9th Circuit: Church Loses Challenge to Washington's Abortion Coverage Mandate

In Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kuderer, (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision (with opinions spanning 110 pages) held that Washington's Reproductive Parity Act taken together with its conscience protection law creates a neutral and generally applicable requirement as to health insurance coverage which survives a claim that the laws violate Cedar Park Church's free exercise rights. Taken together, the two laws require employee health insurance to cover abortions and contraceptives but allow employers who oppose abortion to furnish employees a policy under which the insurer, or the state health department, pays for abortion and contraception coverage. The court said in part:

... Plaintiff argues that, even if the challenged laws do not require it to purchase abortion coverage, the laws have prevented it from obtaining an abortion-excluding group health plan that is “comparable” to the one that it had before the Parity Act took effect.... 

But Plaintiff does not point to any evidence refuting the fact that, in 2019 and 2020, a different health carrier, Cigna, offered to sell Plaintiff a fully insured group health plan that excluded direct coverage for abortion....

Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that the conscience statute “allows carriers to force houses of worship—like [Plaintiff]—to pay for nominally ‘excluded’ abortion coverage.”  Plaintiff’s argument goes like this:  Under the conscience statute, carriers cannot deny enrollees in Plaintiff’s health plan “coverage of, and timely access to, any service or services excluded” from Plaintiff’s “benefits package,” ... 

But section 4 of the conscience statute states that “[n]othing in [the statute] requires a health carrier, health care facility, or health care provider to provide any health care services without appropriate payment of premium or fee.” ...Plaintiff contends that section 4 “empowers carriers to pass along the cost of covering abortion and [objectionable contraceptives] to houses of worship in the form of increased premiums, ‘administrative’ or ‘overhead’ expenses, or other fictitious costs.” 

Plaintiff’s conjecture is premised on a plainly erroneous and ungrammatical reading of section 4 ...

The question remains whether the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into “facilitating access to” abortion services in violation of its religious beliefs....

Plaintiff’s belief that Providence’s plans are religiously permissible undercuts each of the three theories that Plaintiff advances, and on which the dissenting opinion relies, to assert that the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into facilitating access to abortion, even without any indirect payment for coverage.... Plaintiff’s first theory of burden-via-facilitation posits that the challenged laws burden Plaintiff’s religious practice because Plaintiff’s purchase of a health plan is a but-for cause of its employees having access to covered abortion services....

Plaintiff’s second theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion under Cigna’s abortion-excluding plan because Plaintiff’s employees would use the same insurance card both for covered services and for services excluded from the plan—falls apart quickly....

Plaintiff’s third and final theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion because the carrier of an abortion-excluding plan would provide notice to enrollees about how to obtain access to covered abortion services outside the plan—fails for a similar reason....

 Because the challenged laws are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies, and we “must” uphold the laws if they are “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”...

Plaintiff does not contest that the challenged laws “easily satisf[y] that forgiving standard.”

Judge Callahan's 47-page dissent says in part:

The Parity Act burdens Cedar Park’s exercise of religion.  It does so by effectively placing religiously coercive conditions upon a State-controlled privilege: the ability to procure a State-approved group health plan....

The problem with the majority’s position is that it fails to recognize the core distinction between Cedar Park’s former Kaiser plan and any Parity Act-compliant health plan that Cedar Park could obtain... —even if the plans are financially comparable, the new plan under the Parity Act must still provide plan enrollees with access to abortion services....  As far as Cedar Park is concerned, this basic fact—that no Parity Act-compliant plan can actually exclude abortion coverage—makes any Parity Act-compliant plan that Cedar Park could purchase insufficiently comparable to its prior Kaiser plan....

The record strongly suggests that the law operates as a counter to federal regulations that expanded employers’ religious exemptions from paying for or facilitating abortion services in their group health care plans.  In my view, the evidence at minimum raises a serious dispute as to that question, making summary judgment inappropriate.  And while Washington’s overt motivation may not have been specifically hostile towards religion, that does not necessarily make the Parity Act neutral towards religion....

 In addition to its lack of neutrality, the Parity Act is not generally applicable and therefore requires strict scrutiny review for this reason as well....

