Oklahoma City Sued Over Denial of Zoning Approval for Mosque; DOJ Investigates City's Practices

Suit was filed yesterday in an Oklahoma federal district court by the Islamic Society of Tulsa challenging as a violation of RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment the denial of zoning approval for a mosque in a suburb of Tulsa. The complaint (full text) in The Islamic Society of Tulsa v. City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, (ND OK, filed 8/3/2026), alleges in part:

3. ... [A]fter almost 30 years of growth, the spiritual needs of Muslims in Broken Arrow cannot be served by the community’s Tulsa house of worship alone. The mosque in Tulsa is too small, and the Muslims in Broken Arrow are too numerous and too far spread.  

4. Realizing this problem, IST purchased land in Broken Arrow with the hope of expanding. The land they purchased was right next to another church, located in the vicinity of several more, and suitable in every way for the construction and operation of a house of worship.  

5. The City’s own professional staff recommended approval of IST’s project. So did the City’s Planning Commission. However, after a wave of bigoted opposition from members of the community and local politicians, the City Council voted to deny IST’s applications.   

6. The City Council’s decision was a stark departure from the norm. The City regularly approves nearly identical applications for churches..... The City also grants similar requests for non-religious entities, even those with massive commercial footprints....  

7. However, when Muslims in Broken Arrow sought to do the same, the City Council denied them. And the latest media reports containing the email correspondence between constituents and council members reveal why: animosity towards Muslims and an irrational fear of Islam.

CAIR issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. Broken Arrow Sentinel reports on the lawsuit.

The lawsuit comes after the Department of Justice in a July 17 letter to the city said it has initiated an investigation pursuant to RLUIPA into the city's land use practices. the city issued a press release last week announcing the investigation.

Clergyman Loses Attempt to Access Prison to Conduct Religious Services

In Brooks v. Smith, (ED TN, July 30, 2026), a Tennessee federal district court refused to set aside its previous dismissal of a suit brought by a clergyman who contends that he was being prevented from participating in religious services for prisoners. He wants to participate in Holy Communion and in anointment for healing and deliverance with inmates. The court said in part:

Here, Plaintiff is not alleging that Defendants have prohibited him from practicing Holy Communion or anointment altogether. Rather, he challenges restrictions on conducting Holy Communion and anointment within a correctional facility.... That distinction matters.... [T]he Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee unfettered access to practice one’s religion in any manner or location one chooses. Indeed, courts have recognized that outside clergy and chaplains do not possess a constitutional right to enter correctional institutions to administer religious services or sacraments. ...

Plaintiffs pointed to Coalition for Spiritual v. Noem, a 2026 federal district court case that held ICE agents violated RFRA when they denied a religious group entry into an ICE facility to minister to detainees. Distinguishing that case, the court said in part:

... RFRA ... has no application to Plaintiff’s claims because it does not apply to state or local governments.... Furthermore, while an individual may have a valid cause of action against the federal government under RFRA, it does not necessarily follow that the same conduct by a state government is cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause. This is because RFRA provides broader protections for religious exercise and imposes a far more demanding standard on government action than the Free Exercise Clause itself....

The court also rejected plaintiff's Establishment Clause argument. 

Code Enforcement Against Jewish Nursery School Does Not Violate Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA

In Dreskin v. Borough of Bogota, (D NJ, July 31, 2026), a New Jersey federal district court rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA to enforcement of building, fire and health code provisions against a small Jewish nursery school. The court said in part:

On their face and as applied, the Building, Fire, and Health Code provisions at issue are content neutral, and Plaintiff does not identify any specific provision that targets religious conduct.  Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to support her claim of disparate treatment with evidence of similarly situated secular comparators who were treated more favorably....

... [A] plaintiff must show more than a mere inconvenience to establish a “substantial burden” under the RLUIPA; the burden must render religious exercise “effectively impracticable” but does not require a showing of discriminatory governmental conduct....

