Noise Ordinance Is Constitutional as Applied to Anti-Abortion Sidewalk Advocacy

In Knotts v. City of Cuyahoga Falls. (ND OH, March 31, 2026), an Ohio federal district court upheld the application of a noise ordinance to anti-abortion sidewalk counselors who engage in sidewalk advocacy based on their religious beliefs. The court rejected plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and vagueness challenges to the ordinance, saying in part:

The Court notes that on its face 1) the Ordinance does not regulate speaker identity, but rather the amplification of the speaker, 2) it does not regulate the content of speech, but rather the amplification of said speech, and 3) the Ordinance exempts certain locations holding specific events (concerts, live outdoor musical or theatrical performances) from amplification restrictions, not content.  For example, under this Ordinance, a religious organization hosting a theatrical performance on its property is exempt from the amplification restrictions whether that performance is pro-life or pro-choice.  The Ordinance is content neutral. ...

The Ordinance applies to everyone, and does not regulate nor mention any religious activity, creed or affiliation.....  It does not distinguish among religions or between religion and non-religion.  Accordingly, it is neutral and generally applicable.  

Plaintiffs summarily assert that the Ordinance violates their first Amendment right to free exercise as it applies to them.... Plaintiffs explain that they “hold sincere religious convictions that compel them to engage in sidewalk advocacy to save the lives of the unborn, which they express through amplified speech.”... However, “‘a generally applicable law that incidentally burdens religious practices usually will be upheld.’” 

... [T]he burden does not infringe “free exercise unless it places a substantial burden on a central religious belief or practice[.]”   There is no such burden here.  Plaintiffs were not denied the right to speak on their religious views or otherwise express their views, they merely were not permitted to engage in amplified speech over the complaint of neighbors....

Supreme Court Strikes Down Most Applications of Conversion Therapy Ban

In Chiles v. Salazar, (Sup.Ct., March 31, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision struck down most applications of Colorado's law that prohibits licensed counselors from engaging in conversion therapy for minors, defined as therapy that attempts to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Justice Gorsuch, joined by all but Justice Jackson, wrote the majority opinion which says in part:

The State insists, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that its law does not “regulate expression” at all, only “conduct,” “treatment,” or a “therapeutic modality.”...  As a result, Colorado reasons, its law triggers no more than rational-basis or intermediate scrutiny review.... But the State’s premise is simply mistaken.  In many applications, the State’s law banning “conversion therapy” may address conduct—such as aversive physical interventions.  But here, Ms. Chiles seeks to engage only in speech, and as applied to her the law regulates what she may say.  Her speech does not become conduct just because the State may call it that. Nor does her speech become conduct just because it can also be described as a “treatment,” a “therapeutic modality,” or anything else. The First Amendment is no word game. And the rights it protects cannot be renamed away or their protections nullified by “mere labels.”...

As applied here, Colorado’s law does not just regulate the content of Ms. Chiles’s speech.  It goes a step further, prescribing what views she may and may not express.  For a gay client, Ms. Chiles may express “[a]cceptance, support, and understanding for the facilitation of . . . identity exploration.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(I).  For a client “undergoing gender transition,” Ms. Chiles may likewise offer words of “[a]ssistance.” §12–245–202(3.5)(b)(II).  But if a gay or transgender client seeks her counsel in the hope of changing his sexual orientation or gender identity, Ms. Chiles cannot provide it....

At bottom, Colorado and the dissent fundamentally misconceive this Court’s speech-incident-to-conduct precedents. In these cases, the question is not whether a law mostly addresses conduct and only sometimes sweeps in speech. Instead, the focus lies on two entirely different questions: whether the law in question restricts speech only because it is integrally related to unlawful conduct— or ... only for reasons unrelated to its content....

Colorado’s law does not regulate speech incident to conduct under either test....

... Colorado emphasizes, [prior precedent] left open the possibility that a future party might present “persuasive evidence . . . of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition” of content regulation regarding additional categories of professional (or other) speech that might likewise warrant only “diminished” First Amendment protection....

