Employer's Religious Refusal to Cover Gender Dysphoria in Its Health Plan May Violate Title VII, But Not ADA

In Bernier v. Turbocam, Inc., (D NH, Sept. 28, 2026), Lillian Bernier, a transgender woman, sued her employer because the company refused to provide coverage in its health plan for gender-affirming care. The president of the company and his wife are evangelical Christians who operates the company according to their religious tradition. That includes a belief that a person's sex is ordained by God and that it should not be obscured through medical treatment. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act because the Act excludes from its definition of "disability" gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments. However, the court refused to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII sex discrimination claim, saying in part:

Bernier argues that Turbocam adopted the exclusion (and decided not to modify it for her) because of Turbocam’s discriminatory, sex-based animus....

The record here is sufficient for a jury to find that Bernier’s sex is a but-for cause of Turbocam’s refusal to cover the care she seeks. Turbocam states that it adopted the exclusion, declined to modify it, and refused to grant Bernier an exception from it based on Turbocam’s moral disapproval of Bernier’s effort to obscure or change her sex. Further, there is evidence from which a jury could find that Turbocam’s owner harbored personal animus toward Bernier because of her transgender status....

Turbocam contends that, even if a reasonable jury could find that Bernier carried her burden of showing a Title VII violation, Turbocam is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on Bernier’s Title VII claim because a jury would find in Turbocam’s favor on its RFRA defense.. Bernier responds that RFRA is inapplicable to lawsuits between private parties. The court agrees with Bernier, as do most of the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue...

Because Bernier sued only after the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued her a right-to-sue letter, Turbocam contends that the EEOC has effectively delegated governmental enforcement authority to Bernier such that she is for all intents and purposes the “government” under RFRA.... The court is not persuaded. As a matter of law, the EEOC’s “[m]ere approval” of Bernier’s right to initiate a lawsuit does not convert Bernier into a state actor.....

Turbocam asserts that, even if it may not raise RFRA as a defense to Bernier’s Title VII claim, it may raise a defense under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Turbocam cites no case in which a court has permitted an employer (other than a church or religious institution) to raise the Free Exercise Clause as a defense in an employment discrimination suit brought by a private plaintiff.  Even assuming such a defense is available in this case, Turbocam agrees that it is subject to the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Smith.  

Smith held “that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability.’” 

...Title VII is a neutral law of general applicability. 

While Bernier claims that Turbocam admits it has denied coverage to her because Turbocam opposes gender-affirming care, a reasonable jury could conclude that this does not reflect an intent to discriminate against Bernier because she is transgender.... Moreover, while there is evidence of transgender-based animus in the record, it is also undisputed that Turbocam accommodated Bernier’s name change and addressed another employee’s harassment to Bernier’s satisfaction. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, a reasonable jury could find for Turbocam on Bernier’s Title VII claim....

North Dakota Supreme Court Upholds State's Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In T.D. v. Wrigley, (ND Sup. Ct., Sept. 17, 2026), the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected a facial attack on North Dakota's ban of both hormonal and surgical gender-affirming treatment for minors suffering from gender dysphoria. The court held unanimously that the statute does not violate North Dakota's state constitution. The court said in part:

Dr. Casas contends the Act “infringes on fundamental and inalienable rights enshrined in Article I, § 1 of the North Dakota Constitution.....

... [T]he issue is whether a minor has a fundamental right to a particular course of medical treatment. 

Having identified the right at issue, we address whether the right is one the people intended when they adopted Article I, § 1...

Dr. Casas performs no meaningful historical inquiry tied to the alleged right at issue. He does not argue the records of the constitutional convention discuss a right for a minor to receive a particular course of medical treatment. He points to no newspaper coverage of the convention reporting public discussion of the right he asserts on behalf of his minor patients. Dr. Casas also does not cite a single case before or around 1889 interpreting another state’s natural rights provision to include the right of a minor to receive a particular course of medical treatment.... To the contrary, since statehood, the State has regulated the practice of medicine and prohibited certain medical practices. It has also protected minors’ health and welfare by limiting their rights to make certain decisions or participate in certain activities....

... The State has regulated the practice of medicine since statehood, including prohibiting particular medical procedures notwithstanding physician approval....

Dr. Casas argues the Act classifies based on sex and discriminates against transgender individuals, a class he asserts should be recognized as a suspect class. He argues the district court erred by reviewing the Act under the rational basis standard instead of the strict scrutiny standard. The State responds the Act classifies based on age and medical purpose, not sex or transgender status, and therefore is subject to rational basis review....

Because the Act neither burdens a fundamental right nor classifies based on a suspect class, it is subject to rational basis review....

