DOJ Sues California Coffee House for Discriminating Against Jewish Customers

On Monday, the Justice Department filed suit in a California federal district court against an Oakland, California coffee house alleging violations of Title II, the Public Accommodation provisions, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The suit alleges that the coffee house refuses to serve Jewish patrons.  The complaint (full text) in United States v. Harara, (ND CA, filed 6/9/2025), alleges in part:

Among the drinks the coffee house sells are "Iced In Tea Fada," an apparent reference to intifada and "Sweet Sinwar." The coffee house announced these new drinks on Instagram on the one-year anniversary of the October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel....

The Justice Department's press release announcing the filing of the suit summarizes the discrimination charges in the complaint, saying in part:

The lawsuit ... alleges that defendants discriminated against Jewish customers through policies and practices that denied them the full and equal enjoyment of the Jerusalem Coffee House’s services, accommodations, and privileges. Specifically, the lawsuit alleges that on two separate occasions, Harara ordered Jewish customers — identified because they were wearing baseball caps with Stars of David on them — to leave the coffee house. During one incident, an employee told a Jewish customer who was trying to make a purchase, “You’re the guy with the hat. You’re the Jew. You’re the Zionist.  We don’t want you in our coffee shop. Get out.” During another incident, Harara accused another Jewish customer who was with his five-year-old son of wearing a “Jewish star,” being a “Zionist,” and supporting “genocide.” Harara repeatedly demanded that the customer and his son leave and falsely accused them of “trespassing” to the Oakland police....

Teacher's Refusal to Use Student's Preferred Pronouns Justified Her Being Fired

 In Ramirez v. Oakland Unified School District, (ND CA, May 27, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed claims by a former kindergarten teacher that her free speech and free exercise rights were violated by her termination for refusing to refer to a student using male pronouns when the student appeared to be biologically female. Both school officials and the student's parents requested that male pronouns be used. Plaintiff contended that her Catholic faith does not allow her to refer to a person using pronouns that differ from the person’s “divinely-intended gender.” The court held that the school district itself was protected by sovereign immunity and that the individual plaintiffs have qualified immunity as to any action for damages. The court went on to hold that plaintiff also failed to adequately allege either a speech or religious exercise claim, saying in part:

The complaint fails to state a claim because the alleged speech was not protected. Ms. Ramirez agreed to serve as an elementary school teacher at a public school. To do the job, a teacher must address and interact with their students. As other courts have observed, while addressing students is not part of the curriculum itself, “it is difficult to imagine how a teacher could perform [their] teaching duties on any subject without a method by which to address individual students.”,,, 

The plaintiff’s main argument in opposition — that the above analysis does not apply because this case concerns compelled speech — fails both legally and factually. While the Supreme Court has suggested that compelled speech outside of an employee’s official duties warrants heightened protection, the government may insist that the employee deliver any lawful message when the speech is part of the employee’s official duties....

Here, the plaintiff does not contest that the district’s anti-discrimination policy is facially neutral. Instead, she contends that school officials were impermissibly hostile towards her religious beliefs when enforcing the policy. The argument fails because, even accepted as true, the well-pleaded facts do not plausibly allege hostility. 

California Agrees to Consent Decree Allowing Sectarian Schools to Participate In IDEA

 As previously reported, last October the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a California federal district court's dismissal of a suit by the parents of special needs children and by two Orthodox Jewish schools. The suit challenges as a violation of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses California's rules that preclude sectarian schools from receiving payments for special needs children under the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This week, in the district court the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction in Loffman v, California Department of Education, (CD CA, May 19, 2025). The injunction bars California from enforcing requirements that schools be nonsectarian in order to participate in the IDEA program. Fox News reports on these developments.

