Oklahoma AG Sues to Overturn Charter School Board's Strategic Factual Record In Rejecting Religious School

As previously reported, in May 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court split evenly, 4-4, on the constitutionality Oklahoma funding a religiously sponsored charter school. The even split was caused by Justice Barrett recusing herself, apparently because of her connection to those promoting the school. Subsequently, a new test case was created, as the National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation applied to create for a statewide virtual high school. (See prior posting.) This Tuesday, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board voted to reject the Ben Gamla School's most recent application and gave as its formal reason only that under Oklahoma law, a charter school is a public school and must be nonsectarian.  The next day, Oklahoma's Attorney General filed suit against the Charter School Board in an Oklahoma state trial court contending that there were additional unrelated reasons for rejection of Ben Gamla's application. The suit seeks a writ of mandamus to require the Board to identify and incorporate into the record other valid, non-constitutional grounds for the rejection.

The petition (full text) in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board, (OK Dist. Ct., filed 3/11/2026), alleges in part:

[T]he Board's refusal to list all of the reasons for rejecting the revised application is not coincidental. It is a deliberate decision designed to avoid issues of state law when Ben Gamla files a lawsuit seeking to overturn the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.... Oklahoma law does not permit the Board to strategically withhold valid grounds for rejection....

Presumably, if other grounds for the application denial were included, the U.S. Supreme Court might refuse to decide the federal constitutional issue posed by state funded religious schools on the ground that there were other reasons for the Board's rejection of the Ben Gamla application.

VINnews reports on the lawsuit.

Cemetery Loses Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Challenges to Permit Denial

In Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County, Minnesota, (D MN, March 11, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court dismissed claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, RLUIPA, and Minnesota law brought by a nonprofit corporation that was refused permission to establish a cemetery that would perform "green burials." While Minnesota law allowed "religious corporations" to establish private cemeteries, Steelmantown was not formed as a Minnesota religious corporation. The court, explaining its rejection of Steelmantown's 1stAmendment claims, said in part:

... [E]stablishing and operating a cemetery of any sort is not inherently or exclusively a religious practice, and Section 307.01 on its face does not “aid or oppose particular religions” or “establish[] a denominational preference.”...  The statute expressly authorizes “any private person” or “any religious corporation,” regardless of whether they adhere to any religious faith, to establish a private cemetery on land the person or corporation owns....  The statute’s reference to “any religious corporation,” meaning those incorporated under Chapter 315, establishes only a preference toward a specific type of incorporated entity, not a particular religious faith or denomination.... 

Steelmantown effectively seeks preferential treatment because of its religious beliefs that a secular but otherwise identical institution—that is, a foreign nonprofit corporation whose “identity and mission” are not “derived from religious or spiritual traditions,” ... would not receive in the same circumstances.  If anything, that outcome would appear to be closer to a violation of the Establishment Clause than the conduct Steelmantown challenges here....

Steelmantown’s claim, in essence, appears to be that its religious practices are burdened by the requirement to incorporate (or reincorporate) under Chapter 315....  But nowhere does Steelmantown allege any facts that show this requirement “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s]” any “conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet” of its religious beliefs, “meaningfully curtail[s]” its “ability to express adherence” to those beliefs, or denies it a “reasonable opportunity to engage in those activities.” ... It does not explain, for instance, why maintaining its status as a foreign nonprofit corporation under Chapter 303 is central to its ability to express its religious beliefs or engage in its religious practices.  Nor does Steelmantown allege facts that suggest the requirement “operates so as to make the practice of [its] religious beliefs more expensive.”...

5th Circuit: Principal Lacks Qualified Immunity for Barring Teachers' Praying in View of Students

In Barber v. Rounds, (5th Cir., March 9,2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Texas high school principal Bryan Rounds does not have qualified immunity as to a teacher's First Amendment claims in a suit challenging his prohibition on teachers' engaging in any prayer that students might observe. The dispute grew out of the principal cautioning teachers in connection with a staff "See You At the Flagpole" event.  The court said in part:

Barber asserts that the complaint alleges a blanket prohibition by Rounds on teachers engaging in any prayer that students might observe—regardless of whether the prayer was connected to a student-led event.  Rounds, on the other hand, urges a narrower, contextual reading:  that his directives were limited to ensuring teachers did not participate in the student-initiated SYATP gathering.   

