodies. The court said in part:

Exum alleges that St. Andrews-Covenant was negligent in allowing Macleod’s tortious conduct to occur because St. Andrews-Covenant knew or should have known that Macleod had engaged in similar misconduct in his capacity as a church leader in prior roles. ...

 “[T]here is no necessity for th[is] [C]ourt to interpret or weigh church doctrine in its adjudication of” Exum’s claims premised on alleged negligence in placing and retaining Macleod at St. Andrews-Covenant....  “It follows that the First Amendment is not implicated and does not bar” Exum’s claims against St. Andrews-Covenant....  As the Court in Smith [v. Privette] explained, a contrary holding “would go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such [religious] bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the principles constitutionally safeguarded.”....

9th Circuit En Banc Hears Fraud Claim Against LDS Church

On Tuesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit sitting en banc heard oral arguments in Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. (Video of full oral arguments.) In the case, James Huntsman, a prominent former member of the LDS Church who had contributed over $2.6 million to it, charged the Church with fraudulently misrepresenting the manner in which funds from tithes would be used. Huntsman says that the Church used tithed funds to finance a shopping mall and bail out of for-profit life insurance company after representing that the funds would not be used for commercial projects. A 3-judge panel of the 9th Circuit rejected the Church's claim that the suit was barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. (See prior posting.) Deseret News reports in detail on the oral arguments.

Missouri Appeals Court Refers Question of Church's Duty of Supervision to State Supreme Court

 In Doe v. First Baptist Church of Pierce City, Missouri, (MO App., Sept. 2, 2023), a Missouri appellate court described plaintiff's claim:

Plaintiff asserts that FBC, a Southern Baptist religious institution, had a duty to supervise the youth ministries program members, including herself, while they were transported on a church van as part of that program, that FBC breached this duty by failing to either have or follow a policy to protect minors from sexual abuse, and that Plaintiff was injured as a result by the actions of a fellow youth ministries program member....

The court said that a prior state Supreme Court opinion, Gibson v Brewer, would call for dismissal of the case, saying in part:

Returning to the negligence claims at issue in Gibson, we must first address the negligent hiring/ordination/retention and negligent failure to supervise claims.  Our high court observed that “[q]uestions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy . . . necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”...  “Such excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment” and “would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.”... Similarly ... “[a]djudicating the reasonableness of a church’s supervision of a cleric—what the church ‘should know’—requires inquiry into religious doctrine” and, as with the negligent hiring/ordination/retention claim, “would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of supervision.” 

The court concluded, however:

We would affirm the summary judgment of the circuit court, but due to the general interest and importance of the issues on appeal, we transfer the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to Rule 83.02.

Former Priest's Defamation Claim Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Episcopal Diocese of Southern Virginia v. Marshall, (VA App., July 16, 2024), a Virginia state appellate court held that a defamation per se claim by a former Episcopalian priest against a bishop who removed him from the ministry should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The former priest, Robert Marshall, allegedly made improper comments to a female employee. The court said in part:

We find that the defamation claim is inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary proceedings that led to the priest’s ouster.  In addition, the trier of fact would have to decide if the priest committed “sexual misconduct” within the meaning of canon law, which proscribes a broader swath of conduct than secular law....

Marshall claims that the bishop falsely stated that the investigator had “determined that the allegations had merit.” ... He says that the bishop falsely stated that Marshall had admitted to the improper conduct....  He pleads that Bishop Haynes also lied when she claimed that the church had followed the process required under ecclesiastical law....

[A]lthough Marshall denies that he wants a secular court to undo his defrocking, his defamation claim is so intertwined with the bishop’s deposing him as a priest that the defamation claim cannot be litigated without entangling the court in a religious dispute.  When a priest who has been fired sues the church and its leadership raising tort claims that cannot be unscrambled from the church’s decision to fire him, “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.” ...  Churches have an overarching interest “in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” ... In order for a church to remain “free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” ... such tort claims must sometimes give way. 

... The trial court erred in concluding that Marshall’s claim for defamation per se against Bishop Haynes could be resolved on secular principles...

