In Britain, Commons Passes Bill Removing Prosecution of Women for Their Own Abortion; Extending Time Sue for Child Sex Abuse

On June 18, Britain's House of Commons by a vote of 312-95 passed and sent to the House of Lords the Crime and Policing Bill. Among the provisionsin the 444-page bill are Section 82 which removes the limitation period in damage actions claiming child sexual abuse and Section 191 which provides:

For the purposes of the law related to abortion, including sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy.

Discussing Section 191, WGBH reports:

In a landslide vote late Tuesday, lawmakers in the lower house of British parliament, the House of Commons, endorsed new legislation that bars women in England and Wales from ever being investigated, arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned for terminating their own pregnancies — no matter what term or trimester they’re in. The vote was 379 to 137.

Abortion is allowed up to 24 weeks of pregnancy, and beyond that in certain cases, if the woman’s life is in danger. But abortions have to be approved by two doctors, except for those that are terminated at home within 10 weeks....

The bill now goes to the House of Lords for its approval.

USCCB Releases 2024 Report on Sexual Abuse by Clergy

On June 6, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops announced the release of their 2024 Annual Report on the Implementation of the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People (full text of Report). The Preface to the 85-page Report says in part:

Despite our progress, the evil of abuse continues to exist. It is a relentless adversary that demands our ongoing vigilance and initiative-taking measures.... There is a significant cultural shift taking place within the Church. This shift is characterized by an increased emphasis on transparency, accountability, and victim-survivor support....

During the current audit period, dioceses and eparchies provided outreach and support services to 146 victim-survivors and their families who reported during this audit period. Continued support was provided to 1,434 victim-survivors and their families who reported abuse in prior audit periods. The report notes the ongoing work of the Church in continuing the call to ensure the safety of children, the young, and vulnerable adults. In 2024, the Church conducted 2,237,906 background checks on clergy, employees, and volunteers. In addition, in 2024, over 2.2 million adults and over 2.8 million children and youth were trained in how to identify the warning signs of abuse and how to report those signs.

According to the Report's lengthy statistical sections:

Between July 1, 2023 and June 30, 2024, 902 allegations were reported by 855 victims/survivors of child sexual abuse by clergy throughout 195 Catholic dioceses and eparchies that reported information....

...[T]he responding dioceses and eparchies reported that between July 1, 2023 and June 30, 2024, they deemed 122 allegations of sexual abuse of a minor by a diocesan or eparchial priest or deacon to be credible. These allegations were made by 121 individuals against 97 priests or deacons. Of the 122 allegations deemed credible during this reporting period ..., eight allegations involved children under the age of 18 since 2005. All of the other allegations were made by adults who are alleging abuse when they were minors....

Dioceses and eparchies that responded to the survey and reported costs related to allegations, paid out $242,799,401 between July 1, 2023 and June 30, 2024. Like in previous years’ surveys, this includes payments for allegations reported in previous years....

... [T]he total costs for year 2024 ($242,799,401) is 7 percent lower than that reported for year 2023.... That decrease is mostly due to the change in the amount paid in settlements for the year 2024, which decreased by 15 percent.

Bankruptcy Court Allows Child Abuse Victims to File Suits to Avoid New Limits on Damages in Maryland

As previously reported, in September 2023, the Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore filed for bankruptcy protection in advance of the Oct. 1, 2023 effective date of the Maryland Child Victims Act.  That Act removed the statute of limitations for civil actions by victims of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor. However, in an amendment enacted this year (full text), the Maryland legislature reduced the amount of noneconomic damages that can be recovered in suits under the Act. The new limitation applies to actions filed on or after June 1, 2025. In In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, (D MD Bkrptcy, May 2, 2025), a bankruptcy court judge issued an order allowing survivors of child sexual abuse to file and serve a complaint against the Archdiocese and its insurance companies in Maryland courts before June 1 so, if the bankruptcy reorganization is not completed, victims will not be bound by the new limitation on damages.  Without this modification, the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy court's orders in the case would have prevented the filling of claims while the reorganization proceedings were pending. Baltimore Banner reports on the bankruptcy court's action.

