9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....

Street Preachers Can Move Ahead with Free Exercise Claims Against Police

In Raio v. City of Chicago, (ND IL, Feb. 24, 2026), two street preachers and a Gospel singer who had been cited and, on another occasion, arrested for violating Chicago's sound ordinance brought a civil rights action against the city. The three use a microphone connected to a battery-operated speaker for their preaching and music. Ruling on the city's motion to dismiss, the court said that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged First Amendment retaliation, free exercise, false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and IRFRA claims, but dismissed plaintiffs' vagueness, equal protection, and free speech claims. The court said inn part:

Plaintiffs allege that Chicago police officers “cite all street preachers, regardless of whether they meet the requirements of the [Amplification Ordinance] and regardless of the evidence,”... and “engag[e] in a targeted practice of enforcing their interpretation of the [Amplification Ordinance] against only religious speakers,”... Defendants argue that the Amplification Ordinance is instead a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation....

Plaintiffs have failed to allege a single instance in which they, or anyone similarly situated, used amplification to communicate a non-religious message without consequence.  Nor do they allege that secular speakers regularly violate the Amplification Ordinance without any police intervention.  Plaintiffs instead include only conclusory allegations ... extrapolated from the two instances in which the Defendant Officers interacted with them.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants have selectively enforced the Amplification Ordinance....

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Amplification Ordinance burdens their religious exercise....  Plaintiffs instead contend that Defendants violated their First Amendment free exercise rights by burdening their religious beliefs via an unwritten policy and custom of targeting religious activity....

... Plaintiffs provide enough facts that Defendants’ unwritten policy targeting amplified religious speech imposes, at least plausibly, an unjustifiably substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion for the claim to move forward....

... Plaintiffs have not alleged any instances where police officers declined to cite or arrest any similarly situated secular individuals under similar conditions....  As such, Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory allegations fail to suggest that Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent and, consequently, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim...

Hospital Justified In Firing Nurse for Praying with Patients, Discussing Holocaust With Patient

In Sanders v. Kootenai Hospital District, (D ID, Feb. 20, 2026), an Idaho federal district court rejected various claims by Claudia Sanders, a nurse at a crisis center who was fired by her employer, a publicly operated hospital. Sanders duties included triaging patients. According to the court:

Sanders alleges two incidents in which she engaged in constitutionally protected speech or activity that were the cause of her termination. First, she maintains that on January 23, 2022, she “discussed the Holocaust in general terms” with a Jewish patient and provided the patient a copy of Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning, a book written by a psychiatrist who survived the Holocaust.... Second, she contends that she has previously prayed with patients who asked her to pray.

In rejecting Sanders' free speech claims, the court said in part:

The First Amendment does not protect speech made pursuant to a government employee’s official duties....

Sanders admitted that she prayed with patients under the belief that such conduct fell within her job responsibilities....

Sanders’ January 23 discussion on the Holocaust with a patient also was made pursuant to her official duties as a NICC triage nurse....  Because Sanders’ speech owes its existence to her position, she spoke as an employee—not as a citizen. Therefore, the Court concludes that Sanders did not engage in protected speech....

... It is not unreasonable for Kootenai to consider Sanders’ statements about the Holocaust, which implied that it either did not happen or that it was a good thing ...  disruptive to its ability to serve the community...

Kootenai was also justified in terminating Sanders for engaging in prayer with patients. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a compelling interest in avoiding the appearance of taking a position on questions of religious belief when the restriction applies to government employees engaging in religious speech while providing state-sponsored services.... 

... Sanders promoted religious messages while working with patients on Kootenai business, raising a legitimate Establishment Clause concern.....

The court also rejected Sanders' claims of wrongful termination, defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and tarnishing of her reputation.