Contrary to Dr. Casas’s argument, the legislature’s response to the medical uncertainty about the risks and benefits of gender-affirming treatment is not arbitrary. Gender-affirming treatment of minors is relatively novel..... In light of the debate among medical experts about the potential serious and irreversible risks associated with providing gender-affirming treatment to minors, the legislature could rationally decide the procedures are too dangerous for minors, particularly because they may not fully appreciate the long-term consequences of the treatment. ...

Justice Tufte, joined by Justice Jensen, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I write separately because the briefs rest on a premise our modern cases have repeated but never examined: that §§ 21 and 22 [of the North Dakota Constitution] are “equal protection” clauses administered through three tiers of scrutiny determined by suspect classes and a judicial ranking of rights. That construction was assembled between 1974 and 1988 from borrowed federal materials, without examining the text of the state constitution or the history that produced it. The sections themselves are much older. They were copied from an identifiable source and had a settled public meaning when North Dakota’s voters approved them on October 1, 1889. The majority applies our traditional analysis in its discussion of N.D. Const. art. I, § 1. It asks what the words of § 1 meant to the people who adopted them in 1889.... No party asked us to do the same for §§ 21 and 22. Because it appears to me our modern doctrine has strayed from its proper sources, I set forth some of these sources below so that the meaning of these provisions may be more carefully examined in a future case...

Liberty Counsel issued a press release reporting on the decision.

Christian Doctors Challenge Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court contending that the 1st and 14th Amendment rights of Christian doctors are being violated by applying to them the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's Anti-Discrimination Act. In Boe v. Children's Hospital Colorado, (CO Sup. Ct., May 18, 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a children's hospital was violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by complying with a federal effort to end gender-affirming care for minors. The Department of Health and Human Services threatened to cut off federal health care payments to medical providers that continued to offer such services. Now, the 87-page complaint (full text) in Christian Medical & Dental Associations v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 9/9/2026), alleges in part:

1. Colorado is once again at war with common sense, sound science, and religious freedom. After a recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, state law now forces doctors to medically transition their patients—including children—even when doing so violates their conscience and medical judgment. That’s bad for doctors and patients alike. It’s also unconstitutional. Colorado is not allowed to conscript those who have sworn to do no harm into harming the very children and adults entrusted to their care. The First Amendment trumps Colorado’s mandate to embrace the lie of gender ideology.... 

6. CMDA members and Button Family Practice also want to explain their medical services policies and position on pronoun usage by sharing their beliefs about identity to the public. But Colorado makes that illegal, too. If they publish their policies, they could be liable for indicating that they would deny service to someone because of sex, disability, or gender identity or expression—even though they serve people within their scope of practice, no matter a person’s status. To avoid that result, the providers have refrained from posting those statements.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of last week's lawsuit.

New Jersey Expands Protections for Providers and Recipients of Reproductive Health Care; Catholic Conference Provides Guidance for Protesters

On August 20, New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill signed S2260 (full text) into law. The governor's press release announcing the signing of the bill describes it:

The legislation, S2260/A2218, signed today expands existing protections for reproductive healthcare patients and providers. New protections include:

Helping patients physically access care by making it a crime to injure, threaten, intimidate, or physically block patients or providers, or to damage property in an effort to interfere with reproductive healthcare services;

Empowering patients and providers by allowing them to take legal action against individuals who interfere with their access to or delivery of protected care; and

Protecting healthcare providers from professional penalties or adverse actions involving their medical malpractice insurance for providing reproductive healthcare that is legal in New Jersey. 

The legislation also expands New Jersey’s shield laws by expressly including gender-affirming care in the definition of protected reproductive healthcare services. This extends existing protections to patients seeking and providers delivering gender-affirming care in New Jersey. These protections include:

Protecting patient information related to reproductive healthcare from disclosure without prior authorization, as provided by law;

Restricting State entities from assisting certain out-of-state investigations or legal proceedings that seek to impose liability for providing or receiving protected reproductive healthcare; and

Protecting professional licenses by preventing licensing boards from taking action against a provider solely for providing protected reproductive healthcare.

In response, the New Jersey Catholic Conference has issued guidance for anti-abortion protesters in a document titled FAQs Regarding S2260 & Pro-life Activities. It advises in part:

Our call to be a peaceful, prayerful presence for mothers and their children has not changed. This new law does not stop you from praying, witnessing, or offering help outside a facility — it simply draws a clear line around a small set of specific actions. You are encouraged to be aware of that line, stay confidently on the right side of it, and continue this important ministry without fear....