Exclusion of Religious Organization from Non-Profit Discount Challenged Under California's Unruh Act

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by a Christian non-profit claiming that OpenAI's non-profit discount policy that excludes academic, medical, religious, and governmental institutions violates plaintiff's rights under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. The complaint (full text) in Holy Sexuality v. OpenAI, Inc., (SD CA, filed 5/21/2025), alleges in part:

1. Plaintiff Holy Sexuality is a Christian nonprofit based in Texas that uses video courses to teach young people and their families about biblical principles on human sexuality.  

2. To operate more effectively, Holy Sexuality contacted Defendant OpenAI, Inc., a San Francisco-based tech company, to receive OpenAI’s 20% nonprofit discount for a ChatGPT subscription....  

4. But OpenAI and Goodstack denied Holy Sexuality the discount because “religious … institutions are not eligible.” 

5. This categorical denial, OpenAI’s published policy, and Goodstack’s enforcement of that policy are invidious religious discrimination. And they are illegal under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act....

6. People of faith aren’t second-class citizens in California, and tech companies cannot provide lesser services to customers simply because they are religious....

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Church's Removal of Congregant from Services Did Not Violate 1st Amendment

 In Devi v. Sacramento Bhartiya Sabha, (ED CA, May 2, 2025), a California federal magistrate judge recommended dismissal of a suit against a church and the city by plaintiff who was removed from a church service by police serving her with a trespass notice at the request of church board members. The court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that the Board of Trustees and the President of the Church defendant prohibited her from entering the Church and “exercising her rights to freely practice her religious beliefs and to her rights to free speech” under the First Amendment....  She alleges that she was removed from the Church because the Church defendant did not approve of plaintiff’s opinions and questions and was attempting to stop her from stating these opinions....  She alleges the Church defendant retaliated against her by preventing her from attending services because she expressed her opinions and concerns about the Church’s finances....

To state a claim for a violation of the First Amendment, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted under the color of state law....

In order to successfully bring her claim, plaintiff has to show that there is significant state involvement in the private party’s actions.  Plaintiff has made no allegations that the Church defendant’s alleged decision to exclude her from the Church is a “traditionally and exclusively governmental” function.  She also still has not demonstrated that there was “significant” state involvement in the Church defendant’s decision to remove her from the Church.  Based on plaintiff’s allegations, the Church decided to call the police to remove plaintiff from the Church premises because she was trespassing.  To the extent plaintiff is alleging that the Church defendant was a state actor because it had plaintiff removed by the City of Sacramento Police Department, “merely complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state actor.”

Parents Lack Standing to Challenge Law Barring Schools from Disclosing Child's Change of Name or Pronoun

In Chino Valley Unified School District v. Newsom, (ED CA, April 18, 2025), a California federal district court held that plaintiffs, parents of school children, lack standing to challenge a California law that prohibits public schools from requiring disclosure to parents, without their child's consent, of their child's change of name or gender pronoun at school. Plaintiffs are "devout Christians and believe that God created man and woman as distinct, immutable genders." They contend that the law violates their free exercise rights and their right to control the upbringing and medical care of their children.  The court said in part:

While the Court has no doubt as to the concern that Plaintiff Parents have toward the implementation of AB 1955, Plaintiff Parents have not shown that they have suffered or will imminently suffer any form of harm as a result the Act.  For example, Plaintiff Parents do not allege that their own child has gone or goes by a different name at school, that their children’s school has deprived the parents of relevant information about their child, or that this is something that is likely to happen in the future....

Appellate Court Upholds $1.2M Fine Against Church for Violating Covid Public Health Orders

In People of the State of California v. Calvary Chapel San Jose, (CA App., April 15, 2025), a California state appellate court affirmed the imposition of administrative fines totaling $1,228,700 on defendant church for violating Covid public health orders requiring face coverings and submission of a social distancing protocol. The court rejected Calvary Chapel's Free Exercise defense. The court said in part:

...  [T]he People have met their burden to establish as a matter of law that the face covering requirements set forth in the orders are neutral and of general applicability, and Calvary Chapel has failed to submit admissible evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. 