The Borough’s enforcement actions have not rendered Plaintiff’s religious exercise “effectively impracticable”—Plaintiff remains free to practice her faith in other ways, and the enforcement regime does not permanently prohibit PLAYfully from operating or expanding in the future. Rather, the Borough is seeking to enforce the Building, Fire, and Health Codes based on Plaintiff’s prior noncompliance.  Once Plaintiff achieves compliance and resolves any penalties from past violations, her ability to provide religious instruction through the program is not foreclosed on the same grounds.  Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial burden under the RLUIPA.    

Plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Terms provision likewise fails, as she has failed to identify a secular comparator that is similarly situated in the context of the regulation....

Synagogue Challenges Firearms Ordinance

An Orthodox Jewish synagogue and its rabbi filed suit last week in a Maryland federal district court challenging a recently adopted Montgomery County, Maryland Ordinance that, among other things, prohibits possessing a firearm within 100 yards of a place of worship unless one is a law enforcement officer or licensed security guard. One effect of this is to prevent the synagogue from using its own trained security team for protection. The complaint alleges the Jewish law favors reliance on volunteer members of the community, rather than outsourcing protection of the community.

The complaint (full text) in Silver Spring Jewish Center, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Maryland, (D MD, filed 7/30/2026), alleges in part:

5. Luckily, the Constitution protects religious rights and the right to self-defense. Residents of Montgomery County have a constitutionally protected right to exercise their faith, including faiths, like Plaintiffs’, whose religious codes require providing for their own and communal self-defense, including by bearing arms when necessary. In violation of clear, binding Supreme Court precedent, Montgomery County’s law, which singles out houses of worship to their detriment, is not neutral and generally applicable and cannot survive the strict scrutiny to which the First Amendment subjects such intrusions on the free exercise of religion and religious autonomy.  

6. The Second Amendment violation is also clear. EB23-26 forbids conduct that falls squarely within the “plain text” of the Second Amendment, rendering it presumptively unconstitutional....

The Ordinance also prohibits carrying a firearm within 100 yards of schools, libraries, hospitals, parks and various other places of public assembly. The complaint goes on to allege in part:

On the Sabbath and Jewish holidays, Rabbi Shapiro’s sincerely held religious beliefs require that he walk to the synagogue for communal prayer.... The only path between his home and his synagogue requires him to walk within 100 yards of two public schools, two private schools, two parks, and three other houses of worship—each one a “place of public assembly” subject to the Ban. 

JNS reports on the lawsuit.

Arizona Supreme Court Interprets Clergy Exemption from Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse

 In Jane Doe I v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints, (AZ Sup. Ct., July 29, 2026), the Arizona Supreme Court settled important interpretive questions regarding Arizona's requirement to report child abuse to authorities and the ability of a court to inquire into a clergy member's failure to do so. At issue was the scope of the clergy exemption from Arizona's reporting law when a congregation member admits the abuse to the clergy member. The issue arose in a suit by abuse victims against the Church and clergy members. The Court summarized its holding:

We must decide if a factfinder—a court or jury—may inquire into whether a clergy member violated religious doctrine by failing to report abuse of a minor.  Subsection (A) of A.R.S. § 13-3620 (the “Reporting Statute”) requires “[a]ny person who reasonably believes that a minor” is the victim of abuse to “immediately report or cause reports to be made.”  The Reporting Statute, however, allows a clergy member who receives “a confession or confidential communication” to refrain from reporting the “confession” or “confidential communication” if the clergy member “determines that it is reasonable and necessary within the concepts” of the clergy member’s religion....  We hold that the First Amendment generally prohibits factfinders from inquiring into a clergy member’s application of his particular religious doctrine—absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes—in determining whether reporting should be withheld if “reasonable and necessary.” 

We next determine the meaning of the terms “confession” and “confidential communication” in the Reporting Statute.  We hold that “confession” means “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.”  A “confidential communication” refers to “speech or correspondence that is treated as private or made in confidence, generally under circumstances that indicate the communication is intended only for the person or persons addressed.”  The First Amendment, however, requires courts to exercise substantial deference to a religious institution’s own doctrinal conception of “confession” or “confidential communication.” 

