5th Circuit: Section 1981 Does Not Bar Purely Religious Discrimination Against Jews

In Domanic v. Christian Brothers Automative Corporation, (5th Cir., Sept. 30, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Texas religion-based franchisor of auto-repair stores did not violate 42 USC §1981 by requiring that its franchisees be professing Christians. Christian Brothers described its mission as one to "glorify God by providing ethical and excellent services to its customers." The court said in part:

All of [Christian Brothers] more than 250 franchisees—a group which includes some ethnic Jews—are professing Christians. When the company refused to franchise to Evan Domanic, who is an ethnic and religious Jew, Domanic sued for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981. The district court granted Christian Brothers summary judgment, ruling that its franchise policy constituted not racial but religious discrimination, which is not cognizable under § 1981. 

On appeal, Domanic’s main argument is that discrimination against Jews is ipso facto racial discrimination, even when (as here) the differential treatment is motivated purely by religion and not ancestry. We decline to adopt this novel argument, which is in tension with the Supreme Court’s longstanding precedent that § 1981 does not reach religious discrimination.... [T]he Seventh Circuit ... has twice rejected similar contentions about the indivisibility of Jewish ethnicity and faith under § 1981. 

... [N]o evidence suggests that Christian Brothers’s franchise policy is a façade for ethnic discrimination against Jews....

Judge Oldham filed an opinion concurring in the result, saying in part:

...   In an appropriate case, our en banc court should reconsider our use of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment generally and in § 1981 cases specifically.

Heartlander News reports on the decision.

Backers of Hasidic School May Move Ahead with Challenges to Zoning Denials

Congregation Rabbinical Institute of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, NY, (SD NY, Sept.28, 2026), is the latest decision in a long-running attempt by members of the Hasidic Jewish community to build a rabbinical institute in Pamona, New York, that will provide facilities to train rabbinical judges and will include housing for its students and their families.  In an 80-page opinion, a New York federal district court allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with their as-applied federal and state equal protection, free exercise, freedom of speech and association, Fair Housing Act and RLUIPA claims. At issue are plaintiff's compliance with two local laws--one allowing only accredited educational institutions to be constructed in the village, and the second placing a number of restrictions on design of dormitories.

The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants enforced the Challenged Laws with discriminatory intent.

  ... [T]he New York State Education Department no longer provides institutional accreditation....  

Plaintiffs further allege that Tartikov explained to the ZBA that it cannot obtain accreditation through private means because AARTS requires a rabbinical institute to be operational before it can obtain accreditation, leaving Tartikov unable to obtain accreditation without first operating and unable to operate in the Village without first obtaining accreditation....  Rather than address this alleged “Catch-22,” the ZBA chairperson suggested that Tartikov rent a facility outside the Village, operate there until it obtained accreditation, and then return to the Village....  

The ZBA subsequently denied Tartikov’s variance application because Tartikov had not sufficiently established that it could not become accredited.... It did so despite the Rockland County Department of Planning’s conclusion that lack of accreditation, standing alone, presented no significant land-use impacts....

Thus, despite Tartikov’s repeated efforts to obtain permission for student-family housing, Defendants effectively conditioned consideration of that request on Tartikov first overcoming the Accreditation Law—the same requirement that Plaintiffs allege Tartikov cannot satisfy without first operating its rabbinical institute....  These procedural irregularities and alleged delays further support an inference that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent....

At this early stage, Plaintiffs’ allegations of repeated procedural irregularities, the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws, and alleged anti-Hasidic animus among Village officials and community members plausibly support an inference that Defendants applied the Challenged Laws in a discriminatory manner. ...

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise. 

... Plaintiffs allege that the Institute requires a Torah community, which in turn requires prospective students to reside with their families....  Yet the Dormitory Law prohibits the very housing necessary to accommodate Tartikov’s Torah community by excluding single-family, two-family, and multifamily dwelling units from the definition of a dormitory and prohibiting separate cooking, dining, or housekeeping facilities.... These allegations plausibly establish more than a “minimal impact on religious exercise”.... 

These allegations plausibly allege that the Institute would foster protected expression and that Defendants burdened that expression through their application of the Accreditation Law....

Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that the Accreditation Law burdens their ability to associate for the purpose of engaging in that protected activity...

Although Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of demonstrating that the Dormitory Law has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on Hasidic Jews, they need not make that evidentiary showing at this stage in the litigation....

Church Autonomy Doctrine Is Not Broader Than Ministerial Exception in Title VII Cases

In Ference v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg, (WD PA, Sept. 30, 2026), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII suit brought by a secular teacher at a Catholic school who was fired from his position because he was in a same-sex marriage. The school claimed that the exception in Title VII for religion-based hiring by religious institutions protected it from Title VII liability. The court said in part:

Was Mr. Ference’s firing permissible religious discrimination, or prohibited sex discrimination?...