YOU ARE FREE TO: Stand and pray on the public sidewalk; Hold signs; Offer a pamphlet or speak to someone once, as they approach; Sing, read Scripture, or hold a peaceful, stationary vigil; Film, photograph, or post about your own vigil

SIMPLY AVOID: Blocking or standing in a driveway, entrance, or exit; Following or continuing to talk to someone after they say no; Touching, grabbing, or making physical contact with anyone; Threatening, or using/threatening force against, anyone; Physically stopping someone from moving; Making it difficult for someone to access the facility; Damaging the facility's or anyone's property....

Suit Challenges New Jersey School Policy on Social Transitioning

Suit was filed last week in a New Jersey federal district court challenging a school board's policy on dealing with students who seek social gender transition. The school policy provides in part:

Once a student notifies a school official that s/he would like to be referred to by a different pronoun or name, or requests to use the facilities associated with a different gender, his/her school counselor will meet with the student to confidentially discuss the request. During such meeting, the school counselor will also assess the student’s parent/guardian’s knowledge, if any, of the student’s request. If the student’s parent/guardian is not aware of the request, the school counselor will assess whether, and to what extent, parents/guardians can be involved….

The complaint (full text) in Moms for Liberty v. School District of Chathams Board of Education, (D NJ, filed 8/24/2026) contends that this policy violates recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The complaint contends in part:

Parents A and B are practicing Christians who sincerely believe that God created only two genders, male and female....  As Christians, they believe it would be morally wrong to deny one’s God-given status as male or female and purport to be the opposite gender. They also believe that no public school has any right to interfere with the moral and religious formation of their children contrary to their religious beliefs against what they view as the immoral ideology of “transgenderism.”...

These provisions ... further violate the parental rights of Parents A and B by allowing the District to change a student’s name and “gender identity” without parental consent and then allowing the “transitioning” student to live an entire double life at school hidden from his or her parents, solely at the student’s request as affirmed by a school counselor who has no right to interfere in the student’s moral and religious development or to handle the obvious psychological issues involved in a student’s professed gender dysphoria....

Parents A and B have counseled Students C and D to adhere to their Christian beliefs by refusing to pretend that a fellow student has changed his or her gender and must now be referred to by a different name and/or different pronouns that do not correspond to the reality of that student’s God-given gender of male or female.  

Students C and D wish to speak what they believe is the truth of this matter in all its aspects without fear of punishment, both in school and away from school grounds...; For example, they would refuse to say that Tommy is now Sally or that he is now to be referred to as “they” as this would involve uttering what they believe to be lies that contradict their own religious and moral beliefs....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Teacher's Free-Speech Rights Not Infringed by Requirement to Use Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

In Ellis v. The Brooke Charter Schools, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a public charter high school teacher that her free-speech rights were infringed when she was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to comply with the school's requirement that teachers use students' preferred names and pronouns. While the firing was triggered by the teacher's refusal to use a former student's preferred pronouns in a requested letter of recommendation, the teacher's lawsuit alleged that the firing was because of her refusal to comply more broadly with the school's policy. The court said in part:

... [T]he Court finds that ... the requirement that Plaintiff comply with the BCS policy to use students’ preferred names and pronouns, was part of Plaintiff’s official duties as a BCS employee.... [A]ddressing students, particularly in the classroom, is essential to teaching.  A teacher’s official job-related duties, for which she is compensated, require her to communicate with students at her place of employment, including by addressing them in accord with school policy. ...

... [T]o teach effectively, which is inherent in the job duties, requires a teacher to interact with students in a way that does not create a barrier to learning or an unnecessary distraction....

With regards to the letter of recommendation, which again is not the basis of Plaintiff’s free speech claim, although writing letters of recommendation may not be part of a teacher’s principal responsibilities—that is, instructing students on academic curriculum—it is still within the realm of a teacher’s traditional and typical duties.  Recommendation letters are typically written about and derived from knowledge of a student’s classroom performance, communicated via official school channels such as email or letterhead....

The Court, however, need not reach a conclusion as to whether the speech that Plaintiff would have made in connection with the recommendation letter referenced in her complaint would have been a part of her official duties because Plaintiff does not specifically allege or otherwise argue that her refusal to write the letter was the reason for her termination or the basis for her free speech claim....

Further, even if Plaintiff’s speech fell outside of her official duties, her speech did not involve a matter of public concern.... Put simply, “the act of referring to a particular student by a particular name does not contribute to the broader public debate on transgender issues.”...

The school did not ask the court to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims.

