Supreme Court Denies Review in Case of Attorney Held in Contempt for Disclosing Information About Abusive Priest

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Trahant v. Roman Catholic Church, (Docket No. 25-1260, certiorari denied, 6/29/2026). (Order List.). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a January 2026 opinion (full text of opinion) upheld a finding of contempt and a $400,000 sanction imposed on an attorney representing victims of clergy sexual abuse. The 5th Circuit explained in part:

Richard Trahant received confidential information regarding sexual abuse allegations against a New Orleans priest while serving as state court counsel for several alleged victims of sexual abuse who were also members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.  Despite a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information revealed during discovery, Trahant contacted the principal of a local high school to confirm that the priest remained the high school’s chaplain.  Trahant then sent an email to a journalist listing the priest’s name in the subject line, identifying where the priest was employed, and advising the journalist to “[k]eep this guy on your radar.”  The bankruptcy court held Trahant in contempt for violating the protective order and sanctioned him for his conduct.  The district court affirmed....

Notwithstanding the fact that the record fully supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that Trahant violated the protective order, Trahant maintains that he “acted in the utmost good faith at all times” and that the sanctions are “disproportionate” to the alleged conduct.  To support this argument, Trahant points to his “legal, moral, and ethical obligation . . . to keep [the priest] away from children.”  He also points to his belief that the $400,000 sanction is “not causally related to any actual damage or prejudice to any party.”  These arguments are without merit.

The Guardian has additional information on the case.

Supreme Court Grants Review on Ripeness for RLUIPA Zoning Claims

The Supreme Court yesterday granted review in Grand v. University Heights, (Docket No. 25-965, certiorari granted 6/30/2026) (Order List). In the case, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals (full text of 6th Circuit opinion) held that plaintiff's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments are not ripe for review.  Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, held weekly prayer sessions in his home for himself and his neighbors. After the city raised zoning objections, plaintiff had applied for a special use permit necessary in order to operate a "house of worship" in the area that was zoned U-1. Just before a second hearing on his application, plaintiff withdrew the application. After that hearing, the city took no further action on the application. Some 18 months later, plaintiff filed suit against the city. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, the 6th Circuit said in part:

... [N]either the Planning Commission nor the City Council nor the Board of Zoning Appeals has ever determined whether UHCO § 1274.01 applies to the kinds of gatherings he has in mind.  And because Grand withdrew his application, the zoning board has never issued a final decision—or for that matter any decision—about his eligibility for a special use permit.  The government body “charged with implementing the regulations,” in short, has not “reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” ...  Grand’s claims thus never ripened into a dispute suitable for federal review.

Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari lists as the Question Presented to the Supreme Court: 

Whether the First Amendment's established chilling-effect doctrine-- under which a credible government threat that deters the exercise of fundamental rights constitutes a complete and independently actionable constitutional injury-- is displaced by Williamson Cnty.'s land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government threats both before and after a Planning Commission meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and assembly.

The Court will hear arguments in the case in the Fall. ADF issued a press release announcing the Court's grant of review. [Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Supreme Court Allows Schools to Exclude Transgender Females from Girls' and Women's Sports Teams

In West Virginia v. B.J.P., (Sup. Ct., June 20, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may exclude transgender females from girls' and women's athletic teams without violating either Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kavanaugh, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett said in part:

Notably, B. P. J. does not seriously contest that the term “sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the regulations means biological sex.  Moreover, B. P. J. agrees ... that Title IX permits schools to maintain separate female and male teams and to prohibit most biological males from playing on women’s and girls’ teams.  B. P. J. disagrees with West Virginia and the United States only about whether schools must make an exception to that general rule for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

But the texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools must allow certain biological males to participate in women’s and girls’ sports....

Some percentage of biological males who identify as male possess physical and athletic capabilities that fall within (or below) the range of typical female physical and athletic capabilities. But the plaintiffs acknowledge that States may still exclude those biological males from women’s and girls’ sports, given the general physical differences between males and females.

