Massachusetts Supreme Court Says Religious Statues Proposed for Public Building Violate State Constitution

In Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy, (MA Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 20, 2026), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a trial court's preliminary injunction barring the city of Quincy from installing two 10-foot-tall statues on the facade of a new public safety building. One statue depicts Saint Michael stepping on the head and neck of a demon. The other depicts Saint Florian towering above a burning building and extinguishing the fire. The Court concluded that there is a substantial likelihood that this violates Art. III of the Massachusetts Constitution as amended by Article XI, that provides: 

all religious sects and denominations, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good citizens of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.

The Court said in part:

The contested practice here raises concerns at the core of the text, purposes, and history of the amendment of art. 3:  whether the city is singling out a particular religion for special treatment....

The two statues are both of Catholic saints....: the depictions of Saint Michael and Saint Florian in these statues "are consistent with iconography of each religious figure within Catholic tradition"; and the symbols and objects depicted "are all central to the iconographies of each saint, which are not intelligible without reference to Catholic tradition."  ...

The likelihood that these statues of religious figures closely associated with the Catholic faith could be viewed by the public as endorsement of a particular religion, and thus subordination of others, is enhanced by the fact that the statues are not part of a larger collection of statues and monuments that includes nonreligious ones, or statues of figures of particular importance to other religions.  ...

These statues are also not long-standing historic monuments important to our common history, unlike many of the examples highlighted by the city.....

In sum, the preliminary injunction record reflects that the statues are large and will stand alone, they are brand new rather than long standing, they are closely affiliated with a particular religion, and they thus may convey to observing members of the public implicit government support for that religion and, as a result, subordination of other religions....

Americans United issued a press release announcing the decision.

Teacher's Free-Speech Rights Not Infringed by Requirement to Use Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

In Ellis v. The Brooke Charter Schools, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a public charter high school teacher that her free-speech rights were infringed when she was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to comply with the school's requirement that teachers use students' preferred names and pronouns. While the firing was triggered by the teacher's refusal to use a former student's preferred pronouns in a requested letter of recommendation, the teacher's lawsuit alleged that the firing was because of her refusal to comply more broadly with the school's policy. The court said in part:

... [T]he Court finds that ... the requirement that Plaintiff comply with the BCS policy to use students’ preferred names and pronouns, was part of Plaintiff’s official duties as a BCS employee.... [A]ddressing students, particularly in the classroom, is essential to teaching.  A teacher’s official job-related duties, for which she is compensated, require her to communicate with students at her place of employment, including by addressing them in accord with school policy. ...

... [T]o teach effectively, which is inherent in the job duties, requires a teacher to interact with students in a way that does not create a barrier to learning or an unnecessary distraction....

With regards to the letter of recommendation, which again is not the basis of Plaintiff’s free speech claim, although writing letters of recommendation may not be part of a teacher’s principal responsibilities—that is, instructing students on academic curriculum—it is still within the realm of a teacher’s traditional and typical duties.  Recommendation letters are typically written about and derived from knowledge of a student’s classroom performance, communicated via official school channels such as email or letterhead....

The Court, however, need not reach a conclusion as to whether the speech that Plaintiff would have made in connection with the recommendation letter referenced in her complaint would have been a part of her official duties because Plaintiff does not specifically allege or otherwise argue that her refusal to write the letter was the reason for her termination or the basis for her free speech claim....

Further, even if Plaintiff’s speech fell outside of her official duties, her speech did not involve a matter of public concern.... Put simply, “the act of referring to a particular student by a particular name does not contribute to the broader public debate on transgender issues.”...

The school did not ask the court to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims.

Massachusetts Liberalizes Access to Late Term Abortions

On Monday, Massachusetts Governor Maura Healey signed H.5595, titled An Act Prioritizing Patient Access To Care (full text). Under previous law, abortions after 24 weeks of pregnancy were permitted only where necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, or where there is lethal fetal anomaly or grave fetal diagnosis that is incompatible with sustained life outside of the uterus. The new law instead allows abortions to be performed by physicians after 24 weeks "based upon the professional judgment of the physician." It provides further that "no medical review process shall override the professional judgment of a treating physician and a patient or the patient’s health care proxy to provide an abortion.... " And it eliminates the requirement that abortions after 24 weeks be performed in a hospital authorized to provide obstetrical services.