Alabama Supreme Court Refuses to Order United Methodist Conference to Allow Church Disaffiliations

In Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery v. Alabama- West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (AL Sup. Ct., May 31, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and dismissed a challenge by 44 Methodist congregations to a refusal by their parent Conference to allow the congregations to disaffiliate and retain their property. A few months before the congregations sought to disaffiliate, the Conference had changed its rules to provide that a member church could disaffiliate only after the Conference approved an eligibility statement that set out the reasons of conscience that led to the congregation's request. Prior to that, under a policy that was to expire at the end of 2023, congregations could disaffiliate and retain their property merely if they disagreed with the Chruch's policy on same-sex marriage and homosexuality. In affirming the dismissal of the case, the court said in part:

In order to grant the churches the relief they seek -- the right to vote on disaffiliation -- the trial court would have to survey the Judicial Council's ecclesiastical decisions, interpret the doctrinal scope of ¶ 2553 of the Book of Discipline, and review Conference determinations about the religious adequacy of the churches' eligibility statements.  That is, to decide any property questions, the trial court would have to adjudicate whether each of the churches had adequate "reasons of conscience...."  Resolving those issues would "inherently entail inquiry … into the substantive criteria by which [courts] are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question" -- whether the churches' reasons of conscience were sufficient for disaffiliation under ¶ 2553....   "But [that] is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits."

Justice Bryan filed an opinion concurring specially which Justice Mitchell joined. Justice Cook filed an opinion concurring specially which Chief Justice Parker joined. Both opinions expressed sympathy with the churches' claim that the last-minute change in rules was engineered to prevent them from disaffiliating. Justice Mundheim filed an opinion concurring in the result, but not in the reasoning of the main opinion. Justice Sellers concurred in the result without filing a separate opinion. Justices Shaw, White and Stewart recused themselves.

Civil Court Must Accept Disciplinary Actions by Hierarchical Church's Parent Body

In San Jose Korean Central Church v. Korean Evangelical Church of America, (CA App., May 29, 2024), a California state appellate court applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, holding that a trial court was required to accept as binding internal disciplinary judgments by a church's parent body, Korean Evangelical Church of America (KECA).  At issue was an attempt by a local congregation, San Jose Korean Central Church (SJKCC) to disaffiliate from KECA. As explained by the court:

... [T]he board of SJKCC, led by its senior pastor, Francis Chung, purportedly approved new bylaws and voted to disaffiliate itself from KECA.  One week later, at a special meeting set by the board, the congregation ... approved the new bylaws and voted in favor of SJKCC’s disaffiliation from KECA.  Prior to these actions, however, KECA had issued a disciplinary judgment suspending Chung from performing his duties as an SJKCC board member.  KECA therefore contended that the purported actions taken by the SJKCC board, with Chung acting as its chairman ... were void.  As a result of Chung’s disobedience of the judgment of suspension, ... KECA entered a further disciplinary judgment revoking Chung’s SJKCCs pastorship and excommunicating him from KECA.  Shortly before that date, ... KECA entered a disciplinary judgment against two Chung allies, Ki Soo Kim, Jung Young Lee, removing their status as elders and as members of the SJKCC board....

... [I]t is plain that the May 26, 2019 judgment suspending Francis Chung—being a disciplinary action taken by the national hierarchical church, KECA, through the Judgment Committee of its Northern California District Conference—was an internal ecclesiastical decision that was not subject to review by the civil judicial system.  The rule of judicial deference to ecclesiastical matters applies not only to decisions related to matters of religious doctrine; it “also [applies to] issues of membership, clergy credentials and discipline, and church polity and administration.... The rule of deference to internal decisions of clergy discipline applies irrespective of whether the action taken was “by a procedure contrary to church law and regulations, and for improper, false and fraudulent motives.” ...

Alabama Supreme Court: Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply to Church Property Ownership Dispute

In Ex parte The Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (AL Sup. Ct., April 12, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the parent bodies of the Methodist Church in Alabama had not shown that an ownership dispute between them and a local church in Dothan, Alabama should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The Methodist Church's Book of Discipline required church deeds to contain a clause providing the property was held in trust for the parent church. The deed to the Dothan church did not contain such a clause. Four of the Court's 9 Justices recused themselves in the case, and two lower appellate court judges were appointed to sit with the remaining 5 regular Justices to hear the case.  In the opinion for the court written by Justice Cook and concurred in by three others, the Court said in part:

First, the AWFC and the GCFA's claim that this is a church dispute over ecclesiastical, rather than property, issues is premised on the erroneous assertion that "Harvest wants the [trial] court to create a new disaffiliation process just for Harvest contrary to church law." ...