...  Colorado and the dissent ask us to recognize a cavernous “First Amendment Free Zone,”... one in which States may censor almost any speech they consider “substandard care.” It is, once more, an approach our precedents already foreclose. 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a concurring opinion stating that the result might be different if a law regulating speech in doctors' and counselors' offices were content-based but viewpoint-neutral.

Justice Jackson filed a 35-page dissenting opinion saying in part:

Stated simply, the majority has failed to appreciate the crucial context in which Chiles’s constitutional claims have arisen. Chiles is not speaking in the ether; she is providing therapy to minors as a licensed healthcare professional. The Tenth Circuit was correct to observe that “[t]here is a long-established history of states regulating the healthcare professions.” ...  And, until today, the First Amendment has not blocked their way.  For good reason: Under our precedents, bedrock First Amendment principles have far less salience when the speakers are medical professionals and their treatment-related speech is being restricted incidentally to the State’s regulation of the provision of medical care....

Over the past few decades, however, the premise of conversion therapy (in whatever form) has been widely discredited within the medical and scientific community. Conversion therapy is, at bottom, “based on a view of gender diversity that runs counter to scientific consensus.”...

A state license used to mean something to the patients who entrust their care to licensed professionals—i.e., that the person is certified to be one who provides treatments that are consistent with the standard of care. 

That stops today....

The Guardian reports on the decision. ADF, which represented petitioner, issued a press release commenting on the decision.

Detroit Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Ordinance Challenged

Suit was filed last week in a Michigan federal district court challenging a Detroit ordinance that bans picketing within 15-feet of abortion clinics and bans sidewalk counselors from approaching closer than 8 feet from persons entering clinics. The complaint (full text) in Sidewalk Advocates for Life v. City of Detroit, (ED MI, filed 3/18/2026) alleges in part:

The Ordinance, which is enforceable through criminal penalties, violates the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Freedom of Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as the Michigan Constitution....

... The legislative record contains no evidence that the City attempted to address its asserted interests through less restrictive means before enacting the Ordinance. The City did not pursue targeted injunctions against specific individuals. It did not increase enforcement of existing harassment, assault, obstruction, or trespass statutes. It did not seek dispersal orders. It moved directly to a blanket ordinance outlawing an entire category of expressive activity on public sidewalks....

...The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment ... prohibits the government from imposing substantial burdens on the exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs unless the burden is imposed by a neutral law of general applicability....

The Ordinance is not generally applicable because § 31-14 4(b)(2) exempts “[a]uthorized security, personnel, employees, or agents” of healthcare facilities who are “engaged in assisting patients and other persons to enter or exit” the facility. This exemption permits clinic employees and escorts to engage in the precise conduct the Ordinance forbids for everyone else: standing within 15 feet of the entrance, approaching patients, speaking to them, and walking alongside them within the buffer zone. Under the framework of Tandon v. Newsom ... and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia ... whenever the government treats comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise, the law is not generally applicable and strict scrutiny applies automatically. One exemption suffices to create constitutional infirmity.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Says Street Preacher May Challenge Limit on Demonstrations Despite His Prior Conviction

In Oliver v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (Sup. Ct., March 20, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a street preacher may move ahead with his challenge to a city ordinance that limits protests and demonstrations around the city's amphitheater to a designated area when events are scheduled at the amphitheater. The city argued that because the preacher had been convicted of violating the same ordinance several years earlier, the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars the suit. Heck prohibits the use of 42 USC §1983 to challenge a prior conviction or sentence in order to obtain release from custody or to obtain an award of damages. Today the Supreme Court held that this does not bar the street preacher's suit because he is only seeking an injunction to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance. The fact that a victory in his suit would mean that his prior conviction was unconstitutional does not mean that it is barred. Justice Kagan's opinion for a unanimous court said in part:

Olivier’s suit does not ... “collateral[ly] attack” the old conviction.....  It thus cannot give rise, as Heck feared, to “parallel litigation” respecting his prior conduct.... The suit, after all, is not about what Olivier did in the past...  Unlike in Heck, the suit merely attempts to prevent a future prosecution....