Court Refuses to Dismiss Megachurch Pastor's Defamation Suit Against Sex Offender

In Jakes v. Youngblood, (WD PA, April 25, 2025), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to dismiss under Pennsylvania's anti-SLAPP law a defamation suit brought by megachurch pastor T.D. Jakes against convicted sex offender Duane Youngblood.  Jakes sued after Youngblood in a podcast accused Jakes of grooming and sexually abusing him some 40 years earlier when Youngblood was 18 to 19 years old. Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to allow rapid dismissal of suits filed to suppress protected speech. The court, applying the Erie doctrine, held that the Pennsylvania anti-SLAPP law is procedural and thus does not apply to diversity cases in federal court. Instead, dismissal is governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12 and 56.  The court said in part:

The Court does not believe that a procedural rule protecting a substantive right is, by virtue of the right it is protecting, transformed into a substantive law. The statute exists to spare those who exercise their free speech rights from unwarranted and harassing litigation. However, §8340.15 pursues this policy goal through procedural means.

Christian Post reports on the decision.

Oklahoma Indicts Megachurch Pastor on Charges of Lewd Acts With a Minor

The Oklahoma Attorney General has announced that on Wednesday a Multi-County Grand indicted the founder of a Texas Megachurch on five counts of lewd or indecent acts with a young girl. (Full text of indictment). The AG's press release (full text) announcing the indictment said in part:

Robert Preston Morris, 63, resigned last summer as senior pastor of Gateway Church. The Southlake, Texas-based megachurch is among the largest in the United States.

In December 1982, Morris was a traveling evangelist visiting in Hominy with the family of the alleged victim, who was 12 at the time. The indictment alleges Morris’ sexual misconduct began that Christmas and continued over the next four years....

The statute of limitations is not applicable in this case because Morris was not a resident or inhabitant of Oklahoma at any time.

NBC News reports on the indictment.

Maryland Supreme Court Upholds Retroactive Elimination of Limitation Period for Child Sex Abuse Claims

In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Doe, (MD Sup. Ct., Feb. 3, 2025), the Maryland Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision upheld the retroactive elimination of the limitation period for bringing child sexual abuse suits.  The majority said in part:

In 2017, the General Assembly enacted legislation that, among other things, established a new time restriction applicable to filing child sexual abuse claims.  The new provision stated that “[i]n no event” may a civil action for child sexual abuse be filed against a defendant not alleged to have been the perpetrator of the abuse “more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.”...  

In 2023, the General Assembly enacted the Child Victims Act of 2023.  That law eliminated all time restrictions applicable to child sexual abuse claims, including the new provision that had been added in 2017....

We hold that the relevant provision of the 2017 law created a statute of limitations and that the running of a statute of limitations does not establish a vested right to be free from liability from the underlying cause of action.  We further hold that it was within the power of the General Assembly to retroactively abrogate that statute of limitations.  The Child Victims Act of 2023 is therefore constitutional as applied to the defendants in the three cases before us. 

Justice Biran, joined by Justices Eaves and McDonald, filed a dissenting opinion which said in part:

The text of the 2017 Act is unambiguous. In that legislation, the General Assembly created a statute of repose with respect to claims against non-perpetrator defendants. Thus, any claims against non-perpetrator defendants that were untimely on the effective date of the 2017 Act, or that became untimely before the effective date of the 2023 Act, could not be revived without violating the vested rights of the affected defendants. To the extent the General Assembly retroactively repealed the 2017 Act’s statute of repose by enacting the 2023 Act, it violated Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article 3, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution.

Justice McDonald also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Biran and Eaves. 

North Carolina Supreme Court Upholds Window for Bringing Time-Barred Child Sex Abuse Claims That Were Not Previously Adjudicated

The North Carolina Supreme Court last week decided four cases raising the constitutionality and reach of the SAFE Child Act. In McKinney v. Goins, (NC Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 2025), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld against attacks under the state constitution a provision that created a two-year window during which victims of child sexual abuse could bring tort claims that were previously barred by existing statutes of limitation. The Court held that neither the "Law of the Land" Clause not the Ex Post Facto Clause of the North Carolina Constitution bar the challenged provision. The Court also rejected a substantive due process claim. Justice Earls filed an opinion concurring in the result but strongly disagreeing with the majority's method of constitutional interpretation which he labels "extreme originalism".

