Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Apply Where No Ecclesiastical Questions Are at Issue

In Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App, March 2,2026), a California state appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying the ministerial exception doctrine to the wage-and-hour claims brought against a Zen Center by one of its Work Practice Apprentices. The court said in part:

Ehrenkranz contends that the trial court erred in applying the ministerial exception to bar his wage-and-hour claims because the United States Supreme Court has only applied the exception to bar a minister’s employment discrimination and wrongful termination claims and his wage claims do “not implicate [the Center’s] ability to hire or fire its ministers.”  He claims his case is instead about unpaid minimum wages and does not concern any ecclesiastical matter.  ...

[B]arring a minister’s employment claim without any evidence that the claim would raise an ecclesiastical concern is necessary to comply with the First Amendment only if that claim will inevitably ‘thrust the secular courts into the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions of religious faith or doctrine.’ ...  Thus, the ministerial exception only bars employment claims that require inquiries into matters that are ‘ “ strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government’ ” ...

... We therefore conclude that the ministerial exception does not apply to Ehrenkranz’s claims in the absence of evidence of an ecclesiastical concern....

In sum and in short, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants.  However, “our ruling here today does not foreclose the Center from presenting evidence at trial that applying wage-and-hour laws to ministers like [Ehrenkranz] raises an ecclesiastical concern and should therefore be barred under the Religion Clauses.” 

Supreme Court in Shadow Docket Case Rejects California's Policy on Informing Parents of Student's Gender Transition

On Monday evening, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup. Ct., March 2, 2026), barred enforcement against objecting parents of a controversial California school policy that requires student consent before disclosing to parents a student's gender transitioning in school. A California federal district court had enjoined enforcement of the policy in a challenge by parents and teachers. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, stayed the district court's injunction, thus reinstating the policy. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled for the parents.  It vacated the 9th Circuit's stay as to parents who object to the policy, but left the stay in place as to teachers. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the injunction as to teachers as well. Justices Jackson, Kagan and Sotomayor dissented.

The per curiam opinion says in part:

We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim.  California’s policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children.” ...  The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs....

The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds.  Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to “the upbringing and education of children.” ... The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health....

Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The dissent questions how the Court can adhere to parental-rights precedent after its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization..... But Dobbs calls into question neither the doctrine of substantive due process nor the other unexpressed rights that the doctrine protects....

 ... [C]ontrary to the dissent’s charge, granting interim relief is not a sign of the Court’s “impatience” to reach the merits.... Instead, the grant reflects the Court’s judgment about the risk of irreparable harm to the parents.... 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Today’s decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction.  A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court’s injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case’s merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute.  It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as regular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation....

As to due process particularly... I have no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make..... On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children.  But California’s policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children’s health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line.  And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief. 

The Court, however, would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis—in short, to do law in the right way—if it had followed our ordinary processes....

Justice Sotomayor, without writing or joining an opinion, stated that she would have left the 9th Circuit's injunction in place both as to parents and teachers.

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....

Ban on Feeding Feral Animals Did Not Violate Plaintiff's Free Exercise Rights

In Barroca v. Hayward Area Recreation and Parks District, (ND CA, Feb. 23, 2026), a California federal district court dismissed all but a selective prosecution claim in a suit involving activities at a public park in Hayward, California.  Plaintiff, a lover of cats, regularly fed feral and neighborhood cats in the park in violation of an ordinance prohibiting the feeding of wild or feral animals.  He also regularly, to little avail, asked authorities to enforce against dog owners the ordinance requiring dogs in the park to be on leashes. Plaintiff sued the park district and park rangers alleging failure to perform mandatory duties under California law and violations of the Fourteenth, Fourth, and First Amendment.  

One of plaintiff's claims was that the no-feeding ordinance violated his 1st Amendment free-exercise rights. In dismissing that claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that under his Catholic faith and the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi, he believes he has “a duty to God to take care of and love all of God’s animals.” ...  Due to these religious beliefs, Plaintiff “takes care of, feeds, shelters, provides medical needs, spay and neuters, play, love, and protect these cats and all of God’s animals.”  ... Plaintiff has alleged that this park ordinance interferes with his ability to feed cats within Meek Park, thus burdening his religious duty to take care of animals, specifically, the cats that frequent Meek Park. 