Barber’s reading is consonant with the complaint’s language.  Her pleading alleges that Rounds told her she could not pray “in the presence of students” and could not engage in prayer where she would be “visible to students,” even away from the flagpole and even “when the teachers [are] not on school time.” ...

The second question is whether the First Amendment rights at issue were clearly established when Rounds’s challenged conduct occurred....

Barber contends that Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] supplied the requisite clarity.  Again, it does.  As Barber points out, Kennedy expressly rejected the proposition that religious expression by a public-school employee may be restricted merely because students might observe it.  The Kennedy Court rejected the rule that “visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach” may “be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—impermissibly coercive on students.”  597 U.S. at 540.

Vital Law reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Library's Policy on Use of Meeting Room

Suit was filed this week in an Alabama federal district court by Eagle Forum, a Christian community educational organization, challenging the policy of the Tuscaloosa Public Library that bars use of its large meeting room by "religious or sectarian groups for the purpose of preaching or otherwise demonstrating the beliefs of their members." The complaint (full text) in Eagle Forum of Alabama v. Tuscaloosa Public Library Bord of Trustees, (ND AL, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

101. By putting Eagle Forum to a choice between exercising its religious beliefs through faith-based programming at its events and using the Rotary Room, the Defendants burden and “penalize[ ] the free exercise of religion.” ...

112. There is no compelling government interest to justify these content- and viewpoint-based restrictions, and the Reservation Policy is not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling governmental interest.

113. Even if the Rotary Room could only be considered a limited public forum ...  it is well established that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”

The complaint also alleges that the library's policy violates the Equal Protection clause and the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

County Employee Sues Over Denial of Religious Accommodation So He Could Avoid Celebrating Pride Month

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by an employee of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works alleging that the county violated Title VII as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments and California law by denying him a religious accommodation so he would not have to celebrate Pride Month. The complaint (full text) in Batman v. Los Angeles County, (CD CA, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

4. Beginning in March 2023, the County directed all of its government departments to ensure that the “Pride Progress Flag” was flown at every government department.... The policy revisions also directed the government offices to adopt ways to demonstrate that all government offices celebrate so-called “Pride Month” and make its celebration overt, express, and universal.  

5. As a result of his sincerely held religious beliefs and a conflict with his employer’s open and notorious celebration of something Batman considers a sin, Batman requested a simple accommodation of working remotely during the one month of the year that his employment requirements conflict with his sincerely held religious beliefs.....

82. Rather than provide Batman a reasonable accommodation that was plainly available and not burdensome to anyone, Batman was instructed that he could simply use the back entrance....  

83. The Department also suggested to Batman that he seek mental health counseling for any distress he may feel as a result of the conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the Department’s denial of his requested accommodation.... In other words, the Department suggested to Batman that his religious beliefs required mental health counseling rather than accommodation.

The complaint sets out at length the Biblical basis for plaintiff's beliefs.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Federal Jury Awards Muslim Inmates $667,000 After Guards Violently Disrupted Their Prayers

In a press release, CAIR Legal Defense Fund announced that on Monday a jury in federal district court in the Eastern District of Missouri has awarded $667,000 in damages to eight Muslim inmates whose prayer gathering was broken up by prison guards who pepper-sprayed them. The complaint (full text) in Clemons v. Precythe, (ED MO, filed 3/2/2023), alleged in part:

1. With the permission of state prison guards and officials, nine Muslims gathered for prayer on the evening of February 28, 2021. They did so in their housing unit, just as they had hundreds of times in the months preceding the sadistic, violent attack that gives rise to this action. 

2. As Plaintiffs ... stood shoulder to shoulder in prayer, out of the blue, Defendant Basham ordered that there be no more praying in the housing unit. Two plaintiffs—Kent and Smith—abruptly stopped their prayers and stepped away. The others sought to quickly finish up. Nevertheless, five were pepper sprayed and one was viciously beaten, just because they prayed. 

3. Viewing Muslims as nothing more than a gang, more than a dozen guards participated in this violent episode. The brutality began as an effort to disrupt Muslims praying together but morphed into a protracted effort to punish those who prayed—dispersing Plaintiffs throughout the state via transfers and otherwise retaliating against them.

