7th Circuit: Satanic Temple Lacks Standing to Challenge Indiana's Ban on Telehealth Abortion [CORRECTED]

 In Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, (7th Cir., Jan. 6, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that The Satanic Temple lacks standing to bring suit claiming that Indiana's ban on telehealth prescribing of abortion medications violates Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Satanic Temple's beliefs are described by the court:

Members of the Satanic Temple adhere to Seven Tenets.... Tenet III establishes the belief that one’s body is inviolable and subject to one’s own will alone.  Another, Tenet V, establishes that individual beliefs should conform to an individual’s “best scientific understanding of the world” and that each person “should take care never to distort scientific facts to fit one’s own belief.” The Satanic Temple says these Tenets support what it calls the “Satanic Abortion Ritual,” a meditative ritual intended to “cast off notions of guilt, shame, and mental discomfort that a patient may be experiencing due to choosing to have a medically safe and legal abortion.”...

The court concluded that The Satanic Temple had not show any injury in fact to it or any of its members, saying in part: 

Instead of identifying an individual member who has suffered an injury, the Satanic Temple relies on statistical probability to show it has some unnamed members who might be injured....

... [W]e are left with a simple estimate of women who may be involuntarily pregnant, and there is no evidence that any one of them would want to obtain an abortion. Simply put, missing here is evidence that any member of the Satanic Temple has “personally … suffered some actual or threatened injury.”...

As a backstop argument, the Satanic Temple claims “Indiana[’s] Abortion Ban” has caused all of its members to “suffer the stigma of being evil people because they do not believe a human being comes into existence at conception nor do they believe abortion is homicide.” ...  But, other than merely saying so, the Satanic Temple provides no evidence that its members have actually suffered stigmatic injury. ...

The Satanic Temple argues the threat of prosecution ... “if” it prescribes abortifacients via telehealth appointments in Indiana is enough to show an injury to support its pre-enforcement challenge. There is no evidence, however, that the Satanic Temple will knowingly or intentionally prescribe abortifacients in violation of § 16-34-2-1 to face the prospect of prosecution. Indeed, it has not provided affidavits, declarations, or other evidence describing any specific, concrete plans of doing so.

Catholic Vote reports on the decision.

[Post was corrected to indicate that the decision was from the 7th Circuit, not the 6th Circuit.]

Indiana Asks Court to Vacate 2002 Injunction Barring 10 Commandments Monument at Statehouse

Last week, Indiana's Attorney General filed a motion in an Indiana federal district court asking the court to vacate an injunction it issued in 2002 enjoining the governor from erecting a proposed Ten Commandments monument on the Indiana statehouse grounds.  The motion (full text) in Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. Braun, (SD IN, filed 12/29/25), reads in part:

In 2002, this Court permanently enjoined the Governor of Indiana from “taking any steps to erect, on the grounds of the Indiana Statehouse,” a proposed monument that depicts the Ten Commandments, Bill of Rights, and preamble to the Indiana Constitution.... The Court entered the injunction only after the Seventh Circuit held that similarly situated plaintiffs had standing to challenge the placement of such monuments and this monument’s placement would violate the Establishment Clause principles laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman.....   

Not long ago, however, the Supreme Court announced that Lemon has been “abrogated” and that Establishment Clause claims instead must be evaluated based on history and tradition.... Viewed through the lens of this Nation’s history and traditions, erecting the monument raises no Establishment Clause concerns.... That substantial change in law renders it improper to maintain the injunction.  

Substantial changes in standing doctrine provide a second, independent reason for vacating the injunction.... Now that Lemon is no longer good law, there is no longer any basis for holding that an offended observer has standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim. That, too, makes relief from the final judgment proper. 

The Attorney General also filed a 20-page Brief In Support of the Motion. In a press release announcing the court filing, the Attorney General said in part:

The monument—a gift from the Indiana Limestone Institute—displays the Ten Commandments on one large side, the Bill of Rights on the opposite side, and the Preamble to the Indiana Constitution on the smaller sides. A similar monument stood peacefully on the Statehouse lawn for over 30 years until it was vandalized in 1991....