City's Regulation of Donation Boxes Violates Christian Nonprofit's Free Speech Rights

In Arms of Hope v. City of Mansfield, Texas, (ND TX, Feb. 19, 2026), a Christian social service organization challenged the city's regulations on Unattended Donation Boxes (UDBs). The location and color requirements ban them from churches and schools and hide them from public view where they are allowed. A Texas federal district court held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulations under RLUIPA because it does not have a property interest in the sites where its Boxes are located. The court went on, however, to analyze plaintiff's 1st Amendment claims, holding that the regulations violate plaintiff's free speech rights, but not its free exercise rights. The court said in part:

Plaintiff first argues that Defendant has acted with animus toward Plaintiff.... The City’s actions, though concerning, do not appear to target Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s religious motivations....

When compared to non-religious UDBs, Plaintiff’s UDBs are treated identically. The Donation Box Law does not differentiate between those UDBs run by a religious organization and those run by a secular one. Accordingly, the Donation Box Law is a neutral law of general applicability and is facially constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause....

 Charitable solicitations are fully protected speech....

There is no evidence in the record before the Court that Defendant’s negative treatment of Plaintiff reflects a content preference nor the City’s disagreement with Plaintiff’s message.... Accordingly, the Court analyzes the Donation Box law under intermediate scrutiny....

... [W]hen asked “[i]s it that the City does not like the look of donation bins?,” the City’s representative responded, “No. We don’t like the accumulation of trash and debris or unmaintained areas.” The City reiterated that a clean, well-maintained donation box is “not an aesthetic harm”.... Because the City does not regard the medium of expression itself—UDBs—as the cause of visual blight, an outright ban on UDBs is not narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s interests.... 

Defendant fails to demonstrate how the Law’s permitting and maintenance requirements, which burden substantially less speech than the challenged provisions, would fail to achieve the government’s interests....

Given the City’s admission that it makes the “determination” as to color without providing a definite standard, the Court finds that the prohibition on “high-intensity colors” to be an unconstitutional prior restraint.

State's Criticism of Pregnancy Resource Centers Did Not Violate Clinics' Free Speech or Free Exercise

 In A Woman's Concern, Inc. v. Healey, (D MA, Feb. 17, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a religiously affiliated pregnancy resource center ("Your Options Medical Centers" (YOM)) that the state Department of Public Health violated plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights when it disseminated information critical of pregnancy resource centers. In its 59-page opinion, court said in part:

The amended complaint fails primarily because it does not plausibly suggest that Defendants have targeted YOM for actual or threatened enforcement action, let alone to stifle its protected speech or viewpoint.  First, YOM has not plausibly alleged any unconstitutional regulatory action.  YOM takes issue with a guidance letter sent by DPH to every licensed physician, physician assistant, nurse, pharmacist, pharmacy, hospital, and clinic in Massachusetts reminding them to abide by various healthcare regulations.  This guidance highlighted several medical standards and requirements, some of which apply to YOM and some that do not.  No reasonable person reading the guidance would have believed it selectively targets YOM or other PRCs for their views.  The guidance aimed at enforcing numerous, neutral state laws, none of which YOM challenges.  Similarly, broad, public-facing campaign statements criticizing the practices of PRCs generally as “dangerous” “public health threats” constitute permissible government expression, not unconstitutional threats of enforcement against YOM.... The amended complaint also alleges no facts to suggest that state officials wielded threats of enforcement action as a mechanism to suppress YOM’s speech, rather than to crack down on violations of state law. 

Second, Defendants focused the campaign not on the pro-life, religious views of PRCs, but rather on the quality of their medical services and advertising practices.  None of Defendants’ statements suggest any hostility to religion.  No allegations plausibly show that Defendants targeted their enforcement decisions based on the views or religion of YOM specifically or PRCs generally.  Thus, the amended complaint fails, including YOM’s request for “[a] permanent injunction ordering Defendants . . . [to] ceas[e] any advertising activity or campaign that falsely accuses YOM of misconduct or of being a threat to public health.”... 

Universal Hub reports on the decision. 

