9th Circuit Upholds Requirement to Use Only Secular Curricular Materials in Charter School Home Instruction Programs

In Woodlard v. Thurmond, (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected First Amendment challenges to California's refusal to purchase and permit the use of religious curricular materials in home-based independent study programs of two charter schools. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs ... argue that the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs are really homeschooling and that the schools’ provision of curricular materials should be treated as a generally available public benefit in aid of homeschooling, access to which cannot be denied based on Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. The argument is premised on three recent Supreme Court decisions holding that when a state creates a generally available public benefit, it cannot exclude a potential recipient from the benefit because of religious status or religious use....

... [N]ot all government decisions that engender religious objections impose burdens on religion that fall afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. As the Supreme Court made clear in Carson, a state’s decision to provide a “strictly secular” public education does not do so....

... [I]n contrast to private homeschooling, parents in independent study programs can teach only under the supervision of state employees. The extensive legal requirements applicable to the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs make the programs sufficiently public to defeat Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim....

Plaintiffs’ compelled speech claim fares no better. It is premised on the argument that “[w]hen parents in the Blue Ridge and Visions programs select a diverse array of curricula for their children’s diverse needs,” the parents are speaking, not the government. However, we have held that a public school’s curriculum is an “expression of its policy,” ... and that “information and speech ... present[ed] to school children may be deemed to be part of the school’s curriculum and thus School District speech,” 

School Rules on Non-gendered Pronouns Do Not Violate Free Exercise or Free Speech Rights

In Hyland v. State Board of Education, (NJ App., Sept. 9, 2025), a New Jersey state appellate court rejected a 1st and 14th Amendment challenge to amended Board of Education rules that, among other things, eliminated gendered pronouns in the rules. The court said in part:

Hyland argues the State Board may not establish a "religion of secularism" by adopting amendments that define gender as "indeterminate," which can be decided based on the student's feelings, resulting in the treatment of comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.  He further argues the amendments force students who adhere to a "Biblical worldview," to act and operate under a law that directly contradicts those beliefs, and the students or parents are not allowed to opt out of the imposition of those beliefs....

A fair reading of the amended chapter demonstrates the State Board does not seek to promote a "religion of secularism," nor does it create a constitutionally prohibited entanglement.  The students and parents retain the right to opt-out of any instruction related to health, family life education, or sex education or educational activity that violates their religious beliefs.... Thus, the amendments do not violate either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses, as they apply uniformly to all students and do not seek to regulate religious conduct or belief.,,,

We are satisfied that the record establishes there is no violation of the First Amendment free speech rights.  Here, the amendments to Chapter 7 do not regulate or target the speech of students or parents.  While the amendments define gender identity, they neither compel nor coerce students or parents to endorse this definition.  Nor do they prevent students or parents from publicly expressing a different view....

11th Circuit: Government Can Insist on Secular Presenters in Intervention Program for Domestic Abusers

In Nussbaumer v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Families, (11th Cir., Sept. 4, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to Florida's requirements for becoming certified as a provider in the state's batterers' intervention program. Anyone convicted of domestic violence is required to complete the intervention program offered by a certified provider.  Nussbaumer is a Florida minister and licensed clinical Christian psychologist. He was denied certification because state rules require that the program's curriculum not include any faith-based ideology associated with a particular curriculum and not identify poor impulse control as a cause of domestic violence or suggest anger management techniques to prevent domestic violence. The court held that plaintiff's free speech rights were not violated because the curriculum and its presentation are government speech. Similarly, it held that his free exercise rights were not infringed, saying in part:

“the government’s own speech cannot support a claim that the government has interfered with a private individual’s free exercise rights.”... “The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.”

6th Circuit: Transgender Bathroom Rule Did Not Violate Objecting Parents' or Students' Free Exercise Rights

In Jane and John Doe No. 1 v. Bethel Local School District Board of Education, (6th Cir., Aug. 26, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims that a school's policy on use of communal bathrooms by transgender students violated the free exercise rights of Muslim and Christian students and their parents. The court dismissed as moot plaintiffs' request for a declaratory and injunctive relief because while the case was pending, the school changed its policy pursuant to a new Ohio law that mandated bathroom access based on biological sex. However, plaintiffs' claim for damages from past violations was not moot. Nevertheless, the court found no 1st Amendment violation, focusing on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor. The court said in part:

The Supreme Court acknowledged that “the government is generally free to place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does so pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable.” ... But the Court situated Mahmoud in line with Wisconsin v. Yoder, ...  as an exception to the general rule because “[a] government burdens the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to submit their children to instruction that poses ‘a very real threat of undermining’ the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill.” ...

