In Talbott v. United States, (D DC, March 18, 2025), the United States federal district court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction barring the military from implementing Executive Orders and military memoranda that exclude transgender persons from serving in the military. The injunction requires the military to maintain the pre-Trump status quo on military service by transgender individuals. Explaining its decision, the court's 79-page opinion said in part:
The Court agrees that “courts [are] ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have” and that “the military authorities [not courts] have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation’s military policy.”... Often, courts accept “the reasoned, professional analysis of Congress and the Executive on matters strictly within the realm of military expertise.”...
Defendants carry deference too far, however. By “defer” they basically mean the Court must side with the military’s position, end-stop. And they contend the Court must defer even if the judgment, as here, does not make sense....
The Court ... applies Bostock’s reasoning to analyze the Military Ban. In doing so, it does not “import[] the Title VII test for liability,” ... into the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, it borrows Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning to conclude that transgender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination for purposes of the equal protection inquiry....
... [B]ecause the Military Ban targets transgender persons for disparate treatment, it creates an explicit sex-based classification that requires application of intermediate scrutiny. ...
The court also concluded that the Military Ban is subject to intermediate scrutiny because transgender persons should be considered a quasi-suspect class. The court went on:
Defendants have articulated important government objectives in military readiness, unit cohesion, and saving costs. But the Fifth Amendment requires more than pointing to such “broadly formulated interests.”... Defendants must show that the discriminatory Military Ban is in some way substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. And they must do so without relying on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” ... They do not come close. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Military Ban fails intermediate scrutiny review.....
The Military Ban is soaked in animus and dripping with pretext. Its language is unabashedly demeaning, its policy stigmatizes transgender persons as inherently unfit, and its conclusions bear no relation to fact. Thus, even if the Court analyzed the Military Ban under rational basis review, it would fail....
The Court could stop here in its analysis and comfortably conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Military Ban is motivated by animus and is not tailored to meet its stated goals. But, as they say, there is more, for the Military Ban does not stand alone. President Trump has signed an executive order recognizing the existence of only two sexes; blocked schools from using federal funds to promote the idea that gender can be fluid; directed the State Department to stop issuing documents that allow a third “X” gender marker; changed references to “LGBTQI+” on government websites to “LGB,” erasing not just transgender persons, but intersex people as well; revoked the ability of transgender federal employees to receive gender-affirming care; and directed that all incarcerated transgender persons be denied medical treatments and be housed by birth sex, where they are nine times more susceptible to violence....
NPR reports on the decision.