The central question is how expansive Congress intended the religious exemptions to be....

... [T]he Court now turns to whether application of Title VII in this case raises serious constitutional questions.  The Court concludes that it does.  More precisely, it raises a single serious question: whether religious employers are subject to employment discrimination laws that “directly conflict” with their religious doctrine.... Mr. Ference’s claim implies that Title VII prohibits Aquinas Academy’s “right to implement Catholic teachings on marriage.”...

... [T]he Court finds that Congress clearly intended for Title VII’s religious exemptions not to apply to religiously motivated sex discrimination.  The Court therefore concludes that the exemptions don’t apply to Mr. Ference’s firing.  But that doesn’t mean religious employers will always face liability in such cases; the First Amendment provides them with its own robust protections....

... [T]he church autonomy doctrine does not protect employees who are not “ministerial” under the exception.  An employee cannot be non-ministerial for purposes of the exception but still occupy a role “important” enough to trigger the church autonomy doctrine....

Outside the possible applicability of the ministerial exception, the only burden on Aquinas’s religious autonomy in this case stems from Title VII’s direct conflict with the school’s ability to implement Catholic views on marriage.  And that burden is not heavy enough to trigger the church autonomy doctrine.  Holding otherwise would effectively give religious employers constitutional carte blanche to discriminate on any basis—not just sex—in the name of religious autonomy, so long as their beliefs require such discrimination.  The Court declines to take such a radical step.

Furthermore, such an expansive interpretation of the church autonomy doctrine “would render the ministerial exception superfluous.”...

The expressive-association analysis in this case involves balancing the “burden imposed on the school’s associational expression” against the government’s compelling interest in combatting sex discrimination in the workplace....  But the Court concludes that applying Title VII in Mr. Ference’s case would not “significantly affect” Aquinas Academy’s ability to advocate its viewpoints....  For that reason, the burden on the school’s expressive freedom does not outweigh the compelling government interest in this case....

... [A]ll the burden on Aquinas Academy’s freedom of expressive association flows from Mr. Ference’s marriage status alone....  Until the incidental disclosure on the waiver form, his marriage status was apparently a complete secret at Aquinas; and nothing about the circumstances of that disclosure imply that Mr. Ference would not, or could not, remain discreet about his marriage at work.  The Court therefore concludes that applying Title VII to this case would not significantly affect Aquinas Academy’s expressive interest....

Lincoln Memorial University Settles DOJ's Religious Discrimination Charges

The Department of Justice Civil Rights Division announced in a press release yesterday that it has entered a voluntary settlement agreement with Lincoln Memorial University, resolving complaints of discriminatory treatment of Jewish students. The private university is located in Harrogate, Tennessee. The press release says in part:

... [D]uring the 2025-26 school year, LMU’s DeBusk College of Osteopathic Medicine (LMU-DCOM) denied requests by Jewish students to reschedule classes, exams, and other academic assignments so they could celebrate or observe their religious holidays, but granted requests by non-Jewish students who sought the same accommodations. In January 2026 — after Jewish students challenged LMU-DCOM’s double standard — DCOM adopted a policy that it would not accommodate any religious observance requests, but would permit excused absences for “professional student leadership obligations” and other non-religious reasons. In February 2026, DOJ and HHS opened their joint investigation.

Under the settlement agreement, LMU-DCOM will revise its absence policy to allow excused absences for religious reasons on the same basis as non-religious reasons. When an excused absence is approved, the student will not suffer any penalties because of the absence....

Federal Court Settles Application of Michigan's Civil Rights Act to Catholic Institutions

In two lengthy opinions issued last month, a Michigan federal district court granted summary judgment to the state, dismissing pre-enforcement civil rights actions, one brought by a Catholic parish-run school and school parents, and the second brought by a Christian medical services ministry. Both suits allege that Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) violates plaintiffs' 1st and 14th Amendment rights by interfering with their faith-based employment policies and other policies reflecting their religious views. In 2025, the parties agreed to the application of the ELCRA to a number of situations. The recent decisions dismissing the complaints settle a number of remaining issues.

In Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish v. Nessel, (WD MI, August 5, 2026), the court said in part:

In summary, the ELCRA survives the challenges posed in this case. Sacred Heart has not demonstrated that either the "co-religionist doctrine" or the right to expressive association protect its employment choices. Conversely, the ELCRA, via § 403 and the First Amendment, adequately protects Sacred Heart, including its policies regarding admissions, pronouns, sexual orientation, restrooms, uniforms, and sports teams. Consequently, the relief Plaintiffs seek is not warranted. Defendants, in contrast, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these issues.

In Christian Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Nessel, (WD MI, August 5, 2026), the court said in part:

In summary, the ELCRA survives CHC's challenges. CHC has not demonstrated that the "co-religionist doctrine," the right to expressive association, or the right to assembly protect its employment choices. Conversely, the ELCRA, via the First Amendment, provides that CHC can hire whomever it chooses for its Biblical Counsel and Physician positions and can maintain its pronoun policies and gender-affirming care policies that are grounded in sincere religious beliefs. Consequently, the declaratory and injunctive relief CHC seeks is not warranted. Defendants, in contrast, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these issues.