This exception does not apply here.  The bathroom policy does not impose a burden “of the [] same character as the burden in Yoder.”...  Unlike the challenged state law in Yoder, which compelled Amish families to send their children to public or private schools, and the curricular requirement in Mahmoud, which required elementary school students to attend classes where certain LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks that “unmistakably convey a particular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender” were taught, the bathroom policy was not an educational requirement or curricular feature, and the policy did not require students to use the communal restrooms.... [Single occupancy bathrooms were available to students.]

Because the policy was neutral and generally applicable, it is subject to rational basis review, which it survives....

On appeal, the parent plaintiffs specifically argue that the School District infringed on their right to direct the upbringing of their children by (1) modifying the School District’s bathroom operations, (2) increasing their children’s risk of physical danger, and (3) choosing not to answer questions about implementing the bathroom policy.  We are unpersuaded by their arguments, and thus, we affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim....

Judge Larsen filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but saying that the majority had read the Mahmoud case too narrowly. He said in part:

... [T]he ultimate question Mahmoud poses is whether a school policy “substantially interfere[s] with the religious development of the child or pose[s] a very real threat of undermining the religious beliefs and practices the parent wishes to instill in the child.”...  All sorts of non-curricular school rules—which aren’t clearly “educational”—can interfere with parents’ religious upbringing of their children.  Imagine, for example, a school that provides free school lunch to all students, regardless of income, to remove the stigma associated with accepting free or reduced-price meals.  If the school neither provided Kosher meals nor permitted parents to pack brown-bag lunches, that might well impose a Yoder-like burden on Jewish parents and students, even though the policy would neither be obviously “educational” nor involve the curriculum.  If the school cannot require Jewish students to read books “designed to” undermine their commitment to keeping Kosher, why would the school be able to more directly compel them to eat a grilled ham and cheese?...

... In this case, Bethel’s policy allowed religious students to “opt out” by using single-stall restrooms instead of the communal ones to which they objected.  That important fact distinguishes this case from both Yoder and Mahmoud....

Buckeye Flame reports on the decision.

Christian Families Challenge Foster Care Rules on Support of Transgender Children

Two families, asserting Christian religious beliefs, filed suit yesterday in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging on 1st and 14th Amendment grounds a policy of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families that requires foster parents to agree that they will "[s]upport, respect, and affirm the foster child’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression." The complaint (full text) in Jones v. Mahaniah, (D MA, filed 9/3/2025), alleges in part:

3. Both families will provide a loving and respectful home for any child, including transgender, gay, or lesbian foster children. But that is insufficient for Massachusetts....

4. ... [T]he State requires the Joneses and the Schrocks to promise to use a child’s chosen pronouns, verbally affirm a child’s gender identity contrary to biological sex, and even encourage a child to medically transition, forcing these families to speak against their core religious beliefs. 

5. Second, DCF infringes on Plaintiffs’ free-exercise rights through a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable,,,,  A foster parent must promise in advance to use opposite-sex pronouns and encourage a hypothetical child’s gender transition, even if they never have and never will host a child who struggles to accept their natural body....

120. Because DCF compels applicants to speak and express the DCF’s preferred views on human sexuality while prohibiting speech expressing other views it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint, it engages in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination....

134. 110 C.M.R. 7.104(1)(d) is not neutral nor generally applicable because it imposes special disabilities based on religious beliefs, categorically excludes people from foster-care licenses based on religious beliefs, prefers certain religious and secular beliefs over the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, and provides for categorical and individualized exemptions without extending an exemption to religious persons like Plaintiffs.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Members of Healthcare Sharing Ministry Have Standing to Challenge Insurance Regulator

In Gospel Light Mennonite Church Medical Aid Plan v. New Mexico Office of the Superintendent of Insurance, (D NM, Aug. 25, 2025), a New Mexico federal district court held that two members of a healthcare sharing ministry that was barred from operating in New Mexico by insurance regulatory authorities have standing to challenge on free exercise grounds the regulator's order that ended the ministry's operation in the state. The ministry itself was originally also a party to the lawsuit, but it was dismissed because it was challenging the action in state court.