And the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the States from applying that same principle to all biological males, including those who identify as female. In the distinctive sports context, in other words, the States may treat all biological males the same and treat all biological females the same, given the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.....

In so ruling, we emphasize one last point.  Most of the biological female and transgender student-athletes who are involved in transgender sports disputes around the country are teenagers or in their early twenties.  Those student athletes want to play sports. Their desire to compete warrants respect. No student-athlete on either side of the issue, whether a biological female or transgender, deserves to be ostracized or vilified.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are.  Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic ...; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex.... To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].”...

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... Nothing in Title IX clearly and unambiguously alerts funding recipients that they are prohibited from restricting a school-sponsored sports team to biological women or girls....

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment, saying in part:

 ... West Virginia might be right that transgender girls retain some inherent athletic advantage over cisgender girls due to their sex identified at birth even after receiving the hormonal therapy B. P. J. identifies. All agree, moreover, that States do have some room to legislate around issues when there exists significant, and genuine, scientific debate. At this point, however, neither the District Court nor the Fourth Circuit has passed upon any of the available evidence or made the necessary factual findings about the state of the scientific debate....

Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, saying in part:

... [T]he majority is wrong to suggest that the term “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.”...  Title IX makes room for individuals to live in the gender they choose; it cares not just about sex assigned at birth but also about individuals’ ability to match (or not) their gender presentation to their gender identity.  Because West Virginia’s law forces B. P. J. to live—in this case, to play—as a boy though she is a girl, it might well run afoul of Title IX properly construed.

Reuters reports on the decision.

Cert. Denied Over Dissent of 3 Justices in Covid Vaccine Mandate Controversy

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Doe v. Hochul , (Docket No. 24-1015, certiorari denied 6/29/2026) over a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. At issue in the case was New York's refusal to grant state healthcare workers a religious exemption from the state's Covid vaccine mandate. Justice Gorsuch dissenting said in part:

... [T]he Court of Appeals did not assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ requested accommodations.  In fact, the court took as given that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination.” ... Still, the court held, the defendants had presented a successful “undue hardship” defense as a matter of law....  More specifically, the court reasoned that granting the plaintiffs’ requested religious accommodations would have imposed an “undue hardship” on their employers because it “would have required the [employers] to violate the state [vaccine] regulation” and “subjected the [employers] to financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their operating licenses.”... 

Soon after it decided this case, the Second Circuit reiterated its understanding of Title VII’s undue hardship defense, holding that “an accommodation that would require an employer to violate” a state law necessarily “imposes an undue hardship”—and does so even when the state law is “unconstitutional as applied” to the plaintiff....

... [I]t seems to me that state law cannot control whether an employer faces an “undue hardship” for purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, just like it cannot conclusively resolve what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation”.... To hold otherwise would appear to leave States free to strip individuals of the protections guaranteed by so many federal civil rights statutes....

Supreme Court Grants Review on Standing of Parents to Challenge Notification About Children Receiving Gender-Affirming Care

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday granted review in International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, (Docket No. 25-840, certiorari granted 6/29/2026). (Order List.). At issue in the case is whether parents whose children have gender dysphoria and might run away from home in the future have standing to challenge a group of Washington laws that exempt youth shelters from notifying parents that their children are in the shelter when the child is seeking gender-affirming care. Instead, the shelter is to notify the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF).  DCYF must then contact the parents and offer to make referrals for behavioral health services and family reconciliation services.

In a July 2025 decision (full text), the 9th Circuit held that parents had not alleged sufficient current or future injury to grant standing. The 9th Circuit subsequently denied en banc review over the dissents of three judges. The petition for certiorari frames the Question Presented as:

Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision making role as to “gender transitions” of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.