A press release from the Governor's office says in part:

The legislation updates Massachusetts' abortion law by allowing physicians to rely on their professional medical judgment, consistent with accepted standards of care, when providing abortion care later in pregnancy. The law is intended to ensure that patients facing devastating fetal diagnoses, serious pregnancy complications or other complex medical circumstances can receive timely care without unnecessary legal uncertainty.

NBC Boston reports on the new law.

UPDATE: The conservative political action organization CatholicVote has issued a Public Statement (full text) urging the Catholic bishops of Massachusetts to declare that Governor Healey has incurred automatic excommunication for signing the abortion bill.

Father's Suit Seeking Opt-Out for Son of Some Class Lessons Moves Ahead

In Alan L. v. Lexington Public Schools, (D MA, July 21, 2026), the father of a kindergartener sued seeking to opt his child out of classroom lessons and activities that deal with sexual orientation and gender identity and violate plaintiff's Christian religious beliefs. Last year, the court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the school to provide an opt out. (See prior posting). Nevertheless, defendants now moved for a dismissal of all plaintiff's claims. Recognizing that the suit is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, the court in its opinion issued this week refused to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims and most of plaintiff's other contentions, including their claim of qualified immunity. The court however dismissed plaintiff's substantive due process claim because Mahmoud had based its holding on the Free Exercise clause, while a prior 1st Circuit case had held that the due process clause does not create a parental right to opt one's children out of particular lessons.

Massachusetts Supreme Court Invalidates Initiative Petition That Excludes Religious Housing from Rent Controls

The Massachusetts Constitution Art. 48 which sets out the procedures for initiative petitions provides in part that no measure relating to religion, religious practices or religious institutions may be proposed by an initiative petition.  In Cella v. Attorney General, (MA Sup. Judicial Ct., June 23, 2026), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that this provision is violated by a petition proposing an end to the statewide ban on rent control and instituting a limit on rent increases. The new rent control limits, however, would not apply to several categories of dwellings, including dwelling units in facilities operated solely for religious purposes. The court said in part:

The Attorney General argues that the petition does not discriminate in favor of religious institutions because it also provides exemptions for secular dwelling units, including facilities operated for educational and nonprofit purposes.  The presence of secular exemptions does not negate that the petition, on its face, uses religion as "a factor in its application" .... Nor do these secular exemptions change the fact that the petition, by including a carveout for religious facilities, brings "religious questions into the politics of this State"...

The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the petition should be allowed because its "main purpose" is unrelated to religion. The Court said in part:

Applying a less exacting standard -- permitting at least some measures that by their own terms govern religion, religious practices, or religious institutions -- would contravene not only the plain language of art. 48, but also the intent of its framers.  The convention delegates intended to strictly maintain "the entire separation of church and State" by "mak[ing] it as difficult as possible to bring religious questions into the politics of this State." 

The Court however pointed out:

 ... [A]lthough religious beliefs may encompass a wide array of human conduct, an initiative petition does not "relate[]" to religion within the meaning of art. 48 just because a person's personal religious beliefs might inform his or her views on an otherwise secular subject matter; rather, the measure itself must relate to religion....

1st Circuit: Equal Benefit Requirement for Religious Schools Does Not Extend to All Private Schools

 In Hellman v. Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, (1st Cir., March 20, 2026), parents contended that their children who are enrolled in private schools should be entitled to identical special education services as public school students. Under Massachusetts law, private school students only received such services at off-site locations, while public school students received them in their normal school buildings. Rejecting the parents' due process, equal protection and privileges or immunities claims, the court said in part:

The crux of the Parents' argument is that once the state establishes an otherwise generally available benefit, it may not deny that benefit to a student simply because their parents exercise their fundamental right to enroll their child in private school.  But every case they cite arises under the Free Exercise Clause, not the parental rights doctrine involved here.  (The Parents did not bring a Free Exercise claim; the Place Regulation applies to all private schools, secular and religious alike.)  And those holdings have no bearing on their parental rights claim.  They rest on a distinct, First Amendment principle that prohibits the state from imposing even indirect coercion or penalties on religious exercise... 