In refusing to dismiss at this stage for lack of standing, the court said in part:

... OSI acknowledges that Plaintiffs believe “they have a biblical obligation to help their fellow man when in need which is accomplished by sharing each other’s medical expenses.”...  Further, Plaintiffs present evidence—unrebutted by OSI— showing that OSI’s final order directing Gospel Light’s to cease operations tangibly interfered with their religious beliefs and practices. While Smith and Renteria admitted that they continue to pay into Gospel Light’s sharing ministry, they also testified that OSI’s final order prevented them from participating in other aspects of the program, including the ability to share in organized prayer networks which connected them to other Gospel Light members.... Importantly, Renteria stated that OSI’s actions caused her to switch her family to a different healthcare sharing ministry....

... OSI’s final order impacted Plaintiffs’ ability to fully participate in Gospel Light’s sharing ministry. That participation is a distinct part of Plaintiffs’ religious belief structure....

Plaintiffs’ statements raise a plausible inference that they share a concrete and particularized injury: the inability to utilize Gospel Light’s health sharing ministry to its full extent due to OSI’s final order. Because the scope of those injuries remains in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate at this stage....

Pharmacists Sue for Religious Accommodation to Avoid Dispensing Gender-Affirming Drugs

Two Walgreens pharmacists filed suit last week in a Minnesota federal district court challenging the drug chain's refusal to accommodate their religious objections to dispensing drugs that facilitate gender transitions. Walgreens took the position that plaintiffs' long-standing arrangement to refer such prescriptions to other pharmacists to fill was now illegal under Minnesota law as administered by the state Board of Pharmacy.

The complaint (full text) (exhibits to complaint) in Scott v. Minnesota Board of Pharmacy, (D MN, filed 8/22/2025), alleges in part:

3. Walgreens was wrong about the law. Minnesota administrative rules require pharmacists to dispense or compound only those drugs that “may reasonably be expected to be compounded or dispensed in pharmacies by pharmacists.” Reasonable people understand that not every pharmacist or pharmacy sells every drug, for various reasons including supply shortages, insurance reimbursement rates, lack of demand in the community—or a pharmacist’s conscientious objections. 

4. Plaintiffs asked the State Board of Pharmacy to clarify that this is the correct interpretation of the Board’s rules. The Board refused, leaving Plaintiffs and other pharmacists like them in legal limbo and subject to adverse actions from employers like Walgreens. 

5. To any extent that Minnesota law does purport to require Plaintiffs to violate their religious convictions by dispensing or compounding certain drugs, it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the free exercise protections of Minnesota’s Constitution. Forcing individual pharmacists to violate their religious beliefs by dispensing drugs that are readily available from many other pharmacists is not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling government interest. Moreover, Minnesota permits many non-religious exceptions to any “must dispense” requirement, including for economic reasons and based on a pharmacist’s professional judgment about the risks and efficacy of a prescription. Refusing to allow religious accommodations therefore is neither neutral nor generally applicable.

KSTP News reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Supreme Court Review Sought by California Baker

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed this week in Miller v. Civil Rights Division, (Sup. Ct., certiorari filed 8/26/2025). In the case, a California state appellate court held that a bakery, Cathy's Creations, and its owner violated the anti-discrimination provisions of California law when they refused to sell a predesigned cake to a customer because the cake would be used at a same-sex wedding reception. The California court rejected defendant's free exercise and free speech defenses. (See prior posting.) The California Supreme Court denied review. Washington Times reports on the petition seeking U.S. Supreme Court review.

LA Sued Over Its handling of Permit Application for Christian Revival Event

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by leaders of May Day USA, a nationwide Christian revival event, contending that the manner in which Los Angeles officials handed their application for a permit to hold a revival on Hollywood Boulevard violated their 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The 54-page complaint (full text) in Donnelly v. City of Los Angeles, California, (CD CA, filed 8/21/2025), alleges in part:

15. LAPD wielded the unconstitutionally unbridled discretion afforded it under the City’s permitting scheme to subject MayDay to lengthy and pretextual administrative hurdles....

16. Among the LAPD’s many demands was a requirement that MayDay conduct a petition of Hollywood Boulevard’s business owners and vendors to ensure at least 51% approved of MayDay’s expressive activity and speech....

