In Bird v DP (a pseudonym) , (HCA, Nov. 13, 2024), the High Court of Australia in an appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria held that a Catholic diocese is not vicariously liable for sexual abuse of a five-year old boy by a priest from a parish church within the diocese. Plaintiff at age 49 instituted suit for the psychological injuries he had sustained as a child by two separate sexual assaults by the priest that took place at the child's home. The majority opinion on behalf of five justices held in part:
A diocese, through the person of the bishop of that diocese, appoints priests and assistant priests to parishes within that diocese.... In 1966, Coffey was appointed by the then Bishop of Ballarat to St Patrick's parish church.... Coffey was not employed by the Diocese or engaged by the Diocese as an independent contractor. There was no finding that Coffey was an agent of the Diocese.
... [A] relationship of employment has always been a necessary precursor in this country to a finding of vicarious liability and it has always been necessary that the wrongful acts must be committed in the course or scope of the employment. There is no solid foundation for expansion of the doctrine or for its bounds to be redrawn.
The majority explained its conclusion in part as follows:
... [T]he Victorian Parliament enacted the Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 (Vic) and amended the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) in response to the Redress and Civil Litigation Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse... and, in so doing, adopted the recommendation in the Royal Commission report of the imposition of a new duty of care to operate prospectively only and not retrospectively....
Taken as a whole, the terms of the Victorian Parliament's legislative reforms ... weigh heavily against any expansion of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability. The "genius of the common law" includes that the "the first statement of a common law rule or principle is not its final statement", but its genius also includes many self-imposed checks and balances against "unprincipled, social engineering on the part of the common law judges". It is one thing to accept that the common law should not stand still merely "because the legislature has not moved" to adapt to changing social conditions, but another to change a common law principle in circumstances where the legislature has responded to a comprehensive review of the common law's inadequacies by the enactment of statutory provisions which make no change to that common law principle.
Justice Jagot filed an opinion concurring in the result, saying in part:
This case is a missed opportunity for the Australian common law to develop in accordance with changed social conditions and in tandem with developments in other common law jurisdictions. For the reasons given below, I do not agree with the plurality that relationships that are akin to employment do not attract vicarious liability in Australia.
In my view, the relationship between the Diocese of Ballarat ..., and Father Bryan Coffey ..., an assistant parish priest appointed to that role in the parish of Port Fairy, is capable of attracting vicarious liability. Nevertheless, the Diocese is not vicariously liable for the sexual assaults that Coffey inflicted upon DP because those torts occurred in circumstances where Coffey opportunistically took advantage of his role to commit them. The torts were therefore not committed in the course of Coffey's performance of his role as assistant parish priest. Accordingly, I agree with the orders proposed by the plurality.
Justice Gleeson filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
Government attention to historical child abuse by members of religious and other non-government organisations, and subsequent legislative reform to extend liability for personal injury suffered because of child abuse, reflect an evolution of attitudes to the treatment of children in our society. That evolution has produced a general intolerance of physical, sexual and psychological abuse of children, and increased recognition of societal responsibility for setting and maintaining appropriate standards of care for children, especially in institutional settings. The evolution has also been accompanied by reduced deference towards religious and charitable organisations and a commensurate preparedness to impose legal liability upon religious and other non-government organisations, including for harms inflicted by persons associated with such organisations. These changes in social conditions are not unique to Australia and can be observed across the common law world and beyond.
This case is a missed opportunity for the Australian common law to develop in accordance with changed social conditions and in tandem with developments in other common law jurisdictions. For the reasons given below, I do not agree with the plurality that relationships that are akin to employment do not attract vicarious liability in Australia.
Law and Religion Australia reports on the decision.