Cert. Petition Filed in Lipan Apache Efforts To Prevent Impairment of Religious Ceremonial Site

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Perez v. City of San Antonio, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to enjoin San Antonio's development plan for a city park.  Plaintiffs are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. Certain of their religious ceremonies can take place only at a particular river bend in the park and require the presence of cormorants in the trees there. The development plan will remove trees and modify bird habitats. (See prior posting. and 5th Circuit's amended opinion.) The petition for review sets out the Questions Presented as:

1. Whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment permit courts, when deciding whether government action burdens religious exercise, to override a claimant’s sincere theological judgment of what the religious exercise requires. 

2.  Whether the government can satisfy its burden to prove that its action is the least religiously restrictive means available when, after notice that its action would burden religious exercise, the government admits that it failed to consider any workable alternatives prior to litigation.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

Cert. Petition Filed Challenging Grant of Qualified Immunity In 1st Amendment Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S Supreme Court last week seeking review of the 5th Circuit's decision in Hershey v. City of Bossier City. In the case, a 3-judge panel in a splintered decision reversed a Louisiana federal district court's dismissal of a suit against the city by plaintiff who was passing out booklets for the Christian Vegetarian Association outside an arena in which a Christian rock concert was taking place. However, the court affirmed the trial court's qualified immunity dismissal of the claims against police and security guards. (See prior posting.) It is this aspect of the 5th Circuit's decision that is being appealed in the certiorari petition. At issue is whether in free speech and free exercise claims, officers can claim qualified immunity where a reasonable officer should have understood their action to be unconstitutional, but their particular action has not been previously held unconstitutional by a court.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the cert. petition.

Certiorari Denied in Interlocutory Appeal of Church Autonomy Ruling

The Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Conference of Catholic Bishops v. O'Connell, (Docket No. 25-849, certiorari denied 5/26/2026) (Order List). Plaintiff in the case charged the USCCB with fraudulent solicitation of donations, claiming that it misrepresented where money donated to Peter's Pence Collection would go. USCCB sought dismissal of the suit on church autonomy grounds. The district court refused. A 3-judge panel of the DC Circuit held that the district court's ruling could not be appealed until the district court had rendered a final decision in the case. Subsequently (over a lengthy dissenting opinion) the 3rd Circuit denied en banc review. (See prior posting.).

Certiorari Denied In Christian Day Care's Challenge to California's Licensing Requirements

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Foothills Ministries v. Johnson, (Docket No. 25-802, certiorari denied 5/18/2026) (Order List). In the case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Christian day care center lacks standing to bring a free exercise challenge a California requirement that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious activities of their parents' choice. The 9th Circuit held, however, that the day care center does have standing to challenge the state's general licensing requirement and to challenge on free speech grounds required disclosures to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice. On the merits, though, the 9th Circuit held that neither of these requirements infringe the day care's 1st Amendment rights. (See prior posting.)

Supreme Court, Through Stays While Appeals Continue, Allows Continued Mail-Order Delivery of Mifepristone

The Supreme Court today, in a 7-2 decision in Danco Laboratories, LLC v.  Louisiana, (Sup. Ct., May 14, 2026), granted a stay while appeals continue of the 5th Circuit's decision that had barred telehealth prescribing and mail order delivery of the abortion drug mifepristone. The majority granted the stay in a one-paragraph order.

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... [I]t is a criminal offense to ship mifepristone for use in abortions. The Comstock Act bans using “the mails” to ship any “drug . . . for producing abortion.” 18 U. S. C. §1461.  A neighboring provision makes it a felony to use “any express company or other common carrier or interactive computer service” to ship “any drug . . . designed, adapted, or intended for producing abortion.” §1462(c)....

... Applicants are not entitled to a stay of an adverse court order based on lost profits from their criminal enterprise. They cannot, in any legally relevant sense, be irreparably harmed by a court order that makes it more difficult for them to commit crimes.

Justice Alito also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

...  What is at stake is the perpetration of a scheme to undermine our decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization ... which restored the right of each State to decide how to regulate abortions within its borders. 

... [W]ithout any current indication that the FDA plans to resume enforcing the in-person-dispensing requirement, there is no reason to believe that the manufacturers could not continue their current distribution practices....