Finally, we resolve whether a factfinder may determine who qualifies as a “member of the clergy.”  We hold that the First Amendment protects the right of a religious institution to define who is a “member of the clergy” and, absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, prohibits factfinders from inquiring into the religious institution’s designation of clergy.

12 News reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Town's Refusal to Permit Nativity Display on Town Square

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court challenging an upstate New York town's refusal to permit placing of a privately-sponsored nativity display in the town square during the Christmas season. The complaint (full text) in Polverino v. Town of Brighton, New York, (WD NY, filed 7/21/2026), alleges that the town every year permits a Menorah display sponsored by Chabad Lubavitch, while Brighton town officials have ignored, evaded and effectively denied plaintiff's Nativity display requests for more than two years. Plaintiff alleges that this violates his free speech and free exercise rights, as well as the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause and the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection clause. ACLJ issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

9th Circuit: Trial Court Must Evaluate Penological Interest In Refusing to Replace Inmate's Arabic-Language Quran

In Kane v. Haynes, (9th Cir., July 23, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of a free exercise claim brought by a Muslim inmate against prison officials. The court said in part:

While transferring then-inmate Ali Kane between units at the Airway Heights Correctional Center, Department of Corrections (DOC) officers disposed of an unmarked Arabic-language copy of the Quran.  After Kane initiated DOC’s grievance process, DOC offered Kane a replacement copy in English. Kane refused, stating that his religious practice requires him to memorize and utter his prayers in Arabic. 

Kane sued the correctional officers in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the officers’ destruction of Kane’s copy of the Quran and refusal to provide a substitute Arabic-language copy violated his First Amendment right to free exercise....

... Kane ... offered that his inability to memorize the Arabic passages has severe religious consequences (e.g., sin cannot be forgiven as required by Islam), and Kane, having since forgotten the verses, cannot meet his daily religious obligations.   

The district court, however, did not ... evaluate whether the government has shown a legitimate penological interest justifying its actions under [Turner v. Safley]...  We thus remand so that the district court may consider the Turner factors....

Father's Suit Seeking Opt-Out for Son of Some Class Lessons Moves Ahead

In Alan L. v. Lexington Public Schools, (D MA, July 21, 2026), the father of a kindergartener sued seeking to opt his child out of classroom lessons and activities that deal with sexual orientation and gender identity and violate plaintiff's Christian religious beliefs. Last year, the court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the school to provide an opt out. (See prior posting). Nevertheless, defendants now moved for a dismissal of all plaintiff's claims. Recognizing that the suit is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, the court in its opinion issued this week refused to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims and most of plaintiff's other contentions, including their claim of qualified immunity. The court however dismissed plaintiff's substantive due process claim because Mahmoud had based its holding on the Free Exercise clause, while a prior 1st Circuit case had held that the due process clause does not create a parental right to opt one's children out of particular lessons.

9th Circuit: Plan to Convince Vaccination Objectors to Reconsider Did Not Show Hostility To Religion

 In Seagraves v. Wahington State Department of Children, Youth and Families, (9th Cir., July 21, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims by 18 former employees of the Department of Children, Youth and Families who were separated from the agency after their requests for religious exemptions from the state's 2021 Covid vaccine mandate were rejected. The court said in part:

The [complaint] does not plausibly allege personal involvement by any of the Officials [named as defendants] in constitutional violations of the Employees’ free exercise, equal protection, or procedural due process rights.  All the Employees’ requests for accommodations in their current roles were denied, based on determinations that they could not perform the essential functions of their positions unvaccinated without endangering the health and safety of others in the workplace, including children and families.  Accordingly, their supposed constitutional injuries flow from this determination.  Yet the [complaint] does not allege that any of the Officials [named as defendants] personally participated in evaluating the Employees’ accommodation requests or that they played a role in denying them pre-termination hearings....