Child Evangelism Fellowship Sues School District Over Discriminatory Treatment

Suit was filed this week in an Illinois federal district court by Child Evangelism Fellowship alleging that fees charged to it for after-school use of school facilities and its exclusion from literature distribution forums and Backpack Nights forum violate its rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments as well as the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The complaint (full text) in Child Evangelism Fellowship of Illinois, Inc. v. Moline-Coal Valley Unified School District #40, (CD IL, filed 2/10/2026), alleges in part:

For more than five years, Defendants have categorized CEF as a “Category II” church and church-affiliated group, treating them differently than similarly situated nonreligious organizations. Defendants’ discriminatory policies target religious organizations like CEF’s Good News Club, compel them to pay discriminatory facility use fees, prevent them from distributing literature to students to take home to their parents, and bar them from Backpack Nights. In other words, Defendants have unconstitutionally relegated CEF to constitutional orphan status and discriminatory treatment in all forums available for similarly situated organizations in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution....

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Michigan Ban on Discrimination Because of Pregnancy Termination

Last week, two pro-life organizations filed suit in federal district court against Michigan officials challenging on 1st and 14th Amendment grounds 2023 amendments to state anti-discrimination laws that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of termination of pregnancy. The law already included a ban on discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth. The 82-page complaint (full text) in Right to Life of Michigan v. Nessel, (WD MI, filed 2/6/2026) alleges in part:

Recent changes to Michigan’s employment law force religious and pro-life groups to employ and associate with persons who do not share or live by—and may even oppose—the organizations’ beliefs on human life. This violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs Right to Life of Michigan (Right to Life) and Pregnancy Resource Center (PRC) recruit, hire, and retain only employees who adhere to, agree to abide by, and can effectively communicate their pro-life views. This employment policy puts them at odds with Michigan’s new law. Right to Life and PRC bring this suit to ensure they can continue to serve Michiganders without diluting their pro-life views through the lukewarm or hostile hires Michigan’s law demands....

The complaint alleges seven causes of action ranging from infringing free speech and free exercise rights to infringing the right to refrain from taking human life. Zeale reports on the lawsuit.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes Can Move Ahead Against School Officials on Two Counts

In Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. District of Columbia, (D DC, Feb. 3, 2026), the D.C. federal district court found that Fellowship of Christian Athletes' (FCA) claims against D.C. public schools and two school officials were not moot even though the school system revised its rules to allowed religious student organizations to give preference to members of the organization's religious affiliation. The school had originally revoked recognition of FCA because FCA required that students serving in a leadership capacity subscribe to a Statement of Faith and a policy of sexual purity. The court held that the individual defendants had qualified immunity as to FCA's various 1st Amendment claims, to their claims under RFRA, the Equal Access Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The court said, however:

Chancellor Ferebee and CIO Ruiz are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts VI and VII.  FCA alleges that the defendants selectively enforced DCPS’s Anti-Discrimination Policy on the basis of viewpoint (Count VI) and that enforcement of the policy against FCA violated FCA’s First Amendment right to expressive association (Count VII)....

In light of this Supreme Court and circuit case law, the Court concludes that the law was “sufficiently clear” that a “reasonable official” would have known that the challenged actions violated FCA’s First Amendment free speech and expressive association rights....

Supreme Court Review Sought by High School Pro-Life Group Over Free Speech Rights

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the U.S. Supreme Court in E.D. v. Noblesville School District, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 1/28/2026). At issue in the case is a high school's refusal to permit a student pro-life group to post flyers in the school because of the political content of the flyers. The dispute eventually led to the suspension of the pro-life group for several months. The 7th Circuit upheld the school's action. The petition for review filed with the Supreme Court sets out the Question Presented in part as follows:

The Seventh Circuit upheld the school’s censorship under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, ... on the theory that a “reasonable observer could easily conclude that the flyers reflected the school’s endorsement.”... In so doing, it exacerbated a deep, longstanding circuit split over when Hazelwood’s reduced speech protection applies. 

The question presented is: 

Whether Hazelwood applies (1) whenever student speech might be erroneously attributed to the school, as the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held; (2) when student speech occurs in the context of an “organized and structured educational activity,” as the Third Circuit has held; or (3) only when student speech is part of the “curriculum,” as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the cert. petition.

