Cert. Petition Filed in Covid Religious Exemption Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) has been filed in Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire & Rescue, (Sup. Ct., filed 4/16/2026). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims by eight firefighters that the Snohomish fire department violated Title VII and Washington state law by refusing to accommodate their requests for religious exemptions from the state's Covid vaccine mandate for all healthcare providers. (See prior posting.) The petition seeking Supreme Court review frames the Question Presented as follows:

Whether an employer can defeat a Title VII religious accommodation claim by establishing merely that it had a reasonable basis for believing that a requested accommodation would inflict an undue hardship on the employer or whether the employer must establish that the requested accommodation would have actually imposed an undue hardship.

The Center Square reports on the filing.

9th Circuit Denies En Banc Rehearing in Vaccine Mandate Case

In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, (9th Cir., April 15, 2926), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied both a panel rehearing and an en banc rehearing in a case involving a medical center employee's claimed religious objections to both a Covid vaccine requirement and to the accommodation granted by her employer. A 3-judge panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the employee's Title VII lawsuit, concluding that her objections were secular, not religious. (See prior posting.) Her religious exemption from vaccination was conditioned, in part, on her having weekly antigen testing. She objected to that accommodation because she believed the ethylene oxide used in obtaining a nasal swab for the test was carcinogenic and her religion prohibited her from defiling her body in this manner.

In two dissenting opinions, a total of eight judges dissented from the denial of an en banc rehearing, some joining in both dissenting opinions. Judge Forrest's dissent, joined by five other judges, said in part:

Our role in assessing whether a plaintiff has shown a bona fide religious belief is a “narrow function.”... Generally, we may determine only whether the religious conflict identified by the plaintiff “reflects an honest conviction.”... This is because anything more extends beyond a judge’s competence....

The court’s reasoning gives no credence to Detwiler’s claim that she received revelation from God that informed her health choices. For those who believe that God can provide individualized guidance for daily living, whether that guidance relates to “secular” or “spiritual” matters is often a distinction without a difference—both emanate from beliefs about deity and its relationship with humanity. That is, many believers do not perceive that the spiritual and the secular are capable of neat separation as relates to matters of revelation....

Judge Tung, joined by six other judges, filed a dissenting opinion which said in part:

Detwiler properly alleged the religious basis of her objection to testing—namely, that her religion forbade her from ingesting a carcinogen, which she viewed as a defilement upon the temple of her body.  That her objection was based in part on a medical finding—that the testing is carcinogenic—did not negate her religious motivation in refusing to submit to such testing....

... [T]he panel majority misapplied Title VII’s text and precedent interpreting “religion,” misconstrued Detwiler’s allegations, and split with the holdings of several other circuits....  But perhaps most problematic, the panel majority’s approach would recast as “purely secular” a person’s religious practices whenever those practices turn also on secular considerations.  It is hard to imagine, frankly, what religious practice would not turn on secular considerations to some degree.

Ministerial Exception May Not Apply to Non-Catholic 1st Grade Teacher in Catholic School

In Coates v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah, (MD GA, April 6, 2026), a Georgia federal district court refused at this point in the litigation to dismiss on ministerial exception grounds claims of racial discrimination in employment brought against a Catholic school by an African American 1st grade teacher. The court said in part:

... [T]he amended complaint plausibly alleges Coates did not serve a ministerial function at SPCCS [St. Peter Clavar Catholic School].  Coates alleges that before her employment with SPCCS even began, Coates told Hillig [the school's principal] she was not Catholic and would not accept employment if it would require her to “participate in Catholic doctrine or worship services.”... Hillig responded by assuring Coates that religious instruction would not be her responsibility and that she would only need to escort the students to Mass on Wednesdays and monitor behavior.... During Coates’ employment, Coates did not teach religion or lead students in worship or prayer.... Nor did she participate in “Catholic worship or practices.” ... Yet, Coates received positive performance reviews....