Court Enjoins Enforcement Against Synagogue's Voluntary Security Team of Ban on Firearms in Houses of Worship

In Silver Spring Jewish Center, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Maryland, (D MD, Sept. 10, 2026), a Maryland federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Montgomery County's ban on possession of firearms in their place of worship. The court however refused to issue a broader injunction against other portions of the Ordinance.  Silver Spring Jewish Center is an Orthodox synagogue that has implemented its own security plan which includes a trained, armed security team made up of volunteer synagogue members. The county Ordinance impacts those volunteers and also prevents the synagogue's rabbi who walks to synagogue on the Sabbath for religious reasons from carrying a firearm because he walks past other places of public assembly. The court concluded that a portion of the Ordinance likely violates both the Second Amendment and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. The court said in part:

... [T]he sources on which Defendants rely do not demonstrate that the historical analogues for firearm restrictions in places of worship were well-accepted....

Therefore, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro, at this preliminary stage, have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Second Amendment claim of the Code’s firearm restrictions as to places of worship....

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that “[h]alachically, reliance on volunteer members of the community, rather than outsourcing the religious obligation to others, is preferred under Jewish Law” and cite the following sources in support: Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 41a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 250:1....

... The beliefs of SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro are sincere.  Accordingly, at this stage, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have demonstrated a burden on their sincere religious practice. Because SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have shown a burden on their religious exercise, the next step is to evaluate whether the law is neutral and generally applicable....

... [B]ecause the challenged provisions of Chapter 57 apply differently as to places of worship in comparison to not only fraternal lodges, but numerous other privately owned businesses and properties, these portions of the Code are not neutral and generally applicable....

Overall, Plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Free Exercise challenge to Section 57-1(1)(B) and Section 57-11(a) regarding the restriction of firearms in their respective place of worship....

The claim regarding all buffer zones, however, fails at this stage.  Because Rabbi Shapiro must walk to the synagogue on certain days, and thus cannot avail himself of the provisions in Section 57-10—which allows vehicle transportation of firearms even within 100 yards of a place of assembly ...he contends that the buffer zones for other places of public assembly suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ban on firearm possession within a place of worship.  That does not necessarily follow.  A different provision is at work—one that applies to all designated places of public assembly.  The 100-yard restriction is a neutral and generally applied provision and only a rational basis must be shown. 

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that the prohibition on carrying firearms at houses of worship violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by “telling religious institutions what items worshippers may ‘possess’ in places of worship and how religious institutions may (and may not) protect worshippers during their worship.” ...  Plaintiffs argue that the choice of how a religious institution protects itself is an internal management matter that is “essential to [its] central mission.”...

... [A] single trial court decision is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that a religious organization’s need to provide security translates into the absolute right to provide that security through an armed volunteer group.  In any event, at this early stage, with the likelihood of success findings on the other First Amendment claim and the Second Amendment claim as to houses of worship, it is not necessary to proceed further on this claim....

Links to some of the pleadings in the case are available here. New Civil Liberties Alliance issued a press release announcing the decision.

Maine's Compulsory School Vaccination Law Upheld

In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Makin, (D ME, Sept. 8, 2026), a Maine federal district court rejected free exercise and Establishment Clause challenges to Maine's compulsory vaccination law for school children. Plaintiff contended that Maine's removal of religious exemptions from the law render it unconstitutional. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs argue 20-A M.R.S. § 6355 is neither neutral nor generally applicable and, separately, that even if it is neutral and generally applicable, it substantially interferes with Mr. Childs’s right to direct his son’s religious upbringing .... 

... [W]hen the Maine Legislature repealed the religious and philosophical beliefs exemption in 2019, it repealed all personal belief exemptions, “and thus did not single out religion alone.” ... Neither the Legislature’s choice to eliminate certain exemptions, nor the process by which it did so, demonstrates hostility to religion....

... [T]he medical exemption serves rather than undermines Maine’s interest in health and safety. ...

Second, the medical exemption is bounded in a way a religious exemption is not. It rests on an individualized, evidence-based judgment from a licensed provider—subject to professional discipline—and statewide medical exemption rates have stayed below 1.5% in every surveyed grade cohort since 2018....

... [B]ecause Plaintiffs have identified neither a comparable secular activity treated more favorably than religious conduct nor a mechanism for individualized exemptions, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that § 6355 is not generally applicable. ...

Mr. Childs ... argue[s] that § 6355 burdens his right to direct his son’s religious upbringing because compliance would require him to authorize a vaccination he considers an act of sin, thereby undermining his ability to instruct his son in their shared faith and its demands.... On this record, the Court finds that Mr. Childs holds this belief sincerely. Even so, Plaintiffs have not shown that the burden Mr. Childs describes shares the same character of the burden Yoder, Mahmoud, and Mirabelli address. Those cases do not measure a burden by how heavily it presses on the parent who bears it. They measure whether the State has stepped into the relationship between parent and child to compete for the child’s own beliefs. In each case, the challenged practice reached the child directly, through the school itself, by exposing the child to—or facilitating—values contrary to those the parents sought to instill.....

