Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee's Ban on Gender Affirming Care for Minors

In United States v. Skrmetti,(Sup.Ct., June 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court today by a vote of 6-3 upheld Tennessee's law that bars both hormonal and surgical gender transition procedures for minors. The case generated 5 separate opinions spanning 118 pages. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that the Tennessee law does not trigger heightened scrutiny. He said in part:

This Court has not previously held that transgender individuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And this case, in any event, does not raise that question because SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status. As we have explained, SB1 includes only two classifications: healthcare providers may not administer puberty blockers or hormones to minors (a classification based on age) to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence (a classification based on medical use). The plaintiffs do not argue that the first classification turns on transgender status, and our case law forecloses any such argument as to the second....

... [T]here is a rational basis for SB1’s classifications. Tennessee concluded that there is an ongoing debate among medical experts regarding the risks and benefits associated with administering puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence. SB1’s ban on such treatments responds directly to that uncertainty....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

This case carries a simple lesson: In politically contentious debates over matters shrouded in scientific uncertainty, courts should not assume that self-described experts are correct.

Deference to legislatures, not experts, is particularly critical here. Many prominent medical professionals have declared a consensus around the efficacy of treating children’s gender dysphoria with puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgical interventions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. They have dismissed grave problems undercutting the assumption that young children can consent to irreversible treatments that may deprive them of their ability to eventually produce children of their own. They have built their medical determinations on concededly weak evidence. And, they have surreptitiously compromised their medical recommendations to achieve political ends.

Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Because the Court concludes that Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status, it does not resolve whether transgender status constitutes a suspect class.... I write separately to explain why, in myview, it does not....

Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains....

Justice Alito filed an opi nion concurring in part, saying in part:

I do notjoin Part II–A–2 of the opinion of the Court, which concludes that SB1 does not classify on the basis of “transgender status.” There is a strong argument that SB1does classify on that ground, but I find it unnecessary to decide that question. I would assume for the sake of argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, but I would nevertheless sustain the law because such a classification does not warrant heightened scrutiny. I also do not join Part II–A–3 of the Court’s opinion because I do not believe that the reasoning employed in Bostock v. Clayton County ... is applicable when determining whether a law classifies based on sex for Equal Protection Clause purposes.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Jackson and joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it... Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims....

Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny.... So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR shows, it is heightened scrutiny...

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Washington Bishops Sue Challenging Expanded Child Abuse Reporting Law

Last week, the Catholic bishops in Washington state filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a recently adopted amendment to the state's mandatory child abuse reporting law. The amendment requires clergy to report child abuse or neglect when they have reasonable cause to believe that it has occurred, even when a priest learns of the abuse or neglect in a confessional. The complaint (full text) in Etienne v. Ferguson, (WD WA, filed 5/29/2025) alleges in part:

1. Consistent with the Roman Catholic Church’s efforts to eradicate the societal scourge of child abuse, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle and the Dioceses of Yakima and Spokane have each adopted and implemented within their respective dioceses policies that go further in the protection of children than the current requirements of Washington law on reporting child abuse and neglect....

3. Yet despite these self-imposed reporting policies—policies that go beyond what Washington law requires—Washington is targeting the Roman Catholic Church in a brazen act of religious discrimination.  Without any basis in law or fact, Washington now puts Roman Catholic priests to an impossible choice: violate 2,000 years of Church teaching and incur automatic excommunication or refuse to comply with Washington law and be subject to imprisonment, fine, and civil liability....  Washington has done so at the same time that it expanded exemptions from mandatory reporting requirements for certain non-clergy.  The object of this law is clear: subject Roman Catholic clergy to dictates of the state. 

4. Putting clergy to the choice between temporal criminal punishment and eternal damnation, interfering with the internal governance and discipline of the Catholic Church, and targeting religion for the abrogation of all privileges, is a patent violation of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution.

