Indiana Supreme Court Broadly Interprets Churches' Partial Tort Immunity

In Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch, (IN Sup. Ct., Feb. 11, 2025), the Indiana Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation to a state statute that partially shields non-profit religious organizations from tort liability. As summarized by the court:

For an invitee—one who enters the premises with the church’s actual or implied permission—  the church’s twin duties are to warn of hidden dangers of which it has actual knowledge and not to harm the entrant intentionally. Unless the church breaches one of these limited duties, it is not liable for injuries sustained on its premises.

At issue in the case was how broadly to define church "premises." Plaintiff in the case was a church member who was injured while helping construct a storage shed on the five-acre plot of land on which the small church is also located. He sued claiming that the church was negligent in not providing safe equipment and failing to properly supervise him. The court said in part:

Despite the broad meaning of “premises”, Kirsch insists that the term cannot include a church’s entire parcel of land and refers only to the parcel’s specific subpart that is “used primarily for worship services”....

Had the legislature intended “premises” in section 2 to mean only the building where worship services occur or only a subpart of the church’s parcel of land, it could have limited the term’s meaning as it did in adjoining section 34-31-7-3. Section 3 applies to nonprofit religious organizations that offer childcare services for a fee...

“Premises” in section 2, rather, is consistent with general-language dictionaries that define “premises” to include an entire parcel of land....

Section 34-31-7-2 is not without limit.... The “use” requirement is that “the premises as a whole [be] used primarily for worship services”.

[Thanks to Josh Tatum for the lead.]

Negligence Claim Against Army Chaplain Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Winder v. United States, (ND TX, Jan. 17, 2025), a Texas federal district court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires dismissal of a negligence lawsuit filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act growing out of advice given by an Army Chaplain.  The Chaplain was consulted by Latrisha Winder, an Army National Guard member, about her husband's suicide threat which her husband conveyed by phone to her from Texas while she was in Virginia. The Chaplain advised Winder to have local law enforcement conduct a welfare check. When Ms. Winder objected, the Chaplain threatened to call local law enforcement himself if she did not.  This led Ms. Winder to call law enforcement. The welfare check led to a confrontation and to the fatal shooting of Winder's husband by a sheriff's deputy conducting the check. The court said in part:

Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, this action is not "simply a civil dispute in which a religious official happens to be involved." Based on the Complaint's allegations and its reference to Army regulations and training materials, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that this action "entails[] no inquiry into [the Chaplain's] religious doctrine."...

Plaintiffs argue the Chaplain threatened to breach his duty of confidentiality by telling Latrisha "he would call law enforcement if she did not call," which they contend "is wholly secular and a neutral principle that the Court can apply without inquiring into and applying [the Chaplain's] religious training, faith, and beliefs."...

The existence of this tension—whether the Chaplain's duty of confidentiality is religious or secular in nature—is precisely why free exercise principles mandate the Court abstain from adjudication here. Indeed, "[i]t is a core tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that, in resolving civil claims, courts must be careful not to intrude upon internal matters of" religious doctrine.... It is not for the Court to adjudicate, or even question, the Chaplain's duty of confidentiality, given that Plaintiffs have admitted, and Army regulations make clear, there is a religious component to this inquiry.

Cert. Denied in Alabama Frozen Embryo Case

Among the hundreds of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court denied review on Monday was Center for Reproductive Medicine v. Burdick-Aysenne, (Sup. Ct., Docket No. 24-127, certiorari denied, Oct. 7, 2024). (Order List). In the case, the Alabama Supreme Court held, by a vote of 7-2, that Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act covers the negligent destruction of frozen embryos created during IVF treatment and kept in a clinic's cryogenic nursery. (See prior posting.) AP reports on the Court's denial of review.

Alabama Supreme Court: Wrongful Death Law Covers Destruction of Frozen Embryos

In LePage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C., (AL Sup. Ct., Feb. 16, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court held, by a vote of 7-2, that Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act covers the negligent destruction of frozen embryos created during IVF treatment and kept in a clinic's cryogenic nursery. The destruction occurred when a patient wandered into the fertility clinic, removed several embryos and then dropped them when his hands were freeze burned.  Justice Mitchell's majority opinion said in part:

[Defendants] ask us to recognize an unwritten exception for extrauterine children in the wrongful-death context because, they say, our own precedents compel that outcome....

... [Defendants and Alabama Medical Association as amicus] assert that treating extrauterine children as "children" for purposes of wrongful-death liability will "substantially increase the cost of IVF in Alabama" and could make cryogenic preservation onerous.... 