... [T]he City says, a judgment in Olivier’s favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] prior conviction[].”... To declare the city ordinance unconstitutional, as Olivier seeks, would be to imply that no one—including Olivier—should have been convicted under that law. 

The argument is a fair one, but hardly dispositive.  We have to agree that if Olivier succeeds in this suit, it would mean his prior conviction was unconstitutional.  So, strictly speaking, the Heck language fits. But that could just show that the phrasing was not quite as tailored as it should have been....

We think, with the benefit of hindsight, that ... the sentence relied on swept a bit too broad.  That language was used in Heck to identify claims that were really assaults on a prior conviction, even though involving some indirection.

5th Circuit: Principal Lacks Qualified Immunity for Barring Teachers' Praying in View of Students

In Barber v. Rounds, (5th Cir., March 9,2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Texas high school principal Bryan Rounds does not have qualified immunity as to a teacher's First Amendment claims in a suit challenging his prohibition on teachers' engaging in any prayer that students might observe. The dispute grew out of the principal cautioning teachers in connection with a staff "See You At the Flagpole" event.  The court said in part:

Barber asserts that the complaint alleges a blanket prohibition by Rounds on teachers engaging in any prayer that students might observe—regardless of whether the prayer was connected to a student-led event.  Rounds, on the other hand, urges a narrower, contextual reading:  that his directives were limited to ensuring teachers did not participate in the student-initiated SYATP gathering.   

Barber’s reading is consonant with the complaint’s language.  Her pleading alleges that Rounds told her she could not pray “in the presence of students” and could not engage in prayer where she would be “visible to students,” even away from the flagpole and even “when the teachers [are] not on school time.” ...

The second question is whether the First Amendment rights at issue were clearly established when Rounds’s challenged conduct occurred....

Barber contends that Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] supplied the requisite clarity.  Again, it does.  As Barber points out, Kennedy expressly rejected the proposition that religious expression by a public-school employee may be restricted merely because students might observe it.  The Kennedy Court rejected the rule that “visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach” may “be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—impermissibly coercive on students.”  597 U.S. at 540.

Vital Law reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Library's Policy on Use of Meeting Room

Suit was filed this week in an Alabama federal district court by Eagle Forum, a Christian community educational organization, challenging the policy of the Tuscaloosa Public Library that bars use of its large meeting room by "religious or sectarian groups for the purpose of preaching or otherwise demonstrating the beliefs of their members." The complaint (full text) in Eagle Forum of Alabama v. Tuscaloosa Public Library Bord of Trustees, (ND AL, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

101. By putting Eagle Forum to a choice between exercising its religious beliefs through faith-based programming at its events and using the Rotary Room, the Defendants burden and “penalize[ ] the free exercise of religion.” ...

112. There is no compelling government interest to justify these content- and viewpoint-based restrictions, and the Reservation Policy is not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling governmental interest.

113. Even if the Rotary Room could only be considered a limited public forum ...  it is well established that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”

The complaint also alleges that the library's policy violates the Equal Protection clause and the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

County Employee Sues Over Denial of Religious Accommodation So He Could Avoid Celebrating Pride Month

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by an employee of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works alleging that the county violated Title VII as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments and California law by denying him a religious accommodation so he would not have to celebrate Pride Month. The complaint (full text) in Batman v. Los Angeles County, (CD CA, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

4. Beginning in March 2023, the County directed all of its government departments to ensure that the “Pride Progress Flag” was flown at every government department.... The policy revisions also directed the government offices to adopt ways to demonstrate that all government offices celebrate so-called “Pride Month” and make its celebration overt, express, and universal.  

5. As a result of his sincerely held religious beliefs and a conflict with his employer’s open and notorious celebration of something Batman considers a sin, Batman requested a simple accommodation of working remotely during the one month of the year that his employment requirements conflict with his sincerely held religious beliefs.....