That principle does not apply to the parental right.....  [I]t does not require the state to extend public benefits on identical terms to private and public school students to protect the parents' choice of forum.

State's Criticism of Pregnancy Resource Centers Did Not Violate Clinics' Free Speech or Free Exercise

 In A Woman's Concern, Inc. v. Healey, (D MA, Feb. 17, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a religiously affiliated pregnancy resource center ("Your Options Medical Centers" (YOM)) that the state Department of Public Health violated plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights when it disseminated information critical of pregnancy resource centers. In its 59-page opinion, court said in part:

The amended complaint fails primarily because it does not plausibly suggest that Defendants have targeted YOM for actual or threatened enforcement action, let alone to stifle its protected speech or viewpoint.  First, YOM has not plausibly alleged any unconstitutional regulatory action.  YOM takes issue with a guidance letter sent by DPH to every licensed physician, physician assistant, nurse, pharmacist, pharmacy, hospital, and clinic in Massachusetts reminding them to abide by various healthcare regulations.  This guidance highlighted several medical standards and requirements, some of which apply to YOM and some that do not.  No reasonable person reading the guidance would have believed it selectively targets YOM or other PRCs for their views.  The guidance aimed at enforcing numerous, neutral state laws, none of which YOM challenges.  Similarly, broad, public-facing campaign statements criticizing the practices of PRCs generally as “dangerous” “public health threats” constitute permissible government expression, not unconstitutional threats of enforcement against YOM.... The amended complaint also alleges no facts to suggest that state officials wielded threats of enforcement action as a mechanism to suppress YOM’s speech, rather than to crack down on violations of state law. 

Second, Defendants focused the campaign not on the pro-life, religious views of PRCs, but rather on the quality of their medical services and advertising practices.  None of Defendants’ statements suggest any hostility to religion.  No allegations plausibly show that Defendants targeted their enforcement decisions based on the views or religion of YOM specifically or PRCs generally.  Thus, the amended complaint fails, including YOM’s request for “[a] permanent injunction ordering Defendants . . . [to] ceas[e] any advertising activity or campaign that falsely accuses YOM of misconduct or of being a threat to public health.”... 

Universal Hub reports on the decision. 

1st Circuit Upholds Denial of Religious Exemptions from Covid Vaccine

In Brox v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, (1st Cir., Jan. 9, 2026), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals rejected First Amendment free exercise claims by 12 employees of a Massachusetts state government board. Th employees sought religious exemptions from the Authority's vaccination policy. The court agreed with the trial court that the vaccination policy was neutral and generally applicable, so that it is subject only to rational basis review.  Appellants had argued that the policy was not generally applicable because it prohibits religious conduct while permitting comparable secular conduct. The court said in part:

The question is not whether the risks associated with one individual who for religious reasons is unvaccinated are comparable to those associated with an individual who remains unvaccinated due to health concerns.... Rather, the Supreme Court instructs that we consider and compare the risks presented by groups of different sizes in different settings..

... [T]he district court did not err in finding that the two exemptions were not comparable for Free Exercise purposes. 

First, unlike the religious exemption, the medical exemption furthers the Authority's asserted interest in protecting the health and safety of its employees and customers. ...

Second, not only does the medical exemption further the Authority's asserted interests while the religious exemption does not, but also the risks associated with each exemption are not comparable to one another.  We have previously observed that "medical exemptions are likely to be rarer, more time limited, or more geographically diffuse than religious exemptions, such that the two exemptions would not have comparable public health effects."...

Having not persuaded us that the Policy fails rational basis review, the appellants have not established that they are likely to succeed on the merits, and we need not address the remaining preliminary injunction factors....

