Suit Seeks Accommodation for Christian Library Employee Who Objects To Using Co-Workers' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Suit was filed yesterday in a Louisiana federal district court by a Library Technician who was fired for refusing to comply with the library's Inclusivity Policy that requires employees to refer to fellow employees by their chosen name and pronoun.  Plaintiff Luke Ash is also a Christian pastor. The complaint (full text) in Ash v. City of Baton Rouge Louisiana, (MD LA, filed 7/9/2026) alleges in part:

Ash has sincerely held religious beliefs that God created mankind in his own image, and that each individual is created either male or female.... Ash also has sincerely held religious beliefs that biological sex is immutable....  Because of his sincerely held religious beliefs, Ash has sincere religious convictions and beliefs that referring to a person by pronouns inconsistent with their biological sex both dishonors God’s design for that person and constitutes a lie and a grave sin....  Ash believes that he is compelled to tell the truth, even to those who may disagree....

Ash had never, at any point, referred to any co-worker directly using pronouns inconsistent with their preference, and he had certainly never done so after being told by such individual that the pronoun he used was incorrect....

Ash contends that his firing violated his federal and state free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights and that under Title VII the Library was required to provide him a reasonable accommodation from the Inclusivity Policy. The complaint alleges in part:

Permitting Ash to maintain respectful communications to those with whom he interacts at the Library while maintaining compliance with his sincerely held religious beliefs would have been a reasonable accommodation that would impose no hardship whatsoever on the Defendants or the Library. 

The complaint also asks for an injunction barring enforcement of the Inclusivity Policy and asks for reinstatement of plaintiff. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

1st Circuit Upholds Maine's Antidiscrimmination Rules For Religious Schools Except Its Religiouis Expression Nondiscrimination Requirement

Last week, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in two cases raising similar, but not identical, challenges to the antidiscrimination requirements of Maine's Human Rights Act. The schools particularly focused on provisions barring religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  The Act applies to private schools that receive public funding, such as funding under Maine's tuition assistance program.

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court in a 108-page opinion, held that the employment nondiscrimination rule "does not credibly threaten to injure St. Dominic".  The court said in part:

While the rule generally bars schools from employment discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, the MHRA contains two specific carveouts for religious schools that apply regardless of whether a school participates in the tuition-assistance program.  First, section 4553(4) expressly protects a religious school's ability to discriminate "with respect to employment of its members of the same religion, sect or fraternity."... Second, section 4573-A(2) allows a religious school to "require that all applicants and employees conform to [its] religious tenets."

The court also held that neither the ban on religious discrimination in admissions nor the ban on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination trigger strict scrutiny. The court said in part:

[T]he Religious Nondiscrimination Rule does not exclude any school solely because of its religious character.  Rather, the rule excludes a school because it discriminates against students on the basis of the students' religion, a practice that is neither uniquely religious nor uniquely tied to religious schools.... In short, the State is simply saying that a school in Maine, whether religious or not, cannot accept public funds while simultaneously putting up, for example, a "No Protestant Children Need Apply" sign....

... [T]he record does not suggest that religious schools, by their nature, engage in sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination.... Simply put, barring sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination does not exclude religious schools from the tuition-assistance program solely based on their religious character....

Just as combatting religious discrimination qualifies as a legitimate governmental pursuit, so too combatting sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination rises to the level....  And the imposition of liability for sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination on those schools that accept public funding rationally relates to those antidiscrimination goals, as does the requirement that such schools respect students' expression of their gender identity....

The court, however, ordered the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule that  provides "to the extent that an educational institution permits religious expression, it cannot discriminate between religions in doing so." The court said in part:

St. Dominic, as part of its religious mission, requires students to attend religion classes, Mass, and other religious activities.  These activities necessarily entail some degree of student participation.  Even under the Commissioner's reading of the Religious Expression Rule, then, if a preacher at a school-mandated Mass permits students to say "Amen" in order to signify agreement, St. Dominic would then be required to allow expressions of disagreement.  And in the classroom, inculcation often solicits -- indeed encourages -- affirmation, for example in the form of an iterative exchange of expression.  Few would teach the Lord's Prayer without having the students recite it; and under the Religious Expression Rule that recitation would, in turn, appear to require the school to allow the reciting of, for example, the Hare Krishna Mahā mantra.  And while such an example may seem fanciful, the point is that the Religious Expression Rule would inevitably interfere with a religious school's ability to foster an expressive environment consistent with its religious mission.....