4th Circuit Debates When the Reason for Seeking an Accommodation Under Title VII Is "Religious"

In Wilkins-Bailey v. Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC, (4th Cir., Sept. 1, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a North Carolina federal district court wrongly granted summary judgment to an employer charged with religious and racial discrimination under Title VII. The employer denied an exemption from its Covid vaccine mandate to a black female sales administrator who is a Jehovah's Witness. Plaintiff's refusal to be vaccinated led to her dismissal by the company. The company contended that plaintiff's reasons for seeking an exemption were secular, not religious. In rejecting that contention, the 4th Circuit's majority said in part:

... Wilkins-Bailey, by connecting her refusal to vaccinate to her belief that her “body is a temple,” has based her claim on a belief which is religious....  She blends her explanation of her beliefs with numerous references to personal safety and the natural or non-natural character of vaccination and other medical treatments, as well as historical concerns about discriminatory practices in medicine.....

Even so, we think it is plainly clear that Wilkins-Bailey has connected her refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine with her religious beliefs by stating that it “is God’s law” that she must “be protective of [her] temple.”... Indeed, a claimant’s mixed secular and religious motives do not preclude protection under Title VII....

Wilkins-Bailey has clearly provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that her refusal to vaccinate is connected to her religious beliefs....

Moreover, “courts should not expect, much less require, exemption requests to sound like they were written by someone with legal training.”...

Even though Wilkins-Bailey’s beliefs are sufficiently religious, it may be that they do not impose on her a “religious obligation to refuse” vaccination....  Essity contends that because Wilkins-Bailey believes she may personally interpret the requirements of her religion, that her interpretation is therefore the product of a “personal decision.”...

We do not agree.  This interpretation of Title VII would leave millions of religious Americans unprotected in their workplaces.  Many religions permit and even encourage their adherents to discern or interpret official texts, teachings, and tenets in order to decide for themselves which actions are required to fulfill religious obligations.  Some religions have no centrally managed canons, nor agreed-upon sacred commandments.... Title VII protects even those religions which do not require strict adherence to a written catechism....

The court, however, affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's racial discrimination claim, saying in part:

Essity has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for its differential treatment of Wilkins-Bailey and her posited white comparators: it viewed their requests as stating “religious” reasons, while Wilkins-Bailey’s stated “secular” reasons....  For the purposes of a race discrimination claim, that differentiation is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason....

Judge Floyd dissented as to the religious discrimination claim, saying in part: 

I would ... require a plaintiff bringing a religious accommodation claim to put forward more than a mere scintilla of evidence to factually support the conclusion that her belief is connected with her refusal to comply with an employment requirement....

Wilkins-Bailey has not presented the court with a record that could allow a jury to find that her refusal to receive the vaccine is connected to her religious beliefs....

In practice, the majority’s low evidentiary bar would allow any plaintiff who brings a religious discrimination claim to reach a jury so long as they testify that their personal decisions are cloaked in religiosity.  This is improper at summary judgment stage....  Under the majority’s reasoning, an employee who obliquely references Psalm 127:2 ... (“In vain you rise early and stay up late, toiling for food to eat—for he grants sleep to those he loves.”) to refuse to work before noon creates a jury question as to whether the company religiously discriminates when it declines to accommodate that employee’s schedule....

... Wilkins-Bailey prays and then reaches a personal decision, and she concedes that she is not obliged by her religion to come to a particular conclusion.  Her belief that her religion vests her with the ability to make that personal decision is one step removed from her ultimate decision.  Indeed, Wilkins-Bailey “concedes that none of her religious beliefs requires [sic] her to object to the COVID-19 vaccine.”...

Court Says No "Substantial Burden" On Religion When Impacted Belief Is Not Central to Plaintiff's Religion

 In John v. Aviles-Ramos, (ED NY, Aug. 27, 2026), a New York federal district court rejected claims by a former special education teacher that his former colleagues and supervisors discriminated against him because he was a Jehovah's Witness and placed a substantial burden on his practice of his religion. Rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

This claim is based on three alleged instances of misconduct.  First, that he was forced to sing “happy birthday” during school birthday celebrations; second, that he was required to bring his students to a school Christmas party; and third, that he was asked to take down a “God is love” sign....  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants imposed any policy targeting his religion, and none of the alleged incidents of misconduct rises to the level of a violation of his right to free exercise of his religion....