Lower Court Applies Supreme Court's Classroom Religious Opt-Out Decision

In Alan L. v. Lexington Public Schools, (D MA, Dec. 30, 2025), a Massachusetts federal district court, relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, held that the father of a 5-year-old kindergartener has the right to opt his child out of classroom lessons and activities that deal with sexual orientation and gender identity and violate plaintiff's Christian religious beliefs. Plaintiff identified ten books of concern. The court's injunction (full text) provides in part:

3. Defendants shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that J.L. is not taught or otherwise exposed to the content of the Identified Books, whether in the classroom or any other school setting. 

4. By January 20, 2025, defendants shall provide plaintiff with copies of any Other LGBTQ+ Educational Materials in their possession. 

5. By January 27, 2025, plaintiff shall specifically identify in writing any Other LGBTQ+ Educational Materials that he contends would burden his free-exercise rights by “substantially interfer[ing] with” J.L.’s “religious development” or posing a “very real threat of undermining the religious beliefs and practices” he wishes to instill in J.L.   

6. After receipt of plaintiff’s written response, defendants shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that J.L. is not taught or otherwise exposed to all Other LGBTQ+ Educational Materials identified by plaintiff, whether in the classroom or any other school setting....

9. Defendants shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that J.L. is able to receive reasonable and age-appropriate alternative instruction during any time he is removed from his classroom or any school assembly or activity in order to comply with this order.....

Placing Patron Saint Statues on City Safety Building Is Enjoined

In Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy, (MA Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 2025), a Massachusetts state trial court issued a preliminary injunction barring installation, while the case proceeds, on a newly built public safety building of two ten-foot bronze statues depicting the Catholic patron saints of police and firefighters. The suit, filed by taxpayers, was brought under Art. 3 of the state constitution which requires equal treatment of all religious sects. The court held that while the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the Lemon test for federal Establishment Clause challenges, the Lemon test still applies to claims under Art. 2 and 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The court said in part:

The Complaint here plausibly alleges that the statues at issue convey a message of endorsing one religion over others.... The statues, particularly when considered together, patently endorse Catholic beliefs....

Defendants contend that the statues have a secular purpose of inspiring police officers and their display ... neither advance nor prohibit religion... [T]he mayor's professed secular purpose offers nothing more than semantics.... It is impossible to strip the statue of its religious meaning to contrive a secular purpose.... 

ACLU Massachusetts issued a press release announcing the court's decision. A WCVB News report carries photos of the statues in question.

Massachusetts Appellate Court Reverses Dismissal of Vaccine Exemption Claim

In June v. UMass Memorial Healthcare System, (MA App., Sept. 29, 2025), a Massachusetts state appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a state law religious discrimination suit brought by an operating room surgical technician who was denied a religious exemption from the health care system's Covid vaccine mandate. In denying an accommodation, the system's religious exemption committee said:

This requester asserts they cannot receive the COVID-19 vaccines based on their Christian faith because they will 'genetically alter' their body.  This is patently false -- none of the COVID-19 vaccines genetically alter the body or change a person's DNA.  Reliance on demonstrably false information cannot be a basis for a religious accommodation." 

In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court said in part:

A plaintiff, like the plaintiff here, who believes that she was created in God's image and that her body is a temple of God and thus needs God's approval to expose her body to foreign substances, expresses a religious belief.  Moreover, a plaintiff who prays to God and receives a "distinctive message from my God" acts in accordance with religious beliefs when she follows those divine instructions. 

To this, UMass Memorial interposes the objection that "this would create a blanket privilege allowing employees to opt out of any and all employer requirements simply by stating they prayed and received guidance."  Although UMass Memorial is free to argue to a jury that the plaintiff is not telling the truth, "[i]t is not permissible for a judge to determine what is or is not a matter of religious doctrine." ...

Here, the summary judgment record reveals a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether accommodating the plaintiff's religious beliefs would cause an undue hardship to UMass Memorial.

Boston Herald reports on the decision.