Here, the Religious Expression Rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out "religious expression." ...

In Crosspoint Church v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court considered additional challenges to Maine's antidiscrimination rules as they apply to religious schools. Crosspoint Church contended that 2021 amendments to the state's anti-discrimination laws were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Carson v. Makin that required Maine to include religious schools in its tuition assistance program.  The court said in part:

The State likely adopted the 2021 Amendments at least partially in response to the Carson litigation.  But we will not infer something as sinister as an "express[] design[]" to discriminate against a specific religious entity where Maine offers a quite logical and compelling rationale for the amendments' structure and timing: 

If [the State's] Legislature anticipated that the [Carson] litigation might result in [the State] being prohibited from excluding religious schools from [public funding], it would have been entirely appropriate to then make the same distinction in education as the Legislature did [years earlier] for employment and housing and require religious organizations that accept public funds to comply with [all antidiscrimination rules]. 

Thus, just as we concluded in St. Dominic that the plaintiffs there had not shown that general antireligious animus likely motivated the 2021 Amendments,... so too do we hold here that Crosspoint has not shown that specific anti-BCS animus motivated the same amendments....

The court also rejected Crosspoint's free expression claims, saying in part:

The Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, Crosspoint contends, regulates speech because it would "require BCS to affirm a student's gender identity and sexual orientation," even though it would "violate[] BCS's statement of faith to admit a student or allow a student to remain enrolled who violates BCS's statement of faith by presenting as a gender not consistent with his or her biological sex."...

... [H]ere, Crosspoint seeks to refuse admission to (and expel) any student who is gay or transgender, irrespective of that student's speech.  Although such refusal may express Crosspoint's views regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule would interfere with that expression, that does not transform the rule into a speech regulation....

Michigan Catholic Charities Sues State Officials Over Ouster as Provider of Women's Substance Abuse Services

Last week, Catholic Charities serving the Lansing, Michigan area filed suit against the director of Michigan's Department of Health and Human Services, Michigan's Attorney General and other Michigan officials as well as Mid-State Health Network that administers the Department's Medicaid and federal Substance Use Block Grant funds. Catholic Charities, through Cristo Rey Counseling Center, offers federally funded services for women with substance use disorders. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Charities of Ingham, Eaton & Clinton Counties v. Hertel, (WD MI, filed 6/26/2026), alleges that Mid-State discontinued Cristo Rey as a provider under the program after questioning the Counseling Center's requirement that its staff not discuss or make referrals for abortions, contraception, gender identity, or adoption placements with same-sex couples. It alleges that Michigan state Attorney General Dana Nessel is providing legal guidance to the Department of Health and Human Services, and that "Nessel harbors ... hostility toward Catholic and other religious organizations that hold sincere religious beliefs about abortion and contraception...." The complaint alleges that discontinuing Cristo Rey as a provider violates its 1st and 14th Amendment rights as well as federal statutory provisions. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Allows Schools to Exclude Transgender Females from Girls' and Women's Sports Teams

In West Virginia v. B.J.P., (Sup. Ct., June 20, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may exclude transgender females from girls' and women's athletic teams without violating either Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kavanaugh, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett said in part:

Notably, B. P. J. does not seriously contest that the term “sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the regulations means biological sex.  Moreover, B. P. J. agrees ... that Title IX permits schools to maintain separate female and male teams and to prohibit most biological males from playing on women’s and girls’ teams.  B. P. J. disagrees with West Virginia and the United States only about whether schools must make an exception to that general rule for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

But the texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools must allow certain biological males to participate in women’s and girls’ sports....