The remaining factual allegations that the Employees provided in their pleadings undermine the plausibility of their “religious animus” theory.  First consider Hunter’s August 23, 2021, email discussing DCYF’s communications plan for vaccination.  The goal of this plan was to convince as many DCYF employees as possible to get vaccinated.  Part of the plan involved addressing various potential objections to vaccination: medical safety, convenience, religious objections, and political tribalism.  This plan did not single out religiously motivated objections for special treatment.  Religious objections were included among several secular objections, and the aim of the plan was to convince DCYF employees that their concerns about vaccination were unfounded, regardless of the religious or secular character of those concerns.  That religious objections were one of several objections to address does not, without more, indicate hostility toward religion....

Catholic Sisters Sue To Invalidate New York's Assisted Suicide Counseling Requirement

Last week, four Orders of Catholic Sisters along with the Catholic Diocese and Bishop of Rockville Centre, New York, filed suit in a New York federal district court challenging, at least as applied to them, the constitutionality of New York's Medical Aid in Dying Act as it interacts with the state's Palliative Care Information Act. Labelling these a "Suicide Counseling Mandate", the 102-page complaint (full text) in Carmelite Sisters for the Aged and Infirm, Inc. v. James, (ND NY, filed 7/17/2026) alleges in part:

13. The many New York nurse practitioners, doctors, mental health professionals, hospitals, and care homes with religious or moral objections to participating in assisted suicide will have nowhere to go, because New York’s purported “opt-out” is among the narrowest in the nation, and doesn’t apply at all to independent assisted living facilities, including those run by the Benedictine Sisters. The Catholic patients who wish to die without being offered the chance to kill themselves at their lowest moment will be left out in the cold.....

15. First, the First Amendment’s protected sphere of church autonomy requires the government to respect and stay out of matters of governance within religious institutions, such as how the Catholic Church chooses to implement its beliefs on the sanctity of human life and the decision of religious communities to form themselves around those same principles. 

16. Second, its protection of the free exercise of religion prohibits the government from burdening the sincere religious beliefs of Plaintiffs and the patients they serve unless the state is furthering an interest of the highest order and using the least restrictive means to do so—an exceedingly high bar Defendants cannot meet.  

17. Third, its protections against religious gerrymanders prohibit the government from enacting legal burdens that fall uniquely on religious adherents—such as those who object to providing assisted suicide. 

18. Fourth, its protections against compelled speech prevent the government from forcing Catholic doctors and nurses to speak the government’s preferred, supportive message of assisted suicide. 

19. And fifth, its protections for freedom of association allow the Catholic Church, its various communities, and the patients they serve, to organize themselves into like-minded communities with the same values and beliefs—the mission of which is to live faithfully according to those beliefs, for however long or short a time....

Becket issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Artist's Suit Over Removal of Trump with Jesus Painting Is Dismissed

In Rose v. Arts Bonita, Inc., (MD FL, July 12, 2026), a Florida federal district court dismissed, with leave to amend, a complaint against the city and the organizer of an art festival held in a public park in Bonita Springs, Florida. A painting of Jesus blessing President Trump, displayed at the festival by plaintiff Julia Rose, was removed by the festival organizer and Rose was told to leave. The court said in part:

To start, Rose has not alleged that the City took any direct action to infringe on her First Amendment rights. The City itself was not at the art festival. Rose does not claim that municipal employees asked her to leave, nor does she suggest they had any problem with her art. Instead, her grievance lies against a private organization and its director....

... [E]ven if the art festival's conduct could somehow be pinned on the City, Rose's claim runs into another wall. A municipality cannot be held liable simply because it ... permits an event whose organizers allegedly violate the Constitution. There is no respondeat superior liability for civil rights violations....

The court rejected plaintiff's claim under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act, saying in part:

To be sure, getting removed from an art show because of religious content might look and feel like discrimination. But there is a fundamental difference between an act of discrimination and a government-imposed burden on the exercise of religion. ...

The Court concluded:

... [T]he Court cannot say a more carefully drafted pleading would be entirely devoid of merit. When a pro se plaintiff's complaint falls short, she generally gets another bite at the apple if a better-drafted version might state a claim.... So while the City's motion to dismiss is granted, the door is not slammed shut. Rose may file an amended complaint within fourteen days of this order.