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged incidents of misconduct resulted from non-neutral policies.... The Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that the school’s policies surrounding the birthday parties, the Christmas celebration, or the affixing of religious signs were created specifically to target Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

In any event, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the incidents he describes substantially burdened his freedom to exercise his religious beliefs.  The determinative question in assessing whether an action imposes a substantial burden “is whether participation in the [event] . . . is considered central or important to [the plaintiff’s] practice of [his religion].” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593–94 (2d Cir. 2003). “A burden on religious exercise is not substantial when it ‘comfortably could be said that a belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff’s religion that any burden can be aptly characterized as constitutionally de minimis.’”  ...

... Though Plaintiff does not celebrate birthdays due to his religious beliefs, ... there is no basis for his claims that being instructed to sing “happy birthday” at a student’s birthday celebration ... would meaningfully burden his ability to practice as a Jehovah’s Witness.

Plaintiff next alleges that Granger informed him “that he would have to bring the kids to the room” for a Christmas party, and that he “was told there were no exceptions.” ... [A] requirement to merely escort students to a school Christmas party — but without requiring him to actually participate in the celebrations at that party — is not a substantial burden protected by the Free Exercise Clause....

Finally, Plaintiff claims that he was told to take down a sign he had “put up” reading “God is love.” ...  However, it is well established that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” ...

The court also held that plaintiff failed to allege adequate facts to support his disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims.

USCIRF Urges Sanctions Against India During Visit of Hindutva Leader

 As reported by The Hindu, India's Mohan Bhagwat, head of the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) organization, arrived in the United States on Tuesday as part of RSS's 100th anniversary global outreach efforts. He is scheduled to speak to an audience of around 5000 people at Madison Square Garden in New York City on Saturday. On Wednesday, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued a Statement (full text) urging the United States to take action to hold India accountable for its religious freedom violations. The Statement reads in part:

... As USCIRF has reported in recent years, members of RSS subgroups have perpetrated violent attacks against religious minorities, including Christians, Dalits, Muslims, and Sikhs.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has enforced policies that closely align with the RSS’ Hindutva ideology, inherently discriminating against religious minority communities. The government has also engaged in acts of transnational repression to target religious minorities beyond its borders, including assassination and assassination attempts on members of Sikh communities in North America. 

“Religious freedom conditions in India continue to deteriorate as violence and incitement are frequently used to target religious minority communities,” said [USCIRF] Chair Asif Mahmood. “We urge the U.S. government to consider targeted sanctions against RSS members and Indian officials complicit in religious freedom violations, including revoking the visa issued to Mohan Bhagwat and making him ineligible for future entry into the United States.”

Under the BJP-led government, Indian authorities have failed to prevent, investigate, or punish egregious mob violence against Muslims and Christians. Such vigilante violence is often predicated on enforcing the Indian government’s strict anti-conversion laws predominately targeting Christians and other religious minorities....

Texas Governor Attacks Airports' Plans to Install Ablution Facilities for Muslim Prayer Preparation

On August 14, Texas Governor Greg Abbott sent a letter to the CEO of the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport accusing two Texas airports of illegally favoring Muslim travelers. The letter (full text) said in part:

It has come to my attention that the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) plans to install ablution facilities for Islamic wudu washing rituals onsite.  The George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) in Houston has already installed one such facility and an interconnecting prayer room furnished with “copies of the Quran, prayer rugs, prayer beads and a turbah.”  Unlike nondenominational interfaith chapels, these ablution facilities appear designed to single out one subset of the population for special treatment based on religion.  I am unaware of either airport installing standalone facilities to meet the particular needs of the many other religious groups represented across Texas.   

That is illegal. Both airports are government-owned facilities.  Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit government from facilitating this sort of discrimination.  Just as the government cannot favor the secular over the sacred, it also cannot favor one religious view of the sacred over all others in our “pluralistic society.”  Nor may governments use private organizations as a “subterfuge” to “directly or indirectly” foster illegal discrimination more generally....

... I have already referred DFW and IAH to the U.S. Department of Transportation for investigation and enforcement....

Accordingly, this letter serves to notify you that any development, provision, or continued operation of such exclusionary religious spaces in government-owned facilities violates state and federal law and the terms of any grant agreements between the State of Texas and your organizations.  Engaging in these discriminatory practices will subject any organizations found to be in violation to the withdrawal of grant funding and other enforcement actions.

Texas Tribune reports that the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport cancelled its plans after receiving the letter.

On August 14, Governor Abbott also sent a letter (full text) to U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy asking the DOT and the FAA to take enforcement action. Then on August 21, Governor Abbott sent a letter (full text) to U.S. Attorney General Todd Blanche and the head of DOJ's Civil Rights Division referring the matter to the Justice Department. The letter says in part:

Airports can no more offer Muslim-only bathroom spaces than they can maintain white-only bathrooms.  Your office has authority to investigate and put a stop to these discriminatory practices.

The Governor's Office issued a press release announcing the referral to the Justice Department.