82. Rather than provide Batman a reasonable accommodation that was plainly available and not burdensome to anyone, Batman was instructed that he could simply use the back entrance....  

83. The Department also suggested to Batman that he seek mental health counseling for any distress he may feel as a result of the conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the Department’s denial of his requested accommodation.... In other words, the Department suggested to Batman that his religious beliefs required mental health counseling rather than accommodation.

The complaint sets out at length the Biblical basis for plaintiff's beliefs.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Florida Governor's Order Declaring CAIR a Foreign Terrorist Organization Is Held Unconstitutional

As previously reported, last December Florida Governor Ron DeSantis issued an Executive Order declaring CAIR to be a foreign terrorist organization and barring it and anyone providing material support or resources to it from receiving state contracts or state benefits. In CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, (ND FL, March 4, 2026), a Florida federal district court held that the Executive Order violates CAIR's free speech rights. The court said in part:

Plaintiff contends that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to prevent future harm and to remedy ongoing harm to its First Amendment right to free speech due to Defendant’s coercion of third parties to suppress its speech. As evidence of the coercive nature of Defendant’s EO, Plaintiff points to a Florida-based production company that withdrew from a proposed podcast agreement to launch Plaintiff’s civil rights podcast, citing its concerns about the EO, and notes that the company would reconsider its withdrawal from the agreement in the event the EO was found to be unlawful....

A government official “cannot do indirectly what [he] is barred from doing directly: . . . coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on [his] behalf.” 

Defendant’s EO threatens those who platform, collaborate with, or otherwise provide support to Plaintiff.... 

... [T]he production company is an intermediary intending to platform Plaintiff’s speech. By threatening the production company— indeed, by broadly threatening anyone who wishes to do business in Florida— Defendant stifles Plaintiff’s speech....

It should be lost on no one that Defendant’s EO targets one of America’s largest Muslim civil rights organization for indirect suppression of speech. But, as we all know, it is easy for those in power to target minority groups with little pushback. Sadly, history teaches that it is often minority religious groups who find themselves in the crosshairs. And here, the Muslim community presents an especially easy target for Defendant, inasmuch as they make up less than 1% of Florida’s population...

CAIR issued a press release announcing the decision.

9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....

Street Preachers Can Move Ahead with Free Exercise Claims Against Police

In Raio v. City of Chicago, (ND IL, Feb. 24, 2026), two street preachers and a Gospel singer who had been cited and, on another occasion, arrested for violating Chicago's sound ordinance brought a civil rights action against the city. The three use a microphone connected to a battery-operated speaker for their preaching and music. Ruling on the city's motion to dismiss, the court said that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged First Amendment retaliation, free exercise, false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and IRFRA claims, but dismissed plaintiffs' vagueness, equal protection, and free speech claims. The court said inn part:

Plaintiffs allege that Chicago police officers “cite all street preachers, regardless of whether they meet the requirements of the [Amplification Ordinance] and regardless of the evidence,”... and “engag[e] in a targeted practice of enforcing their interpretation of the [Amplification Ordinance] against only religious speakers,”... Defendants argue that the Amplification Ordinance is instead a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation....

Plaintiffs have failed to allege a single instance in which they, or anyone similarly situated, used amplification to communicate a non-religious message without consequence.  Nor do they allege that secular speakers regularly violate the Amplification Ordinance without any police intervention.  Plaintiffs instead include only conclusory allegations ... extrapolated from the two instances in which the Defendant Officers interacted with them.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants have selectively enforced the Amplification Ordinance....

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Amplification Ordinance burdens their religious exercise....  Plaintiffs instead contend that Defendants violated their First Amendment free exercise rights by burdening their religious beliefs via an unwritten policy and custom of targeting religious activity....

... Plaintiffs provide enough facts that Defendants’ unwritten policy targeting amplified religious speech imposes, at least plausibly, an unjustifiably substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion for the claim to move forward....