Detainee Sues Wrong Parties Over Available Religious Texts on Jail's Android Tablets

In Coleman v. LVMPD, (D NV, July 8, 2026), a Nevada federal district court at the screening stage dismissed with leave to amend a religious discrimination complaint filed by Oronde Coleman, a pre-trial detainee at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC). According to the court:

Coleman generally sues Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and ViaPath, the owner and provider of android tablets at CCDC....

Coleman alleges the following. He is a religious member of the House of Yahweh.... Coleman needs the Book of Yahweh and the Book of Yahweh Study Guide to worship his religion. However, the ViaPath tablets do not contain either of those ebooks even though they have other religious books for other religions such as Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, Latter-Day Saints, Orthodox Hindu, Buddhist, Jehovah's Witness, Moorish American, Nation of Islam, and Sundar Gutka. LVMPD had approved these religious texts to be on the android tablet but discriminated against the House of Yahweh.

When Coleman reached out to ViaPath to add the Book of Yahweh onto ebooks, ViaPath responded that it was not a recognized religion, and they would not add it to the contents of the tablets. Coleman told ViaPath that he needed the two books to give praise to his heavenly father and his son in their rightful names. ViaPath told Coleman to write a grievance to LVMPD's religious services unit. Years ago, Coleman wrote grievances to the religious services unit, who told him they do not stock those books....

Although Coleman could potentially state colorable First Amendment free exercise of religion and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, he does not do so in his complaint because he has not established that ViaPath and LVMPD are the parties he should be suing. I thus dismiss the complaint but grant Coleman leave to amend....

Coleman's complaint does not allege how ViaPath is a state actor other than its apparent contract with LVMPD. This alone is insufficient to establish that ViaPath is a state actor who deprived Coleman of his federal rights....

Coleman does not allege that his inability to obtain House of Yahweh religious books is due to a LVMPD custom or policy....

Suit Seeks Accommodation for Christian Library Employee Who Objects To Using Co-Workers' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Suit was filed yesterday in a Louisiana federal district court by a Library Technician who was fired for refusing to comply with the library's Inclusivity Policy that requires employees to refer to fellow employees by their chosen name and pronoun.  Plaintiff Luke Ash is also a Christian pastor. The complaint (full text) in Ash v. City of Baton Rouge Louisiana, (MD LA, filed 7/9/2026) alleges in part:

Ash has sincerely held religious beliefs that God created mankind in his own image, and that each individual is created either male or female.... Ash also has sincerely held religious beliefs that biological sex is immutable....  Because of his sincerely held religious beliefs, Ash has sincere religious convictions and beliefs that referring to a person by pronouns inconsistent with their biological sex both dishonors God’s design for that person and constitutes a lie and a grave sin....  Ash believes that he is compelled to tell the truth, even to those who may disagree....

Ash had never, at any point, referred to any co-worker directly using pronouns inconsistent with their preference, and he had certainly never done so after being told by such individual that the pronoun he used was incorrect....

Ash contends that his firing violated his federal and state free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights and that under Title VII the Library was required to provide him a reasonable accommodation from the Inclusivity Policy. The complaint alleges in part:

Permitting Ash to maintain respectful communications to those with whom he interacts at the Library while maintaining compliance with his sincerely held religious beliefs would have been a reasonable accommodation that would impose no hardship whatsoever on the Defendants or the Library. 

The complaint also asks for an injunction barring enforcement of the Inclusivity Policy and asks for reinstatement of plaintiff. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

1st Circuit Upholds Maine's Antidiscrimmination Rules For Religious Schools Except Its Religiouis Expression Nondiscrimination Requirement

Last week, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in two cases raising similar, but not identical, challenges to the antidiscrimination requirements of Maine's Human Rights Act. The schools particularly focused on provisions barring religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  The Act applies to private schools that receive public funding, such as funding under Maine's tuition assistance program.

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court in a 108-page opinion, held that the employment nondiscrimination rule "does not credibly threaten to injure St. Dominic".  The court said in part:

While the rule generally bars schools from employment discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, the MHRA contains two specific carveouts for religious schools that apply regardless of whether a school participates in the tuition-assistance program.  First, section 4553(4) expressly protects a religious school's ability to discriminate "with respect to employment of its members of the same religion, sect or fraternity."... Second, section 4573-A(2) allows a religious school to "require that all applicants and employees conform to [its] religious tenets."