Father's Rights Not Violated by School's Refusal to Dismiss Son Early on Fridays for Religious Services

In Sapp v. Trenton Board of Education, (D NJ, March 6, 2026), a New Jersey federal district court dismissed a suit brought pro se against school officials who refused to allow plaintiff to pick up his fourth-grade son every Friday two-and-one-half hours early to take the son to Muslim religious services. Plaintiff had joint custody of his son. The son's mother, as well as school officials, objected to the father's request, even though the father had court-ordered parenting time with the son on Fridays. When plaintiff persisted, the Board of Education barred him from school premises. Plaintiff asserted nine causes of action against school officials. Dismissing his due process claim, the court said in part:

Courts have held that “[t]he right of parents to raise their children without undue state interference is well established.”...  Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that “[i]t has long been recognized that parents have a constitutional right to control the education of their children.”...  But such a right is “neither absolute nor unqualified.”... 

Liberally construed, the SAC [second amended complaint] asserts that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right to be on school grounds without affording him due process.  However, the Third Circuit has declined to find that such a right exists....

Dismissing Plaintiff's 1st Amendment claims, the court said in part:

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by “unduly preferring non-religion over religion and interfering with [his] right to peaceably assemble for religious purposes.”...

To support his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges that after picking his son up from school early two Fridays in a row for prayer and submitting a letter to the school seeking a religious exemption, he was turned away by security the next Friday....  Plaintiff also alleges that [school principal] Ramcharan told Plaintiff that his son could pray at school because two-and-a-half hours once per week was too much time for Plaintiff’s son to miss....  Plaintiff was banned from school grounds shortly afterwards....  Even accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights.  Plaintiff fails to allege how the inability to remove his son from school impacts Plaintiff’s right to assemble and to exercise his religious rights.  

Moreover, there is no suggestion that Defendants acted to suppress Plaintiff’s religious views or ideas....  As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a First Amendment freedom of assembly violation....

The court then added a lengthy footnote which reads in part:

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim also fails if construed under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment....  “[T]he First Amendment is only implicated if the governmental burden on religion is ‘substantial,’ which essentially means that the state may not compel an individual to act contrary to his religious beliefs.” ... Here, Plaintiff has pled no facts upon which the Court could infer that Plaintiff’s religious rights were substantially burdened based on his inability to pick up his son from school on two occasions.

7th Circuit: Prison's Refusal to Provide Muslim Prayer Schedules at State Expense Is Permissible

In Childs v. Webster, (7th Cir., March 4, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was not a violation of a Muslim inmate's free exercise rights under RLUIPA or the 1st Amendment when his prison refused to distribute corrected prayer-time schedules to Muslim inmates. Inmates were allowed to purchase corrected schedules with their own funds or by outside donations. Prison policies bar use of taxpayer funds to purchase inmate personal property items. The chaplain had originally made printed schedules available at prison expense to inmates in the chapel, but those schedules turned out to be inaccurate. The court said in part:

The de minimis cost of purchasing a prayer schedule does not rise to the level of a “substantial” burden on religious exercise. Such a “truly negligible” and “unquestionably affordable” financial burden could not realistically coerce Childs to violate his sincerely held religious belief..... Absent a true coercive dilemma, to conclude that Childs’s claim still satisfies the “substantial burden” requirement of RLUIPA would give the word a meaning it cannot bear and render Congress’s choice of the word “substantial” meaningless surplusage.... And because Childs failed to carry his initial burden of persuasion, the government is not required to justify its policy under strict scrutiny....

... [P]rison policy, which does not permit the purchase of personal property for inmates, religious or secular, is a neutral and generally applicable rule that does not violate the Free Exercise Clause...

State Attorney General May Enforce Subpoena Seeking from Archdiocese Evidence of Clergy Sexual Abuse

In State of Washington v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, (WA App, March 2, 2026), a Washington state appellate court allowed enforcement of a subpoena issued by the state Attorney General's Office (AGO) seeking from the Catholic Archdiocese evidence relating to clergy sexual abuse. In issuing the subpoena the Attorney General's Office relied on investigative authority given to it by a provision of the state's Charitable Trust Act. The trial court had quashed the subpoena because the Charitable Trust Act exempts "religious corporations ... operated in good faith as religious organizations" from its provisions. The appeals court, however, held that giving that exemption to religious organizations violates the state constitution's provision barring the granting to any person or corporation privileges or immunities not equally belonging to all citizens or corporations. The court went on to say in part:

Antifavoritism analysis under article I, section 12 subjects legislation to a two-part test.....  First, the court asks whether a challenged law grants a “privilege” or “immunity” for purposes of our state constitution....  If the answer is yes, then the court asks whether there is a “reasonable ground” for granting that privilege or immunity....