First, the text of the revised risk reduction order and the safety measures order shows that these orders are neutral because they are not specifically directed at religious practice, do not discriminate on their face, and religious exercise is not the object of the orders....

Having reviewed the very limited exemptions that Calvary Chapel asserts show that the face covering requirements in public health orders are not of general applicability, we decide that Calvary Chapel has provided no evidence to create a triable question of fact regarding general applicability.

The court also rejected Calvary Chapel's due process claims and additionally held:

... [T]he undisputed facts show that Calvary Chapel’s level of culpability due to violating the public health orders requiring face coverings is high, and therefore the fines in the amount of $1,228,700 do not violate the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Denial of Conditional Use Permit to Church Violated RLUIPA and 1st Amendment

In Anchor Stone Christian Church v. City of Santa Ana, (CD CA, April 7, 2025), a California federal district court issued a preliminary injunction allowing a church to operate and make renovations to an office building it had acquired. The city had denied a conditional use permit to the church. The court concluded that the denial violated RLUIPA's equal terms and substantial burden provisions, as well as the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court said in part:

... [T]he City must do more than identify some similarly situated nonreligious assemblies that are treated as badly as religious assemblies—the City must show that it treats “every” similarly situated nonreligious assembly equally to religious assemblies....

In short, it appears unlikely that the City will meet its burden to establish that the Zoning Ordinance treats religious assembly on equal terms with similarly situated nonreligious assembly uses.... 

The Court concludes that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, Anchor Stone has met its burden to show that the City’s denial of its CUP application substantially burdened Anchor Stone’s religious exercise....

The City’s reasons for denying a CUP to Anchor Stone also appear particularly arbitrary in view of the City’s reasons for granting a CUP to Compass Bible Church....

The Planning Commission and the City Council refused to consider or apply RLUIPA in connection with Anchor Stone’s CUP application.  Multiple commissioners and councilmembers expressed “offense” at the mention of RLUIPA, while the City’s staff affirmed that it was the City’s “position” that RLUIPA was “outside the scope” of the CUP application process.  One councilmember regarded the mention of RLUIPA as a “smack in [his] face” and an attempt to “circumvent [Santa Ana’s] local laws.” Such comments from a government official fall far short of fulfilling the “First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion,”....

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the decision.

Court Upholds California's Repeal of Personal Belief Exemption from School Vaccination Mandate

 In Royce v. Pan, (SD CA, March 17, 2025), a California federal district court rejected a free exercise challenge to California's removal of the "personal belief" exemption from the state's compulsory school vaccination requirements. The court rejected arguments that the repeal of the exemption evidenced hostility to religion and that the law is not generally applicable because it exempts comparable secular activity.  The court said in part:

First, SB 277 did not specifically repeal a religious exemption.  Rather, it repealed a general personal belief exemption that was secular and neutral on its face.  Repeal of a secular exemption does not demonstrate hostility towards any religion or religious practice.  Second, even if SB 277 could be characterized as repealing a religious exemption, repealing a prior religious exemption is not hostile towards religion per se....

Plaintiffs argue that SB 277 is substantially underinclusive and treats secular activity more favorably than religious exercise by eliminating exemptions for religious reasons but permitting secular exemptions that undermine the State’s interest in a similar way.....  In particular, Plaintiffs highlight medical exemptions, exemptions for home schooled children and children enrolled in independent student programs, exemptions for students who qualify for IEPs, exemptions for students over 18 years of age, and conditional enrollment for migrant, homeless, foster, and military children.....

The court concluded that none of these exemptions are comparable to a religious exemption and that rational basis review applies because the law is neutral and generally applicable.

9th Circuit: Profs Lack Standing to Challenge Addition of Caste Discrimination to University's Anti-Discrimination Policy

In Kumar v. Koester, (9th Cir., March 12, 2023), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that two Hindu California State University college professors lack standing to challenge the addition of "caste" as a protected class under the university's anti-discrimination and harassment policy. Plaintiffs claim that this addition falsely attributes a caste system to Hinduism. The court said in part:

Appellants allege that the Policy’s inclusion of “caste” stigmatized their religion and caused them to self-censor certain religious practices, like celebrating holidays and discussing religious texts....