In Cohane v. Home Missioners of America, (NC Sup. Ct., Jan 31, 2025), the Court held that the SAFE Child Act revived suits against those who enabled the abuse, as well as against the abusers. The Court said in part:

The issue here is whether the General Assembly meant to distinguish between abusers who personally harmed the plaintiff and those organizations, institutions, and parties that employed or supervised the abuser or otherwise condoned, ratified, or facilitated the abuse (enablers). Defendants would have us hold not only that the revival provision distinguished between the two types of potential defendants but also that it authorized suits against abusers and not against enablers, in contravention of background tort law principles. We conclude that such a distinction does not follow from the plain text of the provision, nor does it find support in the SAFE Child Act or related statutory provisions read as a whole.

However, in two cases consolidated for decision, John Doe 1K v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte and John Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, (NC Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 2025), the Court said in part:

Plaintiffs in this case are alleged victims of child sexual abuse in the 1970s and 1980s. The SAFE Child Act would have revived plaintiffs’ time-barred claims except for one glaring problem— plaintiffs already brought those claims over a decade ago and courts already entered final judgments dismissing those claims with prejudice because they were time barred. 

... [T]he General Assembly does not have the power to set aside a final judgment of the judicial branch.

AP reports on the decisions. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Maine Supreme Court Invalidates Retroactive Removal of Limitation Period for Child Sex Abuse Claims

In Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, (ME Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 2025), Maine's Supreme Judicial Court, in a 4-2 decision, held that Maine's Constitution bars legislative revival of a cause of action after it has been extinguished by a pre-existing statute of limitations. In the case, the Maine legislature removed any limitation period for sexual acts toward minors.  Numerous plaintiffs sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland for damages for sexual abuse by the Bishop's clergy that took place while plaintiffs were children. The claims were barred by the previous statute of limitations before the removal of limitation periods was enacted. The majority said in part:

... [A]s early as our founding and many times thereafter, we have interpreted our constitutional text to reject retrospective legislation impairing vested rights....

There can be no doubt that we as a society have gained a new understanding of the effect of trauma and the delays that it can cause in the ability of a victim to pursue a cause of action.  Such evolved knowledge provides support for the elimination of any statute of limitations for torts involving sexual assaults.  But the issue here is not the propriety of the elimination of a statute of limitations but rather the revival of a claim after the relevant existing statute of limitations has expired....

Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Lawrence, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The question here is not whether a duly enacted statute of limitations is constitutional.  Rather, the question is whether the Constitution bars the Legislature from reviving a claim after rebalancing competing policies in light of an evolved understanding of the dynamics of childhood sexual abuse that may have prevented victims from asserting their claims earlier.

Portland Press Herald reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge and Scott Mange for the lead.]

Australia's High Court Says Diocese Is Not Vicariously Liable for Sex Abuse by Priest [Corrected]

In Bird v DP (a pseudonym) , (HCA, Nov. 13, 2024), the High Court of Australia in an appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria held that a Catholic diocese is not vicariously liable for sexual abuse of a five-year old boy by a priest from a parish church within the diocese. Plaintiff at age 49 instituted suit for the psychological injuries he had sustained as a child by two separate sexual assaults by the priest that took place at the child's home. The majority opinion on behalf of five justices held in part:

A diocese, through the person of the bishop of that diocese, appoints priests and assistant priests to parishes within that diocese.... In 1966, Coffey was appointed by the then Bishop of Ballarat to St Patrick's parish church.... Coffey was not employed by the Diocese or engaged by the Diocese as an independent contractor. There was no finding that Coffey was an agent of the Diocese.

... [A] relationship of employment has always been a necessary precursor in this country to a finding of vicarious liability and it has always been necessary that the wrongful acts must be committed in the course or scope of the employment. There is no solid foundation for expansion of the doctrine or for its bounds to be redrawn.

The majority explained its conclusion in part as follows: 

... [T]he Victorian Parliament enacted the Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 (Vic) and amended the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) in response to the Redress and Civil Litigation Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse...  and, in so doing, adopted the recommendation in the Royal Commission report of the imposition of a new duty of care to operate prospectively only and not retrospectively....