Court Grants Reconsideration in Free Exercise Challenge to School's Policy on Student Social Transitioning

In Mead v. Rockford Public School District, (WD MI, Aug. 7, 2026), a Michigan federal district court granted a motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision which held that parents' free exercise rights are not violated by a school's policy that encourages teachers and staff to use a student's preferred name and pronouns and does not necessarily require disclosure of this to the student's parents.  The court relied on the Supreme Court's shadow docket opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta in granting reconsideration. The court said in part:

Like the policies at issue in Mirabelli, the policies here likely created a substantial burden on the Meads’ free-exercise rights.  The Meads share religious beliefs similar to the parents in Mirabelli about the permanency of biological sex and the fixed relationship between sex and gender.  At the time of the alleged violation, the Meads’ child was also around the same age (seventh and eighth grades) as one of the children in Mirabelli (eighth grade).  And like the parents in Mirabelli, the Meads did not have an opportunity to opt their child out of Defendants’ policies.   

Defendants’ policies therefore trigger strict scrutiny.... 

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Cert. Filed by Korean Spa That Only Admits Biological Women

A petition for review (full text) in Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, (Sup. Ct., certiorari filed 8/10/2026), was filed with the Supreme Court yesterday.  In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld against 1st Amendment challenges enforcement of Washington state's anti-discrimination law. Defendant is a family-run, Christian, Korean style spa. The spa admits only "biological women", including transgender women who have received gender confirmation surgery, but excludes transgender women who have not completed that surgery. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the certiorari petition.

9th Circuit: School Social Worker's Office Display Was Government Speech Subject to School Regulation

In Theis v. Intermountain Education Service District Board of Directors, (9th Cir., July 21, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision upheld an Oregon federal district court's determination that a school district could bar a school social worker from displaying, when students are in his office, books that the school found to be hostile toward transgender individuals. The majority held that plaintiff's display was not protected by the First Amendment because it is government speech. The court said in part:

First, Theis’s speech occurred within the scope of his professional role.  It was confined to the environments—his offices—in which he was assigned to perform his duties and to times when he was with students.  And Theis does not dispute that his speech was aimed at students.  This case is therefore distinguishable from those in which a school employee engages in the challenged speech off school grounds or while performing tasks unrelated to the school’s ordinary operations, and from cases in which the employee does not direct his speech to students.... 

Second, and most importantly, Theis’s speech “owes its existence to his position” in the IMESD schools.... Theis displayed the books in his offices where he interacted with students as part of his assigned duties, and the displays were visible to those students during evaluations and meetings... 

This case is different [from the Supreme Court case of Kennedy v. Bremerton].  Theis’s display of books occurred in the course of performing his assigned duties and in a setting where he was responsible for interacting directly with his students.  Unlike Coach Kennedy, who was off the clock, Theis was not engaged in a moment of private expression detached from his role.  To the contrary, he was engaged in his core professional responsibilities.... 

Judge VanDyke filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... [E]exactly no one believes the majority’s legal fiction—that anything seen by students on school grounds is necessarily government speech or perceived as such.  When a student sees personal materials hanging in a teacher’s office, they naturally identify that ornamentation as reflecting the teacher’s own personal views....  A free and open American society appropriately recoils at the prospect of public-school teachers becoming involuntarily conscripted apparatchiks of any administration’s particular orthodoxy....

The fact that Theis’s speech was private expression does not render it immune from government regulation.  When a government employee speaks in his personal capacity, he can only invoke the protections of the First Amendment if he can show that he spoke “on a matter of public concern.”...  If this burden is met, courts engage in “a delicate balancing of the competing interests ... [to determine] whether an employee’s speech interests are outweighed by “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 

 ... [I]n this case, nothing could support the conclusion that the government’s interest in efficiently operating its public schools outweighed Theis’s speech interest.... [A]fter three years of Theis’s use of the books in decorating his office, the record contains no evidence whatsoever of “actual, material, and substantial disruption” in the school.... The only negative reaction to the books... all originated from a single, adult teacher who saw “the books in [Theis’s] office, researched them online, and then determined they were offensive.”...

[Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Suit Seeks Accommodation for Christian Library Employee Who Objects To Using Co-Workers' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Suit was filed yesterday in a Louisiana federal district court by a Library Technician who was fired for refusing to comply with the library's Inclusivity Policy that requires employees to refer to fellow employees by their chosen name and pronoun.  Plaintiff Luke Ash is also a Christian pastor. The complaint (full text) in Ash v. City of Baton Rouge Louisiana, (MD LA, filed 7/9/2026) alleges in part:

Ash has sincerely held religious beliefs that God created mankind in his own image, and that each individual is created either male or female.... Ash also has sincerely held religious beliefs that biological sex is immutable....  Because of his sincerely held religious beliefs, Ash has sincere religious convictions and beliefs that referring to a person by pronouns inconsistent with their biological sex both dishonors God’s design for that person and constitutes a lie and a grave sin....  Ash believes that he is compelled to tell the truth, even to those who may disagree....