The complaint ... alleges that the Policy violates the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment by defining the Hindu religion as including a caste system, and in doing so, “ascrib[es] an oppressive and discriminatory caste system to the entire Hindu religion.”...  

Appellants failed to show that they intend to engage in any religious practice that could reasonably constitute caste discrimination or harassment such that the Policy would be enforced against them....

... How can Appellants be injured by a policy prohibiting conduct that they have no intention to engage in?...

... Appellants have alleged no injury to their ability to exercise their religion.  Rather, their claims only indicate that they are offended by an alleged association of the caste system with Hinduism.  This is the exact “moral, ideological, or policy objection to a particular government action” that the injury in fact requirement is meant to “screen[] out.”...

... [T]he district court made a factual finding that the Policy had no hostility toward religion.  It based that finding on (1) the fact that the Policy does not mention Hinduism; (2) dictionary definitions show “caste” is “readily defined without reference to Hinduism” 

... If the Policy does not stigmatize Hinduism, Appellants have no spiritual injury.  And if there is no injury, there is no standing....  Appellants’ Establishment Clause claim fails for lack of Article III standing....

[Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.]

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Title VII Religioius Discrimination Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Hittle v. City of Stockton, California, (Docket No. 24-427, certiorari denied 3/10/2025). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of cert. In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of a religious discrimination suit under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act brought by the city's former Fire Chief.  Among the several reasons given to plaintiff by the city for his dismissal was his attendance at a Christian religious leadership event on city time and with use of a city vehicle, and his approval for three other Department employees to also attend. (See prior posting.) In his dissent, Justice Thomas said in part:

I would have taken this opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas and decide whether its burden-shifting framework remains a workable and useful evidentiary tool.

CNN reports on the denial of review.

DOJ Starts Title VII "Pattern or Practice" Investigation of Antisemitism at University of California

The Department of Justice has launched an employment discrimination investigation of the University of California. A DOJ press release this week says in part:

The Federal Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism announced that the Justice Department has opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into the University of California (UC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The investigation will assess whether UC has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race, religion and national origin against its professors, staff and other employees by allowing an Antisemitic hostile work environment to exist on its campuses....

Under Title VII, the Justice Department has the authority to initiate investigations against state and local government employers where it has reason to believe that a “pattern or practice” of employment discrimination exists....

CBS News reports on the investigation.

Coffee House Sued Over Separate Antisemitic Incidents Involving Harassment of Customers

 A suit under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act alleging religious discrimination was filed yesterday in a California state trial court against an Oakland, California coffee house that (unknown to plaintiff) had a history of promoting menu items with names connected with Hamas. The complaint (full text) in Hirsch v. Native Grounds, Inc. (D/B/A Jerusalem Coffee House), (CA Super. Ct., filed 3/3/2025), alleges that plaintiff, a Jewish American who entered the coffee house with his 5-year-old son, was asked restaurant's owner (also a defendant) to leave because he was wearing a baseball cap that featured a Jewish star.  The complaint alleges in part:

26. Within minutes of sitting down, Mr. Hirsch was approached by Defendant Harara. Harara demanded to know whether Hirsch was a “Zionist.” ... When Hirsch refused to answer Harara’s question, Harara demanded that he leave the premises. 

27. Harara threatened to call the police and repeatedly demanded that Hirsch leave the premises, which he described as his private business.... When Hirsch pointed out that he was being asked to leave because his hat depicted a Jewish star, Harara stated that “this is a violent hat, and you need to leave.” 

28. An employee of the East Bay Community Space ... stated that it was the business’ right and that “they could ask you to leave for any reason.” Mr. Hirsch again pointed out that a business cannot refuse service to someone solely ... because of their religion. Raven [the employee] disagreed, claiming “they’re allowed to ask you to leave for any reason” and ... claiming that “the only reason they know you’re a protected class is that you’re putting on your hat. You’re choosing to be here in this situation.”