4th Circuit: School Gender Identity Guidelines Do Not Violate Teacher's 1st Amendment Rights

 In Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (4th Cir., Jan. 28, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed a Maryland federal district court's denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to the school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. The court rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, concluding that the Guidelines are neutral and generally applicable and that they satisfy the rational basis standard. The majority said in part:

... Polk believes that gender is rigid, based on her understanding of Christianity.  And referring to her students by a gender that is not consistent with the student’s gender assigned at birth places a requirement on Polk, that she says is at odds with her faith....

Distilled to its core, the thrust of Polk’s appellate position is that, because persons who hold religious views are those most impacted by the Guidelines, they cannot be deemed “neutral.” But that logic turns the well-established neutrality analysis on its head.  As the court explained, the Complaint “alleges no facts from which the Court could infer religious animus.” ...  That a certain religious practice is incidentally burdened by the Guidelines is not sufficient. Rather, the Guidelines must be motivated by religious hostility....

The majority also rejected plaintiff's free speech claim, saying in part:

 ... [W]e agree with the district court that the Guidelines’s mandate does not concern the speech of a private citizen, but establishes the official duties of a public-school teacher.  More pointedly, how a teacher addresses a particular student in a particular classroom — and whether a teacher communicates with a student’s parent — is merely a part of that teacher’s job description....

 ... And “[w]hen an employee engages in speech that is part of the employee’s job duties, the employee’s words are really the words of the employer.  The employee is effectively the employer’s spokesperson.” ...

Judge Wilkinson dissented, contending that the Guidelines violated plaintiff's free speech rights.  He said in part:

In holding instead that the Free Speech Clause does not provide even qualified protection to Ms. Polk’s speech, the majority leaves teachers completely vulnerable to becoming the unwilling mouthpieces of government messaging. Although transgender rights advocates may now cheer the majority opinion, they will find today’s cure in truth a poison when states enact legally indistinguishable policies preventing teachers from using preferred pronouns in schools. And because nothing prevents school systems from pushing this newfound control much further than mere pronoun usage, I respectfully dissent....

This case is, without question, about compelled speech—a detail to which the majority gives short shrift....

... My qualm with the majority is simply that we cannot categorically write all in-class speech out of the First Amendment. Garcetti has its place, but chiefly with regard to core curricular functions. Speech at the noncurricular margins of a teacher’s job should remain subject to the same standards that we have always applied. This is no jurisprudential revolution....

 Ms. Polk’s case is one of many plaguing our nation’s educational system. Across all levels of education—elementary to college—LGBT rights, DEI, antisemitism, systemic racism, and innumerable other issues have made our schools hotbeds of vehement sociopolitical debate. Silencing voices and compelling affirmations to government preferred messaging do nothing to temper the vitriol; on the contrary, such actions foster further hostility....

Florida Church Seeks Stay of Trial Court's Injunction Barring Use of Its Strip Mall Unit for Religious Services

Yesterday, a Florida church filed an emergency motion with a Florida state trial court asking it to stay a temporary injunction that it issued on January 23 while the church files an appeal. The emergency motion and the memorandum in support of it in Flagler Square-JAX, Inc. v. Palmer, (FL Cir. Ct., filed 1/26/2026) (full text) says in part:

The Order constitutes a prior restraint in speech, assembly, and religious exercise, prohibiting Defendant and Coastal Family Church from holding religious services. The Order has already prevented Defendant form hosting in-person religious services on Sunday, January 25, 2026. Each additional Sunday that passes inflicts continuing irreparable harm upon Defendant, the Church, and its congregants.

An October press release from Liberty Counsel provides background:

In July 2025, Pastor Roderick Palmer purchased a unit in the Flagler Square strip mall to serve as the home for Coastal Family Church. However, after the church began holding services, Flagler Square – JAX, Inc, the condominium association that oversees the mall’s four units, sued Pastor Palmer for holding “public assemblies” that allegedly violate a “condominium declaration” which prohibits such assemblies. In the complaint, the association claims the church’s services “would overwhelm available parking at all times” despite Sunday services leaving more than 160 parking spots available....