Ash had never, at any point, referred to any co-worker directly using pronouns inconsistent with their preference, and he had certainly never done so after being told by such individual that the pronoun he used was incorrect....

Ash contends that his firing violated his federal and state free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights and that under Title VII the Library was required to provide him a reasonable accommodation from the Inclusivity Policy. The complaint alleges in part:

Permitting Ash to maintain respectful communications to those with whom he interacts at the Library while maintaining compliance with his sincerely held religious beliefs would have been a reasonable accommodation that would impose no hardship whatsoever on the Defendants or the Library. 

The complaint also asks for an injunction barring enforcement of the Inclusivity Policy and asks for reinstatement of plaintiff. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

1st Circuit Upholds Maine's Antidiscrimmination Rules For Religious Schools Except Its Religiouis Expression Nondiscrimination Requirement

Last week, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in two cases raising similar, but not identical, challenges to the antidiscrimination requirements of Maine's Human Rights Act. The schools particularly focused on provisions barring religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  The Act applies to private schools that receive public funding, such as funding under Maine's tuition assistance program.

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court in a 108-page opinion, held that the employment nondiscrimination rule "does not credibly threaten to injure St. Dominic".  The court said in part:

While the rule generally bars schools from employment discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, the MHRA contains two specific carveouts for religious schools that apply regardless of whether a school participates in the tuition-assistance program.  First, section 4553(4) expressly protects a religious school's ability to discriminate "with respect to employment of its members of the same religion, sect or fraternity."... Second, section 4573-A(2) allows a religious school to "require that all applicants and employees conform to [its] religious tenets."

The court also held that neither the ban on religious discrimination in admissions nor the ban on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination trigger strict scrutiny. The court said in part:

[T]he Religious Nondiscrimination Rule does not exclude any school solely because of its religious character.  Rather, the rule excludes a school because it discriminates against students on the basis of the students' religion, a practice that is neither uniquely religious nor uniquely tied to religious schools.... In short, the State is simply saying that a school in Maine, whether religious or not, cannot accept public funds while simultaneously putting up, for example, a "No Protestant Children Need Apply" sign....

... [T]he record does not suggest that religious schools, by their nature, engage in sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination.... Simply put, barring sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination does not exclude religious schools from the tuition-assistance program solely based on their religious character....

Just as combatting religious discrimination qualifies as a legitimate governmental pursuit, so too combatting sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination rises to the level....  And the imposition of liability for sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination on those schools that accept public funding rationally relates to those antidiscrimination goals, as does the requirement that such schools respect students' expression of their gender identity....

The court, however, ordered the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule that  provides "to the extent that an educational institution permits religious expression, it cannot discriminate between religions in doing so." The court said in part:

St. Dominic, as part of its religious mission, requires students to attend religion classes, Mass, and other religious activities.  These activities necessarily entail some degree of student participation.  Even under the Commissioner's reading of the Religious Expression Rule, then, if a preacher at a school-mandated Mass permits students to say "Amen" in order to signify agreement, St. Dominic would then be required to allow expressions of disagreement.  And in the classroom, inculcation often solicits -- indeed encourages -- affirmation, for example in the form of an iterative exchange of expression.  Few would teach the Lord's Prayer without having the students recite it; and under the Religious Expression Rule that recitation would, in turn, appear to require the school to allow the reciting of, for example, the Hare Krishna Mahā mantra.  And while such an example may seem fanciful, the point is that the Religious Expression Rule would inevitably interfere with a religious school's ability to foster an expressive environment consistent with its religious mission.....

Here, the Religious Expression Rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out "religious expression." ...

In Crosspoint Church v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court considered additional challenges to Maine's antidiscrimination rules as they apply to religious schools. Crosspoint Church contended that 2021 amendments to the state's anti-discrimination laws were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Carson v. Makin that required Maine to include religious schools in its tuition assistance program.  The court said in part:

The State likely adopted the 2021 Amendments at least partially in response to the Carson litigation.  But we will not infer something as sinister as an "express[] design[]" to discriminate against a specific religious entity where Maine offers a quite logical and compelling rationale for the amendments' structure and timing: 

If [the State's] Legislature anticipated that the [Carson] litigation might result in [the State] being prohibited from excluding religious schools from [public funding], it would have been entirely appropriate to then make the same distinction in education as the Legislature did [years earlier] for employment and housing and require religious organizations that accept public funds to comply with [all antidiscrimination rules]. 