Taken as a whole, the terms of the Victorian Parliament's legislative reforms ... weigh heavily against any expansion of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability. The "genius of the common law" includes that the "the first statement of a common law rule or principle is not its final statement", but its genius also includes many self-imposed checks and balances against "unprincipled, social engineering on the part of the common law judges". It is one thing to accept that the common law should not stand still merely "because the legislature has not moved" to adapt to changing social conditions, but another to change a common law principle in circumstances where the legislature has responded to a comprehensive review of the common law's inadequacies by the enactment of statutory provisions which make no change to that common law principle.

Justice Jagot filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Gleeson filed an opinion concurring only in the result, saying in part:

Government attention to historical child abuse by members of religious and other non-government organisations, and subsequent legislative reform to extend liability for personal injury suffered because of child abuse, reflect an evolution of attitudes to the treatment of children in our society. That evolution has produced a general intolerance of physical, sexual and psychological abuse of children, and increased recognition of societal responsibility for setting and maintaining appropriate standards of care for children, especially in institutional settings. The evolution has also been accompanied by reduced deference towards religious and charitable organisations and a commensurate preparedness to impose legal liability upon religious and other non-government organisations, including for harms inflicted by persons associated with such organisations. These changes in social conditions are not unique to Australia and can be observed across the common law world and beyond.

This case is a missed opportunity for the Australian common law to develop in accordance with changed social conditions and in tandem with developments in other common law jurisdictions. For the reasons given below, I do not agree with the plurality that relationships that are akin to employment do not attract vicarious liability in Australia.

In my view, the relationship between the Diocese of Ballarat ...,  and Father Bryan Coffey ..., an assistant parish priest appointed to that role in the parish of Port Fairy, is capable of attracting vicarious liability. Nevertheless, the Diocese is not vicariously liable for the sexual assaults that Coffey inflicted upon DP because those torts occurred in circumstances where Coffey opportunistically took advantage of his role to commit them. The torts were therefore not committed in the course of Coffey's performance of his role as assistant parish priest. Accordingly, I agree with the orders proposed by the plurality.

Law and Religion Australia reports on the decision.

[An earlier version of this post incorrectly attributed some quotes from Justice Gleason to Justice Jaggot.]

Archbishop of Canterbury Resigns, Accepting Responsibility for Coverup of Sexual Abuse of Young Men

In Britain yesterday the Archbishop of Canterbury announced his resignation, taking responsibility for an inadequate response to reports of extreme sexual abuse of over 100 boys and young men at Christian camps and public schools for decades by a barrister who was a lay preacher in the Anglican Church. A Report on abuser John Smyth was commissioned by the Church of England and authored by former social services director Keith Makin. The Report (full text) was published last month. As described by the BBC:

The Makin report described [Smyth's] "clearly sexually motivated, sadistic regime" of beatings during the 1970s and 1980s.

He singled out boys attending Christian camps and in sessions at leading public schools, including Winchester College, before taking them to his home and beating them with a cane in his shed.

Some of the victims had to wear adult nappies because of the bleeding they suffered.

Smyth was later able to travel to Zimbabwe and South Africa, where he is alleged to have continued his abuse.

He died in 2018.

A Chanel 4 News report summarizes the situation. 

In a Statement (full text) published yesterday, the Archbishop, Most Rev. Justin Welby, said in part:

Having sought the gracious permission of His Majesty The King, I have decided to resign as Archbishop of Canterbury.

The Makin Review has exposed the long-maintained conspiracy of silence about the heinous abuses of John Smyth.

When I was informed in 2013 and told that police had been notified, I believed wrongly that an appropriate resolution would follow. 

It is very clear that I must take personal and institutional responsibility for the long and retraumatising period between 2013 and 2024. 