The monument remains in Bedford, Indiana, and would be placed near its original intended location if the court grants the motion.

WTHI-TV News reports additional background information.

Catholic Church Sues Over Historic Preservation Designation

 A Catholic church has filed suit in an Indiana federal district court charging that actions of the Indianapolis Historic Preservation Commission and Metropolitan Development Commission designating a former church building as a landmark and prohibiting its demolition violate the church's free exercise rights. The complaint (full text) in St. Philip Neri Catholic Church Indianapolis, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Preservation Commission, (SD IN, filed 12/30/2025), alleges that the historic church building which is in substantial disrepair was deconsecrated in 2019. Catholic canon law imposes specific requirements regarding removal of religious symbols and limits the purposes for which the building can be reused after its deconsecration. The complaint alleges in part:

75. On its face, the Preservation Plan thus invokes the color of state law to unlawfully impose IHPC authority over religious features and aspects of this Catholic Church property, including the immovable religious symbols on the exterior of the Church Building....

95. The October 1, 2025 IHPC hearing was dominated by efforts by officials and commenters to critique and even to ridicule the religious determinations of Plaintiff and individuals associated with the Archdiocese and St. Philip Neri, to substitute their judgments about Roman Catholic religious doctrine for that of the Plaintiff, and to disrupt and intrude on the religious autonomy of the Plaintiff.

96. Multiple governmental officials provided their statements and opinions on what “the Church” is and what Roman Catholicism requires of Plaintiff, creating a decision-making environment for the Demolition Application that was entangled with religious opinions and distorted religious concepts....

168. The MDC’s adoption of 2024-HP-001 requires the Plaintiff to maintain a church that is closed, deconsecrated, and no longer usable as a church at considerable expense and prevents them from selling the property due to the concern that the church building could in the future be put to a forbidden use in violation of Roman Catholic canon law.

World reports on the lawsuit.

Indiana Enacts Parental Rights Law

On April 22, Indiana Governor Mike Braun signed Senate Bill 143 protecting Parental Rights. The new law (full text) provides in part:

... A governmental entity may not substantially burden a parent's fundamental right to direct the: (1) upbringing; (2) religious instruction; (3) education; or (4) health care; of the parent's child, unless the burden, as applied to the parent and the child, is required to advance a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of advancing the governmental interest.

... A governmental entity may not: (1) advise, direct, or coerce a child to withhold information from the child's parent; or (2) deny a child's parent access to information that: (A) is in the control of the governmental entity (B) is requested by the child's parent; and (C) relates to the child's health care or social, emotional, and behavioral well-being.

ADF issued a press release supporting the enactment of the new law.

Indiana Supreme Court Broadly Interprets Churches' Partial Tort Immunity

In Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch, (IN Sup. Ct., Feb. 11, 2025), the Indiana Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation to a state statute that partially shields non-profit religious organizations from tort liability. As summarized by the court:

For an invitee—one who enters the premises with the church’s actual or implied permission—  the church’s twin duties are to warn of hidden dangers of which it has actual knowledge and not to harm the entrant intentionally. Unless the church breaches one of these limited duties, it is not liable for injuries sustained on its premises.

At issue in the case was how broadly to define church "premises." Plaintiff in the case was a church member who was injured while helping construct a storage shed on the five-acre plot of land on which the small church is also located. He sued claiming that the church was negligent in not providing safe equipment and failing to properly supervise him. The court said in part:

Despite the broad meaning of “premises”, Kirsch insists that the term cannot include a church’s entire parcel of land and refers only to the parcel’s specific subpart that is “used primarily for worship services”....

Had the legislature intended “premises” in section 2 to mean only the building where worship services occur or only a subpart of the church’s parcel of land, it could have limited the term’s meaning as it did in adjoining section 34-31-7-3. Section 3 applies to nonprofit religious organizations that offer childcare services for a fee...

“Premises” in section 2, rather, is consistent with general-language dictionaries that define “premises” to include an entire parcel of land....