Suit Seeks Religious Accommodation to Obtain Environmentally Friendly 401(k) Option

 A suit was filed this week in a New York federal district court by an employee of Thermo Fisher Scientific alleging that the company is required under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law to provide plaintiff an investment option in the company's 401(k) plan that is consistent with plaintiff's religious beliefs. The complaint (full text) in Hartley v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., (WD NY, filed 8/4/2026) alleges in part:

4. Dr. Hartley sincerely holds the belief that investing his money in fossil fuels is morally wrong and in violation of his religious convictions.

5. Dr. Hartley believes his Christian faith commands him to care for and steward the earth, and that actively investing in and profiting from fossil fuel companies whose work directly harms the earth and its inhabitants violates his religious obligations. 

6. Because each of Thermo Fisher’s current equity-based retirement plan options maintains significant investments in fossil-fuel companies, Dr. Hartley is forced to either compromise his religious beliefs or forego a significant component of his employer-provided benefit. 

7. To remedy this conflict, Dr. Hartley requested that his employer provide him with an accommodation that would allow him to partake of the benefits of his 401(k) plan in a manner consistent with his faith....

44. Defendant Thermo Fisher’s failure to provide the accommodation sought (a retirement fund option that allows Dr. Hartley to invest in a manner consistent with his religious beliefs) violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended....

The complaint also contends that the company's refusal to provide the investment option sought by plaintiff amounts to religious discrimination.

ClientEarth announced the filing of the lawsuit. HR Dive reports on the lawsuit.

Detainee Sues Wrong Parties Over Available Religious Texts on Jail's Android Tablets

In Coleman v. LVMPD, (D NV, July 8, 2026), a Nevada federal district court at the screening stage dismissed with leave to amend a religious discrimination complaint filed by Oronde Coleman, a pre-trial detainee at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC). According to the court:

Coleman generally sues Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and ViaPath, the owner and provider of android tablets at CCDC....

Coleman alleges the following. He is a religious member of the House of Yahweh.... Coleman needs the Book of Yahweh and the Book of Yahweh Study Guide to worship his religion. However, the ViaPath tablets do not contain either of those ebooks even though they have other religious books for other religions such as Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, Latter-Day Saints, Orthodox Hindu, Buddhist, Jehovah's Witness, Moorish American, Nation of Islam, and Sundar Gutka. LVMPD had approved these religious texts to be on the android tablet but discriminated against the House of Yahweh.

When Coleman reached out to ViaPath to add the Book of Yahweh onto ebooks, ViaPath responded that it was not a recognized religion, and they would not add it to the contents of the tablets. Coleman told ViaPath that he needed the two books to give praise to his heavenly father and his son in their rightful names. ViaPath told Coleman to write a grievance to LVMPD's religious services unit. Years ago, Coleman wrote grievances to the religious services unit, who told him they do not stock those books....

Although Coleman could potentially state colorable First Amendment free exercise of religion and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, he does not do so in his complaint because he has not established that ViaPath and LVMPD are the parties he should be suing. I thus dismiss the complaint but grant Coleman leave to amend....

Coleman's complaint does not allege how ViaPath is a state actor other than its apparent contract with LVMPD. This alone is insufficient to establish that ViaPath is a state actor who deprived Coleman of his federal rights....

Coleman does not allege that his inability to obtain House of Yahweh religious books is due to a LVMPD custom or policy....

1st Circuit Upholds Maine's Antidiscrimmination Rules For Religious Schools Except Its Religiouis Expression Nondiscrimination Requirement

Last week, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in two cases raising similar, but not identical, challenges to the antidiscrimination requirements of Maine's Human Rights Act. The schools particularly focused on provisions barring religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  The Act applies to private schools that receive public funding, such as funding under Maine's tuition assistance program.

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court in a 108-page opinion, held that the employment nondiscrimination rule "does not credibly threaten to injure St. Dominic".  The court said in part:

While the rule generally bars schools from employment discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, the MHRA contains two specific carveouts for religious schools that apply regardless of whether a school participates in the tuition-assistance program.  First, section 4553(4) expressly protects a religious school's ability to discriminate "with respect to employment of its members of the same religion, sect or fraternity."... Second, section 4573-A(2) allows a religious school to "require that all applicants and employees conform to [its] religious tenets."

The court also held that neither the ban on religious discrimination in admissions nor the ban on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination trigger strict scrutiny. The court said in part:

[T]he Religious Nondiscrimination Rule does not exclude any school solely because of its religious character.  Rather, the rule excludes a school because it discriminates against students on the basis of the students' religion, a practice that is neither uniquely religious nor uniquely tied to religious schools.... In short, the State is simply saying that a school in Maine, whether religious or not, cannot accept public funds while simultaneously putting up, for example, a "No Protestant Children Need Apply" sign....

... [T]he record does not suggest that religious schools, by their nature, engage in sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination.... Simply put, barring sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination does not exclude religious schools from the tuition-assistance program solely based on their religious character....