To be sure, the complaint also alleges facts suggesting Coates may have served a ministerial role at SPCCS. Coates signed an employment contract designating her role as “ministerial” and requiring her to model the Catholic faith regardless of religion..... Still, on a motion to dismiss, Coates’ need only plausibly allege she served a non-ministerial function.... Coates has alleged facts suggesting that, despite SPCCS’ formal designation of Coates’ position as ministerial, SPCCS did not actually expect Coates to perform ministerial functions at the school, and ...accepted Coates until she participated in a police investigation against another teacher. Perhaps, as discovery develops, the undisputed facts will show that SPCCS, like most religious schools, has a sincere mission to promote religious education, and that Coates, even as a non-Catholic, served a vital role in that mission. But because the amended complaint plausibly alleg[es] that Coates’ position was non-ministerial, Defendants’ motion to dismiss her employment claims on the basis of the ministerial exception is DENIED...

The court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claims on the basis of the religious institution exclusion in Title VII.

Court Enforces EEOC Subpoena for Information on Jewish Employees at Penn

In U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, (ED PA, March 31, 2026), a Pennsylvania federal district court enforced the EEOC's subpoena for information about Jewish employees of the University of Pennsylvania. The EEOC is investigating a charge that Penn engaged in harassment of Jewish employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The court said in part:

... [U]unlike investigations into ... sexual harassment or racial discrimination, the subpoena sought information pertaining to people’s faith, making its requests more intrusive and calling for greater sensitivity, something the EEOC now acknowledges. 

One of those requests in particular sought ... lists of school groups and organizations “related to the Jewish religion,” including personal contact information for Penn employees in those groups.  Though ineptly worded, the request had an understandable purpose—to obtain in a narrowly tailored way ... information on individuals in Penn’s Jewish community who could have experienced or witnessed antisemitism in the workplace....

Penn and other groups and associations the Court permitted to intervene significantly raised the dispute’s temperature by impliedly and even expressly comparing the EEOC’s efforts to protect Jewish employees from antisemitism to the Holocaust and the Nazis’ compilation of “lists of Jews.”  Such allegations are unfortunate and inappropriate.  They also obfuscate the Court’s limited role and the discrete legal issues before it.  And the EEOC no longer seeks any employee’s specific affiliation with a particular Jewish-related organization on campus.... 

Politico reports on the decision.

4th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments In 3 Employment Discrimination Cases Involving Religiously Affiliated Institutions

On March 17, the U.S.4th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in three cases of interest:

(1) In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (audio of full oral arguments) the court heard an appeal in a Virginia federal district court case. The district court had refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. (See prior posting).

(2) In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, (audio of full oral arguments), the court heard an appeal in a Maryland federal district court case that held that the religious corporation exemption from the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act does not apply to the termination of spousal health care benefits of the same-sex spouse of a data analyst and advisor working for Catholic Relief Services. (See prior posting.)

(3) In General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Horton, (audio of full oral arguments) the court heard an appeal in a Maryland federal district court case which denied a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the Maryland Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious exemption in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that the exemption is limited to claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission of the religious entity. (See prior posting).

County Employee Sues Over Denial of Religious Accommodation So He Could Avoid Celebrating Pride Month

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by an employee of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works alleging that the county violated Title VII as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments and California law by denying him a religious accommodation so he would not have to celebrate Pride Month. The complaint (full text) in Batman v. Los Angeles County, (CD CA, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

4. Beginning in March 2023, the County directed all of its government departments to ensure that the “Pride Progress Flag” was flown at every government department.... The policy revisions also directed the government offices to adopt ways to demonstrate that all government offices celebrate so-called “Pride Month” and make its celebration overt, express, and universal.  

5. As a result of his sincerely held religious beliefs and a conflict with his employer’s open and notorious celebration of something Batman considers a sin, Batman requested a simple accommodation of working remotely during the one month of the year that his employment requirements conflict with his sincerely held religious beliefs.....

82. Rather than provide Batman a reasonable accommodation that was plainly available and not burdensome to anyone, Batman was instructed that he could simply use the back entrance....  

83. The Department also suggested to Batman that he seek mental health counseling for any distress he may feel as a result of the conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the Department’s denial of his requested accommodation.... In other words, the Department suggested to Batman that his religious beliefs required mental health counseling rather than accommodation.