Catholic Sisters Challenge Illinois End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act

Several orders of Catholic sisters as well as Chicago Archbishop Cupich filed suit yesterday in an Illinois federal district court challenging the constitutionality of requiring them to comply with Illinois End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act. The 93-page complaint (full text) in Carmelite Sisters for the Aged and Infirm, Inc. v. Prince, (ND IL, filed 9/3/2026) alleges in part:

9. Through its euphemistically-named End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act, and the Act’s incorporation of burdens imposed by the Health Care Right of Conscience Act, Illinois has conscripted even religious healthcare providers and institutions to participate in the provision of physician-assisted suicide. 

10. Beginning September 12, medical providers caring for terminally ill Illinois residents will have to proactively inform and counsel their patients about their “option” to kill themselves....

12. These national and international norms against doctors raising assisted suicide with their dying patients exist for good reason. Public health researchers have extensively documented that an increase in the public discussion of suicide is often followed by an increase in suicide rates....  

23. The Court can address these problems by enforcing federal law and the First Amendment and finding that Illinois cannot coerce religious providers in this way. That approach would leave the End-of-Life Options Act generally in force. Alternatively, the Court could also invalidate the entire End-of-Life Options Act, because it violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. 

24. Either way, Illinois’ effort to control religious providers and their patients is unlawful and cannot stand.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. Catholic World Report discusses the lawsuit.

Court Allows Suit by Jewish School Denied Zoning Approval to Move Ahead

Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., v. City of Hollywood, Florida, (FL Bkr., Aug. 28, 2026), is a civil rights action being pursued in federal bankruptcy court because plaintiff is in Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy proceedings and the case is related to those proceedings. The court said in part:

Plaintiff Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., is a Jewish religious nonprofit that operates a synagogue. It purchased commercial property ... in Hollywood, Florida with the intention of opening a K–12 Jewish day school. To do so, it needed a special exception under the City of Hollywood’s Zoning and Land Development Regulations. The City denied Bet Midrash’s special exception application. Bet Midrash contends the denial was unconstitutional – that the City applied a zoning scheme that has already been found unconstitutional in another case by a District Court Judge in this District, and that the denial violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Defendant City of Hollywood moved to dismiss the complaint ..., arguing that the special exception criteria are facially neutral and generally applicable, that they are subject only to rational basis review....

... [T]he City argues that the as-applied challenge ... is deficient because Bet Midrash does not allege that the City applied the special exception criteria in a manner that was hostile to its expressive activity, or that the City selectively enforced the special exception provision against it.... Second, Bet Midrash argues that it is engaged in First Amendment protected activity – operating a synagogue and seeking to expand into religious education – and that the Free Exercise Clause protects that activity...

The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion. Religious education – particularly the operation of a Jewish day school by a religious nonprofit that also operates a synagogue – is a form of religiously motivated conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause.  At the pleading stage, the Court accepts these allegations as true. Whether Bet Midrash can ultimately prove that its proposed school constitutes protected religious exercise is a question for another day. For now, the allegations are sufficient....

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship Sues for Recognition as Student Organization

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by a Christian student organization at Broome Community College that is part of the State University of New York system. The group was denied recognition as an official student organization because its proposed constitution requires all student leaders of the organization to affirm its Statement of Faith. The school says that this religious leadership requirement violates the school's non-discrimination policy. The complaint (full text) in Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. SUNY Broome Community College, (ND NY, filed 8/21/2026), alleges in part:

... [I]n over 150 years of precedent, the Supreme Court has emphasized that religious organizations have the right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”... SUNY Broome’s actions here not only interfere but also seek to control a core component of InterVarsity’s governance, faith, and doctrine....

... [I]n the past decade, the Supreme Court has warned governments three times that they cannot deny religious organizations access to benefits because of their religious beliefs....

In 14 counts, the complaint alleges violation of the free exercise, free speech and equal protection provisions of the U.S. and New York constitutions as well as violation of New York's Human Rights Law. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship also filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction and a Memorandum of Law supporting that motion.