A January 26 Liberty Counsel press release summarizes the Church's arguments on appeal.

Anti-Abortion Sidewalk Counselor Loses Challenge to City's Sign Ordinance

In Hamann v. City of Carbondale, Illinois, (SD IL, Jan. 21, 2026), an Illinois federal district court refused to preliminarily enjoin the city of Carbondale's sign ordinance. The Ordinance prohibits plaintiff, a Christian minister, from temporarily placing his anti-abortion signs in the ground on public property near an abortion clinic while he is attempting to persuade women not to have an abortion. Under the Ordinance, he can carry or wear the signs but cannot place them into the ground. The court rejected plaintiff's claims that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and violates his free speech rights. It concluded that the Ordinance is a permissible time, place and manner regulation of speech in a public forum. The court went on in part:

Hamman’s final argument advances a theory of viewpoint discrimination based on the City’s “policy of inaction” towards signs that share messages other than his.... He submitted photos of three temporary signs he found throughout Carbondale which, he believes, were placed in the public right of way and not removed the way his were. From there, he contends that the City engaged in a “targeted campaign of enforcement” against his signs based on their anti-abortion messages....

Hamman acknowledges that he does not know how long these signs had been in the public right of way when he photographed them. This, then, leaves open the possibility that the City had not had time to remove them—something that, Lenzini explained, can happen from time to time. Surely, if these signs had been placed in the public right of way with the City’s permission, or been left there after the City became aware of them, such evidence would support Hamman’s claim of selective enforcement. But the record reveals no such evidence....

Street Preachers' Challenges to Noise Ordinance Fail

 In Cabral v. City of Fort Myers, Florida, (MD FL, Jan. 6,2026), a Florida federal district court dismissed a First Amendment challenge to Fort Myers' Noise Ordinance brought by three Christian street preachers. The challengers were cited for violating the Ordinance's ban on drivers, passengers or pedestrians producing amplified sound that can be heard over 25 feet away. The court rejected plaintiffs' facial and their as-applied challenge to the Ordinance, saying in part:

You don’t get to strike down a city’s noise-control policy just because it might catch a few conversational speakers in its net; you have to show that the net is designed so poorly that it catches a substantial amount of protected speech....

An as-applied challenge against the City ... requires a showing that the City itself—not just an officer with a badge and a misunderstanding of the word “pedestrian”—has a policy of targeting speech it doesn’t like. But Plaintiffs don’t seem to make such a claim. Instead, they allege the Ordinance was inapplicable to them. Even if true, such facts don’t alone trigger the First Amendment....

Though styled as an as-applied challenge under the First Amendment, Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim reads as a Fourteenth Amendment selective enforcement claim....

Plaintiffs claim that the Ordinance was enforced against them while other individuals were making amplified noise audible from 25 feet away.... But Plaintiffs don’t allege that these other individuals weren’t also cited for violating the Ordinance. Nor are these other individuals alleged to have been producing sound on public property. Without those specific facts, the allegation of targeting is just a hunch, not a plausible legal claim.

California's Law Combatting Antisemitism In Public Schools Survives Constitutional Challenge

In Prichett v. Bonta, (ND CA, Dec. 31, 2026), a California federal district court refused to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of California AB 715 which is directed at preventing antisemitism in the curriculum of public schools. Among other things, the new law provides that the Biden Administration's National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism should be a basis to inform schools on how to identify, respond to, prevent, and counter antisemitism. Plaintiffs are California teachers and students who allege that AB 715 violates their free speech rights and is overbroad and void for vagueness. The court said in part:

Teacher Plaintiffs worry that AB 715 exposes them “to charges of unlawful discrimination and corresponding discipline if they convey ideas, information, and instructional materials to their students that may be considered critical of the State of Israel and the philosophy of Zionism—thus, creating a chilling effect and infringing on the First Amendment rights of both the teacher and student.” ...Student Plaintiffs allege ...that AB 715 undermines their “rights to receive information” related to “Palestinian and Arab culture” because teachers will be forced to self-censor to remain within the confines of AB 715....