Some percentage of biological males who identify as male possess physical and athletic capabilities that fall within (or below) the range of typical female physical and athletic capabilities. But the plaintiffs acknowledge that States may still exclude those biological males from women’s and girls’ sports, given the general physical differences between males and females.

And the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the States from applying that same principle to all biological males, including those who identify as female. In the distinctive sports context, in other words, the States may treat all biological males the same and treat all biological females the same, given the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.....

In so ruling, we emphasize one last point.  Most of the biological female and transgender student-athletes who are involved in transgender sports disputes around the country are teenagers or in their early twenties.  Those student athletes want to play sports. Their desire to compete warrants respect. No student-athlete on either side of the issue, whether a biological female or transgender, deserves to be ostracized or vilified.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are.  Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic ...; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex.... To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].”...

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... Nothing in Title IX clearly and unambiguously alerts funding recipients that they are prohibited from restricting a school-sponsored sports team to biological women or girls....

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment, saying in part:

 ... West Virginia might be right that transgender girls retain some inherent athletic advantage over cisgender girls due to their sex identified at birth even after receiving the hormonal therapy B. P. J. identifies. All agree, moreover, that States do have some room to legislate around issues when there exists significant, and genuine, scientific debate. At this point, however, neither the District Court nor the Fourth Circuit has passed upon any of the available evidence or made the necessary factual findings about the state of the scientific debate....

Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, saying in part:

... [T]he majority is wrong to suggest that the term “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.”...  Title IX makes room for individuals to live in the gender they choose; it cares not just about sex assigned at birth but also about individuals’ ability to match (or not) their gender presentation to their gender identity.  Because West Virginia’s law forces B. P. J. to live—in this case, to play—as a boy though she is a girl, it might well run afoul of Title IX properly construed.

Reuters reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Grants Review on Standing of Parents to Challenge Notification About Children Receiving Gender-Affirming Care

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday granted review in International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, (Docket No. 25-840, certiorari granted 6/29/2026). (Order List.). At issue in the case is whether parents whose children have gender dysphoria and might run away from home in the future have standing to challenge a group of Washington laws that exempt youth shelters from notifying parents that their children are in the shelter when the child is seeking gender-affirming care. Instead, the shelter is to notify the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF).  DCYF must then contact the parents and offer to make referrals for behavioral health services and family reconciliation services.

In a July 2025 decision (full text), the 9th Circuit held that parents had not alleged sufficient current or future injury to grant standing. The 9th Circuit subsequently denied en banc review over the dissents of three judges. The petition for certiorari frames the Question Presented as:

Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision making role as to “gender transitions” of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.

Supreme Court Review Sought by Teacher Who Objects to School's Gender identity Policy

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to a Maryland school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. (See prior posting.) The petition for review poses the Questions Presented as:

1. When public schools try to force teachers, over their religious objections, to use pronouns inconsistent with a student’s biological sex and to hide from parents information about their child’s gender expression at school, does Smith apply and foreclose heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause?  

2. Do public schools violate the Free Speech Clause when they compel objecting teachers to adhere to such a school policy?

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

FTC and States Sue Organization Setting Standards for Pediatric Trans Care

The Federal Trade Commission along with the states of Alaska, Iowa, Nebraska and Texas, filed suit yesterday against the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) alleging violations of federal and state fraud and consumer protection laws. WPATH develops Standards of Care (SOC) for pediatric medical gender transitioning. Its SOC are relied upon by clinicians and insurance companies. The 123-page complaint (full text) in Federal Trade Commission v. World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Inc., (ND TX, filed 6/17/2026), alleges in part:

9. In addition to representing that the SOC itself, and the life-altering surgeries it recommends, reflect expert consensus and high-quality evidence, WPATH represents in the SOC that these and other transition services are medically necessary and effective at preventing suicide in children, that puberty blockers are fully reversible, that cross-sex hormones improve mental health, and that breast amputations are safe, effective, and consistently and directly increase children’s health-related quality of life....