HARD Ordinance 19(b) is neutral and generally applicable.  Any burden it places on Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his religious beliefs in caring for animals is incidental.  Since the law is neutral and generally applicable, Plaintiff must show that it is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate government purpose.  But there are many potential legitimate bases for the rule: for example, feeding wild or feral animals attracts them to the park, increasing the risk of conflict with parkgoers and their pets, and the spread of disease.  Since the rule has a conceivable legitimate basis, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim fails.

Various other claims against the park district and park rangers were also dismissed.

9th Circuit: Prison May Not Revoke Religious Diet Privilege Because Inmate Did Not Strictly Adhere to It

In Harris v. Muhammad, (9th Cir., Feb. 4, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a California federal district court's denial of a preliminary injunction to a Buddhist inmate who had been taken off of the prison's Religious Meat Alternative Program (RAMP) because he often purchased non-Halal food from the prison commissary. Plaintiff was a Nichiren Buddhist. On advice of the prison chaplain, Harris chose RAMP, a halal compliant diet, as the closest to his Nichiren Buddhist belief that he should eat natural foods that are not highly processed. His precise diet that was unavailable did not require halal certification. The district court held that taking Harris off of RAMP was not a substantial burden on his religious exercise since his religion did not require him to limit his intake to halal meat. The 9th Circuit said in part:

By conditioning his ability to receive the diet which most aligns with his beliefs on whether he keeps Islamic dietary laws, Harris has shown a substantial burden on his religious exercise. ...

Holding otherwise imposes a judicial assessment of what diet is required by Harris’s Nichiren Buddhist faith....  

Judges ought not be Pharisees, decreeing from on high what practices are relevant to a prisoner’s understanding of his own faith.  See Matthew 23:23. ...  And if external forces cause Harris to fall short of the exact dictates of his religion, it is for him and his conscience, not us as courts, to decide what compromises are appropriate.  Thus, it is sufficient that Harris asserts that he sincerely believes that the RMAP program “is closest to his spiritual needs.”  In holding that an Islamic diet is not required by Harris’s Buddhist faith, the district court erred by discounting Harris’s own understanding of his faith....

... Harris’s departures from the Islamic diet—or even a Buddhist diet—do not demonstrate that his beliefs do not require him to adhere to that diet if possible. “[A] sincere religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for where would religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”  ...

Each man’s faith is his own, and judges must avoid questioning whether a prisoner has strictly abided by the letter of his own sincere belief.

The district court erred by considering these backslides as part of a centrality inquiry (i.e., concluding that expulsion from RMAP would not affect Harris’s ability to practice his own religion)....

Although courts may not determine what actions are dictated by a plaintiff’s personal religious beliefs, a court may determine whether those beliefs are sincerely held..... RLUIPA does not entitle insincere believers in the “Church of Surf ‘n’ Turf” to luxury lobster and steak dinners.  But it also protects the rights of sincere believers, who may not fully adhere to their stated beliefs.  

Neither the district court nor the prison inquired into the sincerity of Harris’s beliefs, only their centrality to his religion.  The district court should consider that issue in the first instance....

Parents Seek Emergency Order from SCOTUS Reinstating Trial Court's Voiding of School Policy on Disclosure of Students' Gender Transition

As previously reported, last December in Mirabelli v. Bonta, a California federal district court held unconstitutional the policy of California school boards that bars public school teachers and staff from informing parents about changes in a child’s gender expression unless the child consents. On January 5, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay pending appeal of the district court's injunction. Now plaintiffs in the case have filed an Emergency Application with the U.S. Supreme Court asking it to vacate the 9th Circuit's stay. (Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup.Ct., filed 1/8/2026). (Full text of 9th Circuit's stay order and Application to Supreme Court).

Education Week reports on these developments.