Maryland Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Challenge to Child Victims Act

 On Tuesday, the Maryland Supreme Court heard oral arguments in three related cases that raise the question of whether the Maryland Child Victims Act of 2023 impermissibly abrogated a vested right created by a 2017 statute. The 2023 Act eliminated the statute of limitations for damage actions alleging sexual abuse while the victim was a minor. The cases heard by the court are Key School, Inc. v. Bunker (video of oral argument); Board of Education of Harford County v. John Doe (videos of oral argument on constitutional question and on standing); and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. John Doe (video of oral argument). AP reports on the oral arguments. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Missouri Appeals Court Refers Question of Church's Duty of Supervision to State Supreme Court

 In Doe v. First Baptist Church of Pierce City, Missouri, (MO App., Sept. 2, 2023), a Missouri appellate court described plaintiff's claim:

Plaintiff asserts that FBC, a Southern Baptist religious institution, had a duty to supervise the youth ministries program members, including herself, while they were transported on a church van as part of that program, that FBC breached this duty by failing to either have or follow a policy to protect minors from sexual abuse, and that Plaintiff was injured as a result by the actions of a fellow youth ministries program member....

The court said that a prior state Supreme Court opinion, Gibson v Brewer, would call for dismissal of the case, saying in part:

Returning to the negligence claims at issue in Gibson, we must first address the negligent hiring/ordination/retention and negligent failure to supervise claims.  Our high court observed that “[q]uestions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy . . . necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”...  “Such excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment” and “would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.”... Similarly ... “[a]djudicating the reasonableness of a church’s supervision of a cleric—what the church ‘should know’—requires inquiry into religious doctrine” and, as with the negligent hiring/ordination/retention claim, “would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of supervision.” 

The court concluded, however:

We would affirm the summary judgment of the circuit court, but due to the general interest and importance of the issues on appeal, we transfer the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to Rule 83.02.

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

 In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese.  The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Diocese Not Liable in Bankruptcy for Sex Abuse Without Agency Relationship with Abuser or Abuser's Institution

In In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, (SD NY, July 15, 2024), a New York federal district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's dismissal of appellants' claims that they were sexually abused as children by clergy and staff at religious institutions in the diocese's territory. The court said in part:

... [T]o adequately assert state law tort claims, Claimants must plead that the Debtor had some control over the abusers or the religious institutions where the abuse occurred....  In other words, Claimants were required to plead the existence of an employment or agency relationship between the Diocese and the alleged abusers, or an agency relationship between the Diocese and the religious institutions.   

The bankruptcy court properly determined that Claimants offered no non-conclusory allegations to support either theory of liability....

The bankruptcy court correctly observed that “the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution bar courts from interpreting issues of religious Canon Law to resolve disputes.”...  Instead, “the claimants must show that an employment or agency relationship existed between the Debtor and abuser or Religious Institutions/Orders, based on facts relevant to those theories as they are normally established in the secular context.”... [T]he resolution of the issue presented in this case ... does not, however, depend upon any interpretation of Canon Law that would violate the First Amendment.  Here, Claimants fail to state a claim because the allegation that the Diocese revoked the faculties of one abuser accused in connection with a claim that is not at issue in this appeal is insufficient to plausibly allege that the specific abusers at issue here were employees or agents of the Diocese, or that their institutions were agencies of the Diocese.... [A]n allegation that the Diocese hired, fired, supervised, or disciplined an individual not at issue in this appeal does not support an inference that the Diocese has the power to control all clergy or staff at Catholic institutions within its geographic territory or exercised that power over any specific abuser in this appeal....

United Methodist Church Is Not a Jural Entity That Can Be Sued Under NY Child Victims Act

In Chestnut v. United Methodist Church, (NY App. Div., July 10, 2024), a New York state appellate court held that the "United Methodist Church" is not a jural entity that can be sued under New York's Child Victims Act. Plaintiff, who alleged that she was sexually abused as a young child over a 4-year period by a youth group leader who was also the son of a clergyman, named 6 defendants. She alleged that United Methodist Church was in a principal-agent relationship with the Woodbury, New York church that employed the abuser. The court said in part:

Here, the issue of whether United Methodist Church is a jural entity capable of being sued does not concern a religious controversy, and, therefore, does not require the interpretation or application of ecclesiastical doctrine. Instead, the issue of whether United Methodist Church may be considered an unincorporated association rests entirely on neutral principles of law....

... [W]e conclude that the defendants established that United Methodist Church ... is a religious denomination ... and not a jural entity amenable to suit as an unincorporated association. It is undisputed that United Methodist Church does not have a principal place of business, does not have its own offices or employees, and does not and cannot hold title to property, and there is no proof in the record that United Methodist Church has incorporated or held itself out as a jural entity in any other jurisdiction....