The Pillar reports on the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Exclusion of Religious Training from Virginia Tuition Grant Programs

Suit was filed last week in a Viginia federal district court challenging the exclusion from Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program and its National Guard Grants of educational programs that provide religious training or theological education. The complaint (full text) in Johnson v. Fleming, (ED VA, filed 5/28/2025), alleges that the exclusions violate the Free Exercise, Establishment and Equal Protection clauses.  The complaint reads in part:

297. Defendants’ religious exclusions violate the Free Exercise Clause several ways....

298. The government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it disqualifies otherwise eligible persons or organizations from receiving otherwise available government benefits “solely because of their religious character,”....

327. Because the VTAG and National Guard religious exclusions are not neutral or generally applicable, they trigger strict scrutiny....

335. So the State Council [of Higher Education] considers CIP Code 39 programs as too religious and excludes them from participation in the Tuition Assistance Grant Program. This requires the State Council to entangle itself in religious matters. 

336. The [Virginnia] Department [of Military Affairs] likewise does not deem religious majors at secular private schools and public schools to be for “religious training or theological education” and students who pursue those programs at those schools can receive a National Guard Grant. 

337. The Department favors students who pursue religious programs at secular private schools and public schools to the detriment of students who pursue religious programs at religious schools....

347. Defendants’ religious exclusions create arbitrary and irrational distinctions based on nothing more than government officials’ discretion about whether a certain program is too religious.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

Suit Challenges Refusal to Recognize Ministers Ordained Online

Suit was filed last week in a Virginia federal district court challenging Augusta County and the City of Staunton's refusal to recognize ministers of the Universal Life Church who obtained ordination online as ministers authorized to perform marriage ceremonies under Virginia Code §20-23. Instead, they are required to register under §20-25 as a civil officiant which includes posting a $500 bond. The complaint (full text) in Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Landes, (WD VA, filed 5/22/2025) alleges that this violates the 1st and 14th Amendment, saying in part:

69. The Clerk defendants violate the Establishment Clause by interpreting and applying Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 to categorically deny ULC Monastery ministers the authority to solemnized marriages as religious officiants, solely because they were ordained by and are in regular communion with the ULC Monastery and not another approved religious society. This conduct impermissibly prefers certain denominations over others.....

77. Many of plaintiff ULC ministers ... choose to exercise their religion by officiating marriage ceremonies.... The Clerk Defendants' interpretation an application of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 ... accordingly places an impermissible burden on Plaintiffs' religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise Clause....

84. ... The Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination against similarly situated individuals and prohibits state action that burdens fundamental rights, including religious freedom.  Discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive strict scrutiny....

91. Defendants' actual and threatened enforcement of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23, 20-26 and 20-28 against ULC Monastery and its ministers burdens speech based on its content and viewpoint, and is accordingly subject to strict scrutiny....

Augusta Free Press reports on the lawsuit. 

[Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.] 

Sports Apparel Company Challenges Colorado's Public Accommodation Law Protection of Transgender Athletes

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by an online athletic apparel company, "XX-YY Athletics," that promotes banning of transgender women from women's sports through logos on its apparel and through advertisements.  The company claims that Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act violates the 1st and 14th Amendments when its public accommodation provisions declare that Coloradans have a right to access advertising that is free from discrimination on the basis of gender expression and chosen name. The complaint (full text) in Committee of Five, Inc. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 5/27/2025), alleges in part:

191. The most common way that XX-XY Athletics demonstrates why male competition in women’s sports is unfair or unsafe is by reference to specific transgender-identifying male athletes....

206. Although CADA prohibits XX-XY Athletics from speaking consistently with its view that sex is immutable, the law allows other businesses that also qualify as public accommodations to speak according to their view that sex can be changed.  

207. This distinction in treatment is based on a particular view that the business holds about human sexuality and gender identity....

222. The First Amendment’s Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses protect XX-XY Athletics’ ability to speak, create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to associate with others and with their messages for expressive purposes; to adopt and act on certain speech-related policies; to decline to associate with others and their message for expressive purposes; to decline to create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to be free from content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination; and to be free from overbroad and vague restrictions on speech that give enforcement officials unbridled discretion....