California's Law Combatting Antisemitism In Public Schools Survives Constitutional Challenge

In Prichett v. Bonta, (ND CA, Dec. 31, 2026), a California federal district court refused to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of California AB 715 which is directed at preventing antisemitism in the curriculum of public schools. Among other things, the new law provides that the Biden Administration's National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism should be a basis to inform schools on how to identify, respond to, prevent, and counter antisemitism. Plaintiffs are California teachers and students who allege that AB 715 violates their free speech rights and is overbroad and void for vagueness. The court said in part:

Teacher Plaintiffs worry that AB 715 exposes them “to charges of unlawful discrimination and corresponding discipline if they convey ideas, information, and instructional materials to their students that may be considered critical of the State of Israel and the philosophy of Zionism—thus, creating a chilling effect and infringing on the First Amendment rights of both the teacher and student.” ...Student Plaintiffs allege ...that AB 715 undermines their “rights to receive information” related to “Palestinian and Arab culture” because teachers will be forced to self-censor to remain within the confines of AB 715....

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that the uncertainty created by AB 715’s inexact definition of antisemitism casts an unconstitutional pall over the entire bill....

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the California legislature’s references in AB 715 to the Biden National Strategy ... were unconstitutional. However, even if Plaintiffs had proved that those two references were unconstitutional, the Court could, and would, properly sever those two references from the remainder of AB 715....

While Teacher Plaintiffs’ claims pass the standing hurdle, those claims are not currently ripe for adjudication....

As public-school education belongs to the government, the government may regulate Teacher Plaintiffs’ speech to accord with the government’s educational goals. It is of no significance that the curricula and the attendant speech required to teach it may advance a single viewpoint to the exclusion of another....

The Court does not find the word antisemitism in AB 715 to be vague....  A reasonable person reading AB 715 would sufficiently understand what the legislature meant by the word “antisemitism.”...

The Forward reports on the decision.

California Policy Barring School's Disclosure of Student's Change in Gender Expression Is Unconstitutional

In Mirabelli v. Olson, (SD CA, Dec. 22, 2025), a California federal district court held unconstitutional the policy of California school boards that bars public school teachers and staff from informing parents about changes in a child’s gender expression unless the child consents. The court concluded:

[The policies] harm the parents by depriving them of the long-recognized Fourteenth Amendment right to care, guide, and make health care decisions for their children, and by substantially burdening many parents’ First Amendment right to train their children in their sincerely held religious beliefs.  And finally, they harm teachers who are compelled to violate the sincerely held beliefs and the parent’s rights by forcing them to conceal information they feel is critical for the welfare of their students.

Justifying its conclusion, the court said: 

The constitutional question is about when gender incongruence is observed, whether parents have a right to be informed and make the decision about whether further professional investigation or therapy is needed.  Put another way, the question is whether being involved in potentially serious medical or psychological decision-making for their school student is a parent’s constitutional right. It is. "Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state...."

The State Defendants argue... that a parent “does not possess a religious exercise right to dictate that a school reject their child’s gender identity.”...  Nevertheless, this Court disagrees....

Defendants concede that parents “may find notification that their child is expressing a transgender identity at school helpful in the general exercise of their right to direct a religious upbringing for that child.” ... So, the State Defendants are aware that notification would be helpful to religious parents, but provide no room for those parents to exercise those federal constitutional rights.... [T]he California state education parental exclusion policies provide no exceptions for religious parents....

The four teacher Plaintiffs and class representatives sincerely hold religious beliefs that that are being severely burdened by the imposition of the parental exclusion policies....

The teachers successfully make out a First Amendment freedom of speech claim when they are compelled to speak in violation of the law or to deliberately convey an illegal message....

Daily Wire reports on the decision.

Bagua Mirror on City Property Did Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Ngo v. City of Westminster, (CD CA, Nov. 26, 2025), a California federal district court held that display of a Bagua Mirror on city property did not violate the Establishment Clause. Plaintiff alleged that the Mirror was a religious symbol displayed outside the mayor's office on a city hall wall, and that as a devout Catholic, he was offended by the display of the Mirror.

The court said in part:

Neither party has briefed in any detail how the Bagua Mirror display fits in the historical understandings and practices of this nation regarding the Establishment Clause.  However, the Supreme Court has noted there “is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789.”...