... United Methodist Church governs itself through the efforts of United Methodists from all over the world who, at various levels, propose and adopt policies and procedures in the Discipline to be followed by, among others, local churches, annual conferences, and the various corporate entities at the general church level, such as GCFA. Given this unique structure, the hierarchical nature of United Methodist Church's "connectional" structure does not, in and of itself, suggest that United Methodist Church is an unincorporated association or anything other than a religious denomination.

Washington State AG Investigating Sex Abuse Cover-Up by Catholic Diocese

Washington state Attorney General Bob Ferguson announced yesterday that it has filed a petition to enforce a subpoena against the Catholic Diocese of Seattle in the AG's investigation of allegations of the misuse of charitable funds to cover up clergy child sex abuse claims. The Seattle Diocese has refused to cooperate in the investigation of three dioceses in the state. The Petition to Enforce the Subpoena of the Complex Litigation Division, (Super. Ct., filed 5/9/2024) (full text) says in part:

Although the Church has released only limited records regarding the extent of its complicity in the sexual abuse of children by its clergy, these limited records make clear that the Archdiocese in Washington State not only failed to warn the public about serial child sex abusers within the Church’s ranks, but actively protected such abusers and repeatedly ensured they would have access to new child victims by frequently allowing them to transfer locations. One especially illustrative example is Father Michael J. Cody, whom the Archdiocese allowed to minister in multiple parishes for over 15 years without ever warning the public, reporting his extensive history of sexually abusing children, or taking any meaningful action to protect the many vulnerable children he victimized.

Relying on Washington's Charitable Trust Act in subpoenaing the Diocese, the AG argues that the religious organization exemption in the Act should not be applied to prevent a sexual abuse investigation. It also argues that the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause does not shield the Diocese here.

Louisiana Supreme Court: Revival of Barred Sex Abuse Claims Violates Priest's Rights Under State Constitution

 In Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, (LA Sup. Ct., March 22, 2024), the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that a 2021 Louisiana statute that revived child sex abuse claims that had previously been time barred violates the Louisiana Constitution. The statute gave victims a 3-year window to file claims. The court said in part:

Essentially, plaintiffs alleged they were sexually molested by a Roman Catholic priest at various times between 1971 and 1979.   At the time of the alleged abuse, plaintiffs ranged in ages from eight to fourteen.  

Defendants responded by filing several exceptions, including a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the general one-year liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1)....

The definite nature of accrued prescription has been repeatedly recognized in our jurisprudence, which makes it clear that, unlike statutes of limitations at common law, under civilian principles, prescriptive periods that have accrued act to extinguish the civil obligation to which they apply....

Guided by Louisiana’s civil law tradition, we decline to upend nearly a half of a century’s jurisprudence that recognizes the unique nature of vested rights associated with liberative prescription, which inure to the benefit of both plaintiffs (protecting an accrued cause of action) and defendants (protecting a defense of accrued liberative prescription).  Therefore, despite the sickening  and despicable factual allegations in this case, we must conclude that La. R.S. 9:2800.9, as amended by the revival provisions, cannot be retroactively applied to revive plaintiffs’ prescribed causes of action.  To find otherwise would divest defendants of their vested right to plead prescription in violation of Art. I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution.

However the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the one-year prescriptive period had tolled.

Justice Crichton filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Griffin.

Chief Justice Weimer dissented, saying in part:

Given Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting its citizens who were sexually abused as minors and in providing them with the ability to seek redress in the courts, and the narrowly tailored nature of the relief provided–the legislation revives, for a short period of time, for a narrow category of tort victims, actions otherwise prescribed–I would find that the revival provision is consistent with the due process guarantee.  Under the due process clause, no rights–not even fundamental ones–are absolute.  The due process clause simply offers protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the government.  The revival provision at issue is not arbitrary (in fact, in this case it is arguable that the “arbitrary and unreasonable” conduct was the alleged sexual abuse perpetrated upon children by those in society who were placed in positions of authority).  And, the provision has been demonstrated to have a substantial relationship to public safety, morals and welfare.

Justice Crain also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice McCallum dissented without opinion.