19. The City’s permitting scheme thus enshrined an unconstitutional heckler’s veto upon MayDay and its expressive activities....

21. The City refused to provide MayDay with any concrete answer on its permit application until the last minute, prohibiting MayDay from finalizing their planned event, advertising it, or otherwise adequately preparing to engage in the event....

23. Three days prior to its requested event, the City denied the permit actually requested by MayDay ...and “granted” the application to host the event at a location ... it never requested and out of the site of the hecklers who Defendants believed would veto MayDay’s speech. In essence, the City tried to put MayDay unconstitutionally out of sight, and out of mind....

25. Simply put, the City said MayDay could speak, but only if it did it quietly, quickly, and where no one who might object would be forced to hear it. Defendants denied MayDay’s permit application on the basis of the views it planned to espouse and out of concern that Hollywood Boulevard was not an appropriate place for their religious speech, exercise, and expression.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Ban on Faith Statements by Colleges Participating in Program for High Schoolers Violates Free Exercise Clause

Loe v. Jett, (D MN, Aug. 22, 2025), is a challenge to a 2023 Amendment to Minnesota's Post Secondary Education Option (PSEO) statute. The statute allows high school students to enroll in nonsectarian college courses in colleges in the state. The state reimburses colleges for the credits earned by high schoolers. The challenged amendment disqualifies colleges that require faith statements from PSEO students, or which discriminate in admission of PSEO students on the basis of race, creed, ethnicity, disability, gender, or sexual orientation or religious beliefs or affiliations. The court held that the Faith Statement ban violates the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, saying in part:

[University of] Northwestern requires PSEO applicants to agree to a Declaration of Christian Community, by which applicants attest to “honor Christ,” “seek Christ‐centered community,” and “stand together against all that the Bible clearly condemns.”... Such an admissions requirement is facially proscribed by the Faith Statement Ban. Now, consider a hypothetical secular private college that participates in the PSEO program. If that secular school required that all PSEO applicants attest to “honor reason,” “seek reason‐centered community,” and “stand together against all that rationalism clearly condemns,” such an admissions requirement would seemingly not be proscribed by the Faith Statement Ban.  

The only difference between the two statement requirements is that Northwestern’s is of a religious—and not a secular—nature. Such a distinction on the face of the Faith Statement Ban is not neutral to religion, and thus triggers strict scrutiny....

In sum, the Faith Statement Ban is unconstitutional on its face under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it burdens religious exercise, is not neutral and generally applicable, and is not narrowly tailored to achieve MDE’s compelling interest. Necessarily, this means that the Faith Statement Ban is also unconstitutional under the Freedom of Conscience Clause of Article One, Section Sixteen of the Minnesota Constitution. ...

The court also held that the Amendment's nondiscrimination provision is inseparable from the Statement Ban, so that it too must be struck down. It also rejected the Department of Education's counterclaims against the religious schools that were among the plaintiffs.

MPR News reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

School Counselor's Office Display of Anti-Trans Books Is Permissible Only When No Students Are in His Office

In Theis v. Intermountain Education Service Board of Directors, (D ORA, Aug. 20, 2025), a social worker employed by the district to administer standardized tests individually to students sued claiming his constitutional rights were violated when the district found that his display of two particular books in his office violated the district's bias policy. The district found that the display of the books-- titled He is He and She is She--constituted a hostile expression toward a person because of their gender identity. Plaintiff was ordered to stop displaying the books. 

The court concluded that the district's policy did not violate plaintiff's free exercise rights, saying in part:

... Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s Speech Policy is not neutral. There is no indication that the ESB Policy restricts any religious practices because of their religious motivations. Indeed, the policy explicitly seeks to prevent discrimination or harassment based on religion. And even if the ESB Policy adversely impacted religious practices, it is addressing the legitimate concern of ensuring an open and welcoming school environment for all students and employees.

Plaintiff also has not shown that Defendants were “hostile” towards his religious beliefs....

The court however agreed in part with plaintiff's free speech claim, saying that "only his display when no students are present is protected under the First Amendment." It explained: 

When no students were present in Plaintiff’s office, the message of the books would not be reasonably attributable to IMESD, and the display could not press Plaintiff’s views on impressionable or captive students.