225. As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly discriminates against the company’s speech based on content and viewpoint by prohibiting it from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex.  

226.  As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly inhibits the company’s ability to form expressive associations it desires to form and to avoid expressive associations it desires to avoid by requiring the company to refer to individuals by their preferred name, pronouns, and other terminology and prohibiting the company from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex....

The complaint also alleges that the Colorado law is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection clause. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

California Agrees to Consent Decree Allowing Sectarian Schools to Participate In IDEA

 As previously reported, last October the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a California federal district court's dismissal of a suit by the parents of special needs children and by two Orthodox Jewish schools. The suit challenges as a violation of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses California's rules that preclude sectarian schools from receiving payments for special needs children under the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This week, in the district court the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction in Loffman v, California Department of Education, (CD CA, May 19, 2025). The injunction bars California from enforcing requirements that schools be nonsectarian in order to participate in the IDEA program. Fox News reports on these developments.

Montana Court Strikes Down Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Cross v. State of Montana, (MT Dist. Ct., May 13, 2025), a Montana state trial court in a 59-page opinion held that Montana Senate Bill 99 that bars hormonal or surgical treatment of minors for gender dysphoria is unconstitutional. The court said in part:

First, concerning the right to privacy, Plaintiffs have met their burden ... by providing evidence that the major medical organizations in the United States endorse gender-affirming medical care as a safe, effective way to treat gender dysphoria. Defendants ... fail to demonstrate a medically acknowledged, bona fide health risk with respect to the care banned by SB 99....

Second, Plaintiffs have met their burden ... on their equal protection claim by demonstrating that SB 99 classifies based on similarly situated classes, infringes on several fundamental rights, and denies minors equal protection of the laws on the basis of sex and transgender status because it prohibits health care providers from administering certain care when sought to treat adolescents with gender dysphoria, but it allows the same providers to administer the same care to all other adolescent patients for all other purposes....

Finally ... Plaintiffs successfully demonstrate that SB 99 unconstitutionally regulates medical providers' speech based on content and viewpoint discrimination, and that it is presumptively invalid.... Moreover, Plaintiffs successfully demonstrate that SB 99 prohibits minors with gender dysphoria and their parents from hearing from health care providers....

The Hill reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Employees' Suit Against School Board for Denying Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Moves Ahead

Decisions in suits by former employees who were denied religious exemptions from employer Covid vaccine mandates continue to be handed down by the courts.  Here is a recent example:

In Brandon v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, (ED MO, May 8, 2025), a Missouri federal district court in a 76-page opinion refused to dismiss 16 employees' free exercise, equal protection, Title VII and state human rights act claims against the St. Louis school board. However, damage claims against the superintendent and the chief human resource officer were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs all had requested religious exemptions from the Board's Covid vaccine mandate. The Board received 189 requests for religious exemptions from its 3500 employees. None of the requests were granted. The board granted between 40 and 50 disability and medical exemptions. The court said in part:

Defendants have failed to meet their initial summary-judgment burden of showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Plaintiffs’ sincere religious beliefs....

... [T]he very providing of exemptions rendered the contract not generally applicable because it “‘invite[d]’ the government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy [were] worthy of solicitude.”...  For these reasons, the Court holds that the strict-scrutiny standard governs here....

Defendants point to three interests that Policy 4624 purportedly served: (1) education, (2) stemming the spread of COVID-19, and (3) promoting “the health, safety, and general welfare of students.”...

Defendants argue that Policy 4624 was necessary to providing “children of any and all backgrounds safe access to education, social mobility, and athletic, cultural[,] and social development.”...  The Court agrees that these interests are compelling. ...

But the Court disagrees that  Defendants have satisfied their summary-judgment burden and proven that Policy 4624 was narrowly tailored to serve those interests....

... [T]he Board could have granted every request for religious exemption, while still granting all the disability and medical exemptions that it granted, and achieved a total employee vaccination rate of between 93.1%  ... and 93.4%.....