Section 34-31-7-2 is not without limit.... The “use” requirement is that “the premises as a whole [be] used primarily for worship services”.

[Thanks to Josh Tatum for the lead.]

7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Accommodating Teacher Who Objects to Using Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Yesterday the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The district court agreed with the school's rejection of using only students' last names as an accommodation. (See prior posting.) ADF, the teacher's counsel, issued a press release ahead of yesterday's arguments.

Indiana Supreme Court Lets Preliminary Injunction Against Abortion Ban When It Violates Religious Beliefs Stand

Last week, the Indiana Supreme Court, by a vote of 3-2, refused to review at this stage in the litigation a preliminary injunction entered by lower courts in a suit claiming that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act is violated when plaintiffs are prohibited by Indiana's abortion law from obtaining an abortion that their religious beliefs direct them to obtain. (See prior posting.) In Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Anonymous Plaintiff 1, (IN Sup. Ct., Dec. 10, 2024), the Order denying the petition to transfer the case to the Supreme Court was not accompanied by a majority opinion. However, Justice Molter joined by Justice Rush filed a concurring opinion saying in part:

This case involves an unusual preliminary injunction—the trial court temporarily enjoined state officials from enforcing the State’s abortion law, but only for a particular group of women who are not pregnant and therefore are not seeking an abortion. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court didn’t exceed its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction while the case continues to be litigated. But the panel also directed the trial court to narrow the preliminary injunction on remand. So thus far, this case is not stopping the defendants from doing anything. And we don’t yet know if it ever will, including because the defendants may ultimately prevail in the lawsuit....

I conclude the more prudent course is for the Court to review the case after a final judgment rather than following a preliminary injunction, which remains a work in progress and subject to more deferential appellate review. In essence, it is better that we review the trial court’s final answer rather than its first guess....

Justice Slaughter, joined by Justice Massa, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Our denial of transfer means the trial court’s “final answer” will lack the benefit of our current thinking. By saying nothing, we may leave the misimpression that the injunction’s only vulnerability is its scope. As my colleagues acknowledge, this case “presents transfer-worthy issues with previously undecided questions of statewide importance”.

Indiana ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision.

7th Circuit Vacates Injunction Against Indiana's Ban on Gender Transition Treatment for Minors

In K.C. v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana, (7th Cir., Nov. 13, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a federal district court's preliminary injunction against Indiana's ban on non-surgical gender transition procedures for minors. Rejecting the district court's conclusion that the treatment ban violates the Equal Protection Clause, the 7th Circuit majority held that the law need only meet the rational basis test. The court said in part:

The only way SEA 480 implicates sex at all is that the medical treatment at issue is sex specific—it denies each sex access to the other’s hormones. A physician could, if not for SEA 480, prescribe two medical treatments: one exclusively to girls with gender dysphoria—testosterone; and one exclusively to boys with gender dysphoria—estrogen.....

When a state regulates a “medical procedure that only one sex can undergo,” the courts apply rational-basis review “unless the regulation is a ‘mere pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members of one sex or the other.’”...

Bostock does not apply to every use of the word “sex” in American statutory and constitutional law. The case decided an interpretive question about Title VII’s reach. Title VII does not apply here, so neither does Bostock.

The majority also rejected the claim that the Indiana law violates the Due Process right of parents to make medical decisions for their children because it does not carve out an exception for treatment when a parent consents. The majority said in part:

SEA 480 is supported by a rational basis.... [P]rotecting minor children from being subjected to a novel and uncertain medical treatment is a legitimate end. And if Indiana had included a parental-consent provision, the exception would swallow the rule...

Finally the majority rejected the claim that the statute's ban on aiding and abetting violates physicians' free speech rights, saying in part:

... [W]hen the physicians and the state do not see eye-to-eye on treatment—and when the state validly regulates that treatment—the state must be able to preclude its physicians from using their authority to help the state’s citizens access the treatment. Otherwise, the physicians would hold a veto over the state’s power to protect its citizens. SEA 480’s secondary liability provision covers unprotected speech, and it reasonably relates to its primary liability provision, which itself is a reasonable regulation.