9th Circuit: Oregon Religious Non-Discrimination Rule for Grantees Is Mostly Valid

 In Youth 71Five Ministries v. Willliams, (9th Cir., Aug. 18, 2025), a Christian youth program sued after the Oregon Department of Education's Youth Development Division withdrew the conditional award of a grant. Plaintiff requires that its board members, employees, and volunteers agree to a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. The Division contended that this violates its religious non-discrimination policy.  Plaintiff contended that the withdrawal violated its free exercise, religious-autonomy, and expressive-association rights. 

 The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals said in part:

... [T]he Rule does not deny funding based on a practice exclusive to religious organizations. Government agencies, secular corporations, and religious ministries alike might engage in religion-based employment discrimination....

Based on the evidence properly before the district court, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that the Division likely treats comparable secular and religious activity the same....

... 71Five argues that merely tailoring services to a target demographic is comparable to 71Five’s categorical exclusion of non-Christians. We disagree....

The Division adopted the Rule to, among other reasons, better reflect its “commitment to equitable access, equal opportunity, and inclusion.” That is a legitimate interest.... The Rule rationally furthers that interest by ensuring that Division-funded initiatives are equally open to employees, volunteers, and participants regardless of race, sex, religion, or any other protected characteristic. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that 71Five is not likely to succeed on the merits of its free-exercise claim....

71Five claims that the Rule abridges its expressive association by requiring it to accept employees and volunteers “who disagree” with its message “or would express a contrary view.” ... We hold that 71Five has established that it is likely to succeed, at least in part. As to Division-funded initiatives, the Rule is likely permissible as a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulation of expressive association in a limited public forum—the Grant Program. But to the extent that it restricts 71Five’s selection of speakers to spread its Christian message through initiatives that receive no Division funding, the Rule likely imposes an unconstitutional condition....

71Five’s complaint does not allege a violation of any clearly established right under the First Amendment, so the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court did not err in dismissing 71Five’s damages claims with prejudice.

Judge Rawlinson concurred only in the judgment and did not join the majority's opinion, saying in part:

I concur in the judgment because, and only because, of our truncated review of a district court's decision granting or denying injunctive relief, and our obligatory deference to a district court's discretionary decision to decline consideration of arguments and evidence presented in a Reply Brief. ...

I decline to join the majority opinion's analysis because it relies heavily on the premise (mistaken, in my view), that Youth Five's website evidenced discrimination, while websites from the secular organizations applying for grants did not evidence discrimination....

[Thanks to Steven Sholk for the lead.]

9th Circuit Rejects Christian Day Care's Challenge to Licensing Requirement

In Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson, (9th Cir., Aug. 14, 2025), Foothills, a Christian day care center, challenged a California licensing provision requiring that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their parents' choice. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulation on free exercise grounds because the state has repeatedly taken the position that the regulation does not prohibit operating a day care center with a mandatory religious curriculum, where parents are made aware of this in advance of enrollment. 

However, the court held that Foothills does have standing to challenge the general licensing requirement on the ground that some secular child day care centers are exempt from licensing. But the court rejected that claim on the merits, saying in part:

Foothills contends that the Act’s exemption of “recreation programs conducted for children by” the YMCA “or similar organizations,”...  But this provision only exempts recreation programs from the licensure requirement; it explicitly does not exempt “child day care programs conducted by” the same organizations and so creates no mechanism for granting individualized exemptions for such facilities....

Foothills points to the exception for any “child daycare program that operates only one day per week for no more than four hours on that one day.”... This exemption applies to, among other things, Sunday schools. But a program that oversees children for only four hours a week does not present a threat to children’s health and safety comparable to that of a facility that can operate up to 24 hours a day....

Foothills alleges that the Act’s exemption of certain sectarian organizations—such as the YMCA and Boy Scouts of America—from licensing gives preferential treatment to certain religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.... 

If Foothills sought to operate a recreation program, it would not be subject to the Act. And if the YMCA or the Boy Scouts sought to operate a child day care facility, they would. This exemption draws no lines based on religion....

The court also held that the required disclosure to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice does not infringe Foothills' free speech rights, distinguishing the Supreme Court case of Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra , saying in part:

 Because the Act merely requires Foothills to inform parents of their children’s rights and does not “convey a message fundamentally at odds with its mission,” the required disclosure is not controversial....