Balls and Strikes reported on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

3 More Leaders of Extremist Jewish Sect Convicted in 2018 Kidnappings

In a March 27 announcement (full text), the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York said in part:

Yoil Weingarten, Yakov Weingarten, and Shmiel Weingarten, leaders of Lev Tahor, an extremist Jewish sect based in Guatemala, have been found guilty of kidnapping a 12-year-old boy and a 14-year-old girl and transporting the 14-year-old girl outside the United States to continue a sexual relationship with her adult male ‘husband.’  With this verdict, all nine Lev Tahor leaders and operatives charged for these heinous crimes have been held accountable.

Rockland/ Westchester Journal News has a lengthier account of the convictions for the 2018 kidnappings, saying in part:

A jury in White Plains federal court took less than four hours to reject the claims of Shmiel, Yakev and Yoil Weingarten that the girl and her 12-year-old brother ... were rescued from abusive treatment in New York and that reuniting the girl with her community and 20-year-old husband had nothing to do with sex.

They face up to 30 years in prison, including a minimum of 10 years on the charge of transporting a minor for sex. They were also convicted of conspiracy charges and international parental abduction. U.S. District Judge Nelson Roman scheduled sentencing for July 9.

(See prior related posting.)

Civil Conspiracy Claims Against Religious Organization Survive 1st Amendment Defenses

In re Gothard, (TX App., Feb. 22, 2024), is a mandamus action that is essentially an appeal of a trial court's refusal to dismiss civil conspiracy claims against Institute in Basic Life Principles and its founder, William Gothard. Plaintiffs claimed that ILBP is a cult that "teachers distorted and heretical Christian doctrines" that led to their sexual abuse by their father and brother. The Texas state appellate court rejected Relators', i.e. defendants', First Amendment defenses, saying in part:

Gothard maintains that religious teachings and the publication thereof are constitutionally protected.  IBLP contends the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars RPIs’ cause of action. It argues that the “alleged religiously motivated conduct of IBLP is the advocacy and publication of religious beliefs.”  According to Relators, if RPIs’ claim is considered valid, any religious leader who speaks on religious topics and publishes his beliefs could be subject to a civil cause of action if a listener or reader improperly applies those beliefs in sexually abusing another person or committing some other unlawful act. ...

But the First Amendment does not bar all claims against religious bodies.,,,  A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government....

The relevant question is whether it appears certain that resolution of [plaintiffs']’ claims will require the trial court to address purely ecclesiastical questions.... IBLP represents that its teachings and materials are based on scriptures from the Bible, none of which “advocate sexual abuse or any other form of sexual immorality.”  Accordingly, by its own admission, IBLP’s teachings and materials do not advocate sexual abuse and consequently, the intentional tort of sexual assault that underlies the civil conspiracy claim is not rooted in religious belief.  ....

Because sexual assault is not part of Relators’ belief system, we cannot definitively say, based on the record before us, that this is a situation in which religious beliefs are so intertwined with a tort claim so as to unconstitutionally burden Relators’ rights and embroil the court in an assessment of those religious beliefs.

Recorded Statements Made to Church Leaders and Pastor Not Privileged

In State of Florida v. Gonzalez, (FL App., Jan. 31, 2024), a Florida state appellate court held that a video recording of a meeting between defendant and some 14 to 20 church leaders (including the pastor) did not meet the statutory requirements for the communication to be privileged. The court reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress the video at defendant's trial for sexually molesting the church pastor's 12-year-old granddaughter. The pastor called the meeting and instructed defendant "that he would need to explain to the church leaders the details of what he had done and that he would need to ask for forgiveness." The court said in part:

We reject the State's attempt to frame the communication here as being made only to S.S. [the victim's mother] and to the other church leaders.  Having viewed the video and reading the transcript therefrom, we conclude that M.S., Gonzalez's pastor, was among the recipients of Gonzalez's communication and, therefore, that part of section 90.505(2) was met. However, the privilege requires more than just a statement being made to a member of the clergy.  The dispute in this case centers on the other requirement: that the communication was confidential.  And that part of the test requires that the communication be "made privately for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel or advice from the member of the clergy in the usual course of his or her practice or discipline and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the communication."  § 90.505(1)(b)....