Thus, just as we concluded in St. Dominic that the plaintiffs there had not shown that general antireligious animus likely motivated the 2021 Amendments,... so too do we hold here that Crosspoint has not shown that specific anti-BCS animus motivated the same amendments....

The court also rejected Crosspoint's free expression claims, saying in part:

The Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, Crosspoint contends, regulates speech because it would "require BCS to affirm a student's gender identity and sexual orientation," even though it would "violate[] BCS's statement of faith to admit a student or allow a student to remain enrolled who violates BCS's statement of faith by presenting as a gender not consistent with his or her biological sex."...

... [H]ere, Crosspoint seeks to refuse admission to (and expel) any student who is gay or transgender, irrespective of that student's speech.  Although such refusal may express Crosspoint's views regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule would interfere with that expression, that does not transform the rule into a speech regulation....

Michigan Catholic Charities Sues State Officials Over Ouster as Provider of Women's Substance Abuse Services

Last week, Catholic Charities serving the Lansing, Michigan area filed suit against the director of Michigan's Department of Health and Human Services, Michigan's Attorney General and other Michigan officials as well as Mid-State Health Network that administers the Department's Medicaid and federal Substance Use Block Grant funds. Catholic Charities, through Cristo Rey Counseling Center, offers federally funded services for women with substance use disorders. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Charities of Ingham, Eaton & Clinton Counties v. Hertel, (WD MI, filed 6/26/2026), alleges that Mid-State discontinued Cristo Rey as a provider under the program after questioning the Counseling Center's requirement that its staff not discuss or make referrals for abortions, contraception, gender identity, or adoption placements with same-sex couples. It alleges that Michigan state Attorney General Dana Nessel is providing legal guidance to the Department of Health and Human Services, and that "Nessel harbors ... hostility toward Catholic and other religious organizations that hold sincere religious beliefs about abortion and contraception...." The complaint alleges that discontinuing Cristo Rey as a provider violates its 1st and 14th Amendment rights as well as federal statutory provisions. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Allows Schools to Exclude Transgender Females from Girls' and Women's Sports Teams

In West Virginia v. B.J.P., (Sup. Ct., June 20, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may exclude transgender females from girls' and women's athletic teams without violating either Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kavanaugh, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett said in part:

Notably, B. P. J. does not seriously contest that the term “sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the regulations means biological sex.  Moreover, B. P. J. agrees ... that Title IX permits schools to maintain separate female and male teams and to prohibit most biological males from playing on women’s and girls’ teams.  B. P. J. disagrees with West Virginia and the United States only about whether schools must make an exception to that general rule for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

But the texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools must allow certain biological males to participate in women’s and girls’ sports....

Some percentage of biological males who identify as male possess physical and athletic capabilities that fall within (or below) the range of typical female physical and athletic capabilities. But the plaintiffs acknowledge that States may still exclude those biological males from women’s and girls’ sports, given the general physical differences between males and females.

And the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the States from applying that same principle to all biological males, including those who identify as female. In the distinctive sports context, in other words, the States may treat all biological males the same and treat all biological females the same, given the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.....

In so ruling, we emphasize one last point.  Most of the biological female and transgender student-athletes who are involved in transgender sports disputes around the country are teenagers or in their early twenties.  Those student athletes want to play sports. Their desire to compete warrants respect. No student-athlete on either side of the issue, whether a biological female or transgender, deserves to be ostracized or vilified.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are.  Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic ...; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex.... To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].”...

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... Nothing in Title IX clearly and unambiguously alerts funding recipients that they are prohibited from restricting a school-sponsored sports team to biological women or girls....

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment, saying in part:

 ... West Virginia might be right that transgender girls retain some inherent athletic advantage over cisgender girls due to their sex identified at birth even after receiving the hormonal therapy B. P. J. identifies. All agree, moreover, that States do have some room to legislate around issues when there exists significant, and genuine, scientific debate. At this point, however, neither the District Court nor the Fourth Circuit has passed upon any of the available evidence or made the necessary factual findings about the state of the scientific debate....

Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, saying in part:

... [T]he majority is wrong to suggest that the term “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.”...  Title IX makes room for individuals to live in the gender they choose; it cares not just about sex assigned at birth but also about individuals’ ability to match (or not) their gender presentation to their gender identity.  Because West Virginia’s law forces B. P. J. to live—in this case, to play—as a boy though she is a girl, it might well run afoul of Title IX properly construed.