The complaint sets out at length the Biblical basis for plaintiff's beliefs.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

EEOC Says Federal Agencies May Base Restroom Access on Biological Sex

 In a February 26 press release, the EEOC announced:

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) voted 2-1 today to approve a federal sector appellate decision adjudicating an appeal regarding access to intimate spaces, including bathrooms and locker rooms, in federal workplaces under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended....

 “Today’s opinion is consistent with the plain meaning of ‘sex’ as understood by Congress at the time Title VII was enacted, as well as longstanding civil rights principles: that similarly situated employees must be treated equally,” said EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas. “When it comes to bathrooms, male and female employees are not similarly situated. Biology is not bigotry.”

When adjudicating appeals of alleged employment discrimination in the federal sector, the EEOC applies longstanding precedent, including relevant Supreme Court decisions, to the facts of the case. In this case, however, such precedent does not exist, as federal courts have not determined whether Title VII requires employers to permit trans-identifying employees to access bathrooms and other intimate spaces otherwise reserved for the opposite sex. In the absence of authoritative court precedent, the EEOC used the traditional tools of statutory construction, turning first to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s text and ensuring that the decision is further anchored by the Supreme Court’s precedents in comparable areas of law.

In applying the traditional tools of statutory construction, the EEOC found that Title VII permits a federal agency employer to maintain single-sex bathrooms and similar intimate spaces; and permits a federal agency employer to exclude employees, including trans-identifying employees, from opposite sex-facilities. Today’s opinion overturns a prior EEOC federal sector appellate decision (Lusardi v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (2015)) with respect to the portion of that opinion addressing a federal employee’s access to an opposite-sex bathroom based on “gender identity.”

As with all of the EEOC’s appellate decisions adjudicating federal agency employment discrimination complaints, this decision applies only to federal agencies subject to the EEOC’s administrative complaint process for federal employees. It does not apply to private sector employers, nor does it bind any federal court.

The Agency's action approved a 23-page Federal Sector Appellate Decision, Selina S. v. Driscoll, (EEOC Federal Sector Appeal, Feb. 26, 2026), a case brought by a civilian employee of the Army.

DOJ Sues UCLA Under Title VII Alleging Antisemitism and Anti-Israel Bias

The Justice Department Civil Rights Division this week filed suit against the University of California alleging that UCLA violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by failing to protect Jewish and Israeli employees from antisemitic and anti-Israel harassment and violence. The 81-page complaint (full text) in United States v. Regents of the University of California, (CD CA, filed 2/24/2026), alleges in part:

Swastikas, calls for the extermination of Jews and the Jewish state of Israel, antisemitic violence, and open harassment of Jewish students, faculty, and staff: this was the grim scene at the University of California Los Angeles ... beginning in the 2023 to 2024 academic year. Following the October 7, 2023 ... massacre in Israel, UCLA’s administration turned a blind eye to—and at times facilitated—grossly antisemitic acts and systematically ignored cries for help from its own terrified Jewish and Israeli employees. Activists at the now infamous encampment at Royce Hall physically excluded Jewish students, faculty, and staff from portions of campus.... UCLA is currently under a permanent injunction banning it and its officers from allowing further exclusions of Jews or religious supporters of Israel from campus or activities. That prior action generally sought to protect the Jewish students at UCLA. But the harm to Jewish and Israeli employees at UCLA goes much deeper. The general atmosphere of antisemitism was, and remains, so severe and pervasive that UCLA’s own official Task Force on Antisemitism and Anti-Israeli Bias concluded that the University’s failures to protect Jewish staff and faculty constituted a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.... This suit seeks to right these wrongs.

Until the United States Department of Justice issued its notice of investigation letter to UCLA in March 2025, not a single one of the dozens of civil rights complaints filed by Jewish and Israeli employees since October 7 was properly investigated. UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, & Inclusion (EDI Office) ... routinely ignored complaints of antisemitism. And UCLA continues to mishandle them....

Moreover, UCLA’s flawed Anti-Discrimination Policy was poorly designed and maintained, making it difficult for victims to report hostile work environment claims. UCLA faculty, staff, and administrators were untrained on the University policy and routinely failed to report antisemitism. The most sophisticated faculty and staff, including members of UCLA leadership, were puzzled by the confusing and ineffective complaint procedures, leaving Jewish and Israeli employees with nowhere to turn. They got UCLA’s message that filing an antisemitism complaint was futile....