The court also held that neither the ban on religious discrimination in admissions nor the ban on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination trigger strict scrutiny. The court said in part:

[T]he Religious Nondiscrimination Rule does not exclude any school solely because of its religious character.  Rather, the rule excludes a school because it discriminates against students on the basis of the students' religion, a practice that is neither uniquely religious nor uniquely tied to religious schools.... In short, the State is simply saying that a school in Maine, whether religious or not, cannot accept public funds while simultaneously putting up, for example, a "No Protestant Children Need Apply" sign....

... [T]he record does not suggest that religious schools, by their nature, engage in sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination.... Simply put, barring sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination does not exclude religious schools from the tuition-assistance program solely based on their religious character....

Just as combatting religious discrimination qualifies as a legitimate governmental pursuit, so too combatting sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination rises to the level....  And the imposition of liability for sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination on those schools that accept public funding rationally relates to those antidiscrimination goals, as does the requirement that such schools respect students' expression of their gender identity....

The court, however, ordered the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule that  provides "to the extent that an educational institution permits religious expression, it cannot discriminate between religions in doing so." The court said in part:

St. Dominic, as part of its religious mission, requires students to attend religion classes, Mass, and other religious activities.  These activities necessarily entail some degree of student participation.  Even under the Commissioner's reading of the Religious Expression Rule, then, if a preacher at a school-mandated Mass permits students to say "Amen" in order to signify agreement, St. Dominic would then be required to allow expressions of disagreement.  And in the classroom, inculcation often solicits -- indeed encourages -- affirmation, for example in the form of an iterative exchange of expression.  Few would teach the Lord's Prayer without having the students recite it; and under the Religious Expression Rule that recitation would, in turn, appear to require the school to allow the reciting of, for example, the Hare Krishna Mahā mantra.  And while such an example may seem fanciful, the point is that the Religious Expression Rule would inevitably interfere with a religious school's ability to foster an expressive environment consistent with its religious mission.....

Here, the Religious Expression Rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out "religious expression." ...

In Crosspoint Church v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court considered additional challenges to Maine's antidiscrimination rules as they apply to religious schools. Crosspoint Church contended that 2021 amendments to the state's anti-discrimination laws were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Carson v. Makin that required Maine to include religious schools in its tuition assistance program.  The court said in part:

The State likely adopted the 2021 Amendments at least partially in response to the Carson litigation.  But we will not infer something as sinister as an "express[] design[]" to discriminate against a specific religious entity where Maine offers a quite logical and compelling rationale for the amendments' structure and timing: 

If [the State's] Legislature anticipated that the [Carson] litigation might result in [the State] being prohibited from excluding religious schools from [public funding], it would have been entirely appropriate to then make the same distinction in education as the Legislature did [years earlier] for employment and housing and require religious organizations that accept public funds to comply with [all antidiscrimination rules]. 

Thus, just as we concluded in St. Dominic that the plaintiffs there had not shown that general antireligious animus likely motivated the 2021 Amendments,... so too do we hold here that Crosspoint has not shown that specific anti-BCS animus motivated the same amendments....

The court also rejected Crosspoint's free expression claims, saying in part:

The Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, Crosspoint contends, regulates speech because it would "require BCS to affirm a student's gender identity and sexual orientation," even though it would "violate[] BCS's statement of faith to admit a student or allow a student to remain enrolled who violates BCS's statement of faith by presenting as a gender not consistent with his or her biological sex."...

... [H]ere, Crosspoint seeks to refuse admission to (and expel) any student who is gay or transgender, irrespective of that student's speech.  Although such refusal may express Crosspoint's views regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule would interfere with that expression, that does not transform the rule into a speech regulation....