The Archdiocese says this case does not involve a ... direct impact on the fundamental right to be free from unwanted bodily interference, because exempting it from the AGO’s statutory subpoena power does not directly condone the invasion of any person’s bodily autonomy,,,,

As the Archdiocese correctly observes, a civil authority in the United States cannot sit in judgment of whether the Archdiocese has conformed to its faith and doctrine.  To the extent, by its subpoena or otherwise, the AGO were to purport to second-guess whether a given action by the Archdiocese was truly “for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof” of the church, the AGO and its use of the subpoena would violate the federal and state constitutional religious protections. ...

At the same time, the subpoena to this point does not implicate a civil authority second-guessing the Archdiocese’s decision-making or good faith, but requires only the production of documents..... The Archdiocese has not pointed to any authority that constitutional religious protections are offended by inquiry into whether criminal or tortious conduct has occurred, including sexual abuse by clergy.  

We perceive in the AGO’s subpoena a scope that, if pursued, would clearly unconstitutionally infringe the Archdiocese’s religious protections, to the extent the AGO seeks to determine whether any given act or expenditure by the Archdiocese was “for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof” of the church.  But we also perceive a scope that clearly does not infringe the Archdiocese’s religious protections, to the extent the AGO seeks evidence relevant to determining that an act occurred that is criminal, tortious, or both, including sexual abuse by clergy.

Suit Alleges Unconstitutional Exclusion of Muslim Schools from Texas School Choice Program

A Muslim parent filed suit this week in a Texas federal district court challenging the state's exclusion of accredited Islamic private schools from participation in the Texas Education Freedom Accounts (TEFA) program. TEFA is a publicly funded school choice program. The complaint (full text) in Cherkaoui v. Paxton, (SD TX, filed 3/1/2026), alleges in part:

Since TEFA's inception, Defendants have systematically targeted Islamic schools for exclusion based on their religious identity, perceived "Islamic ties," and alleged connections to organizations Governor Abbott has designated as "foreign terrorist" or "transnational criminal" entities—even where those schools are fully accredited, satisfy all statutory eligibility criteria, and have no actual connection to terrorism or unlawful activity.

The complaint contends that the state has violated the 1st and 14th Amendments, alleging in part: 

85. Defendants' exclusion of Islamic schools is not neutral or generally applicable. It is explicitly based on religious identity (schools are targeted because they are Islamic), perceived religious association (hosting community events with Islamic civil-rights organizations), and religious animus (official statements equating Islamic identity with terrorism)....

89.   By systematically excluding Islamic schools while approving hundreds of Christian, Jewish, and other non-Islamic religious schools for TEFA participation, Defendants have engaged in denominational discrimination that favors non-Islamic religions over Islam in the distribution of a public benefit. 

90. Defendants' policies and public statements evince a purpose and effect of disfavoring Islam and conveying governmental disapproval of the Muslim faith....

Texas Tribune reports on the lawsuit. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Supreme Court in Shadow Docket Case Rejects California's Policy on Informing Parents of Student's Gender Transition

On Monday evening, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup. Ct., March 2, 2026), barred enforcement against objecting parents of a controversial California school policy that requires student consent before disclosing to parents a student's gender transitioning in school. A California federal district court had enjoined enforcement of the policy in a challenge by parents and teachers. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, stayed the district court's injunction, thus reinstating the policy. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled for the parents.  It vacated the 9th Circuit's stay as to parents who object to the policy, but left the stay in place as to teachers. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the injunction as to teachers as well. Justices Jackson, Kagan and Sotomayor dissented.

The per curiam opinion says in part:

We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim.  California’s policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children.” ...  The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs....

The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds.  Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to “the upbringing and education of children.” ... The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health....

Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The dissent questions how the Court can adhere to parental-rights precedent after its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization..... But Dobbs calls into question neither the doctrine of substantive due process nor the other unexpressed rights that the doctrine protects....