In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court held that a city owned and displayed Christmas nativity scene including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph did not violate the Establishment Clause....  In that opinion, the Supreme Court opined on the long history and tradition of government sponsored and displayed religious symbols.  For example, “[a]rt galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith.”...  

From the Supreme Court’s recounting, it is clear that government-sponsored and displayed religious symbols have long been part of this nation’s history and practices, without violating the Establishment Clause.  Therefore, the Court finds the allegation that a Bagua Mirror was displayed on City property insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Establishment Clause.  In addition, the SAC’s allegation that Plaintiff was offended at the sight of the Bagua Mirror does not amount to any degree of governmental coercion.  Offense does not equate to coercion....  The SAC’s Establishment Clause Claim is dismissed.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Camping Ordinance Does Not Violate Free Exercise Rights of Homeless Resident

In Hebbe v. City of Folsom, (ED CA, Dec. 3, 2025), plaintiff who is an unhoused resident of Folsom, California, challenges on numerous grounds a Folsom Ordinance that prohibits public camping between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.  One of his claims-- rejected by the decision of a California federal magistrate judge-- is that the public camping ban violates his 1st Amendment free exercise rights. The court said in part:

To state a claim under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff must allege that the government action substantially burdens the plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs.... A substantial burden exists when the government puts significant pressure on a person to modify their behavior and violate their religious beliefs....

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance, which prohibits camping between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., forces him to sleep during the day, which prevents him from attending church service....  These allegations, even liberally construed, fail to state a cognizable Free Exercise Clause claim.  Plaintiff does not allege facts showing the Ordinance targets religion or is applied in a discriminatory manner.  Neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.... Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing the Ordinance places a substantial burden on his ability to practice his faith.  Conclusory statements that he cannot go to church service are insufficient....

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Bar Wage-and-Hour Claim

In Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App., Nov. 21, 2025), a California state appellate court held that neither the ministerial exception doctrine nor the church autonomy doctrine bars a wage-and-hour claim for past services by an employee who is a "minister" under the ministerial exception doctrine. The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not apply because plaintiff's wage claims do not raise an ecclesiastical concern. The court said in part:

 ... Lorenzo only challenges the Center’s failure to pay her a minimum wage and overtime wages for work that she has already performed as part of the Center’s commercial activities.  She does not challenge the Center’s decision to terminate her employment or seek reinstatement.  Despite this, the Center asserts that the enforcement of California’s wage-and-hour laws would inevitably result in excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Religion Clauses solely because Lorenzo is a minister.  But the Center does not explain why, and its omission is telling. ...

“[T]he aspect of the church-minister employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its representatives”—is not “present” in every employment claim....  For example, not every aspect of a minister’s compensation is “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”...  Indeed, “[t]he constitutional rationale for protecting some of a church’s [autonomy to choose its representatives] . . . does not apply . . . where what is at issue is not who the [church] will select to educate its youngest students, but only whether it will provide the people it has chosen with meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime pay.”...

...[T]he Center has not pointed to and we have not come across anything in the history of the Religion Clauses to suggest that a minister’s compensation, much less the minimum compensation that a minister should receive to subsist, was a concern of the founders....

Broad Religious Statements Did Not Support Title VII Discrimination Claim

 In Castaneda v. State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, (ED CA, Oct. 28, 2025), a DMV employee brought several federal and state claims challenging her firing. She had raised religious objections to the Covid vaccine and also objected to the alternative of testing by DMV's third-party contractor instead of her own doctor. Dismissing, with leave to amend, plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claim, a California federal magistrate judge said in part:

... Plaintiff does not explain the religious basis for her objection to the vaccine, beyond saying that “her body is sacred and God-given” and she cannot be compelled to have her DNA “harvested” and “tested on” because it is “the code of life given by God.”... The Ninth Circuit recently held that “[i]nvocations of broad, religious tenets cannot, on their own, convert a secular preference into a religious conviction” for purposes of a discrimination claim....  To allow Plaintiff’s claim simply because she invokes the concepts of bodily autonomy and God in the same sentence “would destroy the pleading standard for religious discrimination claims, allowing complainants to invoke magic words and survive a dismissal without stating a prima facie case.” ... 