Harvest's complaint does not seek judicial review of the disaffiliation procedure set forth in the Book of Discipline or otherwise ask the trial court to judicially declare that Harvest's vote to sever its affiliation with the UMC was consistent with the Book of Discipline's requirements....

Instead, the complaint asks that the trial court (1) to recognize that Harvest "alone is the absolute, full, exclusive, fee simple owner of all real or personal property that is owned by [Harvest], held for [Harvest], or titled in its name," (2) to declare that the UMC and the AWFC do not have "any trust, equitable, or beneficial interest in any of the real or personal property so owned by [Harvest],"....

Accordingly, Harvest's claim, on the face of the complaint, pertains solely to the ownership and control of the local church property -- an issue that civil courts generally can resolve by applying "neutral principles of law." 

Chief Justice Parker filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the result, saying in part:

While I believe that the main opinion accurately applies our precedents on the limited issue of church-property disputes, I believe that it goes too far in announcing a grand unifying theory applicable to all church-dispute cases that will unfortunately result in a loss of religious liberty. 

Justice Sellers filed an opinion concurring in the result, saying in part:

[I]n my opinion, once Harvest used the civil legal system to file its deed and organizational documents, it consented to have secular law applied to its filings and, thus, opened the door to have any property dispute resolved pursuant to neutral principles of law.

Special Justice Edwards concurred in the result. 

Alabama Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Church Property Dispute

 In Sails v. Weeks, (AL Sup. Ct., April 5, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court by a vote of 8-1, without an opinion for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of a suit challenging the use and disposal of church property. Defendants contended that plaintiffs are not members of the church and thus could not bring suit on its behalf. Justice Mendheim filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

[I]t is inaccurate to attribute the genesis of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine to the First Amendment. The delicacy with which courts approach church-dispute cases arose more organically from America's history of seeking to disentangle church denominations from state governance...

I believe that our invocation of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence....

The Sails plaintiffs argued that the heart of this dispute concerns the alleged mismanagement or misuse of church property. However, I believe that the Sails plaintiffs' property allegations are a proxy for asking the courts to decide who controls the church -- an issue our courts lack the means and expertise to decide....

... "[T]he nature of the underlying dispute" is whether the Sails plaintiffs, who stopped attending the church several years ago, are still members of the spiritual church, who are the ones that ultimately control the incorporated church and the property it holds. In short, there is no way around the fact that, in this case, a decision concerning the use of the church property implicates the spiritual church because church membership is a spiritual concern. 

Justice Sellers filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Defendants ... moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action on behalf of Union Baptist because, they claimed, Union Baptist was no longer a recognized legal entity under Alabama law because of the official name change that occurred in 2017....

... [C]hanging the name of a corporation, amending an organizational document, or reforming a deed involves the use of our civil legal system that by its very nature is not ecclesiastical.  The issue in this case then is who has the authority to act on behalf of the organization?  And, after identifying that issue, the question then becomes whether secular courts can decide that issue or whether that decision should be left to some ecclesiastical authority?  Because we have no ecclesiastical courts with enforcement authority, I am uncertain how the issue can be decided without court intervention. 

Civil Conspiracy Claims Against Religious Organization Survive 1st Amendment Defenses

In re Gothard, (TX App., Feb. 22, 2024), is a mandamus action that is essentially an appeal of a trial court's refusal to dismiss civil conspiracy claims against Institute in Basic Life Principles and its founder, William Gothard. Plaintiffs claimed that ILBP is a cult that "teachers distorted and heretical Christian doctrines" that led to their sexual abuse by their father and brother. The Texas state appellate court rejected Relators', i.e. defendants', First Amendment defenses, saying in part:

Gothard maintains that religious teachings and the publication thereof are constitutionally protected.  IBLP contends the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars RPIs’ cause of action. It argues that the “alleged religiously motivated conduct of IBLP is the advocacy and publication of religious beliefs.”  According to Relators, if RPIs’ claim is considered valid, any religious leader who speaks on religious topics and publishes his beliefs could be subject to a civil cause of action if a listener or reader improperly applies those beliefs in sexually abusing another person or committing some other unlawful act. ...