... Plaintiffs have not alleged any instances where police officers declined to cite or arrest any similarly situated secular individuals under similar conditions....  As such, Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory allegations fail to suggest that Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent and, consequently, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim...

Hospital Justified In Firing Nurse for Praying with Patients, Discussing Holocaust With Patient

In Sanders v. Kootenai Hospital District, (D ID, Feb. 20, 2026), an Idaho federal district court rejected various claims by Claudia Sanders, a nurse at a crisis center who was fired by her employer, a publicly operated hospital. Sanders duties included triaging patients. According to the court:

Sanders alleges two incidents in which she engaged in constitutionally protected speech or activity that were the cause of her termination. First, she maintains that on January 23, 2022, she “discussed the Holocaust in general terms” with a Jewish patient and provided the patient a copy of Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning, a book written by a psychiatrist who survived the Holocaust.... Second, she contends that she has previously prayed with patients who asked her to pray.

In rejecting Sanders' free speech claims, the court said in part:

The First Amendment does not protect speech made pursuant to a government employee’s official duties....

Sanders admitted that she prayed with patients under the belief that such conduct fell within her job responsibilities....

Sanders’ January 23 discussion on the Holocaust with a patient also was made pursuant to her official duties as a NICC triage nurse....  Because Sanders’ speech owes its existence to her position, she spoke as an employee—not as a citizen. Therefore, the Court concludes that Sanders did not engage in protected speech....

... It is not unreasonable for Kootenai to consider Sanders’ statements about the Holocaust, which implied that it either did not happen or that it was a good thing ...  disruptive to its ability to serve the community...

Kootenai was also justified in terminating Sanders for engaging in prayer with patients. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a compelling interest in avoiding the appearance of taking a position on questions of religious belief when the restriction applies to government employees engaging in religious speech while providing state-sponsored services.... 

... Sanders promoted religious messages while working with patients on Kootenai business, raising a legitimate Establishment Clause concern.....

The court also rejected Sanders' claims of wrongful termination, defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and tarnishing of her reputation.

City's Regulation of Donation Boxes Violates Christian Nonprofit's Free Speech Rights

In Arms of Hope v. City of Mansfield, Texas, (ND TX, Feb. 19, 2026), a Christian social service organization challenged the city's regulations on Unattended Donation Boxes (UDBs). The location and color requirements ban them from churches and schools and hide them from public view where they are allowed. A Texas federal district court held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulations under RLUIPA because it does not have a property interest in the sites where its Boxes are located. The court went on, however, to analyze plaintiff's 1st Amendment claims, holding that the regulations violate plaintiff's free speech rights, but not its free exercise rights. The court said in part:

Plaintiff first argues that Defendant has acted with animus toward Plaintiff.... The City’s actions, though concerning, do not appear to target Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s religious motivations....

When compared to non-religious UDBs, Plaintiff’s UDBs are treated identically. The Donation Box Law does not differentiate between those UDBs run by a religious organization and those run by a secular one. Accordingly, the Donation Box Law is a neutral law of general applicability and is facially constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause....

 Charitable solicitations are fully protected speech....

There is no evidence in the record before the Court that Defendant’s negative treatment of Plaintiff reflects a content preference nor the City’s disagreement with Plaintiff’s message.... Accordingly, the Court analyzes the Donation Box law under intermediate scrutiny....

... [W]hen asked “[i]s it that the City does not like the look of donation bins?,” the City’s representative responded, “No. We don’t like the accumulation of trash and debris or unmaintained areas.” The City reiterated that a clean, well-maintained donation box is “not an aesthetic harm”.... Because the City does not regard the medium of expression itself—UDBs—as the cause of visual blight, an outright ban on UDBs is not narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s interests.... 

Defendant fails to demonstrate how the Law’s permitting and maintenance requirements, which burden substantially less speech than the challenged provisions, would fail to achieve the government’s interests....

Given the City’s admission that it makes the “determination” as to color without providing a definite standard, the Court finds that the prohibition on “high-intensity colors” to be an unconstitutional prior restraint.