Becket Fund has issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Compliance With Building Code Does Not Impose Substantial Burden on Plaintiff's Religious Exercise

In Hadez v. City of Springfield, Illinois, (CD IL, Aug. 28, 2026), a state trial court had ordered plaintiff to cease residing in structures on his property that inspectors found to be unsafe and in violation of the city's Building Code. The structures lack toilets, a sewage system, running water and smoke alarms. Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction from an Illinois federal district court granting him emergency occupancy of his property. He argues that the city's land use regulations impose a substantial burden on his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment. According to the court:

Plaintiff claims he is an adherent of the Celestican Church of Christ and holds sincere religious beliefs that require him "to live off-grid in a faith-based tiny-home or POD structure on real property that he owns or controls.".... Plaintiff states that Scripture teaches him Jesus was a carpenter and he acquired the vacant lot at 1705 E. Carpenter Street as an "intentional act of religious exercise and devotion." ... Plaintiff is allegedly homeless due to the state court injunction and order.

Rejecting plaintiff's petition, the court said in part: 

... [T]he City's Zoning and Building Codes are facially neutral ordinances that pertain to public safety, welfare, and the single family nature of the residence. The ordinance does not treat Plaintiff's exercise of his religion differently from any other activity that he might do in his home.... The City is not simply prohibiting Plaintiff from exercising his faith at the property. It is prohibiting him from doing anything at the property while residing there based on health and safety concerns. If Plaintiff's home was built in compliance with the City's Codes, the City would not be seeking to enjoin Plaintiff from living on the property and Plaintiff could practice his religion at his home. Plaintiff has not shown how a structure that meets the City's Code would substantially burden his religious practice. The fact that he might incur significant costs in bringing his property up to code is not enough to show that the regulation imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiff's religious exercise.

Court Says No "Substantial Burden" On Religion When Impacted Belief Is Not Central to Plaintiff's Religion

 In John v. Aviles-Ramos, (ED NY, Aug. 27, 2026), a New York federal district court rejected claims by a former special education teacher that his former colleagues and supervisors discriminated against him because he was a Jehovah's Witness and placed a substantial burden on his practice of his religion. Rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

This claim is based on three alleged instances of misconduct.  First, that he was forced to sing “happy birthday” during school birthday celebrations; second, that he was required to bring his students to a school Christmas party; and third, that he was asked to take down a “God is love” sign....  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants imposed any policy targeting his religion, and none of the alleged incidents of misconduct rises to the level of a violation of his right to free exercise of his religion....

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged incidents of misconduct resulted from non-neutral policies.... The Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that the school’s policies surrounding the birthday parties, the Christmas celebration, or the affixing of religious signs were created specifically to target Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

In any event, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the incidents he describes substantially burdened his freedom to exercise his religious beliefs.  The determinative question in assessing whether an action imposes a substantial burden “is whether participation in the [event] . . . is considered central or important to [the plaintiff’s] practice of [his religion].” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593–94 (2d Cir. 2003). “A burden on religious exercise is not substantial when it ‘comfortably could be said that a belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff’s religion that any burden can be aptly characterized as constitutionally de minimis.’”  ...

... Though Plaintiff does not celebrate birthdays due to his religious beliefs, ... there is no basis for his claims that being instructed to sing “happy birthday” at a student’s birthday celebration ... would meaningfully burden his ability to practice as a Jehovah’s Witness.

Plaintiff next alleges that Granger informed him “that he would have to bring the kids to the room” for a Christmas party, and that he “was told there were no exceptions.” ... [A] requirement to merely escort students to a school Christmas party — but without requiring him to actually participate in the celebrations at that party — is not a substantial burden protected by the Free Exercise Clause....

Finally, Plaintiff claims that he was told to take down a sign he had “put up” reading “God is love.” ...  However, it is well established that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” ...

The court also held that plaintiff failed to allege adequate facts to support his disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims.

Suit Challenges New Jersey School Policy on Social Transitioning

Suit was filed last week in a New Jersey federal district court challenging a school board's policy on dealing with students who seek social gender transition. The school policy provides in part:

Once a student notifies a school official that s/he would like to be referred to by a different pronoun or name, or requests to use the facilities associated with a different gender, his/her school counselor will meet with the student to confidentially discuss the request. During such meeting, the school counselor will also assess the student’s parent/guardian’s knowledge, if any, of the student’s request. If the student’s parent/guardian is not aware of the request, the school counselor will assess whether, and to what extent, parents/guardians can be involved….