The Justice Department issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

7th Circuit: "Moral" Objections Not Protected By Title VII

 In Bowlin v. Board of Directors, Judah Christian School, (7th Circuit, Feb. 13, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that moral objections that are not also religiously based are not protected by Title VII. The court said in part:

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Illinois required all school employees to either receive a vaccination or undergo weekly testing for the virus. Plaintiffs—three employees at different Illinois grade schools—refused to receive a vaccination, citing their religious beliefs. When the schools offered weekly testing as an accommodation, Plaintiffs claimed the testing also violated their moral consciences and refused. As a result, they were either placed on unpaid leave or terminated....

Although “a ‘religious’ objection can sound in both religious and non-religious terms,” ... here, Plaintiffs do not moor their objections to the testing requirement to any religious beliefs. Their only relevant allegation is that their “moral consciences … prevent them from submitting to health care procedures which they, competent adults, do not believe are medically necessary.” This, on its own, fails to plausibly allege that the request is “based in part on an aspect of [Plaintiffs’] religious belief or practice” because Plaintiffs do not identify what belief or practice the testing would violate.,,,

Nevertheless, even assuming Plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Defendants violated their religious beliefs, their claim still fails because the accommodation they request would require Defendants to violate the law, thereby imposing upon them an undue hardship,,,, 

HRD reported on the decision.

Ministerial Exception Bars Former Priest's Title VII Claims

In Obienu v. Archdiocese of New Orleans, (ED LA, Dec. 11, 2025), a Louisiana federal district court held that a former priest's Title VII claims against his archdiocese are barred by the ministerial exception doctrine. Plaintiff, a United States citizen of Nigerian origin, claimed that clergy in the New Orleans archdiocese mistreated him in a number of ways. Plaintiff filed this Title VII action alleging wrongful termination, failure to promote, failure to allow him to complete the training necessary for promotion, unequal terms and conditions of employment, and retaliation. The court said in part:

Defendants argue that Obienu’s employment discrimination claims are barred because “this lawsuit arises out of a disgruntled former priest’s dissatisfaction with how [the ANO] managed his role as a minister within its system of religious governance.” ...

... [Obienu] contends that summary judgment is not warranted because there are factual disputes whether “the adverse employment actions at issue stemmed not from religious doctrine but from national-origin discrimination, disparate treatment, and retaliation after reporting mistreatment.”...

With the Fifth Circuit’s broad pronouncement in McRaney [v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention] ... that the ministerial exception bars secular courts from considering Title VII and related state-law employment claims brought by a minister against a religious organization, this Court is bound to conclude that Obienu’s remaining employment discrimination claims against Defendants must be dismissed.  It is undisputed that Obienu was, at all relevant times, either a Roman Catholic priest or training to be one.  All the incidents he alleges constitute “employment discrimination” arose while he was training or working under the auspices of the ANO either as a seminarian or as an ordained priest. Further, the persons who he says acted unlawfully were themselves ordained priests or the archbishop.

Prison Chaplain Sues for Wrongful Termination

Suit was filed last week in a Florida federal district court by a Christian pastor who was terminated from his position as Senior Pastor at Madison Correctional Institution after he refused to proctor a newly-hired female pastor. The 75-page complaint (full text) in Horst v. Florida Department of Corrections, (ND FL, filed 11/26/2025), alleges in part:

13. On the basis of his sincerely held religious beliefs grounded in the above-referenced passages of Titus and Timothy, among other Scriptures, Senior Chaplain Horst was compelled to abstain from proctoring training that instructs a female to teach and preach to men. Female chaplains ministering to males is a practice that directly contradicts Scripture and Senior Chaplain Horst’s sincerely held religious beliefs.

14. On the basis of his sincerely held religious beliefs, Senior Chaplain Horst requested religious accommodation that would permit him to comply with his employments roles and requirements but also conform his conduct to his beliefs. 

15. Specifically, Senior Chaplain Horst’s religious accommodation request was that one of the DOC’s dozens of other competent and qualified chaplains proctor Chaplain Doe’s non-mandatory training.