Judge Jackson-Akiwumi filed a dissenting opinion focusing primarily on the ban on Indiana physicians assisting minors in obtaining treatment in other states, saying in part:

The majority opinion holds that, insofar as the aiding and abetting provision regulates speech, it reaches only unprotected speech—either speech integral to unlawful conduct or speech incidental to regulated conduct. Our law, however, defies both conclusions....

So, Indiana can realize its objectives by enacting a law and punishing those who violate it; it cannot accomplish its objectives by punishing speech that somehow relates to the purpose of a state law, yet amounts to no criminal or civil primary violation.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Standing to Challenge Indiana Abortion Law

Last week (Oct. 24) the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, (Docket No. 23-3247). In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed The Satanic Temple's challenge under Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the state's ban on abortions. The court dismissed for lack of standing, finding that TST failed to identify any of its members who are pregnant and has no clinic of its own operating in Indiana. (See prior posting.)

Indiana Trial Court Rejects "As Applied" Challenge to State Abortion Restrictions

Last year, Indiana's Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to the state's 2022 abortion law. In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court held:

Article 1, Section 1 protects a woman’s right to an abortion that is necessary to protect her life or to protect her from a serious health risk. Yet, this holding does not support Plaintiffs’ claim for a preliminary injunction. That is because they framed their claim as a facial challenge to the entire statute in all conceivable circumstances rather than an as-applied challenge to the law’s application in any particular set of circumstances where a pregnancy endangers a woman’s life or health. (See prior posting.)

Plaintiffs then filed an "as applied" constitutional challenge to the Indiana law. In Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, Hawai'i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc. v. Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana, (IN Cir. Ct., Sept. 11, 2024), an Indiana state trial court now rejected that challenge.  The court said in part:

Plaintiffs have not shown a that S.B.1 materially burdens the rights of any specific patient or well-defined class of patients to access constitutionally protected abortion care. Significant and compelling evidence regarding the policy implications of S.B. 1-- and its effect on medical professionals in particular-- was presented. However, the Court cannot substitute its own policy preferences for that of the Indiana General Assembly and the Court limits its examination to the General Assembly's constitutional authority post-Planned Parenthood. Plaintiffs have not shown an instance where an abortion is necessary to treat a serious health risk but would also fall outside of the Health and Life Exception.  Additionally, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Hospital Requirement is materially burdensome to constitutionally protected abortion access, nor that it fails rational basis review as to statutorily authorized (but not constitutionally protected) abortions.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the decision.

Teaching of Evolution Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Reinoehl v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation, (SD IN, Aug. 30, 2024), an Indiana federal district court held that teaching the theory of evolution in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause. The court said in part:

We find that Plaintiffs have failed to allege an Establishment Clause violation here because "it is clearly established in the case law, and perhaps also in common sense, that evolution is not a religion and that teaching evolution does not violate the Establishment Clause." ...

Nonetheless, according to Plaintiffs, "[e]volution promotes positions taken by advocates of Atheism," embodies "all the tenets of atheistic religious belief[,] and fail[s] to follow scientific laws . . . ." Plaintiffs thus "perceive" that the teaching of evolution in public schools "convey[s] a governmental message that students should subscribe to Atheism."... Despite Plaintiffs' assertions to the contrary, the purported similarities between evolution and atheism do not render the teaching of evolution in public schools violative of the Establishment Clause, which has never been understood to prohibit government conduct that incidentally "coincide[s] or harmonize[s] with the tenets of some or all religions."...

Christian Released-Time Education Provider Sues Foe for Copyright Infringement

LifeWise, Inc. is a Christian nonprofit organization that provides released-time religious education to public school students where state law permits. It uses a copyrighted curriculum which it has developed.  Last week it filed a copyright infringement suit in an Indiana federal district court against Fort Wayne parent Zachary Parrish who was a creator of a Facebook group and a website opposing use of the LifeWise curriculum.  Parrish's website contends that "Lifewise Academy is spreading Evangelical Christianity, Purity Culture, Christian Nationalism, homophobic beliefs, transphobia, and hateful rhetoric to the youngest of our children."  The complaint (full text) in LifeWise, Inc. v. Parish, (ND IN, filed 7/2/2024), alleges in part:

30. ... Mr. Parrish signed up online to volunteer for LifeWise. 