Reuters reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Grants Review on Standing of Parents to Challenge Notification About Children Receiving Gender-Affirming Care

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday granted review in International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, (Docket No. 25-840, certiorari granted 6/29/2026). (Order List.). At issue in the case is whether parents whose children have gender dysphoria and might run away from home in the future have standing to challenge a group of Washington laws that exempt youth shelters from notifying parents that their children are in the shelter when the child is seeking gender-affirming care. Instead, the shelter is to notify the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF).  DCYF must then contact the parents and offer to make referrals for behavioral health services and family reconciliation services.

In a July 2025 decision (full text), the 9th Circuit held that parents had not alleged sufficient current or future injury to grant standing. The 9th Circuit subsequently denied en banc review over the dissents of three judges. The petition for certiorari frames the Question Presented as:

Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision making role as to “gender transitions” of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.

Supreme Court Review Sought by Teacher Who Objects to School's Gender identity Policy

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to a Maryland school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. (See prior posting.) The petition for review poses the Questions Presented as:

1. When public schools try to force teachers, over their religious objections, to use pronouns inconsistent with a student’s biological sex and to hide from parents information about their child’s gender expression at school, does Smith apply and foreclose heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause?  

2. Do public schools violate the Free Speech Clause when they compel objecting teachers to adhere to such a school policy?

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

FTC and States Sue Organization Setting Standards for Pediatric Trans Care

The Federal Trade Commission along with the states of Alaska, Iowa, Nebraska and Texas, filed suit yesterday against the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) alleging violations of federal and state fraud and consumer protection laws. WPATH develops Standards of Care (SOC) for pediatric medical gender transitioning. Its SOC are relied upon by clinicians and insurance companies. The 123-page complaint (full text) in Federal Trade Commission v. World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Inc., (ND TX, filed 6/17/2026), alleges in part:

9. In addition to representing that the SOC itself, and the life-altering surgeries it recommends, reflect expert consensus and high-quality evidence, WPATH represents in the SOC that these and other transition services are medically necessary and effective at preventing suicide in children, that puberty blockers are fully reversible, that cross-sex hormones improve mental health, and that breast amputations are safe, effective, and consistently and directly increase children’s health-related quality of life....

14. The success of WPATH’s systematic efforts to expand eligibility for transition services to children in order to profit its members is difficult to overstate. Through the SOC and its other efforts, WPATH has created and currently sustains a lucrative industry of pediatric medical transition services. Over roughly the past two decades, the number of pediatric medical transition providers has multiplied rapidly. The first pediatric medical transition clinic in the United States opened in 2007. By 2015, there were at least forty-one pediatric medical transition clinics across the United States, many embedded within major children’s hospitals and academic medical centers. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of children who were diagnosed yearly with distress about their sex traits in the U.S. nearly tripled from around 15,000 in 2017 to about 42,000 in 2021....

18.  WPATH falsely asserts that its recommendations are the result of rigorous scientific procedures and expert consensus, even though WPATH disregarded established guideline‑development standards, ignored the results of its own evidence reviews, and removed age limits in response to external pressure rather than scientific evidence....

The FTC issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.  AP reports on the lawsuit.

D.C. Circuit: Transgender Troops Can Remain in Military, But Ban on New Trans Enlistees Remains for Now

As previously reported, in March 2025 the federal district court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction barring the military from implementing Executive Orders and military memoranda that exclude transgender persons from serving in the military. Now in Talbott v. United States, (DC Cir., June 1, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the preliminary injunction insofar as it applies to named plaintiffs who are already serving in the military but vacated the preliminary injunction insofar as it applies to the named plaintiffs seeking to enlist. This result came in a fragmented vote of the 3-judge panel which generated three separate opinions spanning a total of 107 pages.

Judge Wilkins concluded that all the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection challenge and that those already serving in the military are entitled to a preliminary injunction.  However, he held that the case should be remanded to the district court for it to consider whether the balance of equities that justify a preliminary injunction are different for those who are merely seeking to enlist.

Discussing the merits, Judge Wilkins concluded that the current policy on transgender service contains classifications that are not sufficiently related to a legitimate government interest; the policy is grounded on archaic and overbroad generalizations about sex, rather than on a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or medical treatment for the condition; gender dysphoria is treated differently than any other medical condition; and the policy contains classifications that are based on invidious discrimination. He concluded in part:

What has been clearly and repeatedly explained are the foundational premises of the Hegseth Policy:  persons with a “false gender identity” are unfit for the military, and persons with a history of gender dysphoria are also unfit because they lack “honesty, humility, . . . and integrity.”... [T]hose animus-filled reasons were expressly given to justify aspects of the Hegseth Policy....  Unless we are going to fall for the old Groucho Marx line—“who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?”—we have direct evidence in this case that animus motivated the classifications in the Hegseth Policy. 