Christian Families Challenge Foster Care Rules on Support of Transgender Children

Two families, asserting Christian religious beliefs, filed suit yesterday in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging on 1st and 14th Amendment grounds a policy of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families that requires foster parents to agree that they will "[s]upport, respect, and affirm the foster child’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression." The complaint (full text) in Jones v. Mahaniah, (D MA, filed 9/3/2025), alleges in part:

3. Both families will provide a loving and respectful home for any child, including transgender, gay, or lesbian foster children. But that is insufficient for Massachusetts....

4. ... [T]he State requires the Joneses and the Schrocks to promise to use a child’s chosen pronouns, verbally affirm a child’s gender identity contrary to biological sex, and even encourage a child to medically transition, forcing these families to speak against their core religious beliefs. 

5. Second, DCF infringes on Plaintiffs’ free-exercise rights through a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable,,,,  A foster parent must promise in advance to use opposite-sex pronouns and encourage a hypothetical child’s gender transition, even if they never have and never will host a child who struggles to accept their natural body....

120. Because DCF compels applicants to speak and express the DCF’s preferred views on human sexuality while prohibiting speech expressing other views it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint, it engages in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination....

134. 110 C.M.R. 7.104(1)(d) is not neutral nor generally applicable because it imposes special disabilities based on religious beliefs, categorically excludes people from foster-care licenses based on religious beliefs, prefers certain religious and secular beliefs over the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, and provides for categorical and individualized exemptions without extending an exemption to religious persons like Plaintiffs.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Display of Statues of Saints on Public Safety Building

Suit was filed yesterday in a Massachusetts state trial court seeking to enjoin the city of Quincy and its mayor from installing statues of two Catholic saints, St. Michael and St. Florian, on the facade of its new public safety building.  The city has already spent over $760,000 for creation of the statues. The suit also seeks to bar additional expenditures. The complaint (full text) in Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy, (MA Super., filed 5/27/2025), alleges that the decision to acquire the statues was made by the city's mayor without notice to the public. Only some members of City Council knew of the plan before it was disclosed in a February 2025 news article. The complaint alleges that installation and display of the statues will violate Art. III of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Americans United issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Mass. Top Court Says Rastafarian Parents Can Bar Vaccination of Their Child Who Is In Temporary State Custody

In Care and Protection of Eve, (MA Sup. Jud. Ct., May 15, 2025), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Department of Children and Families could not vaccinate a child in its temporary custody over the religious objections of the child's parents. The Department was granted emergency custody of the child two days after she was born following incidents of domestic violence by the husband against his wife. The couple's three other children had previously been removed because of domestic violence. They are being raised by a relative. At the custody hearing, the parents testified that their Rastafarian religious beliefs were to avoid Western medicine, including vaccines. The lower court held that the child's best interests outweighed the parents' religious beliefs. Massachusetts' highest court reversed the trial court's order that would have allowed vaccination. The Supreme Judicial Court said in part:

Parents who have temporarily lost custody of their child retain a constitutional right to direct the religious upbringing of the child.  When they object to vaccinations of their child on religious grounds, the department must demonstrate that allowing that child to remain unvaccinated would substantially hinder the department's compelling interest in the vaccinations.  As the Commonwealth allows religious exemptions from vaccination for parents who have not lost temporary custody of their children and the department has not demonstrated a consistent application of the vaccination requirement for children within its custody, even as between this child and her siblings, the department has not demonstrated that leaving this child unvaccinated would substantially hinder the department's compelling interests.

Pregnancy Resource Center Sues Massachusetts Officials Over Opposition Campaign

Suit was filed last week in a Massachusetts federal district court by Your Options Medical Center, an anti-abortion pregnancy resource center, against Massachusetts officials and an abortion rights foundation, alleging deprivation of free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights. The complaint (full text) in A Woman's Concern v. Healy, (D MA, filed 8/19/2024), alleges in part:

This case is necessitated by an overt viewpoint-based campaign of harassment, suppression, and threats against YOM and other PRCs. Directed by Governor Healey and the other Defendants, this campaign involves selective law enforcement prosecution, public threats, and even a state-sponsored advertising campaign with a singular goal – to deprive YOM, and groups like it, of their First Amendment rights to voice freely their religious and political viewpoints regarding the sanctity of human life in the context of the highly controversial issue of abortion. 