31. ... Mr. Parrish does not support LifeWise’s mission. Instead, his goal was to gather information and internal documents with the hope of publishing information online which might harm LifeWise’s reputation and galvanize parents to oppose local LifeWise Academy chapters in their communities. 

32. ... [A]fter submitting his fraudulent volunteer application, Mr. Parrish improperly gained access to LifeWise’s information storage systems, downloaded internal LifeWise documents, and posted them to his Website. He also improperly obtained and posted a digital copy of the entire LifeWise Curriculum.

33. On April 9, 2024, LifeWise’s attorney sent Mr. Parrish a cease and desist letter informing him of his infringement and requesting he remove LifeWise’s internal documents, which are currently unregistered works, from the Website. 

34. Mr. Parrish responded by emailing a meme stating: “it’s called fair use bitch.”

WOSU Public Media and Cleveland.com report on the lawsuit.

6 More States Fend Off Enforcement of Title IX Transgender Discrimination Rules

Four days after a Louisiana federal district court enjoined the Department of Education from enforcing its new sex-discrimination rules under Title IX against Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana and Idaho (see prior posting), a Kentucky federal district court issued an opinion barring enforcement against Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia which were plaintiffs in the case. DOE's new rules interpret the Title IX ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination against transgender students and faculty by institutions receiving federal financial assistance. Intervenors in the Kentucky case are an organization of Christian educators and a cisgender high school girl who objects to a transgender female who was on her Middle School track team. In State of Tennessee v. Cardona, (ED KY, June 17, 2024), the court in a 93-page opinion said in part:

The Department’s new definition of “discrimination on the basis of sex” wreaks havoc on Title IX and produces results that Congress could not have intended....

For purposes of Title IX, “sex” is unambiguous.  Therefore, there is no “implicit delegation from Congress” to the Department to change or expand its meaning.... But even if the word were ambiguous, there would be significant reason for pause before assuming that Congress “had intended such an implicit  delegation.”...  Education is one of the most important functions of state and local governments and is an area where states “historically have been sovereign.” ...  Accordingly, it is unlikely that Congress would have intended to delegate the authority to deviate from Title IX’s original purpose “in so cryptic a fashion.”...

The major questions doctrine assumes that Congress speaks clearly when it delegates to an agency the authority to make “decisions of vast economic and political significance.”...

The court also concluded that the new rules violate teachers' free speech rights, saying in part:

... [P]rivate and public institutions, as well as the students, faculty, and staff therein, will be forced to convey a particular message that may contradict moral or religious values....  For example, the Final Rule’s definition of harassment will likely compel “students and teachers to use ‘preferred’ rather than accurate pronouns.” ...

It is unclear how the Government’s articulated position can be seen as anything less than a tacit endorsement of a content-based heckler’s veto So long as the offended individuals complain with sufficient vigor, the refusal to abide by preferred pronouns can be deemed harassment and exposes a recipient of Federal funds to liability under Title IX....

The court also focused on parental rights and privacy rights, saying in part:

Although the Final Rule gestures at retaining a certain role for parents, it does not provide that parental opposition to their child’s selective gender identity requires schools to exempt that student from Title IX’s new mandate.  To the contrary, it implies that Title IX could supersede parental preferences about a child’s treatment depending on the case.