Senior Circuit Judge Rogers filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He would affirm the district court's preliminary injunction in full, saying in part:

Given the uncontested record evidence and the nature of this court’s review for abuse of discretion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the Hegseth Policy on accession.  This is so even if based on the evidence and argument before it, the district court could have concluded that the retention policy imposes “a much greater hardship” on those currently in the military than those who seek to join it, as Judge Wilkins concludes,... and only enjoined the Hegseth Policy on retention due to  national security concerns.  But the existence of a permissible alternative is not the same as showing that the district court abused its discretion by choosing another permissible alternative....

Judge Walker filed a dissenting opinion. He would reverse in full the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. He said in part:

Sometimes a case will present an open question informed only by confusing and contradictory precedents.  This is not one of those cases.  Rather, ... an unbroken line of unambiguous authorities directs us to uphold a military policy (1) when it does not conflict with a statutory command, (2) when it reflects a “professional military judgment[],” and (3) when it addresses a perceived, military-wide need regarding the “composition, training, equipping, [or] control” of the armed forces.

The policy challenged today meets those criteria.

ABC News reports on the decision.

Tennessee Enacts Women's Safety and Protection Act

On May 22, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee signed SB0468, the Women's Safety and Protection Act (full text). The new law defines the terms "male" and "female" for purposes of any state law or administrative rule in terms of a person's biological reproductive system. It defines the term "sex" as an individual's biological sex as observed or clinically verified at birth. The law goes on to require public schools, domestic violence shelters, correctional facilities and juvenile detention facilities to designate each multi-occupancy restroom, changing room, and sleeping quarters for the exclusive use of either females, males, or members of the same family. With limited exceptions, it prohibits individuals from entering facilities designated for the opposite sex. ADF issued a press release announcing the governor's signing of the bill.

Washington Foster Care Licensing Agency Modifies Rules in Settlement of Litigation

 As previously reported, in DeGross v. Hunter, (WD WA, April 22, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to dismiss free speech and free exercise claims against the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) brought by a Christian couple who objected to the Department's policy on sexual orientation and gender identity. The state has required prospective foster parents to agree to support a foster child's sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE), including using their preferred pronouns and chosen name. The parties have now agreed to a settlement in the case and the Washington federal district court yesterday issued a permanent injunction reflecting the parties' agreement. 

The injunction in the case, now captioned DeGross v. Senn, (WD WA, May 20, 2026), bars DCYF from denying or imposing conditions on a foster family home license solely because of a family's religious beliefs, including speech and actions pertaining to marriage, gender, or sexual relationships. Instead DCYF will amend it rules to require foster parents to either connect, or allow DCYF to connect, their foster child to resources and supports relating to their race, religion, culture, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, developmental capabilities, tribal affiliations, heightened medical needs, behavioral needs, and any other aspect of the child’s individual identity.

The injunction goes on to provide in part:

3. DCYF is prohibited from requiring foster parents to agree to use prescribed words or language, including chosen pronouns, to express views about sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression inconsistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs as a condition of licensure....

6. During the licensing process, DCYF shall be permitted to inquire about an applicant’s views regarding SOGIE. This line of inquiry shall be no different from other information gathering concerning the variety of identities of prospective children in care. 

7. Nothing in this Order prohibits DCYF or a child-placing agency from inquiring about a child’s SOGIE before placement, just as it does for all children for all components of their individual characteristics, including identities. 

8. ... Nothing in this order prohibits DCYF from deciding a child’s placements based on its individualized consideration of the child’s needs and of a foster parent’s concerns or limitations (including where religiously motivated) on their ability or willingness to meet the child’s specific needs, including with regard to their SOGIE....

ADF issued a press release announcing the settlement. 

South Carolina Enacts Student Physical Privacy Act

Last Friday, South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster signed into law H4756, the South Carolina Student Physical Privacy Act (full text). The new law (with narrow exceptions) requires public schools and public colleges and universities to designate multi-occupancy restrooms and changing facilities for use only by members of one sex at a time. "Sex" is defined as "a person's biological sex, either male or female, as observed or clinically verified at birth." The new law also requires all public schools and public colleges and universities to "provide for a single-user restroom and changing facility" or an accommodation by allowing temporary exclusive use of a multi-occupancy rest room.

The new law also provides that during any activity or event sponsored by a public school or college, no student shall be required to share sleeping quarters with a member of the opposite sex. Colleges that provide student housing must provide students the option to be housed only with persons of the same sex.