In sum, the record at a minimum strongly indicates that the Board denied all religious-exemption requests wholesale, and Plaintiffs thus received vastly different treatment than their comparators did....

Plaintiffs marshal evidence that the Board denied Plaintiffs’ religious-exemption requests because the Board thought that the religious-exemption requests were less important than other exemption requests. With this evidence, Plaintiffs more than show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendants unlawfully intended to discriminate against Plaintiffs based on Plaintiffs’ protected religious beliefs....

Antisemitism Claims Against UC Berkeley Move Ahead in Part

In Louis D. Brandeis Center, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, (ND CA, March 31, 2025), plaintiffs allege that UC Berkeley has discriminated against Jewish faculty and students. The California federal district court allowed plaintiffs' free exercise, equal protection and Title VI claims to move forward. However, it dismissed plaintiffs' Sec. 1981 claim for discriminatory refusal to enter contracts. The court said in part:

The FAC [First Amended Complaint] alleges a series of events unfolding over the course of several months on campus, which are said to have been precipitated by a campus culture hostile to Jewish students and professors....  The FAC says that these events were perpetrated by students who professed to oppose Zionism, but actually intended to discriminate against Jewish students and professors because they are Jewish....  The FAC also alleges that Berkeley failed or refused to enforce its anti-discrimination policies as to its Jewish students and faculty in response to these events.... The FAC also plausibly alleges that Berkeley was deliberately indifferent to the on-campus harassment and hostile environment.... Consequently, Brandeis’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution will go forward, as will the Title VI claim.  

It bears mention that the FAC repeatedly alleges that “Zionism is a central tenet of the Jewish faith.”...  This raises concerns about whether Brandeis intends to call upon the Court to determine the articles of faith of Judaism.  If so, a serious constitutional problem would arise....

The 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim is dismissed.  The gist of this claim is that members of the plaintiff organizations who are legal academics cannot contract with certain Berkeley student organizations that adopted a bylaw barring invitations to individuals espousing Zionist beliefs....  Brandeis does not dispute it must show standing.... The complaint does not allege that any academic member has sought to contract with the organizations since adoption of the bylaw, been turned away on account of the bylaw, or has otherwise been put at a contractual disadvantage by the bylaw.

Diocese and Pregnancy Center Challenge Illinois Ban on Employment Discrimination Because of Reproductive Health Care Choices

Suit was filed last week in an Illinois federal district court by a Christian Pregnancy Care Center and a Catholic diocese challenging the requirement that they comply with recent amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act that prohibit discrimination against employees based on their reproductive health care decisions. The complaint (full text) in Pregnancy Care Center of Rockford v. Bennett, (ND IL, filed 3/20/2025), alleges in part:

198. Because they wish to carry out their respective missions and spread their pro-life messages successfully, Plaintiffs hire and retain employees who avoid reproductive decisions that undermine their identity, mission, and message. For Plaintiffs, the credibility of their messengers is as important as the message. 

199. The Act’s Employment, Offensive Speech, and Notice Clauses severely burden Plaintiffs’ freedom of expressive association by forcing them to form associations and assemblies with employees whose reproductive decisions undermine their mission and message....

209. The Act substantially burdens Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion by prohibiting faith-based speech and conduct related to reproduction, interfering with their faith-based employment decisions, and forcing Plaintiffs to revise their statements of faith, positional statements, codes of conduct, employee handbooks, and other policy documents....

235. [The] right to religious (or “church”) autonomy safeguards a religious organization’s decision about which officers, board members, employees, and volunteers are best suited to advance its religious mission and purpose. 

236. This freedom extends to Plaintiffs’ ability to hire and employ only those who believe—and live out—the beliefs of their organizations about reproductive health decisions such as abortion, sterilization, and contraception....

259. The Act also restricts Plaintiffs’ right to free speech because it compels them to speak a message contrary to their beliefs not only to their current employees but also to prospective employees and the public in general....