State's Criticism of Pregnancy Resource Centers Did Not Violate Clinics' Free Speech or Free Exercise

 In A Woman's Concern, Inc. v. Healey, (D MA, Feb. 17, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a religiously affiliated pregnancy resource center ("Your Options Medical Centers" (YOM)) that the state Department of Public Health violated plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights when it disseminated information critical of pregnancy resource centers. In its 59-page opinion, court said in part:

The amended complaint fails primarily because it does not plausibly suggest that Defendants have targeted YOM for actual or threatened enforcement action, let alone to stifle its protected speech or viewpoint.  First, YOM has not plausibly alleged any unconstitutional regulatory action.  YOM takes issue with a guidance letter sent by DPH to every licensed physician, physician assistant, nurse, pharmacist, pharmacy, hospital, and clinic in Massachusetts reminding them to abide by various healthcare regulations.  This guidance highlighted several medical standards and requirements, some of which apply to YOM and some that do not.  No reasonable person reading the guidance would have believed it selectively targets YOM or other PRCs for their views.  The guidance aimed at enforcing numerous, neutral state laws, none of which YOM challenges.  Similarly, broad, public-facing campaign statements criticizing the practices of PRCs generally as “dangerous” “public health threats” constitute permissible government expression, not unconstitutional threats of enforcement against YOM.... The amended complaint also alleges no facts to suggest that state officials wielded threats of enforcement action as a mechanism to suppress YOM’s speech, rather than to crack down on violations of state law. 

Second, Defendants focused the campaign not on the pro-life, religious views of PRCs, but rather on the quality of their medical services and advertising practices.  None of Defendants’ statements suggest any hostility to religion.  No allegations plausibly show that Defendants targeted their enforcement decisions based on the views or religion of YOM specifically or PRCs generally.  Thus, the amended complaint fails, including YOM’s request for “[a] permanent injunction ordering Defendants . . . [to] ceas[e] any advertising activity or campaign that falsely accuses YOM of misconduct or of being a threat to public health.”... 

Universal Hub reports on the decision. 

Child Evangelism Fellowship Sues School District Over Discriminatory Treatment

Suit was filed this week in an Illinois federal district court by Child Evangelism Fellowship alleging that fees charged to it for after-school use of school facilities and its exclusion from literature distribution forums and Backpack Nights forum violate its rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments as well as the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The complaint (full text) in Child Evangelism Fellowship of Illinois, Inc. v. Moline-Coal Valley Unified School District #40, (CD IL, filed 2/10/2026), alleges in part:

For more than five years, Defendants have categorized CEF as a “Category II” church and church-affiliated group, treating them differently than similarly situated nonreligious organizations. Defendants’ discriminatory policies target religious organizations like CEF’s Good News Club, compel them to pay discriminatory facility use fees, prevent them from distributing literature to students to take home to their parents, and bar them from Backpack Nights. In other words, Defendants have unconstitutionally relegated CEF to constitutional orphan status and discriminatory treatment in all forums available for similarly situated organizations in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution....

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Michigan Ban on Discrimination Because of Pregnancy Termination

Last week, two pro-life organizations filed suit in federal district court against Michigan officials challenging on 1st and 14th Amendment grounds 2023 amendments to state anti-discrimination laws that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of termination of pregnancy. The law already included a ban on discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth. The 82-page complaint (full text) in Right to Life of Michigan v. Nessel, (WD MI, filed 2/6/2026) alleges in part:

Recent changes to Michigan’s employment law force religious and pro-life groups to employ and associate with persons who do not share or live by—and may even oppose—the organizations’ beliefs on human life. This violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs Right to Life of Michigan (Right to Life) and Pregnancy Resource Center (PRC) recruit, hire, and retain only employees who adhere to, agree to abide by, and can effectively communicate their pro-life views. This employment policy puts them at odds with Michigan’s new law. Right to Life and PRC bring this suit to ensure they can continue to serve Michiganders without diluting their pro-life views through the lukewarm or hostile hires Michigan’s law demands....