San Francisco Standard reports on the lawsuit.

This suit follows one filed in a California federal district court by another plaintiff several days earlier alleging antisemitic discrimination at the same coffee house.  The complaint (full text) in Radice v. Jerusalem Boxing Club, LLC, (ND CA, filed 2/27/2025), alleges in part:

2. Once in July 2024 and once in August 2024, Mr. Radice visited Oakland in connection with his work as the interim executive director for a nonprofit organization to secure the East Bay Community Space ... as a venue for a fundraiser event for that nonprofit organization. The Community Space’s building houses JBC and JCH [Jerusalem Coffee House]. 

3. On both occasions, Mr. Radice was harassed and excluded from JCH (a place of public accommodation), explicitly because he is Jewish. On the second occasion, Mr. Radice was refused service and followed out of JCH and down the block. Accordingly, JBC violated Mr. Radice’s civil rights under both federal and California law. 

ADL issued a press release announcing the filing of this lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Software Company's Denial of Discount to Christian Nonprofit

A suit under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by a Christian nonprofit organization that offers a video curriculum designed to instruct teenagers about Christian beliefs on sexuality.  The complaint (full text) in Holy Sexuality v. Asana, Inc., (SD CA, filed 2/18/25), alleges that Asana, Inc. which sells subscriptions for project management software, violated the public accommodation religious discrimination provisions of California law when it denied plaintiff the 50% discount offered to nonprofits. According to the complaint:

To qualify, nonprofits must: have 501(c)(3) status; not be an education or academic institution, hospital, hospital auxiliary, nurse register, mutual organization, or credit union; and not “advocate, support, or practice discrimination based on age, ethnicity, gender, national origin, disability, race, size, religion, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic background.”...

But, under its Religious Discrimination Policy, Asana denies that discount to “[r]eligious organizations that exist to solely propagate a belief in a specific faith.”...

Asana’s religious discrimination was and remains arbitrary, especially because Asana grants discounts to nonprofits who hold views opposite to Holy Sexuality’s and grants discounts to other religious nonprofits.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Refusing to Allow Minister To Wear Collar At His Criminal Trial Was Not Reversable Error

 In People v. Johnson, (CA App., Feb. 18, 2025), a California state appellate court held that a trial court's refusal to allow a criminal defendant, an ordained minister, to wear his clerical collar and have a Bible with him during his trial was not reversable error. Defendant was charged with gross vehicular homicide while intoxicated. The court said in part:

Assuming only for purposes of argument that the trial court erred in not allowing defendant to wear a collar, we must determine whether the error would have been prejudicial.  Federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the beneficiary of the error can show it was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ...

... [P]rohibiting defendant from wearing a clerical collar did not result in a structural defect in the constitution of his trial.  Nothing in the record indicates his inability to wear a collar impacted the outcome of his trial, interfered with his fundamental trial rights, or in any way impacted the trial’s structural truth-finding process.  Any error by the trial court in not allowing defendant to wear a collar was not structural. 

We thus must determine whether the assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt...  Defendant offers no argument on this point.  As a result, he has forfeited the issue....  Any error by the trial court denying defendant his request to wear a clerical collar was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and not prejudicial.

The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life under California's Three Strikes Law. The Court of Appeals however remanded the case for resentencing, finding that defendant did not receive fair notice that a three-strike sentence would be sought.

Refusal To Sell Generic Cake for Same-Sex Wedding Reception Violates California Anti-Discrimination Law

In Civil Rights Department v. Cathy's Creations, Inc., (CA App., Feb. 11, 2025), a California state appellate court in a 74-page opinion held that a bakery violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA) when it refused to sell a predesigned white cake to a customer because the cake would be used at the customer's same-sex wedding reception. The bakery had a policy of refusing customer requests that violate fundamental Christian principles. The court rejected defendant's free exercise and free speech defenses and concluded that the bakery's referral of the customer to another bakery did not eliminate the violation. The court said in part:

Here, the policy’s application hinges not on the act of marriage, but on the same sex status of the couple to be married.  Thus, the policy’s purposeful exclusion of same sex couples is facial discrimination because of sexual orientation....