Mother Loses Free Exercise Challenge To Violence Against Women Act

In United States v. Gaviola, (ED CA, Sept. 25, 2025), a California federal district court held that enforcement of 18 USC §2262(a)(2) does not violate the free exercise rights of a California mother who arranged for her 16-year-old son to be forcibly transferred to a religious boarding school in Missouri.  The son had previously obtained a temporary restraining order against his mother prohibiting her from contacting him. He had also filed a petition to become an emancipated minor. 18 USC §2262(a)(2), which is part of the Violence Against Women Act, criminalizes causing a person to travel in interstate commerce by force, coercion, duress or fraud where that violates a state court protection order. According to the court:

Gaviola asserts that her decision to cause her child, MV, to cross state lines in order to enroll him in a Christian school “reflects her sincerely held religious beliefs and her absolute right to direct her child’s religious and moral education.”... As such, she claims that “[p]rosecuting her under 18 U.S.C. § 2262 for this conduct imposes a substantial burden on her free exercise of religion, as it effectively penalizes her for making a constitutionally protected choice.”

In rejecting her claim, the court said in part:

Section 2262 is neutral. It does not single out religion or religiously motivated conduct for special burdens; it applies regardless of the defendant’s beliefs. It is generally applicable because it uniformly prohibits all persons from violating protection orders; it does not afford discretion to grant exceptions for secular motivations (e.g., employment, education, medical reasons) while denying them for religious ones. The government’s interest—interstate enforcement of state court orders and protection of victims of domestic violence—applies equally across the board. Thus, under Smith, § 2262 is a classic example of a neutral, generally applicable law whose enforcement does not trigger strict scrutiny, even if a defendant claims her conduct was religiously motivated....

Moreover, if the Court set aside Smith and applied strict scrutiny, Gaviola’s arguments still fails....

Gaviola does not raise a claim or defense under the RFRA. However, whether under Gaviola’s interpretation of a First Amendment challenge or one under the RFRA, the “net effect” is the same: “the government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if and only if the government’s action can survive ‘strict scrutiny.’” ...  

As previously discussed, the Court does not doubt the sincerity of Gaviola’s religious beliefs. The Court will also assume, without deciding, that prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(2) substantially burdens her exercise of religion. Even so, the government’s interests are compelling. 

The federal government has a paramount interest in protecting victims of domestic violence, including by ensuring the enforceability of state-court protection orders and preventing their evasion through interstate travel. Enforcing § 2262—as well as other provisions of the Violence Against Women Act—advances these compelling interests, such as safeguarding children, upholding judicial orders, and deterring interstate abduction.... 

California Legislature Passes Law Aimed at Combatting Antisemitism and Other Bias in Schools

On September 12, the California legislature gave final passage to AB 715 (full text) which amends the state Education Code to create a state office of Civil Rights. The new Office is to work directly with local educational agencies to address discrimination and bias. It is to provide educational resources to identify and prevent antisemitism and other forms bias. The bill also requires the Office to employ an Antisemitism Prevention Coordinator who is to provide antisemitism education to school personnel and make recommendations to the legislature on legislation that is needed to prevent antisemitism in educational settings. The bill provides in part:

The United States National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism, published by the Biden Administration on May 25, 2023, shall be a basis to inform the Antisemitism Prevention Coordinator on how to identify, respond to, prevent, and counter antisemitism.

The bill also provides in part:

51500. (a) (1) A teacher shall not give instruction and a school district shall not sponsor any activity that promotes a discriminatory bias on the basis of race or ethnicity, gender, religion, disability, nationality, or sexual orientation or because of a characteristic listed in section 220....

(2) Discriminatory bias in instruction and school-sponsored activities does not require a showing of direct harm to members of a protected group. Members of a protected group do not need to be present while the discriminatory bias is occurring for the act to be considered discriminatory bias.

(3) If the governing board or body of a local educational agency finds that instruction or school-sponsored activities are discriminatory pursuant to this section, corrective action shall be taken.