14. The success of WPATH’s systematic efforts to expand eligibility for transition services to children in order to profit its members is difficult to overstate. Through the SOC and its other efforts, WPATH has created and currently sustains a lucrative industry of pediatric medical transition services. Over roughly the past two decades, the number of pediatric medical transition providers has multiplied rapidly. The first pediatric medical transition clinic in the United States opened in 2007. By 2015, there were at least forty-one pediatric medical transition clinics across the United States, many embedded within major children’s hospitals and academic medical centers. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of children who were diagnosed yearly with distress about their sex traits in the U.S. nearly tripled from around 15,000 in 2017 to about 42,000 in 2021....

18.  WPATH falsely asserts that its recommendations are the result of rigorous scientific procedures and expert consensus, even though WPATH disregarded established guideline‑development standards, ignored the results of its own evidence reviews, and removed age limits in response to external pressure rather than scientific evidence....

The FTC issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.  AP reports on the lawsuit.

D.C. Circuit: Transgender Troops Can Remain in Military, But Ban on New Trans Enlistees Remains for Now

As previously reported, in March 2025 the federal district court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction barring the military from implementing Executive Orders and military memoranda that exclude transgender persons from serving in the military. Now in Talbott v. United States, (DC Cir., June 1, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the preliminary injunction insofar as it applies to named plaintiffs who are already serving in the military but vacated the preliminary injunction insofar as it applies to the named plaintiffs seeking to enlist. This result came in a fragmented vote of the 3-judge panel which generated three separate opinions spanning a total of 107 pages.

Judge Wilkins concluded that all the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection challenge and that those already serving in the military are entitled to a preliminary injunction.  However, he held that the case should be remanded to the district court for it to consider whether the balance of equities that justify a preliminary injunction are different for those who are merely seeking to enlist.

Discussing the merits, Judge Wilkins concluded that the current policy on transgender service contains classifications that are not sufficiently related to a legitimate government interest; the policy is grounded on archaic and overbroad generalizations about sex, rather than on a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or medical treatment for the condition; gender dysphoria is treated differently than any other medical condition; and the policy contains classifications that are based on invidious discrimination. He concluded in part:

What has been clearly and repeatedly explained are the foundational premises of the Hegseth Policy:  persons with a “false gender identity” are unfit for the military, and persons with a history of gender dysphoria are also unfit because they lack “honesty, humility, . . . and integrity.”... [T]hose animus-filled reasons were expressly given to justify aspects of the Hegseth Policy....  Unless we are going to fall for the old Groucho Marx line—“who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?”—we have direct evidence in this case that animus motivated the classifications in the Hegseth Policy. 

Senior Circuit Judge Rogers filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He would affirm the district court's preliminary injunction in full, saying in part:

Given the uncontested record evidence and the nature of this court’s review for abuse of discretion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the Hegseth Policy on accession.  This is so even if based on the evidence and argument before it, the district court could have concluded that the retention policy imposes “a much greater hardship” on those currently in the military than those who seek to join it, as Judge Wilkins concludes,... and only enjoined the Hegseth Policy on retention due to  national security concerns.  But the existence of a permissible alternative is not the same as showing that the district court abused its discretion by choosing another permissible alternative....

Judge Walker filed a dissenting opinion. He would reverse in full the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. He said in part:

Sometimes a case will present an open question informed only by confusing and contradictory precedents.  This is not one of those cases.  Rather, ... an unbroken line of unambiguous authorities directs us to uphold a military policy (1) when it does not conflict with a statutory command, (2) when it reflects a “professional military judgment[],” and (3) when it addresses a perceived, military-wide need regarding the “composition, training, equipping, [or] control” of the armed forces.

The policy challenged today meets those criteria.

ABC News reports on the decision.