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that the uncertainty created by AB 715’s inexact definition of antisemitism casts an unconstitutional pall over the entire bill....

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the California legislature’s references in AB 715 to the Biden National Strategy ... were unconstitutional. However, even if Plaintiffs had proved that those two references were unconstitutional, the Court could, and would, properly sever those two references from the remainder of AB 715....

While Teacher Plaintiffs’ claims pass the standing hurdle, those claims are not currently ripe for adjudication....

As public-school education belongs to the government, the government may regulate Teacher Plaintiffs’ speech to accord with the government’s educational goals. It is of no significance that the curricula and the attendant speech required to teach it may advance a single viewpoint to the exclusion of another....

The Court does not find the word antisemitism in AB 715 to be vague....  A reasonable person reading AB 715 would sufficiently understand what the legislature meant by the word “antisemitism.”...

The Forward reports on the decision.

California Policy Barring School's Disclosure of Student's Change in Gender Expression Is Unconstitutional

In Mirabelli v. Olson, (SD CA, Dec. 22, 2025), a California federal district court held unconstitutional the policy of California school boards that bars public school teachers and staff from informing parents about changes in a child’s gender expression unless the child consents. The court concluded:

[The policies] harm the parents by depriving them of the long-recognized Fourteenth Amendment right to care, guide, and make health care decisions for their children, and by substantially burdening many parents’ First Amendment right to train their children in their sincerely held religious beliefs.  And finally, they harm teachers who are compelled to violate the sincerely held beliefs and the parent’s rights by forcing them to conceal information they feel is critical for the welfare of their students.

Justifying its conclusion, the court said: 

The constitutional question is about when gender incongruence is observed, whether parents have a right to be informed and make the decision about whether further professional investigation or therapy is needed.  Put another way, the question is whether being involved in potentially serious medical or psychological decision-making for their school student is a parent’s constitutional right. It is. "Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state...."

The State Defendants argue... that a parent “does not possess a religious exercise right to dictate that a school reject their child’s gender identity.”...  Nevertheless, this Court disagrees....

Defendants concede that parents “may find notification that their child is expressing a transgender identity at school helpful in the general exercise of their right to direct a religious upbringing for that child.” ... So, the State Defendants are aware that notification would be helpful to religious parents, but provide no room for those parents to exercise those federal constitutional rights.... [T]he California state education parental exclusion policies provide no exceptions for religious parents....

The four teacher Plaintiffs and class representatives sincerely hold religious beliefs that that are being severely burdened by the imposition of the parental exclusion policies....

The teachers successfully make out a First Amendment freedom of speech claim when they are compelled to speak in violation of the law or to deliberately convey an illegal message....

Daily Wire reports on the decision.

5th Circuit 10-7 Denies En Banc Review in Case of Leafleting by Christian Vegetarian Advocate

By a 10-7 vote, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition for an en banc rehearing in Hershey v. City of Bossier City, (5th Cir., Dec. 18, 2025). In the case, a 3-judge panel in a splintered decision reversed a Louisiana federal district court's dismissal of a suit against the city by plaintiff who was passing out booklets for the Christian Vegetarian Association outside a concert arena in which a Christian rock concert was taking place. (See prior posting.)  Judge Ho filed an opinion concurring in the denial of an en banc rehearing, saying in part:

... As I noted at the outset, the First Amendment violation presented here should be obvious.  Of course people have the right to spread the gospel in public spaces.  Yet our colleagues deny that this case presents a legitimate religious liberty issue. Richard Hershey claims the right to share religious materials in public spaces.  But our colleagues deny that his claim has anything to do with religious liberty....

Judge Oldham, joined by 6 other judges, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of an en banc rehearing, saying in part:

Richard Hershey is a “vegetarian advocate whose ethical beliefs compel him to share his message with others.”... When security officers told Hershey to stop distributing his leaflets, he sued for “deprivation of his rights of speech.”... Hershey does not allege that the officers even knew of the content of his vegetarianism leaflets—let alone targeted him for his vegetarian views.... Nor does Hershey allege anything about his religion. You’ll look in vain for any mention in Hershey’s complaint about faith, religiosity, the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, or evangelism.... 