The complaint alleges seven causes of action ranging from infringing free speech and free exercise rights to infringing the right to refrain from taking human life. Zeale reports on the lawsuit.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes Can Move Ahead Against School Officials on Two Counts

In Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. District of Columbia, (D DC, Feb. 3, 2026), the D.C. federal district court found that Fellowship of Christian Athletes' (FCA) claims against D.C. public schools and two school officials were not moot even though the school system revised its rules to allowed religious student organizations to give preference to members of the organization's religious affiliation. The school had originally revoked recognition of FCA because FCA required that students serving in a leadership capacity subscribe to a Statement of Faith and a policy of sexual purity. The court held that the individual defendants had qualified immunity as to FCA's various 1st Amendment claims, to their claims under RFRA, the Equal Access Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The court said, however:

Chancellor Ferebee and CIO Ruiz are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts VI and VII.  FCA alleges that the defendants selectively enforced DCPS’s Anti-Discrimination Policy on the basis of viewpoint (Count VI) and that enforcement of the policy against FCA violated FCA’s First Amendment right to expressive association (Count VII)....

In light of this Supreme Court and circuit case law, the Court concludes that the law was “sufficiently clear” that a “reasonable official” would have known that the challenged actions violated FCA’s First Amendment free speech and expressive association rights....

Supreme Court Review Sought by High School Pro-Life Group Over Free Speech Rights

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the U.S. Supreme Court in E.D. v. Noblesville School District, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 1/28/2026). At issue in the case is a high school's refusal to permit a student pro-life group to post flyers in the school because of the political content of the flyers. The dispute eventually led to the suspension of the pro-life group for several months. The 7th Circuit upheld the school's action. The petition for review filed with the Supreme Court sets out the Question Presented in part as follows:

The Seventh Circuit upheld the school’s censorship under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, ... on the theory that a “reasonable observer could easily conclude that the flyers reflected the school’s endorsement.”... In so doing, it exacerbated a deep, longstanding circuit split over when Hazelwood’s reduced speech protection applies. 

The question presented is: 

Whether Hazelwood applies (1) whenever student speech might be erroneously attributed to the school, as the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held; (2) when student speech occurs in the context of an “organized and structured educational activity,” as the Third Circuit has held; or (3) only when student speech is part of the “curriculum,” as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the cert. petition.

4th Circuit: School Gender Identity Guidelines Do Not Violate Teacher's 1st Amendment Rights

 In Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (4th Cir., Jan. 28, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed a Maryland federal district court's denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to the school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. The court rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, concluding that the Guidelines are neutral and generally applicable and that they satisfy the rational basis standard. The majority said in part:

... Polk believes that gender is rigid, based on her understanding of Christianity.  And referring to her students by a gender that is not consistent with the student’s gender assigned at birth places a requirement on Polk, that she says is at odds with her faith....

Distilled to its core, the thrust of Polk’s appellate position is that, because persons who hold religious views are those most impacted by the Guidelines, they cannot be deemed “neutral.” But that logic turns the well-established neutrality analysis on its head.  As the court explained, the Complaint “alleges no facts from which the Court could infer religious animus.” ...  That a certain religious practice is incidentally burdened by the Guidelines is not sufficient. Rather, the Guidelines must be motivated by religious hostility....

The majority also rejected plaintiff's free speech claim, saying in part:

 ... [W]e agree with the district court that the Guidelines’s mandate does not concern the speech of a private citizen, but establishes the official duties of a public-school teacher.  More pointedly, how a teacher addresses a particular student in a particular classroom — and whether a teacher communicates with a student’s parent — is merely a part of that teacher’s job description....

 ... And “[w]hen an employee engages in speech that is part of the employee’s job duties, the employee’s words are really the words of the employer.  The employee is effectively the employer’s spokesperson.” ...