 ... [C]ontrary to the dissent’s charge, granting interim relief is not a sign of the Court’s “impatience” to reach the merits.... Instead, the grant reflects the Court’s judgment about the risk of irreparable harm to the parents.... 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Today’s decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction.  A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court’s injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case’s merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute.  It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as regular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation....

As to due process particularly... I have no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make..... On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children.  But California’s policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children’s health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line.  And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief. 

The Court, however, would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis—in short, to do law in the right way—if it had followed our ordinary processes....

Justice Sotomayor, without writing or joining an opinion, stated that she would have left the 9th Circuit's injunction in place both as to parents and teachers.

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....

Street Preachers Can Move Ahead with Free Exercise Claims Against Police

In Raio v. City of Chicago, (ND IL, Feb. 24, 2026), two street preachers and a Gospel singer who had been cited and, on another occasion, arrested for violating Chicago's sound ordinance brought a civil rights action against the city. The three use a microphone connected to a battery-operated speaker for their preaching and music. Ruling on the city's motion to dismiss, the court said that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged First Amendment retaliation, free exercise, false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and IRFRA claims, but dismissed plaintiffs' vagueness, equal protection, and free speech claims. The court said inn part:

Plaintiffs allege that Chicago police officers “cite all street preachers, regardless of whether they meet the requirements of the [Amplification Ordinance] and regardless of the evidence,”... and “engag[e] in a targeted practice of enforcing their interpretation of the [Amplification Ordinance] against only religious speakers,”... Defendants argue that the Amplification Ordinance is instead a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation....

Plaintiffs have failed to allege a single instance in which they, or anyone similarly situated, used amplification to communicate a non-religious message without consequence.  Nor do they allege that secular speakers regularly violate the Amplification Ordinance without any police intervention.  Plaintiffs instead include only conclusory allegations ... extrapolated from the two instances in which the Defendant Officers interacted with them.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants have selectively enforced the Amplification Ordinance....

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Amplification Ordinance burdens their religious exercise....  Plaintiffs instead contend that Defendants violated their First Amendment free exercise rights by burdening their religious beliefs via an unwritten policy and custom of targeting religious activity....

... Plaintiffs provide enough facts that Defendants’ unwritten policy targeting amplified religious speech imposes, at least plausibly, an unjustifiably substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion for the claim to move forward....

... Plaintiffs have not alleged any instances where police officers declined to cite or arrest any similarly situated secular individuals under similar conditions....  As such, Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory allegations fail to suggest that Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent and, consequently, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim...

Clergy Seek Access To ICE Detainees

Suit was filed this week in a Minnesota federal district court by Evangelical Lutheran and United Church of Christ organizations and by a Catholic priest seeking access to a federal building in Minneapolis that houses individuals held by Immigration and Customs Enforcement personnel. The complaint (full text) in Minneapolis Area Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D MN, filed 2/23/2026) alleges in part:

The Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building ... now stands in stark contrast to its namesake’s legacy. The federal government is using the building to hold Minnesotans detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) while barring faith leaders from offering prayer, pastoral guidance, sacramental ministry, and spiritual comfort to detainees in moments of profound fear, isolation, and despair. By prohibiting faith leaders from providing essential pastoral care to individuals in ICE detention, the federal government unconstitutionally obstructs their sacred obligation to exercise their faith through ministry to community members in the greatest need of spiritual comfort....

Defendants’ policies and practices unreasonably burden Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment and the broad protections under RFRA.

[Thanks to Heather E. Kimmel for the lead.]

Ban on Feeding Feral Animals Did Not Violate Plaintiff's Free Exercise Rights

In Barroca v. Hayward Area Recreation and Parks District, (ND CA, Feb. 23, 2026), a California federal district court dismissed all but a selective prosecution claim in a suit involving activities at a public park in Hayward, California.  Plaintiff, a lover of cats, regularly fed feral and neighborhood cats in the park in violation of an ordinance prohibiting the feeding of wild or feral animals.  He also regularly, to little avail, asked authorities to enforce against dog owners the ordinance requiring dogs in the park to be on leashes. Plaintiff sued the park district and park rangers alleging failure to perform mandatory duties under California law and violations of the Fourteenth, Fourth, and First Amendment.  