... [D]espite society’s enduring recognition of biological differences between the sexes, as well as an individual’s basic right to bodily privacy, the Final Rule mandates that schools permit biological men into women’s intimate spaces, and women into men’s, within the educational environment based entirely on a person’s subjective gender identity.  This result is not only impossible to square with Title IX but with the broader guarantee of education protection for all students.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Indiana Suit Seeks Release of Reports from Abortion Providers

Suit was filed last week in an Indiana state trial court by an anti-abortion organization objecting to the state Health Department's new policy of releasing only aggregate data from Termination of Pregnancy Reports filed by abortion providers. The organization seeks continued release of individual reports (which do not contain information identifying patients) in order to identify violations of health or safety standards by providers.  The complaint (full text) in Voices for Life v. Indiana Department of Health, (IN Super. Ct., filed 5/1/2024), alleges in part:

On April 11, 2024, Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita issued an Official Opinion 2024-2. Exhibit 14. In it he rejected the Public Access Counselor’s informal opinion (23-INF-15) asserting that TPRs are patient medical records exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 5-14-3-4(a)(9), and set forth reasons why TPRs are not exempt from disclosure under the APRA on the theory they are patient records....

IDOH’s refusal to provide access to TPRs deprives private citizens of their role in petitioning the Attorney General to investigate cases that suggest a termination of pregnancy was unlawful. Complaints by members of the public are a condition precedent to the Attorney General’s exercise of his lawful authority....

Because it frustrates needed investigation into potentially unlawful abortions, IDOH’s refusal to disclose TPRs to Plaintiffs places human lives at risk. It also frustrates Voices For Life’s mission to protect the lives of mothers and the unborn. These results of the Public Access Counselor’s Informal Opinion are the opposite of what the statute intends in mandating creation and filing of TPRs. The Court must not allow this situation to continue.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Accommodating Teacher's Anti-Transgender Beliefs Created Undue Hardship for School Under Title VII

In Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, (SD IN, April 30, 2024), an Indiana federal district court in a 46-page opinion that sets out extensive factual background information, dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The school had initially permitted the teacher to refer to students by their last names only, but later withdrew that accommodation and forced the teacher's resignation. A primary issue in the case was whether continuing to allow a last-names-only accommodation would create an "undue hardship" for the school under the Supreme Court's definition of that term in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy. Finding that it would, the court said in part:

BCSC's business is "educating all students," which it achieves by "fostering a learning environment of respect and affirmation."...  Part of that is BCSC's mission to "afford[] dignity and empathy toward transgender students."...  Parents, medical professionals, administrators, and many students all agree that pursuing that mission would require transgender students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns....

Lest there be any doubt about disruption, Mr. Kluge himself believed that the Last Names Only Accommodation would result in disruption and indeed was encouraged by it.  He explained to Dr. Daghe that far from resigning, he was "encouraged all the more to stay." ...  After all, he believed, his "persecution" was "a sign that [his] faith as witnessed by using last-names-only . . . was being effective."...  Faced with Mr. Kluge's own statements—"pleading" with the school to avoid going down the "transgender path," seeking to discuss with students their "eternal destination," and hoping to stay because his "persecution" surrounding the Last Names Only Accommodation was being "effective"—complaints from others were hardly necessary.  While the Last Names Only Accommodation might have been intended as neutral, it ultimately was perceived as intentional....

As the Supreme Court held in Groff, undue hardship is to be viewed within the context of a particular business, not a particular employee.  The Court compares the cost to BCSC's mission, not Mr. Kluge's.  BCSC could either support its transgender students in pursuit of its mission and comply with the law, or accede to Mr. Kluge's accommodation and risk harm to students and the learning environment and/or substantial and disruptive litigation.... The law of Title VII does not require BCSC to continue an accommodation that actually resulted in substantial student harm, and an unreasonable risk of liability, each sharply contradicting the school's legally entitled mission to foster a supportive environment for all.  The Last Names Only Accommodation was an undue burden to BCSC as a matter of law.....

New Indiana Law Strengthens Parents' Right to Have Children Attend Released-Time Religious Instruction

Last week, Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb signed House Bill 1137 (full text) which strengthens parents' rights to have their children attend up to two hours per week of released-time religious instruction. Previously Indiana law permitted, but did not require, a public school to honor parents' requests for their children to attend up to two hours per week of religious instruction provided by a church or other religious educational organization. As amended, the law now requires the principal to allow attendance at up to two hours of religious instruction when a parent has requested it. The law calls for the principal, the parent and the religious school to work cooperatively in finding the least disruptive time for the religious instruction. ADF issued a press release on the new legislation.