Judge Wilkinson dissented, contending that the Guidelines violated plaintiff's free speech rights.  He said in part:

In holding instead that the Free Speech Clause does not provide even qualified protection to Ms. Polk’s speech, the majority leaves teachers completely vulnerable to becoming the unwilling mouthpieces of government messaging. Although transgender rights advocates may now cheer the majority opinion, they will find today’s cure in truth a poison when states enact legally indistinguishable policies preventing teachers from using preferred pronouns in schools. And because nothing prevents school systems from pushing this newfound control much further than mere pronoun usage, I respectfully dissent....

This case is, without question, about compelled speech—a detail to which the majority gives short shrift....

... My qualm with the majority is simply that we cannot categorically write all in-class speech out of the First Amendment. Garcetti has its place, but chiefly with regard to core curricular functions. Speech at the noncurricular margins of a teacher’s job should remain subject to the same standards that we have always applied. This is no jurisprudential revolution....

 Ms. Polk’s case is one of many plaguing our nation’s educational system. Across all levels of education—elementary to college—LGBT rights, DEI, antisemitism, systemic racism, and innumerable other issues have made our schools hotbeds of vehement sociopolitical debate. Silencing voices and compelling affirmations to government preferred messaging do nothing to temper the vitriol; on the contrary, such actions foster further hostility....

Florida Church Seeks Stay of Trial Court's Injunction Barring Use of Its Strip Mall Unit for Religious Services

Yesterday, a Florida church filed an emergency motion with a Florida state trial court asking it to stay a temporary injunction that it issued on January 23 while the church files an appeal. The emergency motion and the memorandum in support of it in Flagler Square-JAX, Inc. v. Palmer, (FL Cir. Ct., filed 1/26/2026) (full text) says in part:

The Order constitutes a prior restraint in speech, assembly, and religious exercise, prohibiting Defendant and Coastal Family Church from holding religious services. The Order has already prevented Defendant form hosting in-person religious services on Sunday, January 25, 2026. Each additional Sunday that passes inflicts continuing irreparable harm upon Defendant, the Church, and its congregants.

An October press release from Liberty Counsel provides background:

In July 2025, Pastor Roderick Palmer purchased a unit in the Flagler Square strip mall to serve as the home for Coastal Family Church. However, after the church began holding services, Flagler Square – JAX, Inc, the condominium association that oversees the mall’s four units, sued Pastor Palmer for holding “public assemblies” that allegedly violate a “condominium declaration” which prohibits such assemblies. In the complaint, the association claims the church’s services “would overwhelm available parking at all times” despite Sunday services leaving more than 160 parking spots available....

A January 26 Liberty Counsel press release summarizes the Church's arguments on appeal.

Anti-Abortion Sidewalk Counselor Loses Challenge to City's Sign Ordinance

In Hamann v. City of Carbondale, Illinois, (SD IL, Jan. 21, 2026), an Illinois federal district court refused to preliminarily enjoin the city of Carbondale's sign ordinance. The Ordinance prohibits plaintiff, a Christian minister, from temporarily placing his anti-abortion signs in the ground on public property near an abortion clinic while he is attempting to persuade women not to have an abortion. Under the Ordinance, he can carry or wear the signs but cannot place them into the ground. The court rejected plaintiff's claims that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and violates his free speech rights. It concluded that the Ordinance is a permissible time, place and manner regulation of speech in a public forum. The court went on in part:

Hamman’s final argument advances a theory of viewpoint discrimination based on the City’s “policy of inaction” towards signs that share messages other than his.... He submitted photos of three temporary signs he found throughout Carbondale which, he believes, were placed in the public right of way and not removed the way his were. From there, he contends that the City engaged in a “targeted campaign of enforcement” against his signs based on their anti-abortion messages....

Hamman acknowledges that he does not know how long these signs had been in the public right of way when he photographed them. This, then, leaves open the possibility that the City had not had time to remove them—something that, Lenzini explained, can happen from time to time. Surely, if these signs had been placed in the public right of way with the City’s permission, or been left there after the City became aware of them, such evidence would support Hamman’s claim of selective enforcement. But the record reveals no such evidence....