(b) Teacher instruction shall be factually accurate and align with the adopted curriculum and standards ..., and be consistent with accepted standards of professional responsibility, rather than advocacy, personal opinion, bias, or partisanship.

The bill now goes to Governor Gavin Newsom for his signature. JNS reports on the passage of the legislation. KQED reports on the controversy that surrounded the bill.

9th Circuit Upholds Requirement to Use Only Secular Curricular Materials in Charter School Home Instruction Programs

In Woodlard v. Thurmond, (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected First Amendment challenges to California's refusal to purchase and permit the use of religious curricular materials in home-based independent study programs of two charter schools. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs ... argue that the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs are really homeschooling and that the schools’ provision of curricular materials should be treated as a generally available public benefit in aid of homeschooling, access to which cannot be denied based on Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. The argument is premised on three recent Supreme Court decisions holding that when a state creates a generally available public benefit, it cannot exclude a potential recipient from the benefit because of religious status or religious use....

... [N]ot all government decisions that engender religious objections impose burdens on religion that fall afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. As the Supreme Court made clear in Carson, a state’s decision to provide a “strictly secular” public education does not do so....

... [I]n contrast to private homeschooling, parents in independent study programs can teach only under the supervision of state employees. The extensive legal requirements applicable to the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs make the programs sufficiently public to defeat Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim....

Plaintiffs’ compelled speech claim fares no better. It is premised on the argument that “[w]hen parents in the Blue Ridge and Visions programs select a diverse array of curricula for their children’s diverse needs,” the parents are speaking, not the government. However, we have held that a public school’s curriculum is an “expression of its policy,” ... and that “information and speech ... present[ed] to school children may be deemed to be part of the school’s curriculum and thus School District speech,” 

State Office Violated Title VII by Refusing to Allow Jehovah's Witness to Attach Addendum to Required Employment Oath

In Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the California State Controller, (ED CA, Aug. 29, 2025), a California federal district court, in a case on remand from the 9th Circuit (see prior posting), granted summary judgment to plaintiff on her Title VII failure to accommodate claim.  Plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, insisted on attaching an Addendum to the oath she was required to take as an employee of the State Controller's Office.  She contended that the required Oath violated her religious beliefs in four ways, one of which was the Oath’s language that she "will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California."  She contended that this conflicted with her religious belief that "her allegiance is first and foremost to God."

The court said in part:

The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff’s religious beliefs conflict with the “true faith and allegiance” provision.  Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Schmalz opined that “the requirement to ‘bear true faith and allegiance’ presents a conflict with a typical Jehovah’s Witness’ most basic loyalty to Jehovah God — a fundamental precept guiding Watchtower belief and practice.” 

Plaintiff's proposed Addendum read:

I, [Plaintiff], vow to uphold the Constitutions of the United States and that of the State of California while working in my role as an employee of the [SCO].  I will be honest and fair in my dealings and neither dishonor the Office by word nor deed.  By signing this oath, I understand that I shall not be required to bear arms, engage in violence, nor participate in political or military affairs.  Additionally, I understand that I am not giving up my right to freely exercise my religion, nor am I denouncing my religion by accepting this position.

The court concluded:

... [T]he undisputed evidence shows that Defendants would not have experienced an undue hardship if Plaintiff had been allowed to attach the Proposed Addendum and sign the Oath, as she requested.

The court dismissed several of plaintiff's other claims.

Supreme Court Review Sought by California Baker

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed this week in Miller v. Civil Rights Division, (Sup. Ct., certiorari filed 8/26/2025). In the case, a California state appellate court held that a bakery, Cathy's Creations, and its owner violated the anti-discrimination provisions of California law when they refused to sell a predesigned cake to a customer because the cake would be used at a same-sex wedding reception. The California court rejected defendant's free exercise and free speech defenses. (See prior posting.) The California Supreme Court denied review. Washington Times reports on the petition seeking U.S. Supreme Court review.