Plaintiff alleges failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, violation of Florida's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as well as violations of the First and 14th Amendments.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Andrea Lucas Named Chair of EEOC

Last week, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced that Andrea R. Lucas has been designated by President Trump as Chair of the Commission. She has been a member of the Commission since 2020. She was confirmed by the Senate in July 2025 to serve a second term on the Commission. She has been serving as Acting Chair of the EEOC since January of this year. (Background.) According to Lucas' biography on the EEOC website:

She prioritizes evenhanded enforcement of civil rights laws for all Americans, including by rooting out unlawful DEI-motivated race and sex discrimination; protecting American workers from anti-American national origin discrimination; defending the biological and binary reality of sex and related rights, including women’s rights to single-sex spaces; protecting workers from religious bias and harassment; and remedying other areas that have been historically under-enforced by the agency.

On Oct. 7, the U.S. Senate confirmed Brittany Panuccio as an EEOC member, restoring sufficient members for a quorum. The EEOC lost its quorum when President Trump removed two Biden-appointed Commissioners in January. (Background.)

The EEOC administers federal laws barring employment discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of religion.

Broad Religious Statements Did Not Support Title VII Discrimination Claim

 In Castaneda v. State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, (ED CA, Oct. 28, 2025), a DMV employee brought several federal and state claims challenging her firing. She had raised religious objections to the Covid vaccine and also objected to the alternative of testing by DMV's third-party contractor instead of her own doctor. Dismissing, with leave to amend, plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claim, a California federal magistrate judge said in part:

... Plaintiff does not explain the religious basis for her objection to the vaccine, beyond saying that “her body is sacred and God-given” and she cannot be compelled to have her DNA “harvested” and “tested on” because it is “the code of life given by God.”... The Ninth Circuit recently held that “[i]nvocations of broad, religious tenets cannot, on their own, convert a secular preference into a religious conviction” for purposes of a discrimination claim....  To allow Plaintiff’s claim simply because she invokes the concepts of bodily autonomy and God in the same sentence “would destroy the pleading standard for religious discrimination claims, allowing complainants to invoke magic words and survive a dismissal without stating a prima facie case.” ... 

Title VII Suit Alleges Failure to Accommodate Religious Refusal to Work Alone with a Woman

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by an HVAC technician who alleges that his firing violated Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law. The complaint (full text) in Ostapa v. Trane U.S. Inc,, (ND NY, filed 10/14/2025), alleges that Plaintiff's employer, Trane Technologies, for the first time hired a female technician to work out of the same office as plaintiff. The complaint goes on in part:

13. Paul is a devout Christian. He attended Bible College in Ukraine before emigrating to the United States and is a member in good standing of the Southern Baptist Convention, a fundamentalist Christian denomination. 

14. Paul’s Christian faith and sincerely held religious beliefs dictate that he is not to be alone with a woman other than his wife. The origin of this religious doctrine is the biblical story of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife found in Genesis 39....

Plaintiff's manager agreed to accommodate plaintiff's beliefs by not assigning a female to work alone with plaintiff. Subsequently, however, a dispatcher reported plaintiff to the HR department and he was ultimately fired. The complaint alleges that the firing constituted a failure to accommodate and retaliation in violation of Title VII, as well as a violation of New York law.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Kansas Supreme Court: Expanded Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate Is Not in Conflict with Title VII

In Powerback Rehabilitation, LLC v. Kansas Department of Labor, (KS Sup. Ct., Sept. 26, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court in a 4-2 decision, upheld a Kansas  statute (K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 44-663) that requires employers to grant religious exemptions from any Covid vaccine mandate without inquiring into the sincerity of an employee's asserted religious belief. Powerback was subject to federal Medicaid rules that required it to impose a Covid vaccine mandate on its employees. Medicaid incorporated into its rules federal Title VII standards which allow employers to question the sincerity of an employee's religious belief. The Supreme Court rejected the trial court's holding that the Kansas statute was pre-empted by federal law. The Kansas Supreme Court said in part:

Powerback's argument is simple and alluring at first blush. It simply points out that "federal law contemplates an inquiry into the sincerity of an employee's purported religious beliefs. [K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 44-663] specifically disallows this same inquiry. The Vaccine Act thus forces Powerback to make an impossible decision between compliance with Kansas law or compliance with federal law." But this framing of the problem incorporates a deft sleight-of-hand. Because federal "contemplation" is not a mandate. That is, nowhere in the federal regulations ... is an employer subject to the Vaccine Mandate required to inquire into the sincerity of an employee's religious beliefs. At most, the employer is permitted to make this inquiry....