281. Defendants’ application of the Act’s provisions about reproductive decisions to Plaintiffs’ religious speech and conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Catholic Vote reports on the lawsuit. 

Court Enjoins Implementation of Ban on Transgender Individuals Serving in the Military

In Talbott v. United States, (D DC, March 18, 2025), the United States federal district court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction barring the military from implementing Executive Orders and military memoranda that exclude transgender persons from serving in the military. The injunction requires the military to maintain the pre-Trump status quo on military service by transgender individuals. Explaining its decision, the court's 79-page opinion said in part:

The Court agrees that “courts [are] ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have” and that “the military authorities [not courts] have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation’s military policy.”... Often, courts accept “the reasoned, professional analysis of Congress and the Executive on matters strictly within the realm of military expertise.”...   

Defendants carry deference too far, however.  By “defer” they basically mean the Court must side with the military’s position, end-stop.  And they contend the Court must defer even if the judgment, as here, does not make sense....

The Court ... applies Bostock’s reasoning to analyze the Military Ban.  In doing so, it does not “import[] the Title VII test for liability,” ... into the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.  Rather, it borrows Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning to conclude that transgender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination for purposes of the equal protection inquiry....

... [B]ecause the Military Ban targets transgender persons for disparate treatment, it creates an explicit sex-based classification that requires application of intermediate scrutiny. ...

The court also concluded that the Military Ban is subject to intermediate scrutiny because transgender persons should be considered a quasi-suspect class. The court went on:

Defendants have articulated important government objectives in military readiness, unit cohesion, and saving costs.  But the Fifth Amendment requires more than pointing to such “broadly formulated interests.”...  Defendants must show that the discriminatory Military Ban is in some way substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.  And they must do so without relying on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” ... They do not come close.  Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Military Ban fails intermediate scrutiny review.....

The Military Ban is soaked in animus and dripping with pretext.  Its language is unabashedly demeaning, its policy stigmatizes transgender persons as inherently unfit, and its conclusions bear no relation to fact.  Thus, even if the Court analyzed the Military Ban under rational basis review, it would fail....

The Court could stop here in its analysis and comfortably conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Military Ban is motivated by animus and is not tailored to meet its stated goals.  But, as they say, there is more, for the Military Ban does not stand alone.  President Trump has signed an executive order recognizing the existence of only two sexes; blocked schools from using federal funds to promote the idea that gender can be fluid; directed the State Department to stop issuing documents that allow a third “X” gender marker; changed references to “LGBTQI+” on government websites to “LGB,” erasing not just transgender persons, but intersex people as well; revoked the ability of transgender federal employees to receive gender-affirming care; and directed that all incarcerated transgender persons be denied medical treatments and be housed by birth sex, where they are nine times more susceptible to violence....

NPR reports on the decision.

Refusal To Amend Birth Certificate Did Not Violate Plaintiff's 1st or 14th Amendment Rights

In Malone-Bey v. Mississippi State Board of Health, (MS App, March 4, 2025), a Mississippi state appellate court held that plaintiff's religious free exercise, equal protection and due process rights were not violated when the State Board of Health refused to amend his birth certificate to designate his race as “white: Asiatic/Moor.” The court said in part:

[Plaintiff] asserts that “[t]he inability to recognize this information on [his] birth certificate impedes his full expression of his identity.”  He further asserts that the Board is “discriminating against [him] or placing undue burdens on him due to his religious beliefs or status” and has “denied [him] the ability to fulfill religious obligations and affirm his identity.”

These arguments are without merit.  The Board is in no way “discriminating against” Malone-Bey.  To the contrary, the Board’s approved Certificate of Live Birth does not identify the race, nationality, or religion of any child.  The Board has not treated Malone-Bey different from anyone else.  The Board has treated him just like everyone else....

“Just as the [State] may not insist that [Malone-Bey] engage in any set form of religious observance, so [Malone-Bey] may not demand that the [State] join in [his] chosen religious practices by” adding new categories of information to the State’s records....