If the FDA were to execute an abrupt about-face and commence enforcement of the in-person-dispensing requirement, the manufacturers could promptly reapply for stays at that time.  But even were that to happen, the manufacturers have not shown that they would suffer irreparable injury....

NBC reports on the decision. 

Supreme Court Grants 1-Week Administrative Stay of 5th Circuit's Abortion Drug Decision

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito this morning granted an administrative stay until 5:00 PM on May 11th in Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. State of Louisiana (full text of Order) and in Genbiopro, Inc. v. State of Louisiana (full text of Order). Justice Alito is responsible for receiving Emergency Petitions from the 3rd and 5th Circuits. The administrative stay of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal's May 1 decision (see prior posting) means that mail order delivery of the abortion drug mifepristone can continue at least temporarily. A response to the pharmaceutical companies' petition for a longer stay of the 5th Circuit's decision must be filed by Louisiana by 5:00 PM on May 7. CNN reports on today's action by Justice Alito.

UPDATE: On May 11, Justice Alito in two separate Orders extended the administrative stay of the 5th Circuit's Order until May 14.

Mifepristone Makers Ask Supreme Court to Stay 5th Circuit's Ruling Ending Mail-Order Delivery of Abortion Drug

As previously reported, last Friday the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay pending appeal of the FDA's 2023 ruling that removed the requirement that the abortion drug mifepristone be prescribed only after an in-person visit with a doctor. The FDA ruling permitted out-of-state doctors to prescribe mifepristone which then could be delivered by mail. Within one day of the 5th Circuit's ruling, two pharmaceutical manufacturers that had intervened as defendants in the case in the lower courts filed an emergency petition with the U.S. Supreme Court asking it to stay the 5th Circuit's ruling while appeals continue. Alternatively, they seek immediate Supreme Court review. They also ask for an immediate administrative stay of the 5th Circuit's judgement while the Supreme Court is considering their petition. 

The 56-page petition (full text) in Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. State of Louisiana, Ct. filed 5/2/2026) contends in part that Louisiana lacks standing to challenge the FDA ruling and that the 5th Circuit's judgment "injects immediate confusion and upheaval into highly time-sensitive medical decisions."

SCOTUSblog reports on the case and traces much of the background to the present filing.

Supreme Court: Pregnancy Resource Center Has Standing to Challenge Subpoena for Donor Records

The Supreme Court today in First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, (Sup. Ct., April 29, 2026), held that First Choice, a religious anti-abortion pregnancy counseling center, has Article III standing to challenge a subpoena from the New Jersey Attorney General. The subpoena sought the names, addresses, phone numbers and places of employment of individuals who made donations to the center so that the state could contact a sample of donors to determine if they had been misled into thinking that the center provided abortions. New Jersey contended that the subpoena did not chill First Choice's associational rights. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court disagreed, saying in part:

Since the 1950s, this Court has confronted one official demand after another like the Attorney General’s.  Over and again, we have held those demands burden the exercise of First Amendment rights.  Disputing none of these precedents but seeking ways around them, the Attorney General has offered a variety of arguments.  Some are old, some are new, but none succeeds....

Christian Post reported on the decision.

Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today in Falun Gong Practitioners' Alien Tort Statute Suit

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments this morning in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I. In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Falun Gong victims of human rights abuses carried out by China can move ahead with claims against Cisco Systems and its executives for their assistance that enabled China to carry out monitoring of Internet activity by Falun Gong members. (See prior posting.)  The Supreme Court's grant of review was limited to the questions of whether the Alien Tort Statute and/or the Torture Victim Protection Act allows a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

All pleadings and briefs in the case are available from the Docket sheet on the Supreme Court's website. Audio of the oral arguments will be streamed live here by the Court beginning at 10:00 A.M. A recording and a written transcript of the arguments will be posted by the Court here later today. SCOTUSblog has a preview of today's arguments.