Tennessee Enacts Women's Safety and Protection Act

On May 22, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee signed SB0468, the Women's Safety and Protection Act (full text). The new law defines the terms "male" and "female" for purposes of any state law or administrative rule in terms of a person's biological reproductive system. It defines the term "sex" as an individual's biological sex as observed or clinically verified at birth. The law goes on to require public schools, domestic violence shelters, correctional facilities and juvenile detention facilities to designate each multi-occupancy restroom, changing room, and sleeping quarters for the exclusive use of either females, males, or members of the same family. With limited exceptions, it prohibits individuals from entering facilities designated for the opposite sex. ADF issued a press release announcing the governor's signing of the bill.

Washington Foster Care Licensing Agency Modifies Rules in Settlement of Litigation

 As previously reported, in DeGross v. Hunter, (WD WA, April 22, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to dismiss free speech and free exercise claims against the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) brought by a Christian couple who objected to the Department's policy on sexual orientation and gender identity. The state has required prospective foster parents to agree to support a foster child's sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE), including using their preferred pronouns and chosen name. The parties have now agreed to a settlement in the case and the Washington federal district court yesterday issued a permanent injunction reflecting the parties' agreement. 

The injunction in the case, now captioned DeGross v. Senn, (WD WA, May 20, 2026), bars DCYF from denying or imposing conditions on a foster family home license solely because of a family's religious beliefs, including speech and actions pertaining to marriage, gender, or sexual relationships. Instead DCYF will amend it rules to require foster parents to either connect, or allow DCYF to connect, their foster child to resources and supports relating to their race, religion, culture, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, developmental capabilities, tribal affiliations, heightened medical needs, behavioral needs, and any other aspect of the child’s individual identity.

The injunction goes on to provide in part:

3. DCYF is prohibited from requiring foster parents to agree to use prescribed words or language, including chosen pronouns, to express views about sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression inconsistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs as a condition of licensure....

6. During the licensing process, DCYF shall be permitted to inquire about an applicant’s views regarding SOGIE. This line of inquiry shall be no different from other information gathering concerning the variety of identities of prospective children in care. 

7. Nothing in this Order prohibits DCYF or a child-placing agency from inquiring about a child’s SOGIE before placement, just as it does for all children for all components of their individual characteristics, including identities. 

8. ... Nothing in this order prohibits DCYF from deciding a child’s placements based on its individualized consideration of the child’s needs and of a foster parent’s concerns or limitations (including where religiously motivated) on their ability or willingness to meet the child’s specific needs, including with regard to their SOGIE....

ADF issued a press release announcing the settlement. 

South Carolina Enacts Student Physical Privacy Act

Last Friday, South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster signed into law H4756, the South Carolina Student Physical Privacy Act (full text). The new law (with narrow exceptions) requires public schools and public colleges and universities to designate multi-occupancy restrooms and changing facilities for use only by members of one sex at a time. "Sex" is defined as "a person's biological sex, either male or female, as observed or clinically verified at birth." The new law also requires all public schools and public colleges and universities to "provide for a single-user restroom and changing facility" or an accommodation by allowing temporary exclusive use of a multi-occupancy rest room.

The new law also provides that during any activity or event sponsored by a public school or college, no student shall be required to share sleeping quarters with a member of the opposite sex. Colleges that provide student housing must provide students the option to be housed only with persons of the same sex.

Texas and DOJ Settle With Texas Hospital Ending Its Gender Transition Services and Creating Detransition Clinic

Last Friday, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton and the U.S. Department of Justice announced an unusual settlement agreement with Texas Children's Hospital ending the hospital's gender transition services. AG Paxton's press release (full text) describing the settlement says in part:

... [The settlement agreement] compels the creation of the country’s first-ever Detransition Clinic; requires the hospital to pay $10 million for billing Texas Medicaid for unallowable and illegal ‘gender-transition’ interventions, including by using false diagnosis codes; and compels the termination and revocation of privileges of multiple physicians....

Under the terms of this landmark agreement, Texas Children’s will establish the first-ever multidisciplinary clinic designed to provide medical care to patients who were subjected to “gender-transition” procedures. This Detransition Clinic will help patients reverse the damage caused by ideologically-motivated physicians who harmed patients by performing dangerous medical interventions for the purpose of “transitioning” them. For the first five years, all services provided through the Detransition Clinic will be funded by Texas Children’s and be free of charge to patients. 