Court Enjoins Cutoff of Funds to Institutions Offering Gender-Affirming Care to Minors

In PFLAG, Inc. v. Trump, (D MD, March 4, 2025), a Maryland federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against enforcement of provisions in two Executive Orders that threaten to cut off federal funding to medical institutions that offer gender-affirming care to individuals under 19 years of age.  The court found that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on three claims, saying in part:

Because the Executive Orders direct agencies to withhold funding on a condition that Congress has not authorized, the President has exceeded his authority. The Plaintiffs have thus sufficiently shown likelihood of success on the merits of their ultra vires claim that the Executive Orders violate the separation of powers....

Plaintiffs accurately note that the Executive Orders foist upon hospitals receiving federal funds an impossible choice: (I) keep providing medical care to transgender patients under the age of nineteen in compliance with the anti-discrimination statutes and risk losing federal funding under the Executive Orders, or (2) stop providing care on the basis of trans gender identity in violation of the statutes, but in compliance with the EOs. Because the challenged portions of the Executive Orders are facially discriminatory on the basis of transgender identity, and therefore sex under Kadel and Bostock, in violation of Section 1557 of the ACA and Section 1908 of the PHSA, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their ultra vires statutory claim....

Guided and bound by Fourth Circuit's analysis in Kadel, and with a barer record than the one before the Fourth Circuit there, the Court is compelled to find that the Executive Orders' effective ban on all gender-affirming care for those under nineteen by federally funded institutions is not substantially related to the important government interest of protecting children. As such, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim....

Last month, the court issued a nation-wide temporary restraining order in the case. (See prior posting.)  ACLU issued a press release announcing yesterday's decision.

Court Issues TRO Barring Cutoff of Funds to Institutions Offering Gender-Affirming Care to Minors

In PFLAG, Inc. v. Trump, (D MD, Feb. 14, 2025), a Maryland federal district court set out its reasons for issuing a nation-wide temporary restraining order barring enforcement of the sections of two Executive Orders that prohibit federal funding for institutions that provide gender affirming care for patients under 19 years of age. At issue are provisions in Executive Order 14168, titled Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government and in Executive Order 14187, titled Protecting Children from Chemical and Surgical Mutilation. The court said in part:

Defendants admit in the very first line of their response in opposition to the motion for a TRO that the President "issued two Executive Orders directing agencies to take steps, as permitted by law, to condition certain federal grant funding on his policy preferences."23 ECF 55, at 3. This is a clear violation of the Constitution as "attempt[s] [by the Executive Branch] to place new conditions on federal funds [are] an improper attempt to wield Congress's exclusive spending power and is a violation of the Constitution's separation of powers principles."....

Because the challenged portions of the Executive Orders are facially discriminatory on the basis of transgender identity, and therefore sex under Kadel and Bostock, in violation of Section 1557 of the ACA and Section 1908 of the PHSA, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their ultra vires statutory claim....

Defendants assert that the challenged portions of the Executive Orders are based on the important government interest of "protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth."...  Defendants assert that the Orders are substantially related to this important government interest because "[ e ]vidence. abounds that treatments covered by the Protecting Children EO 'are dangerous and ineffective."'... Though Defendants might well have support for this argument, the en banc Fourth Circuit in Kadel rejected a similar claim by noting that "those criticisms do not support the notion that gender-dysphoria treatments are ineffective so much as still developing."... Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim....

AP reports on the decision.

Evangelist Can Move Ahead with Free Speech Claim Against Officer Who Arrested Him at Pride Festival

In Cocchini v. City of Franklin, Tennessee, (MD TN, Feb. 6, 2025), a Tennessee federal district court held that plaintiff, a Christian evangelist, had successfully stated a claim for violation of his 1st Amendment free speech rights. Plaintiff was asked by a police officer to leave a Pride Festival after he began to share his Christian testimony with two women at a church booth.  When he refused to leave, he was arrested. He sued, contending that the police officer discriminated against him by impermissibly regulating his speech conducted in a public forum. The police office asserted a defense of qualified immunity. The court said in part:

Here, Cocchini has alleged facts plausibly demonstrating that the Park remained a public forum throughout Franklin Pride....