5th Circuit Allows San Antonio Park Development To Move Ahead Over Religious Objections of Lipan-Apache

In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., Aug. 13, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to enjoin San Antonio's development plan for a city park.  Plaintiffs are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. Certain of their religious ceremonies can take place only at a particular river bend in the park and require the presence of cormorants in the trees there. The development plans involve removing and relocation of trees and modifying bird habitats to deter birds from nesting in highly urbanized areas of the park. Plaintiffs claim that removal of trees and the bird deterrence program violate their religious freedom protected by the 1st Amendment, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Texas Constitution.  In a prior opinion, the 5th Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court a question on the meaning of a 2021 amendment to the Texas Constitution that prohibits the government from interfering with religious services. In response, the Texas Supreme Court said that the constitutional provision does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands.

In this week's decision, the majority, refusing to grant an injunction pending further appeal, held that the project did not violate the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, saying in part:

... [T]he City’s development plan only indirectly impacts Appellants’ religious conduct and expression. Appellants continue to have virtually unlimited access to the Park for religious and cultural purposes. The record shows that, regardless of the rookery management program, no cormorants, due to their migration patterns, inhabit the area for extended periods of time each year....

Appellants did not meet their burden to show that they are likely to succeed on their claim that the plan constitutes a substantial burden of their religious exercise. Even if they did, that would not change the outcome of this appeal because the City’s plan advances a compelling interest through the least restrictive means—and thus survives strict scrutiny.

The majority also held that the city's program did not violate the 1st Amendment, saying in part:

The parties’ dispute under the Free Exercise Clause centers on which standard of constitutional review applies to the instant case, rational basis or strict scrutiny. Appellants argue that the City’s plans for tree removal and rookery management measures are not neutral and generally applicable and, therefore, must be analyzed under the more exacting strict scrutiny standard. The City contends that its planned Park improvements are neutral and generally applicable and that the more deferential rational basis standard of review applies. Assuming strict scrutiny applies, we conclude that the challenged government action in this case withstands Appellants’ Free Exercise challenge, as illustrated infra in the TRFRA claim analysis.

Judge Higginson dissented in part, saying in part:

Despite my respect for the majority’s analysis, I continue to think that Appellants’ religious exercise is substantially burdened and that the City of San Antonio ... failed to accommodate Appellants’ religious beliefs in the least restrictive manner.  I would therefore hold that the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“TRFRA”) requires the City to accommodate Appellants’ religious beliefs across two “items of relief” requested in the complaint: the City’s tree-removal (“Item 2”) and anti-nesting (“Item 3”) measures....

Appellants’ testimony shows that services at the riverbend would be “meaningless” without the trees or the cormorants, and that disruption to either will “unravel” the land’s spiritual ecology—a sine qua non for Church members’ religious exercise.  Just as importantly, Appellants’ testimony confirms that these services cannot “be performed anywhere else.”...

To the extent the majority suggests that Appellants can obtain  spiritual fulfilment by exercising their religious beliefs in a manner contrary to their testimony, such reasoning is forbidden.

Denial of State Reimbursement for Religious Home School Material Does Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Trakel v. Critchfield, (D ID, Aug. 6, 202), an Idaho federal district court rejected parents' claim that they are entitled to reimbursement for religiously influenced supplemental materials that they purchased for their children who are enrolled in the state's home learning program, the Idaho Home Learning Academy. The court said in part:

IHLA is an accredited public charter school that provides Idaho students with a customizable online education. The school offers its own online curriculum options but also reimburses families for the costs of certain self-selected supplemental and enrichment materials. Some of these items are “preapproved,” while others require IHLA to first determine that the items are educationally appropriate, reasonable, and an efficient use of tax dollars....

The school denied the reimbursement request, citing State Department of Education policies and Article IX, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution, known as the Blaine Amendment,  which prohibits the use of public money for religious purposes....

The Trakels argue this denial violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. Specifically, they view IHLA’s reimbursement policy as a public benefit, which is unconstitutionally limited to secular curriculums....

... [T]he Trakels seek to compel IHLA to provide a religious education. IHLA’s reimbursement policy is not a public benefit that allows parents to make fully independent decisions regarding their children’s education. Although families have an unusual degree of input and flexibility, IHLA is ultimately a public school that sets its own curriculum. To qualify for reimbursement, supplemental materials must receive approval and meet a variety of standards set by the school.... To put it simply, reimbursed materials become part of the IHLA curriculum. The question, then, is whether the Trakels have a free exercise or free speech right for their children to receive a public religious education. The answer is clearly no.