Indiana Governor Vetoes Antisemitism Bill for Omitting Examples in Widely-Adopted Definition

As previously reported, earlier this month the Indiana legislature passed House Enrolled Act 1002 which would amend the state Education Code to specifically protect against antisemitism in public schools and colleges. The bill adopts the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's Working Definition of Antisemitism, but, in a controversial compromise, excludes examples given by IHRA that, among other things, indicate when criticism of Israel amounts to antisemitism. As reported by JNS, that exclusion led Jewish groups to encourage Governor Eric Holcomb to veto the bill, which he did on Monday. His veto message (full text) said in part:

While I applaud the General Assembly's effort to address and define antisemitism, I cannot agree with the outcome. The language that emerged in the final days of the session fails to incorporate the entire International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance ("IHRA") definition and its important contemporary examples. Additionally, the confusing language included in the bill could be read to exclude those examples....

However, I also refuse to leave a void as to Indiana's stance on antisemitism. That is why I am happy to share that I have also signed a proclamation reiterating that Indiana condemns all forms of antisemitism and ensures we join numerous states and countries by supporting the entire IHRA definition with its inextricable examples....

The Governor's lengthy Proclamation (full text) says in part:

Whereas, the Working Definition provides a clear, comprehensive and non-legally binding definition that can be used to determine contemporary manifestations of antisemitism.... 

The State of Indiana condemns antisemitism and stands in solidarity with the Jewish community in the face of this pernicious and insidious hatred.

While the Proclamation makes clear that its embrace of the IHRA Working Definition includes its examples, the Proclamation makes no explicit mention of criticism of Israel.

Certiorari Denied in Case of Anorexic Transgender Teen Placed Under State's Care

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in M.C. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, (Docket No. 23-450, certiorari denied, 3/18/2024) (Order List). In the case, an Indiana state appellate court upheld the removal to state custody of a 16-year-old transgender child who was suffering from anorexia. The teen's parents, because of their Christian religious beliefs, refused to accept their child's transgender identity. The appellate court also upheld an order barring the parents from discussing the child's transgender identity during visitation.  (See prior posting.)  USA Today reports on the Supreme Court's action.

Custody Order Barring Father from Taking Child to His Church Upheld

In Bardonner v. Bardonner, (IN App., March 12, 2024), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a father's free exercise rights were not infringed in any way by a provision in a custody order that gives his former wife custody of their child and the sole right to determine the child's religious training.  At issue is a trial court order that provides in part:

Father shall NOT permit the child to attend any All Saints Orthodox Church service, Sunday school, social event, any event located at the church, any event sponsored in whole or in part by All Saints Orthodox Church; nor any private events hosted by a member of All Saints Orthodox Church....

The court said in part:

The bottom line is that Mother has the exclusive authority to dictate Child’s religious training, and she has decided that Child shall not participate in Father’s church. Mother does not need to explain her reasons or justify her decision in any way.

Finally, we note that it was Father’s own violations of previous court orders, which were less restrictive on this issue, that led the trial court to impose the current prohibition against taking Child to even private functions hosted by members of Father’s church. Given the trial court’s broad discretion in family matters, we decline Father’s invitation to find an abuse of that discretion here. 

In sum, the trial court’s order does not violate Father’s First Amendment rights; nor is it erroneous for other reasons.

Indiana Legislature Passes Bill Barring Antisemitism in Public Schools and Colleges

On Friday, the Indiana legislature gave final passage to House Bill 1002 (full text) which amends the state Education Code to specifically protect against antisemitism in public schools and colleges.  The bill, as finally enacted, defines antisemitism by adopting the text of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's definition, but, in a compromise, excludes examples given by IHRA that, among other things, indicate when criticism of Israel amounts to antisemitism.  AP reports on the bill's passage, discussing the compromise in greater detail. The bill now goes to Governor Eric Holcomb for his signature.