While we appreciate the defendants' concerns, these types of policy-focused arguments belong before the Legislature, not this Court.... Here, the text of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act is sweeping and unqualified.  It applies to all children, born and unborn, without limitation.  It is not the role of this Court to craft a new limitation based on our own view of what is or is not wise public policy.  That is especially true where, as here, the People of this State have adopted a Constitutional amendment directly aimed at stopping courts from excluding "unborn life" from legal protection.  Art. I, § 36.06, Ala. Const.

Chief Justice Parker filed a concurring opinion focusing on Art. I of the Alabama Constitution which provides that declares "it is the public policy of this state to recognize and support the sanctity of unborn life...." The Chief Justice said in part:

... [T]he theologically based view of the sanctity of life adopted by the People of Alabama encompasses the following: (1) God made every person in His image; (2) each person therefore has a value that far exceeds the ability of human beings to calculate; and (3) human life cannot be wrongfully destroyed without incurring the wrath of a holy God, who views the destruction of His image as an affront to Himself. Section 36.06 recognizes that this is true of unborn human life no less than it is of all other human life -- that even before birth, all human beings bear the image of God, and their lives cannot be destroyed without effacing his glory.

Justice Shaw, joined by Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion. 

Justice Mendheim filed an opinion concurring in the result, saying in part:

In my judgment, the main opinion's view that the legal conclusion is "clear" and "black-letter law" is problematic because when the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act was first enacted in 1872, and for 100 years thereafter, IVF was not even a scientific possibility....

Ultimately ... we must be guided by the language provided in the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act and the manner in which our cases have interpreted it. Under those guideposts, today's result is correct. However, the decision undoubtedly will come as a shock in some quarters of the State. I urge the Legislature to provide more leadership in this area of the law given the numerous policy issues and serious ethical concerns at stake....

Justice Sellers filed an opinion dissenting in part, saying in part:

To equate an embryo stored in a specialized freezer with a fetus inside of a mother is engaging in an exercise of result-oriented, intellectual sophistry, which I am unwilling to entertain.

Justice Cook filed a 56-page dissenting opinion, saying in part:

...   I believe the main opinion overrules our recent Wrongful Death Act caselaw that requires "congruence" between the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes and the definition of "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act.  Both the original public meaning and this recent caselaw indicate the same result here -- that the Wrongful Death Act does not address frozen embryos. 

Moreover, there are other significant reasons to be concerned about the main opinion's holding.  No court -- anywhere in the country -- has reached the conclusion the main opinion reaches. And, the main opinion's holding almost certainly ends the creation of frozen embryos through in vitro fertilization ("IVF") in Alabama....

1819 News reports on the decision.

[Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Conservative Christian Groups Oppose Arkansas Tort Reform Ballot Measure

AP reports that Arkansas' proposed constitutional amendment on tort reform (full text) is receiving surprising opposition from conservative Christian anti-abortion groups:

A Christian group has begun rallying churches and abortion opponents against the measure, saying that limiting damage awards in lawsuits sets an arbitrary value on human life, contrary to anti-abortion beliefs, and conflicts with biblical principles of justice and helping the poor....

The Family Council, which championed Arkansas’ ban on gay marriages, is organizing meetings with church leaders to call for the measure’s rejection.

“The Bible is full of references to justice, and [the proposal] creates an environment where the powerful can tip the scales of justice against everybody else, but especially the poor,” Jerry Cox, the Family Council’s head, said at a recent breakfast meeting with pastors.

Pastors were handed informational booklets emblazoned with the words “Don’t Put A Price Tag On Human Life.” Flyers left on each table offered attendees inserts for their church bulletins.

Idaho Supreme Court: Mormon Church Owed No Special Duty To Child Injured At Church Organized Camp Out

In Beers v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (ID Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2013), the Idaho Supreme Court held that neither the Mormon Church nor various individual Ward members are liable for broken ankle suffered by a 13-year old girl in jumping from a bridge during a camp out organized by Ward members of the Church. The court held that there was no special relationship between the Church ("COP") or Ward members and the teenager ("Heidi") that imposed a duty of care to prevent foreseeable injury to the teen.  As to the Church's duty, the Court said:

We are unable to ascribe moral blame to the COP for this incident. We can, however, ascertain negative consequences to the community that would result from imposing a duty and resulting liability upon religious organizations to members of their faith. The result would be a powerful disincentive to organized fellowship activities. Thus, we decline to extend or create a new duty on the part of the COP toward Heidi.

AP reports on the decision.