Prosecution of Religious Leader for Psilocybin Use Is Enjoined

In Jensen v. Utah County, (D UT, Aug. 4, 2025), a Utah federal district court enjoined Utah County from continuing its prosecution of plaintiff Bridger Lee Jensen for violating the Utah Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on psilocybin. Jensen is the founder of Singularism, an entheogenic religion. The court said in part:

... [A]t this procedural juncture ... it would be wisest to assume—without deciding—that the Utah constitution’s free exercise clause provides protections equal to those of the Federal Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. Doing so adheres to “the general rule that courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other grounds.”...

... [T]he Utah Controlled Substances Act’s restrictions on psilocybin possession and use, though neutral, are not generally applicable due to the secular exemption for behavioral-health treatment by certain healthcare systems and accordingly trigger strict scrutiny if a plaintiff can show that the restrictions burden its religious exercise. And Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges facts sufficient for the court to conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged a burden on their free exercise....

Only after this court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their state RFRA claim did Defendants institute criminal proceedings against Mr. Jensen and invoke Younger abstention. From this sequence of events, the court finds that Defendants commenced the state criminal action (the basis for their abstention argument now) in order to relitigate the RFRA issue on which they appear to be poised to lose in this court—in other words, to get a second bite at the apple. The court will not allow the shield of the Younger doctrine to be used as a gamesmanship sword.  

Even if Defendants had not waived their Younger abstention defense by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction, the court finds that the bad-faith and irreparable-injury exceptions apply....

Based on the record in this case, the court notes once again its finding that the prosecution was brought in bad faith as part of a larger effort to harass Plaintiffs for their entheogenic religious practices and in hopes of giving the government a second opportunity to litigate the free-exercise issues presented squarely in this case. The prosecution has already caused Singularism to lose many of its practitioners and affiliates, and forcing Plaintiffs to wait until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings to secure their free-exercise rights would be the equivalent of issuing a death warrant for their nascent religion....

Court Enjoins Compliance with Arkansas Law Requiring Posting of 10 Commandments in All Classrooms

Earlier this year, Arkansas enacted Act 573 requiring display of the Ten Commandments in public school and college classrooms. In Stinson v. Fayetteville School District No. 1, (WD AR, Aug. 4, 2025), an Arkansas federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring four school districts that are defendants in the case from complying with the new law.  The court said in part:

Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court struck down a Ten Commandments law nearly identical to the one the Arkansas General Assembly passed earlier this year. That precedent remains binding on this Court and renders Arkansas Act 573 plainly unconstitutional. Why would Arkansas pass an obviously unconstitutional law? Most likely because the State is part of a coordinated strategy among several states to inject Christian religious doctrine into public-school classrooms. These states view the past decade of rulings by the Supreme Court on religious displays in public spaces as a signal that the Court would be open to revisiting its precedent on religious displays in the public school context. ...

Despite the Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] Court’s rather sweeping announcement that the Lemon test had been “abandoned,” ..., there is no cause to believe that all Supreme Court precedent that relied on the Lemon test has been—or will be—overruled. The Kennedy opinion itself makes that crystal clear....

...  Act 573’s mandate is incompatible with the Founding Fathers’ conception of religious liberty. The Founders were deeply committed to the principle that government must not compel religious observance or endorse religious doctrine, and that commitment is reflected in multiple foundational texts....

The State has not established that burdening Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights “serve[s] a compelling interest and [is] narrowly tailored to that end.”... Even if the State were to meet its burden of showing a compelling interest, it would fail the “narrowly tailored” prong. There are many ways in which students could be taught the relevant history of the Ten Commandments without the State approving an official version of scripture and then displaying it to students in every classroom on a permanent, daily basis....

ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

UPDATE: On Aug. 28., a Supplemental Complaint was filed adding an additional school district as a defendant. The court issued a temporary restraining order barring that district from complying with the statute, and giving it an opportunity to submit briefing on why the preliminary injunction should not be expanded to include it.