But you would not know that from the opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc. In that opinion, this case about vegetarian ethics somehow transforms into a battle over street preaching, the Great Commission, hatred of Christians, and religious persecution dating back “thousands of years.”...This quixotic effort does nothing to justify the panel’s badly splintered, three-judge-four-opinion approach to this case. And while it tilts at windmills that appear nowhere in this case, it does nothing to justify our court’s refusal to reconsider the matter en banc....

6th Circuit: Michigan's Ban on Conversion Therapy for Minors Violates 1st Amendment

In Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee, and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, (6th Cir., Dec. 17, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Michigan's ban on licensed therapists engaging in conversion therapy with minors violates the 1st Amendment's free speech protections.  The court said in part:

 “As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”...  The law at issue here does that:  it bans counseling “that seeks to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity, including, but not limited to, efforts to change behavior or gender expression[,]” among other things.  M.C.L. § 330.1100a(20).

Worse, the Michigan law discriminates based on viewpoint... Specifically, the Michigan law forbids counseling that “seeks to change” a child’s “sexual orientation or gender identity” to align with the child’s religious beliefs or biological sex....  But the law expressly permits “counseling that provides assistance to an individual undergoing a gender transition”.... The law omits a similar carveout for sexual orientation.  Thus, ...the Michigan law codifies “a particular viewpoint—sexual orientation is immutable, but gender is not—and prohibit[s] the therapists from advancing any other perspective.” ...

So HB 4616 finds itself in a constitutional no-man’s land, absent some exception that liberates it from First Amendment scrutiny altogether.  The district court thought that exception came by way of “the broad power of States to regulate the practice of licensed professionals[.]” ...

But it takes more than a general tradition of regulation, in some domain of human activity, to validate content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech....

For HB 4616 to survive strict scrutiny, the defendants must show that its restrictions on speech are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest....  The defendants have not come close to making that showing; indeed they have hardly tried....

Judge Bloomekatz filed a lengthy dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The majority opinion overrides Michigan’s judgment about the efficacy and harms of conversion therapy by declaring that regulations of medical treatments are subject to “the strictest of scrutiny” whenever the regulated treatment is delivered via words....  The majority opinion reaches that result by saying that psychotherapy consists of “spoken words and nothing more,” and then affords it the same protection as speech in the public square or a conversation between friends....  I disagree.  

Not all words receive the same First Amendment protection, as is evident from the law’s long tradition of subjecting speech that administers a medical treatment to lesser First Amendment scrutiny.  Far from being “words and nothing more,” psychotherapy is an evidence-based medical intervention provided by trained licensed professionals, and it falls within the state’s historic power to regulate medicine.  By affording the words therapists say while providing psychotherapy the highest constitutional protection possible, the majority opinion ties states’ hands as to medically-repudiated practices like conversion therapy, and its reasoning threatens to subject wide swaths of medical regulations to strict scrutiny. 

What’s more, the majority opinion reaches this result even though all agree that the Supreme Court is poised to resolve the same issue in Chiles v. Salazar.... 

AP reports on the decision.

CAIR Sues Florida Over Terrorism Designation

As previously reported, earlier this month Florida Governor Ron DeSantis issued an Executive Order designating CAIR (the Council on American-Islamic Relations), as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, as terrorist organizations under state law. Now CAIR has filed suit in a Florida federal district court challenging the consitutionality of the Governor's action. The complaint (full text) in CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, (ND FL, filed 12/15/2025), alleges in part:

By issuing this order, Defendant DeSantis has violated the U.S. and Florida Constitutions, as well as federal and state laws. He has usurped the exclusive authority of the federal government to identify and designate terrorist organizations by baselessly declaring CAIR a terrorist organization. He has violated the Constitution’s guarantee of due process by unilaterally declaring CAIR a terrorist organization and then ordering immediate punitive, discriminatory action against CAIR and its supporters....