5th Circuit: Evidence of Defendant's Affiliation with Satanism Was Relevant in Sentencing Phase of Murder Trial

In Davis v. Guerrero, (5th Cir., June 25, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the death sentence imposed on Irving Davis who was convicted of raping and murdering a 15-year-old.  In the habeas proceeding challenging the sentence, Davis contended that it was error for the state to introduce evidence of his affiliation with Satanism at the sentencing hearing. The district court rejected that claim, and the 5th Circuit affirmed that decision, citing Supreme Court precedent that rejected the argument that the Constitution forbids consideration of evidence protected by the First Amendment in making sentencing decisions. The 5th Circuit then went on in part to say:

... [T]he evidence [in this case] was not adduced just because the jury could think that Satanism is unpalatable in and of itself, but to indicate that Davis’s adherence to Satanist views increased the likelihood that he would be a danger to society. ....

Davis claims it is undisputed that he was an adherent of the Church of Satan and its non-violent ideals, but as previously highlighted that is not the case.  Because the actual nature of Davis’s relationship with Satanism was not undisputed or established as a fact, it was reasonable for the CCA to conclude that Davis belonged to a group that endorsed or encouraged violence.  Likewise, it was not unreasonable for the CCA to rely on Haley’s interpretation merely because another expert and Davis himself testified that the language in the Satanic texts were symbolic. ...

... [T]he drawings and writings “exhibit[ed] a preoccupation with rape, violence (particularly towards women), and death.”...  Because those materials were admissible on their own, the bare fact of Davis’s association with Satanism ... would likely be beneficial, not prejudicial, to Davis, providing him an opportunity to explain the metaphorical nature of his writings....

Texas Scorecard reports on the decision.

Oregon's Definition of "Religious Employer" Violates Free Exercise Rights of Right-To-Life Organization

In Oregon Right to Life v. O'Day, (D OR, July 1, 2026), an Oregon federal district court held that provisions in Oregon's Reproductive Health Equity Act (RHEA) that effectively require Oregon Right to Life to provide its employees health insurance covering certain abortions and "abortifacient contraceptives" is unconstitutional as applied to Oregon Right to Life. Exemptions in the Act allow plaintiff to obtain employee health insurance from an insurer that is exempt from the Act's requirements. However, that company's policies still cover contraceptives that plaintiff classifies as abortifacients and do not limit abortion coverage to cases of imminent danger to the mother’s life. The Act does include an exemption for "religious employers" that meet the Act's definition. Plaintiff does not qualify for that exemption, however, because its purpose is prolife advocacy, not inculcating religious values, and because it does not primarily serve only persons sharing its religious tenets.

The court held that the RHEA's definition of "religious employer" violates plaintiff's free exercise rights. The court said in part:

While church and non-church distinctions may be permissible in other contexts, RHEA’s criteria here are not neutral or objective. RHEA’s religious employer exemption expresses a preference for religious organizations who inculcate and only serve members of the same religion. Defendant therefore owes the burden to show that RHEA passes strict scrutiny....

...  Defendant does not explain how exempting organizations that inculcate or only serve co-religionists and requiring other religious organizations to comply has any relationship to ensuring reproductive care for all Oregonians. The mere aim to limit the number of exceptions does not pass constitutional muster.... RHEA’s religious employer exemption is therefore not “closely fitted” to Defendant’s interest ...  and it is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff’s religious views.

OPB reports on the decision. 

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

1st Circuit: University's Rejection of Property Sale to Church Was Not Religious Discrimination

In Calvary Chapel Belfast v. University of Maine System, (1st Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to stop the sale by the University of Maine of the Frederick Hutchinson Center property to a bidder that was competing with Calvary Chapel Belfast to obtain the property.  Originally, the University selected Calvary Chapel to negotiate a purchase agreement. However, according to the court:

In the days following the public announcement, numerous area residents as well as University alumni, donors, students, faculty, and staff criticized the University's selection of a religious entity, and Calvary in particular, as the winning bidder.  One online commentor, for example, referred to the decision as "disappointing," with another writing, "[t]hese evangelists from [Calvary] are just another religious cult that believes in magical thinking."...