As part of the settlement, Texas Children’s has also agreed to fire, permanently and irrevocably terminate all existing privileges, and never again hire or credential five woke doctors who performed harmful medical interventions on Texans.As part of the settlement, Texas Children’s agrees not to provide “gender-transition” services; will implement a host of compliance and ethics measures.

The U.S. Justice Department also issued a press release saying that the settlement resolves federal claims that Texas Children's violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the False Claims Act, and federal fraud and conspiracy laws.  It noted that "At all times during the investigation, TCH remained cooperative, proactive, and solution-driven..."

Houston Public Media reports on the settlement and quotes Texas Childrens' as saying in part: 

Today, we made the difficult decision to settle with the Texas Attorney General and the Department of Justice, closing a chapter that has been wrought with falsehoods and distractions. To be clear – we are settling to protect our resources from endless and costly litigation. This settlement will allow us to redirect those precious resources to focus on the life-saving care and groundbreaking discoveries of our exceptional clinicians and scientists.

[Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

ED Says Smith College Should Lose Title IX Exception for Single-Sex Colleges Because It Admits "Biological Men"

The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights announced on Monday that it has opened a Title IX sex-discrimination investigation of Smith College for admitting transgender women to the all-women's school. The DOE announcement said in part:

Today, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) opened an investigation into Smith College, one of the nation’s largest all-women's colleges, for admitting biological men and granting them access to women-only spaces, including dormitories, bathrooms, locker rooms, and athletic teams....

Title IX contains a single-sex exception that allows colleges to enroll all-male or all-female student bodies—but the exception applies on the basis of biological sex difference, not subjective gender identity. An all-girls college that enrolls male students professing a female identity would cease to qualify as single sex under Title IX.

When an institution holds itself out as being an all-women’s college, it is not just promising to deliver female-only dorms and bathrooms, and single-sex athletics; it is also committing to maintain a student body that makes possible a particular form of sorority and camaraderie....  

The investigation stems from a civil rights complaint filed last year by the advocacy organization Defending Education. Politico reports on the Department's action.

Suit Challenges Idaho's Ban on Transgender Use of Gender-Conforming Bathrooms

Six transgender residents of Idaho filed a class-action lawsuit last week in an Idaho federal district court challenging recently enacted HB 752, an Idaho law that prohibits "knowingly and willfully enter[ing] a restroom or changing room in a government-owned building or a place of public accommodation ... that is designated for use by the opposite biological sex of such person...." The statute includes exceptions to the ban for various emergency, health-related and similar situations. A violation is punishable by up to one year in prison. A second violation within five years is punishable by up to five years in prison. The complaint (full text) in Jackson-Edney v. Labrador, (D ID, filed 4/29/2026), alleges that the law is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating on the basis of sex and transgender status. It also contends that it violates plaintiffs' right to informational privacy by compelling disclosure of a person's transgender status.

ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

1st Amendment Challenges to State's Foster Care Licensing Policy Move Ahead

In DeGross v. Hunter, (WD WA, April 22, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to dismiss free speech and free exercise claims against the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families brought by a Christian couple who object to the Department's policy on sexual orientation and gender identity. The state requires prospective foster parents to agree to support a foster child's sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE), including using their preferred pronouns and chosen name. The DeGrosses were granted only a limited foster care license because they would not agree to fully implement the state's policy. The court said in part:

The DeGrosses have plausible alleged that Policy § 1520 draws distinctions based on the message the speaker conveys....  Policy § 1520 restricts certain speech by prospective parents on the topic of SOGIE, while requiring speech that aligns with the state’s perspective.... 

In essence, the Department has forced the DeGrosses to choose between forfeiting their freedom of speech to obtain an unrestricted license, or upholding their beliefs surrounding SOGIE, and receiving a less-favorable license subject to certain restrictions.   