LA Sued Over Its handling of Permit Application for Christian Revival Event

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by leaders of May Day USA, a nationwide Christian revival event, contending that the manner in which Los Angeles officials handed their application for a permit to hold a revival on Hollywood Boulevard violated their 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The 54-page complaint (full text) in Donnelly v. City of Los Angeles, California, (CD CA, filed 8/21/2025), alleges in part:

15. LAPD wielded the unconstitutionally unbridled discretion afforded it under the City’s permitting scheme to subject MayDay to lengthy and pretextual administrative hurdles....

16. Among the LAPD’s many demands was a requirement that MayDay conduct a petition of Hollywood Boulevard’s business owners and vendors to ensure at least 51% approved of MayDay’s expressive activity and speech....

19. The City’s permitting scheme thus enshrined an unconstitutional heckler’s veto upon MayDay and its expressive activities....

21. The City refused to provide MayDay with any concrete answer on its permit application until the last minute, prohibiting MayDay from finalizing their planned event, advertising it, or otherwise adequately preparing to engage in the event....

23. Three days prior to its requested event, the City denied the permit actually requested by MayDay ...and “granted” the application to host the event at a location ... it never requested and out of the site of the hecklers who Defendants believed would veto MayDay’s speech. In essence, the City tried to put MayDay unconstitutionally out of sight, and out of mind....

25. Simply put, the City said MayDay could speak, but only if it did it quietly, quickly, and where no one who might object would be forced to hear it. Defendants denied MayDay’s permit application on the basis of the views it planned to espouse and out of concern that Hollywood Boulevard was not an appropriate place for their religious speech, exercise, and expression.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Good News Clubs Must Have Equal Access to School Facilities

In Child Evangelism Fellowship NorCal, Inc. v. Oakland Unified School District Board of Education, (ND CA, Aug. 15, 2025), a California federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the Oakland School District from denying Christian Evangelism Fellowship and its Good News Clubs access to school facilities after school on an equal basis with the access provided similarly situated nonprofit organizations. Plaintiff had been denied use of school facilities, in part because all space was being used by two broad afterschool programs that choose subcontractors to provide content. The court said in part:

Even assuming that afterschool space is now controlled by the lead agencies, as OUSD seems to urge, Plaintiff has provided an example of a lead agency similarly denying CEF access as a subcontractor because of its religious affiliation....

In short, the Court finds that the law and facts clearly favor Plaintiff’s position that OUSD violated CEF’s free speech rights.

Catholic News Agency reports on the decision.

9th Circuit Rejects Christian Day Care's Challenge to Licensing Requirement

In Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson, (9th Cir., Aug. 14, 2025), Foothills, a Christian day care center, challenged a California licensing provision requiring that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their parents' choice. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulation on free exercise grounds because the state has repeatedly taken the position that the regulation does not prohibit operating a day care center with a mandatory religious curriculum, where parents are made aware of this in advance of enrollment. 

However, the court held that Foothills does have standing to challenge the general licensing requirement on the ground that some secular child day care centers are exempt from licensing. But the court rejected that claim on the merits, saying in part:

Foothills contends that the Act’s exemption of “recreation programs conducted for children by” the YMCA “or similar organizations,”...  But this provision only exempts recreation programs from the licensure requirement; it explicitly does not exempt “child day care programs conducted by” the same organizations and so creates no mechanism for granting individualized exemptions for such facilities....

Foothills points to the exception for any “child daycare program that operates only one day per week for no more than four hours on that one day.”... This exemption applies to, among other things, Sunday schools. But a program that oversees children for only four hours a week does not present a threat to children’s health and safety comparable to that of a facility that can operate up to 24 hours a day....

Foothills alleges that the Act’s exemption of certain sectarian organizations—such as the YMCA and Boy Scouts of America—from licensing gives preferential treatment to certain religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.... 

If Foothills sought to operate a recreation program, it would not be subject to the Act. And if the YMCA or the Boy Scouts sought to operate a child day care facility, they would. This exemption draws no lines based on religion....

The court also held that the required disclosure to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice does not infringe Foothills' free speech rights, distinguishing the Supreme Court case of Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra , saying in part:

 Because the Act merely requires Foothills to inform parents of their children’s rights and does not “convey a message fundamentally at odds with its mission,” the required disclosure is not controversial....