The complaint (full text) in Moms for Liberty v. School District of Chathams Board of Education, (D NJ, filed 8/24/2026) contends that this policy violates recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The complaint contends in part:

Parents A and B are practicing Christians who sincerely believe that God created only two genders, male and female....  As Christians, they believe it would be morally wrong to deny one’s God-given status as male or female and purport to be the opposite gender. They also believe that no public school has any right to interfere with the moral and religious formation of their children contrary to their religious beliefs against what they view as the immoral ideology of “transgenderism.”...

These provisions ... further violate the parental rights of Parents A and B by allowing the District to change a student’s name and “gender identity” without parental consent and then allowing the “transitioning” student to live an entire double life at school hidden from his or her parents, solely at the student’s request as affirmed by a school counselor who has no right to interfere in the student’s moral and religious development or to handle the obvious psychological issues involved in a student’s professed gender dysphoria....

Parents A and B have counseled Students C and D to adhere to their Christian beliefs by refusing to pretend that a fellow student has changed his or her gender and must now be referred to by a different name and/or different pronouns that do not correspond to the reality of that student’s God-given gender of male or female.  

Students C and D wish to speak what they believe is the truth of this matter in all its aspects without fear of punishment, both in school and away from school grounds...; For example, they would refuse to say that Tommy is now Sally or that he is now to be referred to as “they” as this would involve uttering what they believe to be lies that contradict their own religious and moral beliefs....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Parents Seek State Funds for Catholic School Attendance Without Requirement to First Attend Failing Public School

Suit was filed this week in a Georgia state trial court challenging on free exercise grounds the eligibility requirements for participating in the Georgia Promise Scholarship Program. Plaintiff families live in districts with low-performing public schools. The Promise Scholarship Program requires a student to be enrolled for one year in a failing school in order to qualify for funds to use for alternatives. The complaint (full text) in Tootle v. Green, (GA Super., filed 8/24/2026), alleges in part:

3. Each family knows they could obtain a free education at their assigned public schools.  But they also know that their assigned public schools would substantially interfere with their children’s religious education and that public schools impose a pressure to conform to contrary viewpoints and lifestyles.  From experience, they know that every subject would be taught in a secular manner, and that full school days would leave their children with little time for additional religious instruction.  Plaintiffs also know that peers and teachers would favor secular ways of thinking that denigrate their children’s faith and pressure their children to hide their rich spiritual heritage....

6. ... [T]o be eligible, the Promise Scholarship generally requires that a child must have been enrolled in a public school through two consecutive state enrollment counts—roughly one full school year—before becoming eligible (the attendance requirement), and the child must be assigned to a failing public school (the assignment requirement). 

7. Plaintiffs regard both the attendance requirement and the assignment requirement as burdens on their free exercise.  The attendance requirement substantially burdens free exercise by opening scholarship access only if Plaintiffs forfeit their right to provide a religious education to their children by enrolling them in public school for two semesters.  The assignment requirement substantially burdens free exercise by opening scholarship access only if Plaintiffs subject their families to the stress and financial loss of moving to a failing public school district—harms Plaintiffs believe their religion obliges them to avoid.

8. These substantial burdens would be resolved if Defendant granted a religious accommodation from the attendance and the assignment requirements, so that Plaintiffs would no longer be compelled to forfeit their religious exercise to access public benefits....

WRDW News reports on the lawsuit.

State Must Show Compelling Interest to Bar Child Sex Offender from Church Services

In Reeces Chapel Missionary Baptist Church v. Buck, (ED NC, Aug. 14, 2026), a North Carolina federal district court refused to dismiss a suit challenging North Carolina's statute barring a registered child sex offender from being within 300 feet of a location intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors. Reece's Chapel is a religious organization that offers religious services. It has a play area and an area used for religious education of minors within 300 feet of its worship hall, so worship services are considered by law enforcement to be off limits for child sex offenders. The court said in part:

Doe desires to attend religious services in the Reeces Chapel worship hall.... Doe has a "sincerely held religious belief' that he must "attend worship services at a duly constituted Christian church.... Doe alleges that subsections 14-208.18(a)(2) and 14-208.llA "render every church within a reasonable distance from [his] home off-limits because all such churches have either play areas or areas dedicated to the instruction of minors."... 

Reeces Chapel knows of Doe's conviction and status under subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) yet desires to admit him for religious services because of its "duty to minister to those seeking the comfort of Christ[,] ... includ[ing] those persons on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry."...