The designation in the Executive Order imposes burdens on Plaintiffs’ speech and expressive activities by attaching an unauthorized terrorism designation, directing law enforcement agencies to “undertake all lawful measures” pursuant to that designation, and altering Plaintiffs’ legal status with respect to the State in a manner that chills and burdens protected expression. Such burdens are unconstitutional viewpoint-based penalties.....

CAIR issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges High School's Ban on Religious and Political Messages on Its Spirit Rock

A suit was filed this week in a North Carolina federal district court by a high school student whose patriotic and religious tribute to the late Charlie Kirk painted on her high school's Spirit Rock led to controversy and revision of school rules. The 66-page complaint (full text) in G.S. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, (WD NC, filed 12/8/2025), reads in part:

3. In a desire to emulate Charlie Kirk’s boldness for his faith, G.S. wanted to remind her classmates, friends, and others in the Ardrey Kell High School community that Charlie Kirk had received and was enjoying eternal life with his Savior, Jesus Christ, and to create a space where students could memorialize him. 

4. After receiving permission from school officials to paint the Ardrey Kell High School spirit rock with a patriotic message related to Charlie Kirk, that’s exactly what G.S. and two friends did. They painted the spirit rock with a heart, a United States flag, the message “Freedom 1776,” and a tribute to Charlie Kirk: “Live Like Kirk—John 11:25.” Then they placed flowers in a vase at the base of the spirit rock....

John 11:25 reads: "Jesus said to her, 'I am the resurrection and the life. The one who believes in me will live, even though they die'."

School authorities quickly painted over the tribute and promulgated a Revised Spirit Rock Speech Code which barred students from expressing “political” or “religious messages” on the spirit rock. According to the complaint, authorities also investigated her for a few days for vandalism. 

The complaint, among other things seeks:

A declaratory judgment that Defendant’s Unwritten Spirit Rock Speech Code, Vandalism Policy, and Revised Spirit Rock Speech Code, and the unconstitutional actions against G.S. pursuant to it—including censoring her speech, publicly accusing her of misconduct, searching her cell phone, refusing to clear her name, and adopting a new viewpoint-based policy—violated her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments....

In detailing her claims, plaintiff alleged in part:

458. G.S.’s views and expression on the Ardrey Kell High School spirit rock were motivated by her sincerely held religious beliefs, are avenues through which she expressed her religious faith, and constitute a central component of her sincerely held religious beliefs.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

11th Circuit: Pedestrian Buffer Zone at Abortion Clinic's Parking Lot Entrance Violates Leafleters Free Speech Rights

In Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida, (11th Cir., Dec. 4. 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a preliminary injunction should issue barring enforcement of a ban on pedestrians in the sidewalk crossing the 28 foot wide entrance to a local abortion clinic's parking lot, and for 5 feet of sidewalk on either side of the driveway. The majority said in part:

Florida Preborn has provided “uncontradicted testimony” that the buffer zone has effectively stifled sidewalk counselors’ ability to distribute literature to patients entering and exiting the clinic.  ...

Separately, it remains the case that, by its terms, the Ordinance forbids a clinic patient who has parked her car to approach sidewalk counselors to receive a leaflet....

We think it clear that the Ordinance burdens substantially more speech—namely, the sidewalk counselors’ leafletting activities—than is necessary to achieve the government’s asserted interest in promoting vehicular safety....  

Dispositively here, the city failed to adequately consider alternative measures....

Judge Abudu dissented, saying in part:

The record shows that counselors wait in brightly colored vests at the edge of the driveway, offering materials to patients driving into the clinic.  If the patients desire, they can stop, roll down their window, and engage with the leafleteers.  However, many choose not to do so. Thus, when balancing FPR’s right to communicate its message against the rights of patients and others not to engage, it is clear that there is no substantial burden on FPR’s ability to leaflet.    

Moreover, the fact that FPR has alternative channels of communication available further demonstrates why the Ordinance is constitutional.  As the district court found, the remaining portions of the driveway and adjacent sidewalk area are still available....

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the decision.