The DeGrosses have carried their burden to show that the Department’s enforcement of Policy § 1520 plausibly constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.  Thus, the DeGrosses alleged sufficient facts to show a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny....

... [T]he DeGrosses plausibly allege the Department’s policy at issue here puts the DeGrosses in an unfair predicament: they may obtain an unrestricted foster care license but only if they disavow their religious beliefs.... "[S]uch a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny." ...

... “A law is not generally applicable if it ‘invites’ the government to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions.’”... 

... [T]he DeGrosses have carried their burden, at the motion to dismiss stage, to show that § 1520 is neither neutral nor generally applicable.  Thus, the DeGrosses alleged sufficient facts to show a First Amendment violation of freedom of religion unless Defendants can satisfy strict scrutiny.  Based on the limited record before it, the Court is unable to determine at this time whether Defendants can satisfy strict scrutiny.  Thus, the DeGrosses’ freedom of religion claim survives the motion to dismiss.

The court however dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection claim.

European Court Invalidates Hungarian Law Shielding Minors from Transgender and Homosexual Depictions

In European Commission v. Hungary, (CJEU, April 21, 2026), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that Hungary's Law on the Protection of Children and other provisions of Hungarian law adopted in 2021 violate the Treaty on European Union and other EU rules. Hungary's Law on the Protection of Children provides in part:

‘In order to safeguard the objectives set out in this Law and to ensure the protection of children’s rights, making the following available to persons under the age of 18 shall be prohibited: pornography, as well as content that depicts sexuality for its own purposes, or that promotes or portrays deviation from the self-identity corresponding to the sex assigned at birth, gender reassignment, or homosexuality.’

The European Commission brought an action against Hungary challenging its 2021 enactments. In a 621-paragraph opinion, the Court of Justice said in part:

446... [T]he fact that a legislative act ... states, according to its title, that it is laying down ‘stricter measures in respect of persons convicted of paedophilia’, while providing that minors must be protected from portrayals of deviation from ... the sex assigned at birth... or of homosexuality, is also such as to amplify the offensive and stigmatising effect of the provisions ..., or even to encourage the development of hateful conduct towards non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons, given that such persons could thereby be associated with persons convicted of paedophilia....

487   ... [T]he result of the provisions at issue is the stigmatisation and marginalisation of non-cisgender persons – including transgender persons – or non-heterosexual persons, who constitute a minority group of persons, solely on the basis of their gender identity or their sexual orientation.

488    ... Hungary has, in a binding legal act, made an association between the fact of not being cisgender or not being heterosexual, on the one hand, and being convicted of paedophilia, on the other. Such an association, through its offensive and stigmatising effect – an association which is, moreover, such as to encourage the development of hateful conduct towards such persons – violates the human dignity of those persons, for the purposes of Article 1 of the Charter.

489    ... [T]hat association and that stigmatisation entail a group of persons forming an integral part of a society in which pluralism prevails being treated as a threat to that society meriting special legal treatment, which results in such persons’ social ‘invisibility’ being established, maintained, or reinforced, in breach of Article 1 of the Charter....

The Court has also issued a press release and a video explaining the decision. Politico reports on the decision.  [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Certiorari Denied in Challenge to School Policy on Gender Transitioning Students

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, (Docket No. 25-77, certiorari denied 4/20/2026). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held that petitioners' parental rights protected by the 14th Amendment were not infringed by a school Protocol requiring staff to use a student's requested name and gender pronouns in school without notifying parents of the request unless the student consents. Parents' objections to the policy were not religious, but were moral and scientific. Reuters reports on the Supreme Court's action.