Calvary asserts an intentional discrimination claim, arguing that the University violated the Equal Protection Clause by carrying out the facially neutral public procurement process in a discriminatory way. ... Specifically, Calvary argues that the court created a "novel rule" when it required Calvary "to make a direct 'showing connecting the animus in the community to the government action' to raise an inference of discriminatory intent."  ...

The court recognized that widespread religious animus in the community can, in certain circumstances, support an inference that a government official acted with discriminatory intent by essentially adopting the community's view even if the official did not personally share that view.... But the presence of community opposition does not, without more, imply a conclusion of intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.... And here the court found scant evidentiary support for the alleged irregularities -- "the more" -- urged by Calvary....

2nd Circuit Reaffirms Permissibility of NY Repeal of Religious Exemptions from School Vaccination Requirements

In Miller v. McDonald, (2d Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision that New York's repeal of its religious belief exemption from required school immunizations, while keeping medical exemptions, does not violate either Amish parents' free exercise rights or their parental rights to control their children's religious upbringing.  Last year, the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor. In reaffirming its earlier decision, the Second Circuit said in part:

New York Public Health Law § 2164 is neutral on its face.  It does not target or affirmatively prohibit religious practices....  Moreover, the act of repealing the religious exemption did not “in and of itself transmute” this otherwise neutral law into one “that targets religious beliefs.”...

Nor does the legislative history reveal an anti-religious bias....

... [T]he motives of a small number of legislators cannot be attributed to the legislative body as a whole.

Plaintiffs contend that exempting students for medical reasons treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious beliefs....

Repealing the religious exemption decreases “to the greatest extent medically possible” the number of unvaccinated students and thus the risk of disease; maintaining the medical exemption allows “the small proportion of students” who medically “cannot be vaccinated” to avoid the health consequences that “taking a particular vaccine would inflict.” ... Exempting religious objectors, however, detracts from that interest.  Religious exemptions increase “the risk of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.”...

New York passed § 2164 in response to the 2018 to 2019 measles outbreak.  Legislators felt particularly concerned about the concentration of unvaccinated children with religious exemptions in the same schools....

Plaintiffs’ remaining argument is that, even if § 2164 is neutral and generally applicable, it burdens the parental free-exercise right recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and clarified in Mahmoud v. Taylor.  We conclude that it does not....

Section 2164 does not regulate what children are taught, does not require them to affirm any belief, does not expose them to state-selected instruction contrary to their parents’ faith, and does not enlist school officials to displace parental religious formation.  It imposes a health-and-safety condition on in-person school attendance to reduce the spread of communicable disease....  The burden may be serious, but it is not the kind of state interference with a child’s religious development that triggered strict scrutiny in Yoder or Mahmoud....

Mahmoud asks whether a burden is “of the same character” as the burden in Yoder, not whether it is more or less serious....  A greater burden in degree is not necessarily the same burden in kind....

Cert. Petition Filed in Lipan Apache Efforts To Prevent Impairment of Religious Ceremonial Site

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Perez v. City of San Antonio, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to enjoin San Antonio's development plan for a city park.  Plaintiffs are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. Certain of their religious ceremonies can take place only at a particular river bend in the park and require the presence of cormorants in the trees there. The development plan will remove trees and modify bird habitats. (See prior posting. and 5th Circuit's amended opinion.) The petition for review sets out the Questions Presented as:

1. Whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment permit courts, when deciding whether government action burdens religious exercise, to override a claimant’s sincere theological judgment of what the religious exercise requires. 

2.  Whether the government can satisfy its burden to prove that its action is the least religiously restrictive means available when, after notice that its action would burden religious exercise, the government admits that it failed to consider any workable alternatives prior to litigation.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

Supreme Court Review Sought by Teacher Who Objects to School's Gender identity Policy

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to a Maryland school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. (See prior posting.) The petition for review poses the Questions Presented as:

1. When public schools try to force teachers, over their religious objections, to use pronouns inconsistent with a student’s biological sex and to hide from parents information about their child’s gender expression at school, does Smith apply and foreclose heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause?  

2. Do public schools violate the Free Speech Clause when they compel objecting teachers to adhere to such a school policy?

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.