There are two competing stories for Cocchini’s exclusion from the Park.  Officer Spry says he removed Cocchini from the public forum, causing him to cease his peaceful invited religious speech, apparently for violating Tennessee’s criminal trespass law....  However, the Complaint alleges that Officer Spry told Cocchini on the day of his arrest, and under oath, that he arrested Cocchini because a Franklin Pride TN security event coordinator wanted him removed.....  Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, Cocchini sufficiently asserts that the justification for his exclusion from the Park, and arrest, was based on the content of his speech....

If the arrest was to “avoid offense to gay, lesbian, or transgender individuals,” as the Complaint alleges, such an interest (compelling or not) is not narrowly tailored by arresting individuals like Cocchini who express religious views....

... [I]if as Cocchini alleges, Officer Spry arrested him “because of the content of his speech,” then he “acted in violation of the First Amendment in ways that should have been clear to a reasonable officer.” ... This is a disputed issue of fact such that “development of the factual record is [] necessary to decide whether [Officer Spry’s] actions violated clearly established law.” ...

The court however dismissed plaintiff's equal protection claim which was based only on the alleged violation of his 1st Amendment rights.

Differential School Bussing for Parochial School Students Does Not Violate Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clauses

In Swiech v. Board of Education for the Sylvania City School District, (OH App., Feb. 7, 2025), an Ohio state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by the mother of elementary school children. Plaintiff claimed that the hub-and-spoke bussing arrangement for transporting of children to Catholic elementary schools violates her free exercise and equal protection rights. Public school students were furnished direct home-to-school bus transportation. The court said in part:

The first step in analyzing an equal protection claim is determining the appropriate standard of review....  

... [B]ecause this case does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class, rational basis review applies.

... [I]t is rational and reasonable to classify public school students separately from nonpublic and community school students based on the differences in how many students attend each school, where the students are located in relation to their school, and when the schools start and end....

... Swiech’s argument that she receives lesser governmental benefits as a consequence of the exercise of religion lacks nuance.  Swiech’s children receive different transportation not because she is exercising her religion, but because she chooses to send them to a nonpublic or community school.  All students residing in the School District who attend a nonpublic or community school are similarly transported regardless of whether they attend a religious or non-religious school. ...

In any event, we agree with the School District that its bussing plan does not have a coercive affect against Swiech in the practice of her religion.  While the bussing plan may impact Swiech’s and her children’s sleep schedules, work schedules, and medication schedules, it does not interfere with their ability to practice their religion.  Indeed, the School District’s bussing plan ensures that Swiech’s children are able to attend their chosen religious school on time every day.

U.S. Reverses Position in Transgender Case Already Argued Before Supreme Court

Last December, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Skrmetti. The case involves a challenge to a Tennessee statute prohibiting chemical, hormonal or surgical treatment of minors for gender dysphoria. The case began as a suit by a private party, but the United States then intervened and filed its own complaint challenging the constitutionality of the statute. After a decision by the 6th Circuit reversing a preliminary injunction against enforcement, both the United States and the private plaintiff filed petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted review only in the United States' case. Now with a change of Administrations, the United States has changed its position and no longer challenges the Tennessee statute.  The United States on February 7 filed a letter (full text) with the Supreme Court, reading in part:

The Department has now determined that SB1 does not deny equal protection on account of sex or any other characteristic.  Accordingly, the new Administration would not have intervened to challenge SB1—let alone sought this Court’s review of the court of appeals’ decision reversing the preliminary injunction against SB1.