Thus, Powerback could have granted a religious exemption to Keeran that was consistent with both Title VII (as incorporated into the Vaccine Mandate) and with K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 44-663 by simply not inquiring into Keeran's religious sincerity.

The dissent rejects this conclusion on the grounds that Title VII's allowance of what the dissent characterizes as a "meaningful interactive process with the employee" is actually a "federally granted right" which state law cannot "nullify" or "forbid" an employer from exercising.... If this were true, the dissent would be correct. But it is not true. Indeed, the dissent has dramatically misunderstood—and in fact inverted— Title VII. The statutory framework adopted by Congress in Title VII does not define or create any genuine "rights" in employers. It is instead entirely about protecting and preserving the rights of employees not to be discriminated against....

Justice Stanridge, joined by Justice Rosen, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Under longstanding Supremacy Clause doctrine, state law must yield where compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or where state law frustrates Congress' objectives. K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 44-663 fails on both counts....

Title VII embodies a carefully calibrated framework, one that protects religious exercise while preserving the ability of employers to safeguard legitimate operational and safety interests. K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 44-663 is incompatible with that framework in two respects. It makes compliance with both state and federal law impossible, and it obstructs the objectives of Congress by replacing a balanced system with one of absolute deference. Either defect alone is sufficient for preemption; together, they leave no room for doubt. Because Kansas has attempted to supplant federal law with a contradictory regime, I would hold K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 44-663 is preempted by the Supremacy Clause.

Kansas City Star reports on the decision.

Justice Department Issues Opinion to EEOC On Impact of Recent Developments for Federal Employees

Earlier this month, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an advisory opinion Religious Liberty Protections for Federal Employees in Light of Recent Legal Developments, 49 Op. O.L.C. __ (Sept. 18, 2025). The opinion was requested by the Acting Chair of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission who wanted to know the extent to which 1997 Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace and a 2017 Memorandum Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty remain operative. OLC responded that recent developments require two exceptions to continuing to enforce those prior directives:

First ... the Supreme Court held in Groff that an employer experiences “undue hardship” only where the burden posed by an accommodation would be “substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.”... Thus, under Title VII, an agency cannot deny a religious accommodation if the burden imposed on the agency by the accommodation in the context of the agency’s work is insubstantial. Agencies should therefore disregard references in the 1997 Guidelines to the “de minimis” standard as inconsistent with their statutory obligations....

Second, the 1997 Guidelines provide that, although agencies generally may not “restrict personal religious expression by employees in the Federal workplace,” agencies must restrict such expression where it “creates the appearance, to a reasonable observer, of an official endorsement of religion.”... Again, that restriction reflected Supreme Court precedent that has since been abrogated....

The 1997 Guidelines’ “official endorsement” test thus creates a special restriction on religious expression without a constitutionally valid justification.  

... [O]ur conclusion that the “appearance of official endorsement” test can no longer be enforced does not mean that all religious expression in the workplace must be permitted. Nor does it mean that the Constitution imposes no limits on religious conduct or expression by government employees. The Supreme Court has never cast doubt on the principle that government employers can prohibit disruptive or coercive behavior by their employees regardless of the religious nature of that conduct.

The OLC Opinion also went on to provide that telework as a form of religious accommodation for federal employees may still be used despite President Trump's directive to federal employees to return to in-person work.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

11th Circuit En Banc: Exclusion of Sex-Change Surgeries from Health Care Coverage Is Not Facially Discriminatory Under Title VII

In Lange v. Houston County, Georgia, (11 Cir., Sept. 9, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, in an 8-5 decision, held that a county's employee health insurance plan is not facially discriminatory under Title VII by reason of its exclusion of coverage for "sex change surgery." The case generated 8 opinions spanning 108 pages. The majority opinion relied in large part on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Skrmetti. The majority said in part:

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Skrmetti applies equally here. The County’s policy does not pay for a sex change operation for anyone regardless of their biological sex....