European Court Says Russia Violated Religious Rights in Its War with Ukraine

In Ukraine and Netherlands v. Russia, (ECHR, July 9, 2025), the European Court of Human Rights in a 1652 paragraph Grand Chamber opinion held Russia has violated a large number of provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in its conflict with Ukraine. The opinion covers the period from 2014 until 2022 when Russia withdrew as a party to the Convention. Among the violations were intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups other than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), in violation of Article 9 of the Convention which protects freedom of religion. The Court said in part:

1269.  The evidence shows that since May 2014 freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in occupied Ukrainian territory. The separatists in the “DPR” [Donetsk] and the “LPR” [Lugansk] quickly declared the UOC-MP to be the main religious group in occupied territory. They harassed and persecuted religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship ... in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law.... There are numerous reports of religious leaders being ill-treated, abducted during religious activities and, in some cases, killed by separatists in eastern Ukraine. It is clear from the context of many of these instances that these individuals had been targeted on account of their positions as leaders of religious communities and in the context of a generalised practice of disrupting and preventing the right of those not adhering to the UOC-MP to practise their religions.... There is also evidence of the banning of religious material, which was deemed to be “extremist” by separatist administrations and institutions.... Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses appear to have been particularly targeted.

1270.  From 2016 the evidence shows that the “DPR” and the “LPR” began to put in place formal requirements for the registration and operation of religious groups..... Some religious organisations were identified as “extremist” organisations and banned on this ground with their religious material and publications seized, destroyed and banned... Religious leaders and parishioners were pursued on charges of organising or attending illegal gatherings....

1271.  ... In 2022 the Russian occupation administration “nationalised” property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends....

The Court also issued a press release summarizing the full decision.

Office of Personnel Management Says Federal Employee Religious Speech In Workplace Is Protected

Yesterday, the federal Office of Personnel Management issued a Memo (full text) to heads of federal departments and agencies on Protecting Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace. The cover letter transmitting the Memo says in part:

The memo provides clear guidance to ensure federal employees may express their religious beliefs through prayer, personal items, group gatherings, and conversations without fear of discrimination or retaliation....

The memo builds on OPMʼs July 16 guidance on reasonable accommodations for religious purposes....

The Memo itself defines kind of religious speech that should be protected in the federal workplace, saying in part:

... Employees should be permitted to display and use items used for religious purposes or icons of a religiously significant nature ... on their desks, on their person, and in their assigned workspaces. 

... Agencies should allow ... employees to engage in individual or communal religious expressions in both formal and informal settings alone or with fellow employees, so long as such expressions do not occur during on-duty time...

... Employees may engage in conversations regarding religious topics with fellow employees, including attempting to persuade others of the correctness of their own religious views, provided that such efforts are not harassing in nature. Employees may also encourage their coworkers to participate in religious expressions of faith, such as prayer, to the same extent that they would be permitted to encourage coworkers participate in other personal activities. The constitutional rights of supervisors ...should not be distinguished from non-supervisory employees.... However, unwillingness to engage in such conversations may not be the basis of workplace discipline.   

...  [W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.....

Among the specific examples of protected employee speech set out in an Appendix to the Memo are:

• An employee may invite another to worship at her church despite being belonging to a different faith. 
• On a bulletin board meant for personal announcements, a supervisor may post a handwritten note inviting each of his employees to attend an Easter service at his church....
• A park ranger leading a tour through a national park may join her tour group in prayer.
• A doctor at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital may pray over his patient for her recovery.....

The Hill reports on the Memo. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

RFRA and Free Exercise Clause Apply to Corporate Entities Exercising Religion

In United States v. Safehouse, (3d Cir., July 24, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause apply to corporate entities, and to non-religious entities exercising religion. The United States contended that defendant's offering of supervised illegal drug use violates federal law. Defendant argued that its overdose prevention services reflect its Board members' religious belief in the value of human life. The court said in part:

RFRA’s plain text and Free Exercise doctrine are clear that those statutory and constitutional protections extend to non-natural persons, including so-called non-religious entities. In so holding, we express no view about whether threatened prosecution of Safehouse substantially burdens its exercise of religion. We likewise decline Safehouse’s invitation to determine in the first instance whether it has plausibly stated RFRA and Free Exercise claims. We only address the proper object of RFRA’s and the First Amendment’s protections: that object includes a non-natural entity allegedly exercising religion, even if the entity itself is not religious.