Section 14-208.18 includes four exceptions to subsection (a) providing relief mechanisms for covered persons (1) who are the parent or guardian of a student enrolled in a school to visit that school property, (2) who are eligible to vote to visit polling places, (3) who are eligible to attend public school to attend such schools, or ( 4) who are juveniles to visit restricted areas for medical treatment or mental health services.... Such an exception regime "reveal[ s] a lack of neutrality by protecting secular activities more than comparable religious ones."...The state appears to trust the community's safety more when an offender votes or spends time at his child's school than when the offender goes to church (where minors may or may not be present). It cannot do so without justifying its choice with evidence....Buck must show that the "restrictions serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end."...

Reeces Chapel alleges that it maintains and communicates a system of religious values to its members through congregational worship, teaching, and evangelism; that the challenged statutes exclude Doe from physically participating in the church's central expressive activities.... These allegations plausibly allege more than an incidental effect on expressive association.

Satanic Temple Sues Over Denial of Use of Iowa Capitol Rotunda for Holiday Events

In Iowa, private organizations and individuals may request use of space on the Capitol Grounds, including the Capitol Rotunda, for events that are open to the public. Earlier this month, The Satanic Temple filed suit in an Iowa federal district court alleging that applications for holiday events they have filed have been denied in violation of the organization's 1st Amendment rights and its rights under Iowa law. The complaint (full text) in The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Campbell, (SD IA, filed 8/13/2026), alleges in part:

11. The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect TST-Iowa’s right to expression. Defendants’ ongoing exclusion of TST-Iowa from engaging in protected religious speech, grounded in their beliefs of Satanism and the governing tenets of TST, at the Rotunda is based on their religious viewpoint. This exclusion constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination and is presumptively unconstitutional. The exclusion is also a content-based restriction and is not narrowly tailored to, or the least restrictive means of, achieving a compelling interest.... 

12. The First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“Iowa RFRA”) protect TST-Iowa’s right to freely exercise their religion. By denying TST-Iowa’s applications to hold an event at the Rotunda because of their religious beliefs, Defendants have violated their clearly established constitutional and statutory right to the free exercise of religion, and this exclusion cannot survive strict scrutiny.  

13. Additionally, by allowing other religious events, but prohibiting TST-Iowa’s events, Defendants have engaged in unlawful disparate treatment against TST-Iowa based on their religion, protected speech, and membership in a suspect class. This exclusion cannot survive strict scrutiny and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  

14. Finally, Defendants have also violated TST-Iowa’s statutory rights under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”). For the past two years and on an ongoing basis, Defendants have discriminated against TST-Iowa by denying them services and public accommodations, both (1) on the basis of their religion and/or their perception of their religion and (2) in retaliation for their prior reports of discrimination.....

ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Two Cert. Petitions Raising Issues of State Aid for Religious Instruction Filed

Two petitions for certiorari raising First Amendment issues were filed this week with the U.S. Supreme Court. Both involve the permissibility of state aid for religious instruction.

A petition (full text) asking the Court to review a Virginia federal district court's decision before the 4th Circuit hears the case was filed in Johnson v. Fleming, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 8/20/2026). In the case, a Virginia federal district court dismissed Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause claims challenging exclusions from the Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program for theology and religion majors. (See prior posting). ADF issued a press release announcing the filing.  Earlier this month, a certiorari petition was filed in a separate case raising a similar challenge to religious exclusions from Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program. (See prior posting.)

A petition for certiorari (full text) was also filed this week in Woolard v. Thurmond, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 8/20/2026). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected First Amendment challenges to California's refusal to purchase and permit the use of religious curricular materials in home-based independent study programs of two charter schools. (See prior posting.) First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filling.

9th Circuit: Suit Over Confiscation of Inmate's Wiccan Materials Should Not Be Dismissed on Summary Judgment

In Goff v. Rode, (9th Cir., Aug. 18, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that an inmate presented sufficient evidence to create a dispute that should go to trial over whether confiscation of his Wiccan religious items constituted a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The majority said in part:

... [A] jury could reasonably conclude that the deprivation of Goff’s protective medallion and altar cloth substantially burdened his exercise of Wicca.  Defendants do not dispute the sincerity of Goff’s religious beliefs.  And according to Goff, his medallion stored energy and had significant “spiritual” value, preventing “negative or evil forces/energies that would seek to cause imbalance or harm.”  Goff’s altar cloth was similarly “[a] consecrated space for casting runes for Divination, altar items . . . , [and] prayer focus.”...

That Goff could have alternative ways to practice Wicca in some form, as our dissenting colleague contends, does not make the deprivation of his religious items any less of a substantial burden....