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that transgender status is separately protected under Title VII apart from sex. And Bostock did not add transgender status, as a category, to the list of classes protected by Title VII. To the contrary, the Court expressly denied that it was answering any question other than “whether an employer who fires someone simply for being . . . transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against that individual ‘because of such individual’s sex’” within the meaning of Title VII’s plain terms....

Although the plaintiffs’ claim in Skrmetti arose under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court expressly held that the state statute at issue did not discriminate based on transgender status under the same Title VII precedents that we must apply here....

In short, the County’s plan does not facially violate Title VII. The County’s plan draws a line between certain treatments, which it covers, and other treatments, which it does not. That line may or may not be appropriate as a matter of health care policy, but it is not facial discrimination based on protected status.

Judge Newsome filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I write separately simply to emphasize that I don’t take either Skrmetti or today’s en banc opinion to collapse the separate analyses that apply to claims under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause....

Judge Rosenbaum filed an opinion concurring in the judgment

... I haven’t found a meaningful way to distinguish Houston County’s healthcare plan—which excludes from coverage certain surgeries, but only if they involve (in the words of the plan) a “sex change” (a procedure one would have only to address gender dysphoria)—from the law at issue in Skrmetti.  So Skrmetti requires me to conclude that the plan doesn’t classify by sex.   

I say this with deep regret for three reasons.  First, ...  the record compellingly reveals that Houston County precludes sex-affirming surgeries for discriminatory reasons..... Second, most respectfully, Skrmetti’s conclusion that the law there didn’t discriminate by sex or transgender status ... conflicts with decades of Title VII jurisprudence....  And third, Skrmetti’s determination that the law there didn’t discriminate by sex or transgender status ... effectively imports the reasoning of Geduldig v. Aiello ... into Title VII jurisprudence.  But Congress expressly amended Title VII to reject the holding and reasoning of Geduldig....

Judge Jill Pryor, joined by Judges Jordan, Abudu, Kidd and Wilson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The majority opinion concludes that the County health plan’s exclusion of medical care related to a “sex change” does not discriminate based on sex or transgender status because it merely “draws a line between certain treatments, which it covers, and other treatments, which it does not.” ... This is the exact same reasoning that both Congress and the Supreme Court rejected for Title VII claims....

The Skrmetti majority’s discussion of Bostock does not bind us. No Title VII claim was before the Supreme Court. Skrmetti therefore did not and could not decide whether an employer’s insurance plan that bases coverage of medical treatments on sex or transgender status violates Title VII. Nor did Skrmetti address the use of equal protection precedent in the Title VII context in commenting on Bostock.... Although we do not take lightly Supreme Court dicta, we simply are not free to follow it in the face of binding Supreme Court authority to the contrary. After all, “[t]he Supreme Court has told us, over and over again, to follow any of its decisions that directly applies in a case, even if the reasoning of that decision appears to have been rejected in later decisions and leave to that Court ‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”...

Judge Abudu filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I write separately to acknowledge the ongoing cultural war in which this Court, like courts before us, has had to participate.  Our role is to ensure that, regardless of religious, political, or other ideologies, the law applies equally to all.  The majority’s decision, unfortunately, undermines that goal and sets us up for yet another episode in our Circuit’s legal history where the majority just gets the outcome wrong, and the short- and long-term implications of its flawed decision cannot be ignored....

The majority reaches its conclusion without acknowledging the elephant in the room—transgender rights have come to the forefront of debate in recent years, shining a necessary light on areas of society still rife with discrimination....

... [L]ike the early work of eliminating explicit sex- and gender based distinctions in the law, we only are tasked with reading Houston County’s healthcare exclusions to decide whether they, on their face, treat Deputy Lange worse because she is transgender, i.e., that her sex was the “but-for cause” of Houston County’s decision to deny her medical coverage.  The healthcare exclusions do just that.... 

Judge Wilson, joined by Judges Abudu and Kidd, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... Because the majority manipulates Bostock’s but-for test to obfuscate the discrimination apparent on the face of the plan, I dissent.... 

Georgia Recorder reports on the decision.