Catholic Hospice Sues Over NY Standards for Care of Transgender Patients

Last week, Dominican Sisters who operate a home that provides palliative care for indigent, terminally ill cancer patients filed suit in a New York federal district court challenging New York's requirements for care of transgender patients. The complaint (full text) in Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne v. Hochul, filed 4/6/2026) alleges in part:

New York’s LGBTQ Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights ...  require long-term care facilities to assign patients to rooms based on stated “gender identity” rather than biological sex even over the opposition of the roommate, to permit residents and their visitors of one sex to access bathrooms set aside for those of the opposite sex, to use patients’ “preferred pronouns” even when the patient is not present, to use language and to “create communities” affirming patients’ sexual preferences, to accommodate patients’ desire for extramarital relations, and to post notices affirming compliance with these requirements....

... The Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne and Rosary Hill Home operate in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives and the teachings of the Catholic Church. They cannot comply with the Mandate without violating these sincerely held religious beliefs.....

Requiring a person to identify another by a sex other than his or her God-gifted sex would therefore require such a person to act against central, unchangeable and architectural teachings of the Catholic faith. It would contradict the teachings of the Bible concerning God’s creative sovereignty, contradict reason and truth, and betray our sacred obligation not to knowingly harm other persons, particularly the most vulnerable. The implications are so much greater than whether to utter the words “he” or “she.” Indeed, to demand that a Catholic deny another’s sex is to require him or her to affirm another religious worldview....

The complaint alleges 7 counts: Free Exercise; Religious Autonomy Doctrine; Ministerial Exception; Establishment Clause; Equal Protection; Free Speech; and Expressive Association.

NewsNation reports on the lawsuit.

DOJ Investigating California and Maine for Housing Transgender Women in Women's Prisons

Last Thursday, the Department of Justice announced that it has notified the governors of California and Maine that DOJ is initiating investigations into their housing of transgender women who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery in women's prisons. DOJ's press release reads in part:

“California’s Transgender Respect, Agency, and Dignity Act has provided none of these qualities to the female inmates of state prisons who have been forced to share space with biological men who are violent felons,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli of the Central District of California.  “Our Constitution protects women from having their civil rights violated by harmful state legislation wrapped in the language of ‘equity’ and ‘progress.’”...

In California, the Justice Department will investigate widely reported allegations of deprivation of female prisoners’ rights, including the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion, the Eighth Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  There have been allegations of sexual assaults, rape, voyeurism and a pervasive climate of sexual intimidation due to the presence of males in the women’s prison.

Under California law, men in state prisons, including violent felons charged with sex crimes and who have intact genitals, can request transfer to women’s prisons based on self-identification as transgender.

In Maine, the Justice Department will investigate allegations that Maine has allowed a biological male inmate to remain housed with women despite complaints that the male inmate has assaulted or harassed several female inmates.

9th Circuit Denies En Banc Review of Spa's Policy on Transgender Women, With Unusually Controversial Dissent

Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, (9th Cir., March 12, 2026), is the denial of a panel and en banc rehearings to two Korean Spas that lost their 1st Amendment challenges to application of Washington state's anti-discrimination provisions to the spas admission policies. The spas admitted only "biological women", including transgender women who had received gender confirmation surgery. They excluded transgender women who had not completed that surgery. The original 3-judge panel denied a rehearing, but issued an amended majority opinion amending the opinion originally issued on May 29, 2025 (full text of original opinion). The court then denied en banc review.  Three opinions dissenting from the denial of en banc review were filed. Judge VanDyke's dissenting opinion led to an unusual Statement concurred in by 27 Ninth Circuit judges saying:

The American legal system has long been regarded as a place to resolve disputes in a dignified and civil manner or, as Justice O’Connor put it, to “disagree without being disagreeable.”1 It is not a place for vulgar barroom talk. Nor is it a place to suggest that fellow judges have “collectively lost their minds,” or that they are “woke judges[]” “complicit” in a scheme to harm ordinary Americans. That language makes us sound like juveniles, not judges, and it undermines public trust in the courts. The lead dissent’s use of such coarse language and invective may make for publicity or entertainment value, but it has no place in a judicial opinion. The lead dissent ignores ordinary principles of dignity and civility and demeans this court. Neither the parties nor the panel dissent found it necessary to invoke such crude and vitriolic language. Decorum and collegiality demand more.