Defendants’ retaliation and selective-enforcement campaign accuses YOM and other PRCs of being a public health threat, of carrying out false and misleading advertising, and of other falsehoods, while actively urging citizens to report PRCs to State law enforcement....

It is well-settled that viewpoint discrimination applied through threats of legal sanctions and other means of coercion and intimidation violates the United States Constitution where, as here, such measures chill protected First Amendment activities. That very kind of selective censorship scheme is evidenced here. Moreover, the threats in this case were targeted explicitly against the religious speech of PRCs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

Catholic News Agency reports on the lawsuit.

1st Circuit: Satanic Temple Loses Bid to Deliver City Council Invocation

In The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Boston, (1st Cir., Aug. 6, 2024), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments that the failure to invite Satanic Temple to deliver an invocation at a Boston City Council meeting violated the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause and the free exercise clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. Individual members of Council invite invocation speakers, without any guidelines as to selection. They choose speakers based on personal relations or based on the work the speaker does in the member's district or with the member's constituents. The court said in part:

TST has not shown that any of the Boston City Councilors have chosen invocation speakers based on the Councilors' own religious preferences or biases or barred potential speakers from delivering invocations that oppose the Councilors' religious beliefs.  The record shows rather that speakers were invited based on their contributions to the Councilors' districts and to the Boston community....

The record shows that there are many neutral, non-discriminatory reasons why TST has not been invited to give an invocation, including the following.  TST does not claim to have had a personal or working relationship with any Councilor on the basis of work it has done to benefit Boston communities. ...

Chief Judge Barron filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The City starkly sets forth the argument that causes me concern in its brief to us on appeal.  It contends -- seemingly unabashedly -- that the Establishment Clause permits City Councilors to choose invocation speakers based on how likely the selection is to earn them votes at the ballot box from certain religious communities.... 

I suppose the City is right that using invocations to attract political support from certain religious communities does not constitute invidious religious discrimination.  But I am dubious that the Establishment Clause blesses the practice that the City describes....

1st Circuit Remands Covid Vaccine Religious Exemption Case

In Brox v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, (1st Cir., Oct. 6, 2023), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part and vacated in part a trial court's refusal to require that plaintiffs be given a religious exemption from a state agency's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

[T]he appellants argue that the Policy, as administered, provides medical exemptions that permit unvaccinated employees to work "in close contact with colleagues, despite the purported direct threat . . . [their] unvaccinated status poses to them" but not religious exemptions that would permit unvaccinated employees to do the same even though their unvaccinated status poses no greater threat. And, according to the appellants, the Policy, as administered, is therefore not generally applicable -- and thus is subject to strict scrutiny -- because it "prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way"....

The appellees do argue that the Policy is generally applicable -- and so not subject to strict scrutiny -- for reasons having to do with the differing statutory liability that the Authority would face in denying requests for exemption that are medically rather than religiously based. The appellees assert in that regard that an employer may show that an accommodation for religious practice would constitute an "undue hardship" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... more easily than an employer may show that an accommodation for a disability would constitute an undue hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act.... 

But even if we were to accept the appellees' contention about the greater leeway that an employer has under Title VII,.., the appellees do not develop any argument as to why we must conclude that, as a matter of law, the greater federal statutory liability that an employer faces for denying a medical exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate than for denying a religious exemption from one suffices in and of itself to show that, for free exercise purposes, the former exemption may be granted and the latter exemption may be denied to employees who pose comparable risks of spreading the virus without thereby rendering the mandate not generally applicable and so subject to strict scrutiny....

We thus do not see how we may rely on this ground to affirm the District Court's "likelihood of success" ruling as to the appellants' free exercise claim....