UPDATE: Links to audio and a written transcript of the oral arguments can be found here. The New York Times, reporting on the oral arguments, said in part: "A majority of the Supreme Court on Tuesday appeared skeptical of a lawsuit by Falun Gong members who claim that an American tech company helped the Chinese government to target them for torture."

Cert. Petition Filed in Covid Religious Exemption Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) has been filed in Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire & Rescue, (Sup. Ct., filed 4/16/2026). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims by eight firefighters that the Snohomish fire department violated Title VII and Washington state law by refusing to accommodate their requests for religious exemptions from the state's Covid vaccine mandate for all healthcare providers. (See prior posting.) The petition seeking Supreme Court review frames the Question Presented as follows:

Whether an employer can defeat a Title VII religious accommodation claim by establishing merely that it had a reasonable basis for believing that a requested accommodation would inflict an undue hardship on the employer or whether the employer must establish that the requested accommodation would have actually imposed an undue hardship.

The Center Square reports on the filing.

Certiorari Denied in Challenge to School Policy on Gender Transitioning Students

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, (Docket No. 25-77, certiorari denied 4/20/2026). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held that petitioners' parental rights protected by the 14th Amendment were not infringed by a school Protocol requiring staff to use a student's requested name and gender pronouns in school without notifying parents of the request unless the student consents. Parents' objections to the policy were not religious, but were moral and scientific. Reuters reports on the Supreme Court's action.

Supreme Court Grants Review on When Religious Schools Can Be Excluded from General State Programs

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning granted certiorari in St. Mary Catholic Parish in Littleton v. Roy, (Docket No. 25-581, cert. granted 4/20/2026). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the nondiscrimination requirements of Colorado's Universal Preschool Program do not violate the free exercise or expressive association rights of Catholic schools that are excluded from the program because they insist on considering the sexual orientation and gender identity of a student and their parents in making decisions on who will be admitted. (See prior posting.) In granting review, the Court limited it grant to Questions 1 and 2 in the petition for certiorari:

1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.

2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions.

It excluded from the grant petitioner's third question:

3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled.

Supreme Court Strikes Down Most Applications of Conversion Therapy Ban

In Chiles v. Salazar, (Sup.Ct., March 31, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision struck down most applications of Colorado's law that prohibits licensed counselors from engaging in conversion therapy for minors, defined as therapy that attempts to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Justice Gorsuch, joined by all but Justice Jackson, wrote the majority opinion which says in part:

The State insists, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that its law does not “regulate expression” at all, only “conduct,” “treatment,” or a “therapeutic modality.”...  As a result, Colorado reasons, its law triggers no more than rational-basis or intermediate scrutiny review.... But the State’s premise is simply mistaken.  In many applications, the State’s law banning “conversion therapy” may address conduct—such as aversive physical interventions.  But here, Ms. Chiles seeks to engage only in speech, and as applied to her the law regulates what she may say.  Her speech does not become conduct just because the State may call it that. Nor does her speech become conduct just because it can also be described as a “treatment,” a “therapeutic modality,” or anything else. The First Amendment is no word game. And the rights it protects cannot be renamed away or their protections nullified by “mere labels.”...

As applied here, Colorado’s law does not just regulate the content of Ms. Chiles’s speech.  It goes a step further, prescribing what views she may and may not express.  For a gay client, Ms. Chiles may express “[a]cceptance, support, and understanding for the facilitation of . . . identity exploration.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(I).  For a client “undergoing gender transition,” Ms. Chiles may likewise offer words of “[a]ssistance.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(II).  But if a gay or transgender client seeks her counsel in the hope of changing his sexual orientation or gender identity, Ms. Chiles cannot provide it....

At bottom, Colorado and the dissent fundamentally misconceive this Court’s speech-incident-to-conduct precedents. In these cases, the question is not whether a law mostly addresses conduct and only sometimes sweeps in speech. Instead, the focus lies on two entirely different questions: whether the law in question restricts speech only because it is integrally related to unlawful conduct— or ... only for reasons unrelated to its content....