... [T]he fact that Miller’s adoption of the discriminatory policy was driven by her sincerely held religious beliefs rather than malice or ill will is irrelevant to the issue of intentional discrimination....

Discriminatorily denying service and then telling would-be customers they may take their business down the street (or farther) to a separate, unassociated establishment where they may be served by way of referral in no way ensures full and equal access to the product or service at the same price and under the same conditions.... [A] referral to a separate and independent business subjects the customer to “‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments’” that public accommodation laws like the UCRA are generally designed to address.....

Focusing on the bakery's free speech and free exercise defenses, the court said in part: 

The act of providing a product to a wedding reception with the intent to send a message does not transform that product into pure speech if the product itself is not the self-expression of the vendor.  If this were the case, a host of nonexpressive products or services provided for a same-sex wedding reception could be deemed to convey a message merely because they were provided for the event—e.g., flatware, chairs and linens, etc.  Moreover, many standard products provided to a wedding reception are equally as visible as the cake and used by the couple in a symbolic manner....  The mere fact these products are prepared for and provided to a same-sex wedding in a routine economic transaction does not transform them into the self-expression of the vendor....

There is also little likelihood a viewer would understand the cake’s sale and provision to a same-sex wedding conveyed any message about marriage generally or an endorsement and celebration of same-sex marriage in particular....

Here, the UCRA does not draw any distinctions between secular and religious activities, and there is no evidence the UCRA was enacted as a means to discriminate against religion.  Moreover, defendants’ argument the statutory provisions relating to the preservation of housing for senior citizens ... are contradictory secular exemptions under the UCRA, rendering it not generally applicable, is unpersuasive.

University Did Not Violate Constitution by Permitting Anti-Zionist Encampment

In Groveman v. Regents of the University of California, (ED CA, Feb. 4, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed a suit alleging that the University of California Davis participated in the denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights when it allowed a pro-Palestinian encampment to continue even though it violated University rules on camping and obtaining permits. Plaintiff who is Jewish and identifies as a Zionist was blocked by the encampment from walking through the campus. He was told that Zionists are not welcome and was struck by an umbrella. Rejecting plaintiff's equal protection claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of establishing even a causal connection between defendants’ actions and plaintiff’s exclusion from the encampment, let alone that defendants acted with discriminatory intent.... Nor does plaintiff allege any facts suggesting that the university treated Jewish individuals differently than the encampment participants; there is no indication that Jewish individuals sought to establish an encampment, or that if they had, the university would have rebuffed them or prevented them from engaging in comparable treatment of pro-Palestinian protestors....

Rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that defendants “deprived [him] of the right to express his Jewish identity freely” by “allowing the encampment to thwart religious dialog[ue]” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment....  It is not possible to draw a plausible inference that defendants’ actions (or inactions) had the effect of favoring or disfavoring any religion or burdening plaintiff’s religious exercise....

The court also concluded that defendants had qualified immunity. Plaintiff's claim under Title VI was dismissed for lack of standing because he was not connected with any University program that received federal funding. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's Americans With Disabilities Act claim. While plaintiff had a mobility issue, the fact "that a single path preferred by plaintiff was not accessible does not plead a violation of Title II of the ADA."

Lifeguard Who Has Religious Objections to Pride Month Has Claim for Undermining of His Religious Accommodation

In Little v. Los Angeles County Fire Department, (CD CA, Jan. 25, 2025), a California federal district court allowed a Fire Department captain assigned to the Lifeguard Division to move ahead on certain of his Free Exercise, Title VII and state anti-discrimination law claims after the Department revoked his previous religious exemption from the County's directive to fly the Progress Pride Flag during LGBTQ+ Pride Month. The suspension of his accommodation was triggered by his removing Pride flags that had been put up in an area to which he was assigned. The court said in part:

Little is an "Evangelical Christian with traditional and orthodox beliefs on marriage, family, and sexual behavior and identity."...