Just as combatting religious discrimination qualifies as a legitimate governmental pursuit, so too combatting sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination rises to the level....  And the imposition of liability for sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination on those schools that accept public funding rationally relates to those antidiscrimination goals, as does the requirement that such schools respect students' expression of their gender identity....

The court, however, ordered the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule that  provides "to the extent that an educational institution permits religious expression, it cannot discriminate between religions in doing so." The court said in part:

St. Dominic, as part of its religious mission, requires students to attend religion classes, Mass, and other religious activities.  These activities necessarily entail some degree of student participation.  Even under the Commissioner's reading of the Religious Expression Rule, then, if a preacher at a school-mandated Mass permits students to say "Amen" in order to signify agreement, St. Dominic would then be required to allow expressions of disagreement.  And in the classroom, inculcation often solicits -- indeed encourages -- affirmation, for example in the form of an iterative exchange of expression.  Few would teach the Lord's Prayer without having the students recite it; and under the Religious Expression Rule that recitation would, in turn, appear to require the school to allow the reciting of, for example, the Hare Krishna Mahā mantra.  And while such an example may seem fanciful, the point is that the Religious Expression Rule would inevitably interfere with a religious school's ability to foster an expressive environment consistent with its religious mission.....

Here, the Religious Expression Rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out "religious expression." ...

In Crosspoint Church v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court considered additional challenges to Maine's antidiscrimination rules as they apply to religious schools. Crosspoint Church contended that 2021 amendments to the state's anti-discrimination laws were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Carson v. Makin that required Maine to include religious schools in its tuition assistance program.  The court said in part:

The State likely adopted the 2021 Amendments at least partially in response to the Carson litigation.  But we will not infer something as sinister as an "express[] design[]" to discriminate against a specific religious entity where Maine offers a quite logical and compelling rationale for the amendments' structure and timing: 

If [the State's] Legislature anticipated that the [Carson] litigation might result in [the State] being prohibited from excluding religious schools from [public funding], it would have been entirely appropriate to then make the same distinction in education as the Legislature did [years earlier] for employment and housing and require religious organizations that accept public funds to comply with [all antidiscrimination rules]. 

Thus, just as we concluded in St. Dominic that the plaintiffs there had not shown that general antireligious animus likely motivated the 2021 Amendments,... so too do we hold here that Crosspoint has not shown that specific anti-BCS animus motivated the same amendments....

The court also rejected Crosspoint's free expression claims, saying in part:

The Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, Crosspoint contends, regulates speech because it would "require BCS to affirm a student's gender identity and sexual orientation," even though it would "violate[] BCS's statement of faith to admit a student or allow a student to remain enrolled who violates BCS's statement of faith by presenting as a gender not consistent with his or her biological sex."...

... [H]ere, Crosspoint seeks to refuse admission to (and expel) any student who is gay or transgender, irrespective of that student's speech.  Although such refusal may express Crosspoint's views regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule would interfere with that expression, that does not transform the rule into a speech regulation....

1st Circuit: University's Rejection of Property Sale to Church Was Not Religious Discrimination

In Calvary Chapel Belfast v. University of Maine System, (1st Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to stop the sale by the University of Maine of the Frederick Hutchinson Center property to a bidder that was competing with Calvary Chapel Belfast to obtain the property.  Originally, the University selected Calvary Chapel to negotiate a purchase agreement. However, according to the court:

In the days following the public announcement, numerous area residents as well as University alumni, donors, students, faculty, and staff criticized the University's selection of a religious entity, and Calvary in particular, as the winning bidder.  One online commentor, for example, referred to the decision as "disappointing," with another writing, "[t]hese evangelists from [Calvary] are just another religious cult that believes in magical thinking."...

Calvary asserts an intentional discrimination claim, arguing that the University violated the Equal Protection Clause by carrying out the facially neutral public procurement process in a discriminatory way. ... Specifically, Calvary argues that the court created a "novel rule" when it required Calvary "to make a direct 'showing connecting the animus in the community to the government action' to raise an inference of discriminatory intent."  ...

The court recognized that widespread religious animus in the community can, in certain circumstances, support an inference that a government official acted with discriminatory intent by essentially adopting the community's view even if the official did not personally share that view.... But the presence of community opposition does not, without more, imply a conclusion of intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.... And here the court found scant evidentiary support for the alleged irregularities -- "the more" -- urged by Calvary....

9th Circuit: Question of Fact Remains on Whether Airline Flight Attendants Were Fired Because of Their Religious Beliefs

In Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., (9th Cir., June 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes dismissing before trial a suit by two Alaska Airlines flight attendants (Brown and Smith) who were fired after they posted comments on an internal intranet communications network opposing the Airline's support for the proposed federal Equality Act. That proposed Act protected LGBTQ+ rights. At issue is whether the firings were because of the flight attendants' religious beliefs or instead because their comments violated the company’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. The court said in part:

... [T]he issue is not whether Alaska can punish employees who engage in discrimination and harassment (it can).  The issue here is instead a factual one of whether Brown was in fact fired for engaging in discrimination or harassment, or whether Alaska instead used the cover of its employee policies to fire Brown because of her religious beliefs.  Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, there is a genuine dispute of material fact on this point, and so summary judgment for Alaska was improper....