Colorado’s law does not regulate speech incident to conduct under either test....

... Colorado emphasizes, [prior precedent] left open the possibility that a future party might present “persuasive evidence . . . of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition” of content regulation regarding additional categories of professional (or other) speech that might likewise warrant only “diminished” First Amendment protection....

...  Colorado and the dissent ask us to recognize a cavernous “First Amendment Free Zone,”... one in which States may censor almost any speech they consider “substandard care.” It is, once more, an approach our precedents already foreclose. 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a concurring opinion stating that the result might be different if a law regulating speech in doctors' and counselors' offices were content-based but viewpoint-neutral.

Justice Jackson filed a 35-page dissenting opinion saying in part:

Stated simply, the majority has failed to appreciate the crucial context in which Chiles’s constitutional claims have arisen. Chiles is not speaking in the ether; she is providing therapy to minors as a licensed healthcare professional. The Tenth Circuit was correct to observe that “[t]here is a long-established history of states regulating the healthcare professions.” ...  And, until today, the First Amendment has not blocked their way.  For good reason: Under our precedents, bedrock First Amendment principles have far less salience when the speakers are medical professionals and their treatment-related speech is being restricted incidentally to the State’s regulation of the provision of medical care....

Over the past few decades, however, the premise of conversion therapy (in whatever form) has been widely discredited within the medical and scientific community. Conversion therapy is, at bottom, “based on a view of gender diversity that runs counter to scientific consensus.”...

A state license used to mean something to the patients who entrust their care to licensed professionals—i.e., that the person is certified to be one who provides treatments that are consistent with the standard of care. 

That stops today....

The Guardian reports on the decision. ADF, which represented petitioner, issued a press release commenting on the decision.

Supreme Court Says Street Preacher May Challenge Limit on Demonstrations Despite His Prior Conviction

In Oliver v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (Sup. Ct., March 20, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a street preacher may move ahead with his challenge to a city ordinance that limits protests and demonstrations around the city's amphitheater to a designated area when events are scheduled at the amphitheater. The city argued that because the preacher had been convicted of violating the same ordinance several years earlier, the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars the suit. Heck prohibits the use of 42 USC §1983 to challenge a prior conviction or sentence in order to obtain release from custody or to obtain an award of damages. Today the Supreme Court held that this does not bar the street preacher's suit because he is only seeking an injunction to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance. The fact that a victory in his suit would mean that his prior conviction was unconstitutional does not mean that it is barred. Justice Kagan's opinion for a unanimous court said in part:

Olivier’s suit does not ... “collateral[ly] attack” the old conviction.....  It thus cannot give rise, as Heck feared, to “parallel litigation” respecting his prior conduct.... The suit, after all, is not about what Olivier did in the past...  Unlike in Heck, the suit merely attempts to prevent a future prosecution....

... [T]he City says, a judgment in Olivier’s favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] prior conviction[].”... To declare the city ordinance unconstitutional, as Olivier seeks, would be to imply that no one—including Olivier—should have been convicted under that law. 

The argument is a fair one, but hardly dispositive.  We have to agree that if Olivier succeeds in this suit, it would mean his prior conviction was unconstitutional.  So, strictly speaking, the Heck language fits. But that could just show that the phrasing was not quite as tailored as it should have been....

We think, with the benefit of hindsight, that ... the sentence relied on swept a bit too broad.  That language was used in Heck to identify claims that were really assaults on a prior conviction, even though involving some indirection.

Cert. Petition Filed in RLUIPA Zoning Case

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday seeking U.S. Supreme Court review in Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic. In the case, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that RLUIPA was not violated by denying a conditional use permit to a church that wished to build a grotto in Park Hills, Kentucky to honor the Virgin Mary’s appearance at a grotto in Lourdes, France. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that denial of a permit and variances did not impose a substantial burden on the church's religious exercise. (See prior posting.) First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.