Nevertheless, the United States believes that the confluence of several factors counsels against seeking to dismiss its case in this Court.  The Court’s prompt resolution of the question presented will bear on many cases pending in the lower courts.  Since granting certiorari last June, the Court has received full briefing and heard oral argument, including from the private plaintiffs, who have participated in this Court as respondents supporting the United States at the merits stage and who remain adverse to the state respondents in a dispute that has not become moot.  Accordingly, the Court may resolve the question presented without either granting the private plaintiffs’ pending petition for a writ of certiorari, see L.W. v. Skrmetti, No. 23-466 (filed Nov. 1, 2023), or requesting further, likely duplicative briefing from the same parties about the same court of appeals judgment in the underlying suit between the private plaintiffs and the state respondents.

AP reports on the government's action.

University Did Not Violate Constitution by Permitting Anti-Zionist Encampment

In Groveman v. Regents of the University of California, (ED CA, Feb. 4, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed a suit alleging that the University of California Davis participated in the denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights when it allowed a pro-Palestinian encampment to continue even though it violated University rules on camping and obtaining permits. Plaintiff who is Jewish and identifies as a Zionist was blocked by the encampment from walking through the campus. He was told that Zionists are not welcome and was struck by an umbrella. Rejecting plaintiff's equal protection claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of establishing even a causal connection between defendants’ actions and plaintiff’s exclusion from the encampment, let alone that defendants acted with discriminatory intent.... Nor does plaintiff allege any facts suggesting that the university treated Jewish individuals differently than the encampment participants; there is no indication that Jewish individuals sought to establish an encampment, or that if they had, the university would have rebuffed them or prevented them from engaging in comparable treatment of pro-Palestinian protestors....

Rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that defendants “deprived [him] of the right to express his Jewish identity freely” by “allowing the encampment to thwart religious dialog[ue]” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment....  It is not possible to draw a plausible inference that defendants’ actions (or inactions) had the effect of favoring or disfavoring any religion or burdening plaintiff’s religious exercise....

The court also concluded that defendants had qualified immunity. Plaintiff's claim under Title VI was dismissed for lack of standing because he was not connected with any University program that received federal funding. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's Americans With Disabilities Act claim. While plaintiff had a mobility issue, the fact "that a single path preferred by plaintiff was not accessible does not plead a violation of Title II of the ADA."

9th Circuit: Hindu Out-of-Stater Lacks Standing to Challenge Ban on Caste Discrimination

In Bagal v. Sawant, (9th Cir., Jan. 21, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a practicing Hindu who lives in North Carolina lacks standing to challenge a Seattle, Washington Anti-Caste Discrimination Ordinance. The court said in part:

Appellant argues that the Ordinance violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment....

Appellant speculates that the Ordinance could be enforced against him on a future visit to Seattle for ordering a vegetarian meal or wearing a religious marker called a Mauli thread on his wrist.  But these activities are not prohibited by the Ordinance, and Appellant fails to demonstrate that engaging in them would subject him to a credible threat of prosecution....

Appellant argues that the Ordinance creates stigma toward the Hindu religion, which amounts to disapproval of Hinduism over other religions and causes Appellant to refrain from certain Hindu practices.... Appellant has offered no plausible connection between his decision to refrain from engaging in certain Hindu practices in North Carolina and a Seattle Ordinance that prohibits none of those activities....

Appellant has also not demonstrated that he has a geographical connection to the Ordinance sufficient for standing for an Establishment Clause claim. 

National Guard Officer Sues After Dismissal for His Religion-Based Anti-LGBTQ Views

Suit was filed last week in an Idaho federal district court by an Idaho National Guard officer who was removed from a command position that he had just assumed because of his Christian religious views on sexuality that he had expressed during his previous campaigns for mayor and state senator. The complaint (full text) in Worley v. Little, (D ID, filed 1/17/2025), reads in part:

74. The Investigating Officer stated, in his findings, that Major Worley had “well documented discriminatory views against the LGBTQ community” that “suggest an inability to uphold the values of equality, respect, and impartiality expected of a company commander.”...

75.... In addition to his unconstitutional and unconscionable findings as it relates to Major Worley’s religious beliefs, views, expression, and exercise, the Investigating Officer also recommended to Defendants that they institute a “No Christians in Command” Policy. ...

The complaint alleges that this violates plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.