But the First Amendment does not bar all claims against religious bodies.,,,  A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government....

The relevant question is whether it appears certain that resolution of [plaintiffs']’ claims will require the trial court to address purely ecclesiastical questions.... IBLP represents that its teachings and materials are based on scriptures from the Bible, none of which “advocate sexual abuse or any other form of sexual immorality.”  Accordingly, by its own admission, IBLP’s teachings and materials do not advocate sexual abuse and consequently, the intentional tort of sexual assault that underlies the civil conspiracy claim is not rooted in religious belief.  ....

Because sexual assault is not part of Relators’ belief system, we cannot definitively say, based on the record before us, that this is a situation in which religious beliefs are so intertwined with a tort claim so as to unconstitutionally burden Relators’ rights and embroil the court in an assessment of those religious beliefs.

Court Supervision of Church Election Invalidated by Mississippi Supreme Court

In Melton v. Union Hill Missionary Baptist Church, (MS Sup. Ct., Jan. 11, 2024), the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and vacated a decision of a state Chancery Court in a dispute over whether a church had dismissed its pastor.  After an initial vote to oust the pastor, the pastor continued to preach at the church.  The church filed suit and the chancellor ordered the congregation to hold a second vote at a church meeting at which the chancellor would preside. That meeting voted to retain the pastor. Invalidating the chancellor's order to hold a new meeting, the Supreme Court said in part:

The chancellor’s self appointment to oversee a congregational election outside the courthouse and inside a house of worship is far removed from the judicial function and treads heavily upon Mississippi’s Constitution and the Establishment Clause. Thus, the chancellor’s actions, though undoubtedly well intended, amounted to a constitutional violation, resulting in a blending of church and state. This unusual arrangement was the antithesis of the constitutional doctrine that historically has demanded separation of church and state....

Because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, this Court reverses and vacates the orders of the Madison County Chancery Court.

Pastor's Breach of Contract Suit Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Craver v. Faith Lutheran Church, (TX App., Nov. 8, 2023), a Texas state appeals court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires dismissal of a pastor's suit for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement brought against the church that was his former employer. After the church's executive board received complaints against the pastor, the church entered a severance agreement with the pastor. The pastor contends that the agreement included an assurance that the allegations against him would not be spread throughout the congregation. The court said in part:

Craver argues his case presents a “run-of-the mill” civil dispute, which can be resolved by application of neutral principles of law and without reference to religious matters. He contends: “While Faith Lutheran’s decision to terminate [him] is generally unreviewable, [his] claims have nothing to do with that and are instead about Faith Lutheran’s obligations under a secular, civil contract not to make certain statements.”

We disagree that church matters can be so cleanly and completely severed. Instead, the substance and nature of Craver’s fraudulent inducement and breach of contract claims are “inextricably intertwined” with matters of Faith Lutheran’s church governance.... [B]oth claims rely on circumstances surrounding contract formation and it is those circumstances which implicate the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine...

[W]e cannot untwine recommendations Church executives made in the course of church governance from the allegedly fraudulent representations that form the basis of Craver’s lawsuit.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply to Church's Fraud Claims Against Former Pastor

 In New Bethel Baptist Church v. Taylor, (TX App., Aug. 29, 2023), a Texas state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not prevent civil courts from adjudicating fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims against its former pastor who also served as the general contractor on a church construction project.  Plaintiff claims that the pastor withdrew $300,000 from the church's bank account without authorization. The court concluded that the claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law. the court said in part:

... [T]he resolution of these causes of action does not depend on the interpretation of New Bethel’s bylaws and constitutions or other relevant provisions of governing documents. Indeed, this is an example of a civil law controversy in which a church official happens to be involved....

However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit because the attorney did not carry her burden of proof that she was authorized to represent the church. The court said in part:

... [R]egardless of how it is named or classified in the underlying suit, it is undisputed that there is only one church. Within this one church, there are two competing factions claiming control, i.e., the board of deacons and directors. With two competing factions claiming control of the church, attorney Robinson, as the challenged attorney, was either authorized to represent both entities, or she was not. In granting Taylor’s rule 12 motion to show authority, the trial court concluded that attorney Robinson failed to discharge her burden of proof to show her authority to act and nothing more.