Under our cases, a union under Title VII “has an affirmative obligation to oppose employment discrimination against its members,” and if the union instead “acquiesce[s] or join[s] in the Company’s discrimination practices, it too is liable to the injured employees.”

The record raises factual questions about whether AFA’s representation of Brown was colored by potential disagreement with her religious views....

Judge Christen dissented in part, saying in part:

I dissent from my colleagues’ decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Lacey Smith’s claims against Alaska because I do not agree that Smith demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Alaska terminated her because of her religion...

During Alaska’s investigation, Smith insisted that she was merely posing a philosophical question rather than asserting to the investigators that her Christian beliefs caused her to conclude that the Equality Act was immoral.  The majority posits that “‘morality’ is often associated with religious beliefs,” but references to morality are not inherently religious....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

U.S. and Florida Launch Investigations of Religious Discrimination by Major League Baseball

Major League Baseball's apparent selective enforcement of its rules regarding players' uniforms has led to religious discrimination investigations by both the EEOC at the behest of the Department of Justice and by Florida's Attorney General.  A June 18 letter (full text) from the U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet Dhillon to Commissioner of Baseball Robert Manfred says in part:

According to media reports, Major League Baseball ("MLB") has warned and/or is considering disciplining three players on the San Francisco Giants who refused to participate in "Pride Night." The three players expressed their opposition to MLB's pro-Pride orthodoxy by inscribing Bible verses on their rainbow-colored hats....

MLB has asserted that its warning to the Giants players "had absolutely nothing to do with the content of the message" and that it merely is enforcing a policy that prohibits writing on uniforms. Yet MLB has allowed players to wear uniform patches reading "Black Lives Matter."  This double standard-- under which players may not inscribe Bible verses on hats for one game only but may wear "Black Lives Matter" patches for one game only-- calls MLB's true motives into question and raises serious concerns about MLB's compliance with Title VII....

I have referred this matter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for further investigation.

A June 19 press release from Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier says that his office has sent a letter and issued an investigative subpoena to MLB, indicating that Florida is also launching a formal probe into whether MLB is engaging in religious discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act by selectively enforcing its rules regarding uniforms.

9th Circuit Grants En Banc Review in Church Autonomy Case

In  Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown, (9th Cir., June 18, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals voted to review en banc the 3-judge panel's decision that barred enforcement of Washington's Law Against Discrimination against a Christian ministry that gives hiring preference to co-religionists for non-ministerial positions. (See prior posting.)

Judge Bumatay, joined by Judges VanDyke and Tung, filed an opinion dissenting from the grant of en banc review, saying in part:

... [T]he Ninth Circuit has relegated religious liberty to a second-class right.  In case after case, our court has condoned governmental interference with the rights of the religious to practice their faith as they believe. 

Now, with this en banc vote, we continue down this disturbing path.  In what is likely a foregone conclusion, our court steps toward endorsing the view that States can force a religious organization to hire individuals who openly flout its religious beliefs and teachings.  As a matter of constitutional first principles and precedent, that’s wrong.... 

DC Circuit Gives Pleading Leeway to Pro Se Muslim Plaintiff Who Claims Religious Discrimination

 In Naz v. Wright, (DC Cir., June 9, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's dismissal of a religious discrimination claim brought by a Muslim woman of Pakistani origin who was fired from her position at the Department of Energy.  The majority said in part:

Naz alleged that, in May or June 2019, she asked Gross—who by then had become her supervisor—whether during the month of Ramadan, he could adjust the start time of their weekly team meetings by 30 minutes and grant her a flexible work schedule to accommodate her religious observance....  But “instead of accommodating m[y] request,” Naz alleges, Gross “bluntly replied to me that [the Department] is a workplace, not a religious institution, and he does not believe in Islamic religious extremism.” ...   

The district court’s opinion, though, does not expressly take account of Naz’s allegation about Gross’s statement. Granted, Naz did not include the allegation in her complaint, instead stating it in her opposition to the Department’s motion to dismiss.  But as noted, our precedents generally call for considering a pro se plaintiff’s allegations in an opposition to a dismissal motion even if they are not in the complaint....

Judge Katsas filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... [M]y colleagues vacate the dismissal of the discrimination claims, based on a contestable argument raised neither by Naz nor by the amicus curiae whom we appointed to support her position.  Specifically, my colleagues conclude that the district court erred in not plucking an allegation out of Naz’s 148-page opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss, deeming that allegation to be part of Naz’s complaint, and then considering whether it tipped the balance against dismissal.  Rather than inject that contention into this appeal, I would instead apply ordinary party-presentation principles, which compel an affirmance....