Judge Rawlinson dissented, saying in part:

... There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Goff was coerced into acting contrary to his beliefs or that he was pressured in any way to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs.... Indeed, Goff continued to practice his rituals as he did before confiscation of the altar cloth and medallion....

In addition, Goff could have replaced the altar cloth and medallion, but elected not to do so.  It is undisputed that the altar cloth and medallion cost $12 each.  It is also undisputed that Goff was previously allowed to possess the medallion and chain, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that a request to replace the altar cloth and medallion would be denied.  Goff does not assert that he lacks the funds to replace the altar cloth and medallion.  Rather, he has elected not to do so because he "will not place money on [his] account until [he] start[s] getting these [11 lawsuits] dealt with and taken care of."

Ministry Loses Challenge to Ban on Sex Offenders Living Near Places That Children Gather

In Hope Prison Ministries v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, (ND TX, Aug. 14, 2026), a Christian ministry that operates transitional housing for former inmates, including sex offenders, challenged a Fort Worth Ordinance that bars registered child sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of any premises where children regularly gather. Apparently, this restriction makes it difficult for HPM to locate appropriate housing. Rejecting plaintiff's claim under the Fair Housing Act, the court said in part:

While Plaintiff may house individuals with a disability apart from them being a child sex offender, Plaintiff fails to identify any provision in the Ordinance that discriminates against persons on the basis of a qualifying disability.

The court rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, saying in part:

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts showing that the Ordinance is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.”....  A plain reading of the Ordinance shows the restriction is not aimed at any religious practice—it is aimed at protecting children from the risks associated with having child sex offenders near areas where children gather. This neither facially discriminates against adherents of any particular faiths nor targets any religious conduct. Moreover, the Ordinance is generally applicable because it does not restrict housing based on any religious or secular conditions. The Ordinance applies universally to residences under the Ordinance’s jurisdiction. Thus, all conduct—secular and religious—is limited equally, without consideration of any religious commitments or individual exceptions....

The court rejected plaintiff's equal protection claim, saying that "sex offenders are not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause." It rejected plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, saying that the challenged Ordinance is not a land use regulation. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Supreme Court Review Sought in Texas 10 Commandments Cases

 A joint petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the Supreme Court in Nathan v. Alamo Heights School District and Cribbs Ringer v. Comal Independent School District, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 8/17/2026). In Nathan, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, upheld the constitutionality of the Texas law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. (See prior posting.) Subsequently, on the basis of their Nathan decision, the 5th Circuit in an unpublished Order summarily reversed and vacated a district court's opinion in Cribbs Ringer. The cert. petition frames the Questions Presented as:

1. Whether the Establishment Clause forbids a state from mandating the permanent, conspicuous display of a government-selected version of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom. 

2. Whether permanently displaying the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom interferes with parents’ Free Exercise Clause right to direct their children’s religious education and burdens children’s religious freedom.

ACLU of Texas issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Police Enforcement of Rules Set by Farmers' Market Does Not Support a Section 1983 Action

In Conwell v. City of Benson, Minnesota, (D MN, Aug. 14, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court denied a motion for a temporary restraining order filed by an anti-abortion preacher who was cited for trespass by police after he insisted on evangelizing at a privately-run farmer's market held on city property without registering as a vendor and paying a vendor's fee. The court held that there was insufficient state involvement to support a claim under 42 USC §1983, saying in part:

... Conwell was initially approached by a volunteer working for the Market.  Then, he was approached and cited by city police working in their official capacity.   

The Court finds that Conwell is unable to show a likelihood of success on these facts.  Neither the City nor the police were involved in the creation of the Market’s vendor rules.  The police did not plan to enforce these rules by providing routine security....  The police merely responded to a call from a private citizen who volunteered at the Market.  Had Conwell ... followed the volunteer’s instruction, there would be no police involvement.  Conwell cannot manufacture a § 1983 claim by refusing to follow the Market’s rules, necessitating the involvement of police.  

Without a strong showing on the merits, the extraordinary measure of a preliminary injunction is inappropriate....

Teacher's Free-Speech Rights Not Infringed by Requirement to Use Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

In Ellis v. The Brooke Charter Schools, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a public charter high school teacher that her free-speech rights were infringed when she was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to comply with the school's requirement that teachers use students' preferred names and pronouns. While the firing was triggered by the teacher's refusal to use a former student's preferred pronouns in a requested letter of recommendation, the teacher's lawsuit alleged that the firing was because of her refusal to comply more broadly with the school's policy. The court said in part:

... [T]he Court finds that ... the requirement that Plaintiff comply with the BCS policy to use students’ preferred names and pronouns, was part of Plaintiff’s official duties as a BCS employee.... [A]ddressing students, particularly in the classroom, is essential to teaching.  A teacher’s official job-related duties, for which she is compensated, require her to communicate with students at her place of employment, including by addressing them in accord with school policy. ...