[T]he Fire Department granted Little's accommodation request and agreed that, for the remainder of June, Little would be assigned to facilities that were incapable of flying the Progress Pride Flag due to insufficient flag clasps.... 

Little alleges that his request for a religious accommodation was protected activity, and that Defendants retaliated against Little for seeking that accommodation by suspending him from his role on the Background Investigation Unit....

... [T]he pleading here gives rise to a sufficient "suspicion" of religious animosity to warrant "pause" before dismissing Little's neutrality claim as implausible.... The FAC alleges that Chiefs Boiteux and Lester knew that Little had been granted a religious accommodation and conspired to undermine that accommodation by bringing additional flag poles to the Area 17 sites so that they would be required to fly Progress Pride Flags in time for ,,,Little's scheduled shift there....

However, the court rejected other claims by plaintiff, including his free speech claim, saying in part: 

Because Little has not shown that the speech at issue is anything other than government speech, he has failed to state a viable compelled-speech claim under the First Amendment....

9th Circuit: Police Department's LGBTQ Outreach Was Government Speech That Did Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Sangervasi v. City of San Jose, (9th Cir., Jan. 14, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a California federal district court's denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a police officer who objected to the police department's authorizing officers to wear an LGBTQ Pride uniform patch and to the raising of a Pride flag at police headquarters.  Plaintiff wanted to create other uniform patches and flag designs featuring Christian or anti-LGBTQ themes. His proposal was denied and he was placed on indefinite administrative leave. He sued, claiming violation of his equal protection, free speech and free exercise rights. The court said in part:

The district court properly dismissed Sangervasi’s free speech and free exercise claims because Defendants were engaging in government speech and Sangervasi was speaking as a government employee....  The district court properly dismissed Sangervasi’s equal protection claims because he failed to allege facts demonstrating a discriminatory intent.

Challenges to School Policy on Disclosure of Gender Identity Change May Move Ahead

In Mirabelli v. Olson, (SD CA, Jan. 7, 2025), a California federal district court denied motions to dismiss a suit brought by teachers and parents challenging a policy of the state board of education that schools are not to disclose a student's announced change of gender identity to the student's parents without the student's consent. The policy is intended to protect student privacy.  Among other challenges, plaintiffs claimed that the policy violates their 1st Amendment free exercise and free speech rights. The court said in part:

According to the Complaint, the policies force parents to accede to a school’s plan to neither acknowledge nor disclose information about their child’s gender dysphoria.  By concealing a child’s gender health issues from the parents, parents are precluded from exercising their religious obligations to raise and care for their child at a time when it may be highly significant, because they are kept uninformed of the need for their child’s religious guidance.  “....

... Teachers do not completely forfeit their First Amendment rights in exchange for public school employment.  To the extent that teachers allege (as they do here) that EUSD has hired their speech to speak falsely or deceptively to parents of students, the teachers make out a plausible claim for relief under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.  Likewise, to the extent teachers allege (as they do here) that EUSD’s curriculum includes what the teachers sincerely believe to be lies and deceptions for communications with school parents and that such prevarications are religiously or morally offensive, the teachers make out a plausible claim for relief under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.  EUSD contends that it is not a lie to not answer a question.  That the teachers sincerely held religious beliefs to the contrary cannot be simply dismissed....

There are no controlling decisions that would compel this Court to limit or infringe parental rights, notwithstanding the State’s laudable goals of protecting children.  This Court concludes that, in a collision of rights as between parents and child, the long-recognized federal constitutional rights of parents must eclipse the state rights of the child.  Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have stated plausible claims upon which relief can be granted and the motions to dismiss are denied.