One of plaintiff's claims was that the no-feeding ordinance violated his 1st Amendment free-exercise rights. In dismissing that claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that under his Catholic faith and the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi, he believes he has “a duty to God to take care of and love all of God’s animals.” ...  Due to these religious beliefs, Plaintiff “takes care of, feeds, shelters, provides medical needs, spay and neuters, play, love, and protect these cats and all of God’s animals.”  ... Plaintiff has alleged that this park ordinance interferes with his ability to feed cats within Meek Park, thus burdening his religious duty to take care of animals, specifically, the cats that frequent Meek Park. 

HARD Ordinance 19(b) is neutral and generally applicable.  Any burden it places on Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his religious beliefs in caring for animals is incidental.  Since the law is neutral and generally applicable, Plaintiff must show that it is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate government purpose.  But there are many potential legitimate bases for the rule: for example, feeding wild or feral animals attracts them to the park, increasing the risk of conflict with parkgoers and their pets, and the spread of disease.  Since the rule has a conceivable legitimate basis, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim fails.

Various other claims against the park district and park rangers were also dismissed.

City's Regulation of Donation Boxes Violates Christian Nonprofit's Free Speech Rights

In Arms of Hope v. City of Mansfield, Texas, (ND TX, Feb. 19, 2026), a Christian social service organization challenged the city's regulations on Unattended Donation Boxes (UDBs). The location and color requirements ban them from churches and schools and hide them from public view where they are allowed. A Texas federal district court held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulations under RLUIPA because it does not have a property interest in the sites where its Boxes are located. The court went on, however, to analyze plaintiff's 1st Amendment claims, holding that the regulations violate plaintiff's free speech rights, but not its free exercise rights. The court said in part:

Plaintiff first argues that Defendant has acted with animus toward Plaintiff.... The City’s actions, though concerning, do not appear to target Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s religious motivations....

When compared to non-religious UDBs, Plaintiff’s UDBs are treated identically. The Donation Box Law does not differentiate between those UDBs run by a religious organization and those run by a secular one. Accordingly, the Donation Box Law is a neutral law of general applicability and is facially constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause....

 Charitable solicitations are fully protected speech....

There is no evidence in the record before the Court that Defendant’s negative treatment of Plaintiff reflects a content preference nor the City’s disagreement with Plaintiff’s message.... Accordingly, the Court analyzes the Donation Box law under intermediate scrutiny....

... [W]hen asked “[i]s it that the City does not like the look of donation bins?,” the City’s representative responded, “No. We don’t like the accumulation of trash and debris or unmaintained areas.” The City reiterated that a clean, well-maintained donation box is “not an aesthetic harm”.... Because the City does not regard the medium of expression itself—UDBs—as the cause of visual blight, an outright ban on UDBs is not narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s interests.... 

Defendant fails to demonstrate how the Law’s permitting and maintenance requirements, which burden substantially less speech than the challenged provisions, would fail to achieve the government’s interests....

Given the City’s admission that it makes the “determination” as to color without providing a definite standard, the Court finds that the prohibition on “high-intensity colors” to be an unconstitutional prior restraint.

State's Criticism of Pregnancy Resource Centers Did Not Violate Clinics' Free Speech or Free Exercise

 In A Woman's Concern, Inc. v. Healey, (D MA, Feb. 17, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a religiously affiliated pregnancy resource center ("Your Options Medical Centers" (YOM)) that the state Department of Public Health violated plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights when it disseminated information critical of pregnancy resource centers. In its 59-page opinion, court said in part:

The amended complaint fails primarily because it does not plausibly suggest that Defendants have targeted YOM for actual or threatened enforcement action, let alone to stifle its protected speech or viewpoint.  First, YOM has not plausibly alleged any unconstitutional regulatory action.  YOM takes issue with a guidance letter sent by DPH to every licensed physician, physician assistant, nurse, pharmacist, pharmacy, hospital, and clinic in Massachusetts reminding them to abide by various healthcare regulations.  This guidance highlighted several medical standards and requirements, some of which apply to YOM and some that do not.  No reasonable person reading the guidance would have believed it selectively targets YOM or other PRCs for their views.  The guidance aimed at enforcing numerous, neutral state laws, none of which YOM challenges.  Similarly, broad, public-facing campaign statements criticizing the practices of PRCs generally as “dangerous” “public health threats” constitute permissible government expression, not unconstitutional threats of enforcement against YOM.... The amended complaint also alleges no facts to suggest that state officials wielded threats of enforcement action as a mechanism to suppress YOM’s speech, rather than to crack down on violations of state law. 