... [T]o teach effectively, which is inherent in the job duties, requires a teacher to interact with students in a way that does not create a barrier to learning or an unnecessary distraction....

With regards to the letter of recommendation, which again is not the basis of Plaintiff’s free speech claim, although writing letters of recommendation may not be part of a teacher’s principal responsibilities—that is, instructing students on academic curriculum—it is still within the realm of a teacher’s traditional and typical duties.  Recommendation letters are typically written about and derived from knowledge of a student’s classroom performance, communicated via official school channels such as email or letterhead....

The Court, however, need not reach a conclusion as to whether the speech that Plaintiff would have made in connection with the recommendation letter referenced in her complaint would have been a part of her official duties because Plaintiff does not specifically allege or otherwise argue that her refusal to write the letter was the reason for her termination or the basis for her free speech claim....

Further, even if Plaintiff’s speech fell outside of her official duties, her speech did not involve a matter of public concern.... Put simply, “the act of referring to a particular student by a particular name does not contribute to the broader public debate on transgender issues.”...

The school did not ask the court to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes Sues to Challenge School's Ban on Outside Adults at Student Religious Club Meetings

Suit was filed this week in a New Jersey federal district court by the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) challenging a New Jersey school district's ban on outside adults attending on-campus meetings of student religious groups. The ban was put in place after a complaint from the Freedom from Religion Foundation.  Fellowship of Christian Athletes organizes student chapters called "huddles" in which students pray, engage in Bible study, support one another in their faith and athletics, and eat pizza. FCA staff and adult volunteers also attend the huddles. The complaint (full text) in Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. Board of Education of the Hopewell Valley Regional School District, (D NJ, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... [T]he District’s new religious-clubs-only volunteer ban does indeed discriminate against religious clubs and single them out for disfavored treatment. While FFRF had claimed that FCA’s adult supporters were being given “unique access” to students, this is simply false. The District expressly permits adult visitors on its campuses for a variety of different reasons. And other non-religious student groups are allowed to—and regularly do—take advantage of this permission as a matter of course....

... FCA’s student leaders want to meet with fellow students and adult volunteers on campus so they can model to fellow students and coaches what it looks like to follow Christ in their school communities—something they cannot do if they’re forced to meet elsewhere.  

Having adult staff and volunteers present on campus is also critical to FCA’s religious mission because it allows FCA to see how student leaders are doing and give the students invited feedback and guidance....

Plaintiffs allege that the school's action violates their free exercise, free speech and equal protection rights as well as the federal Equal Access Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Illinois End of Life Options Act

Suit was filed yesterday in an Illinois federal district court by four Catholic doctors, a Catholic bishop and a Lutheran skilled nursing facility objecting to the requirement that they comply with Illinois' recently enacted End of Life Options Act. The complaint (full text) in Kirchoff v. Treto, (ND IL, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... Illinois’s “End-of-Life Options” Act ...—which takes effect on September 12th—both legalizes assisted suicide and mandates that doctors who conscientiously object to it nonetheless promote its alleged “benefits” to “terminally ill” patients and, if requested, refer or transfer those patients to someone who is “able and willing” to help them commit suicide..... 

Illinois’s conscription of objecting practitioners into its new assisted suicide regime blatantly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, EOLO plainly compels or restricts speech based on content and viewpoint by requiring such practitioners to (a) discuss assisted suicide’s alleged “benefits” and make specific “referrals” for the same....

EOLO also violates the First Amendment right of expressive association by forcing health care entities to hire and otherwise associate with health care professionals who promote or even directly participate in assisted suicide. 

EOLO additionally violates the First Amendment’s protection for the free exercise of religion and church autonomy. Put simply, requiring only a narrow class of “health care professionals” to discuss the “benefits” of and “refer” for assisted suicide with respect only to “terminally ill” patients, contrary to those professionals’ deeply held religious beliefs, is neither neutral nor generally applicable. And requiring health care entities to hire and retain employees who promote and even participate in assisted suicide violates the internal governance of religious institutions in deciding whom they authorize to carry out their religious mission to save and promote the dignity of every patient’s life....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.