HRD reports on the decision.

HHS Reorganizes Civil Rights Office to Emphasize Religious Liberty, Conscience Protections and Racial Discrimination

The Department of Health and Human Services yesterday announced a restructuring of its Office of Civil Rights into three subject-matter Divisions: the Conscience and Religious Freedom Division, the Civil Rights Division, and the Health Information Privacy, Data, and Cybersecurity Division. The press release announcing the reorganization said in part:

... “This reorganization reinstitutes a structure that rightly prioritizes civil rights and conscience and religious freedom alongside health information privacy and security”...

The new structure will improve OCR’s effectiveness and efficiency to advance the protection of conscience rights, address race-based discrimination in a color-blind manner, eradicate antisemitism and anti-Christian bias, and restore biological truth....

 More information about the reorganization will be published through a Federal Register notice next month....

Bloomberg Law reports on the reorganization. 

President's Task Force on Anti-Christian Bias Issues Report

Yesterday, the President's Task Force to Eradicate anti-Christian Bias issued a report (full text) titled Eradicating Anti-Christian Bias within the Federal Government. The 197-page Report (with an additional 368 pages of Exhibits) focuses on policies of the Biden Administration, and concludes in part:

The Task Force found that, in its zealous pursuit of its preferred policies and constituents, the Biden Administration engaged in anti-Christian bias, seeking to limit Christians’ ability to act in concert with their sincerely held beliefs in their homes, in the workplace, and in the public square. At times, it went still further, leading Christians to reportedly choose between their beliefs and compliance with federal law. And, most troublingly, the Biden Administration is alleged to have prosecuted and jailed peaceful Christian pro-life demonstrators, terminated or harassed Christian workers who did not comply with the vaccine mandates, targeted Christian organizations with IRS inquiries, and subjected Christian schools to excessive fines. Taken together, the findings presented by the Task Force raise serious concerns about whether certain Biden-era policies and practices were administered in a manner consistent with the Constitution and applicable federal law. These concerns implicate core American commitments—religious liberty, equal treatment, and the rule of law—that protect all Americans of faith and conscience....

Our Nation’s forefathers recognized that our most essential rights are given to us by God and are not bestowed by civil government. By design, the Constitution and federal law limit the government’s reach into speech and religion to protect those inalienable rights from the vicissitudes of politics and changing times. Americans have been promised freedom of religion, not just in the privacy of their homes and four walls of their churches, but to daily walk in accordance with their religious teachings and conscience in the public square.

The National Catholic Register summarizes the Report.  The Freedom from Religion Foundation issued a press release strongly criticizing the Report.

European Court Says German Catholic Organization Cannot Dismiss Employee Who Left the Church

In Katholische Schwangerschaftsberatung, (CJ EU, March 17, 2026), in a referral from the Federal Labor Court (Germany), the Court of Justice of the European Union, interpreted Council Directive 2000/78 that, among other things, bans employment discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. The Court said in part:

2.  The request [for a Preliminary Ruling] has been made in proceedings between the Katholische Schwangerschaftsberatung (a Catholic association counselling on pregnancy, Germany) ... and JB concerning the legality of the dismissal of the latter on the grounds of an alleged infringement of the duty to act in good faith and with loyalty to the Association’s ethos....

24. JB, who is the mother of five children, entered the service of the Association in 2006. Until her parental leave, which began on 11 June 2013 and which ended on 31 May 2019, she was entrusted with pregnancy counselling. In October 2013, JB, under the procedure provided for by the national provisions, declared before the competent local authority that she was leaving the Catholic Church. The grounds she stated for leaving the Catholic Church were that the Diocese of Limburg levied, in addition to the State church tax, an additional church levy on Catholic persons who, like JB, are in an interfaith marriage with a high-earning spouse.

25      After unsuccessfully attempting to persuade JB to rejoin the Catholic Church, the Association, on 1 June 2019, dismissed JB on the grounds that she had left that church.... [I]n the pregnancy counselling service in which JB was working the Association employed four employees who were members of the Catholic Church and two employees who were not members of that church....

... [T]he Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules: Article 4(1) and (2) of Directive 2000/78 ... must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a private organisation the ethos of which is based on a religion may require of an employee who is a member of a certain church practising that religion not to leave that church during the employment relationship, on pain of dismissal or, in order to continue the employment relationship, to rejoin that church after leaving it, even though--  that organisation employs other persons to carry out the same duties as those of the employee in question, without requiring that those persons be members of that church, and  –  that employee does not openly act in a manner that is antagonistic to the church concerned, where ... those occupational requirements are not genuine, legitimate and justified having regard to that organisation’s ethos.

The July 2025 Opinion of the Advocate General, the Court's Press Release on the case, and the Court's explanatory video on the case are available from the Court's website.

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.