Second, Defendants focused the campaign not on the pro-life, religious views of PRCs, but rather on the quality of their medical services and advertising practices.  None of Defendants’ statements suggest any hostility to religion.  No allegations plausibly show that Defendants targeted their enforcement decisions based on the views or religion of YOM specifically or PRCs generally.  Thus, the amended complaint fails, including YOM’s request for “[a] permanent injunction ordering Defendants . . . [to] ceas[e] any advertising activity or campaign that falsely accuses YOM of misconduct or of being a threat to public health.”... 

Universal Hub reports on the decision. 

Suit Challenges Colorado's Blaine Amendment

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court challenging the Colorado Constitution's ban on use of state funds to support any religious school as violative of the Free Exercise, Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The challenge was brought by a Board of Cooperative Education Services (BOCES), a private entity which contracts with schools to provide them innovative educational services. BOCES can receive and administer state and federal education grants. The complaint (full text) in Education Re-Envisioned BOCES v. Cordova, (D CO, filed 2/13/2026), focuses on the inability of BOCES to contract with religious schools, alleging in part:

24. The Colorado Department of Education (CDE) provides funding to ERBOCES for these contract schools....

33. In August 2025 ... ERBOCES entered a contract with Riverstone Academy to provide tuition-free education to the parents and children of Pueblo County, Colorado.  

34. After ERBOCES contracted with Riverstone, it submitted its annual request for state funding to CDE. ERBOCES included Riverstone Academy’s students in its request.  

35. In response to its funding request, ERBOCES received a letter from CDE stating that Colorado law requires ERBOCES to refuse to contract with any religious school....  

36. Specifically, the letter informed ERBOCES that providing funding to Riverstone Academy would violate the Colorado Constitution and Colorado statutory law because Riverstone is a Christian school....

73. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits.” Carson, 596 U.S. at 778....

76. State provisions prohibiting aid to “sectarian” institutions date back to the 1870s and were enacted out of hostility to certain religious groups. Such provisions were “born of bigotry” against religion, especially the Catholic church.....  

77. Colorado’s Blaine amendment shares this “shameful pedigree.”...

93. To the extent the Colorado Constitution and any implementing statutes require school districts and BOCES to scrutinize contract school applicants’ curricula to determine if they are religious, they violate the Establishment Clause. ...

Christian Post reports on the lawsuit.

Child Evangelism Fellowship Sues School District Over Discriminatory Treatment

Suit was filed this week in an Illinois federal district court by Child Evangelism Fellowship alleging that fees charged to it for after-school use of school facilities and its exclusion from literature distribution forums and Backpack Nights forum violate its rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments as well as the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The complaint (full text) in Child Evangelism Fellowship of Illinois, Inc. v. Moline-Coal Valley Unified School District #40, (CD IL, filed 2/10/2026), alleges in part:

For more than five years, Defendants have categorized CEF as a “Category II” church and church-affiliated group, treating them differently than similarly situated nonreligious organizations. Defendants’ discriminatory policies target religious organizations like CEF’s Good News Club, compel them to pay discriminatory facility use fees, prevent them from distributing literature to students to take home to their parents, and bar them from Backpack Nights. In other words, Defendants have unconstitutionally relegated CEF to constitutional orphan status and discriminatory treatment in all forums available for similarly situated organizations in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution....

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Supreme Court's Decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor

Yesterday, the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education held a hearing titled Defending Faith and Families Against Government Overreach: Mahmoud v. Taylor.  A video of the entire hearing, written prepared statements of the subcommittee chairman and four witnesses, as well as the Committee's "Hearing Recap" are all available here on the Subcommittee's website. Three of the witnesses strongly supported the Supreme Court's Mahmoud decision, while one of the witnesses argued that Mahmoud went too far in permitting parental opt outs. UPI reported on the hearing, saying in part that "Republicans expressed concern ... about school districts ignoring the ruling, while Democrats voiced fears that the ruling condoned discrimination." [Thanks to Zalman Rothschild for the lead.]