9th Circuit Upholds Fire Department's Denial of Religious Exemptions from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue, (9th Cir., Sept. 2, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims by eight firefighters that the Snohomish fire department violated Title VII and Washington state law by refusing to accommodate their requests for religious exemptions from the state's Covid vaccine mandate for all healthcare providers. The court said in part:

SRFR has pointed to several substantial costs of accommodating Plaintiff’s requested vaccine exemption— the health and safety of its own firefighters and the public, the large number of firefighters seeking accommodations, the risk to its operations and the cost of widespread absences, the potential loss of a lucrative contract with DOC, and the risk of additional liability.  SRFR also provided unrebutted medical evidence that showed the inadequacy of Plaintiffs’ proposed accommodation.  All of this amounts to a showing that SRFR could not reasonably have accommodated Plaintiffs without undue hardship in October 2021....

We cannot judge SRFR by the responses taken by other fire departments....  Nor can we judge SRFR with the clarity of hindsight or the benefit of post-pandemic debates over what measured responses frontline employers should have taken.  We must consider the costs faced by SRFR in October 2021, not today.... [A]t the time the Governor issued the Proclamation, “COVID-19 cases were spiking....  The pandemic forced the State of Washington to make decisions quickly and with limited information.  In so doing, SRFR relied on the scientific evidence and COVID data then available and acted in the best interests of the community....

State Office Violated Title VII by Refusing to Allow Jehovah's Witness to Attach Addendum to Required Employment Oath

In Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the California State Controller, (ED CA, Aug. 29, 2025), a California federal district court, in a case on remand from the 9th Circuit (see prior posting), granted summary judgment to plaintiff on her Title VII failure to accommodate claim.  Plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, insisted on attaching an Addendum to the oath she was required to take as an employee of the State Controller's Office.  She contended that the required Oath violated her religious beliefs in four ways, one of which was the Oath’s language that she "will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California."  She contended that this conflicted with her religious belief that "her allegiance is first and foremost to God."

The court said in part:

The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff’s religious beliefs conflict with the “true faith and allegiance” provision.  Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Schmalz opined that “the requirement to ‘bear true faith and allegiance’ presents a conflict with a typical Jehovah’s Witness’ most basic loyalty to Jehovah God — a fundamental precept guiding Watchtower belief and practice.” 

Plaintiff's proposed Addendum read:

I, [Plaintiff], vow to uphold the Constitutions of the United States and that of the State of California while working in my role as an employee of the [SCO].  I will be honest and fair in my dealings and neither dishonor the Office by word nor deed.  By signing this oath, I understand that I shall not be required to bear arms, engage in violence, nor participate in political or military affairs.  Additionally, I understand that I am not giving up my right to freely exercise my religion, nor am I denouncing my religion by accepting this position.

The court concluded:

... [T]he undisputed evidence shows that Defendants would not have experienced an undue hardship if Plaintiff had been allowed to attach the Proposed Addendum and sign the Oath, as she requested.

The court dismissed several of plaintiff's other claims.

8th Circuit: Evidence Did Not Support Dismissal of Jail Administrator's Title VII Religious Discrimination Case

In Naylor v. County of Muscatine, Iowa, (8th Cir., Aug. 19, 2025), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit brought by a county jail administrator who was fired because of his online postings.  The court said in part:

At the district court, Muscatine County argued it would suffer two types of undue hardship if it continued to employ Naylor as jail administrator. First, the County argued that keeping Naylor on would cause the jail undue hardship because the publicity surrounding his online commentary—which included disparaging views of Muslims and “the gay lifestyle”—had harmed its public image....

We assume, but need not decide, that public image effects can present issues for an organization sufficient to rise to the level of an undue hardship under Title VII. Here, the County has simply not provided sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment on this ground....

As a second, related type of undue hardship, Muscatine County argued to the district court that retaining Naylor as the jail administrator would imperil its business relationships. The district court agreed, relying on evidence that two outside entities—USMS and Johnson County—considered ending their agreements to send their overflow detainees to the jail as a result of Naylor’s online commentary, and that the loss of these relationships would cause a significant financial burden to Muscatine County. While a reasonable jury could find this evidence sufficient to establish an undue hardship, the evidence is insufficient to support the grant of summary judgment.