Thus, we vacate the District Court's ruling with respect to its denial of the requested injunctive relief on the appellants' free exercise claim. We leave it to the parties and to the District Court on remand, therefore, to consider the appellants' request for that relief under the applicable legal framework that we have set forth....

Church Member's Defamation Suit Dismissed on Church Autonomy Grounds

In David v. South Congregational Church, (MA Super. Ct., Sept. 1, 2023), a Massachusetts trial court dismissed on church autonomy grounds a defamation suit against a Church, its Pastor and its Moderator brought by a Church member who was removed from the Church's Leadership, Finance and Investment Committees.  Plaintiff, a financial advisor, claims that he was inaccurately charged with unethical conduct in handling the funds of another church member. He seeks damages and other remedial action, including reinstatement on church committees. The court said in part:

... [T]here is no evidence that the defendant Moderator Figueroa's email to six Church leaders advising of the plaintiff's removal from the three Church leadership committees was ever communicated or published by the defendant Church officials beyond those leadership officials.... The sole disciplinary action taken by the church defendants was the plaintiff's removal from Church committees and positions of [Church] leadership.... Plaintiff's claimed defamation damages ... are necessarily limited exclusively to his reputation amongst the internal Church leadership.

But even limiting the scope of plaintiff's tort damage claim will not save his cause of action against the defendant Church, its Pastor and Moderator. A jury ... may not be permitted to second-guess church officials' and require them to pay damages because the jury disagrees with internal church discipline decisions...

The plaintiff is improperly asking this court to interject itself into-- and moreover reverse-- the internal disciplinary action imposed by the Church Pastor and Moderator upon another Chruch member.

[Thanks to John Egan for the lead.]

Catholic Couple Sues Foster Care Agency For Religious Discrimination [Revised]

 A Catholic couple has filed suit in a Massachusetts federal district court against the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families claiming free exercise and free speech violations. Plaintiffs were denied a foster care license because they would not be affirming to a child who identified as LGBTQIA.  The complaint (full text) in Burke v. Walsh, (D MA, filed 8/8/2023), alleges in part:

As faithful Catholics, the Burkes believe that all children should be loved and supported, and they would never reject a child placed in their home. They also believe that children should not undergo procedures that attempt to change their God-given sex, and they uphold Catholic beliefs about marriage and sexuality....

In effect, DCF has interpreted its regulations, which require foster families to “support[] and respect[] a child’s sexual orientation or gender identity,” 110 CMR 7.104(1)(d), as an absolute bar for Catholics who agree with the Church’s teaching on sex, marriage, and gender.

Becket issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

[Note-- this post was erroneously published previously with a title but no text.]

7th Grader Sues Over School's Hate Speech Dress Code

Suit was filed yesterday in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging the Middleborough school district's Dress Code which provides:

Clothing must not state, imply, or depict hate speech or imagery that target groups based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, religious affiliation, or any other classification.

The complaint (full text) in Morrison v. Town of Middleborough, (ED MA, filed 5/17/2023), alleges that a 7th-grader's free speech rights were violated when he was not permitted to attend classes wearing a T-shirt carrying the message, "There are only two genders". Two weeks later he came to school wearing a shirt with the message, "There are censored genders". He was also barred from wearing this shirt.  The complaint alleges in part:

101. As Defendants interpret their Speech Policy, some viewpoints on the topic of “gender identity or expression” are permitted while some viewpoints on the same topic are prohibited. In particular, speech expressing the viewpoint that there are only two genders is prohibited, while speech expressing the viewpoint that gender is fluid and is on a spectrum is permitted....

135. Defendants’ censorship of Liam’s shirts while permitting shirts and other apparel with different messages on related topics is viewpoint discrimination, which is unconstitutional in any type of forum....

153. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from censoring speech pursuant to vague standards that grant enforcement officials unbridled discretion.

154. The arbitrary determination by school officials of what is and is not “hate speech,” what speech “targets” a specific group, or what speech is “unacceptable to community standards” violates this norm.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.