Showing posts with label Establishment Clause. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Establishment Clause. Show all posts

Thursday, May 14, 2026

Agriculture Department Employees Sue Secretary Alleging Establishment Clause Violations

Seven employees of the Department of Agriculture and a federal employees' union filed suit yesterday against the Department and Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins contending that:

[The Secretary]  has adopted a practice of sending increasingly proselytizing communications to the entire USDA workforce, promoting her own preferred brand of Christian beliefs and theology to the captive audience of employees that report to her, directly or indirectly. 

The complaint (full text) in National Federation of Federal Employees v. Rollins, (ND CA, filed 5/13/2026), alleges that the Secretary's communications to employees, particularly her highly religious 2026 Easter Message, violate the Establishment Clause. The complaint alleges in part:

52. Individual Plaintiffs feel that the Secretary is pressuring them to believe in her faith or act as if they share the same faith as the Secretary. Given the Secretary’s clear religious preference, Individual Plaintiffs feel intimidated from expressing their own beliefs at work and compelled to shape their behavior accordingly and hide their own beliefs. 

53. Individual Plaintiffs fear being singled out and disfavored for not being religious, not believing in the brand of Christianity that the Secretary espouses, or for having a different religion.... 

54. Individual Plaintiffs also fear retaliation for objecting to the Secretary’s preaching from the public office that she occupies.

Democracy Forward issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Friday, May 01, 2026

Court Orders Action to Protect Reputation of Party Sanctioned by Rabbinical Court

In  In re Bain v. Strulovitch, (Westchester Cty. NY Sup. Ct., April 29, 2026), a New York state trial court found itself in the middle of a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court.

Samuel Strulovitch began an arbitration proceeding against Jonathan Bleier before a rabbinical court in Rockland County. At issue was ownership interests in a nursing home. Moshe Bain then filed an arbitration action in a different rabbinical court in Brooklyn claiming that he had a right of first refusal as to the nursing home. That rabbinical court issued an order restraining Strulovitch from taking any action to enforce the arbitration award issued by the Rockland rabbinical court until the Brooklyn rabbinical court issued a decision. Bain also filed suit in a New York civil court, and the court issued an injunction barring Strulovitch from taking any action to confirm the disputed Rockland County rabbinical court decision.

Despite that injunction, Strulovitch instituted another arbitration proceeding in a different Brooklyn rabbinical court, contending that the civil court's injunction did not prohibit a new suit. That rabbinical court issued a summons to Bain. According to the New York trial court:

When Bain asked Strulovitch to withdraw the proceeding, he asserted that Bain was free to ignore the summons.  According to Bain, this is simply impossible; one of the rabbis on the panel told Bain’s counsel that ignoring it may result in a “seruv,” a “letter of recalcitrance.  He may be subject to all forms of communal sanctions and societal pressures due his flagrant violation of Jewish law.”  Strulovitch’s representative reiterated the seriousness of ignoring the summons, stating to Bain that “This is serious and the lawyer cannot protect you from your hashem and your religious obligations.  If you get a siruv [sic] everyone will know that you do not listen to Beis din.”

When the parties appeared in Court on the Order to Show Cause ..  Strulovitch argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over the arbitration because it is a religious matter....

The matters that Strulovitch has raised with the Beis Din, however, are not religious, as clearly stated in the summons (hazmana)....

In this matter, the Court will only need to apply neutral principles of secular law to the issues raised herein.  There is, thus, no First Amendment reason to deny the motion....

With respect to Bain’s contention that Strulovitch violated the stay imposed by the Court because the arbitral panel issued a seruv to Bain ...,  the Beis Din replied that “‘We want to make it very clear that neither Strulowitz nor his agents requested the seruv after the TRO was issued.  The BD issued it of its own volition as a response to the chutzpah of enjoining a litigant from pursuing his Halachic rights to a Din Torah.’”  

Given this letter, ...  the Court denies the request to sanction Strulovitch.  There is no evidence that Strulovitch or any of his representatives, secular or religious, have violated the Court’s rulings. ...

To rectify the potential damage to Bain's reputation in the religious community resulting from the issuance of the seruv by the Beis Din, Strulovitch must take all steps necessary to have the Beis Din withdraw it, including withdrawing the entire proceeding.

Wednesday, April 22, 2026

5th Circuit En Banc Upholds Texas Law Requiring Posting of 10 Commandments In Classrooms

In Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, (5th Cir., April 21, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc upheld the constitutionality of the Texas law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. By a 9-8 vote, the court found that the law did not violate the Establishment or Free Exercise clause. But 3 of these 9 judges thought that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, all eight of the judges who dissented as to the constitutionality of the law thought plaintiffs had standing, so 14 judges in all held that the case was justiciable.

Judge Duncan's majority opinion on the merits said in part:

... Plaintiffs primarily claim we are bound by Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), which invalidated a similar Kentucky law decades ago. We disagree. Stone applied an analysis—the “Lemon test”—which confounded courts for decades.... Mercifully, the Supreme Court jettisoned Lemon and its offspring some years ago. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist..... With Lemon extracted, there is nothing left of Stone. 

In place of Lemon, courts now ask a question rooted in the past: does the law at issue resemble a founding-era religious establishment? ...

S.B. 10 looks nothing like a historical religious establishment. It does not tell churches or synagogues or mosques what to believe or how to worship or whom to employ as priests, rabbis, or imams. It punishes no one who rejects the Ten Commandments, no matter the reason. It levies no taxes to support any clergy. It does not co-opt churches to perform civic functions. These are the kinds of things “establishments of religion” did at the founding. S.B. 10 does none of them. 

Plaintiffs counter that, like historical establishments, S.B. 10 is “coercive” because it pressures children to honor the Ten Commandments. Not so. S.B. 10 requires no religious exercise or observance. Students are neither catechized on the Commandments nor taught to adopt them. Nor are teachers commanded to proselytize students who ask about the displays or contradict students who disagree with them. 

Most importantly, the “coercion” characteristic of religious establishments was government pressure to engage in religious worship.... Yes, Plaintiffs have sincere religious disagreements with its content. But that does not transform the poster into a summons to prayer....

Second, the Free Exercise Clause. Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor....

To Plaintiffs, merely exposing children to religious language is enough to make the displays engines of coercive indoctrination. We disagree. The curriculum in Mahmoud went far beyond books sitting silently on classroom shelves. Those materials were deployed by teachers with lesson plans designed to subvert children’s religiously grounded views on marriage and gender. S.B. 10 authorizes nothing of the sort.

Judge Ho filed a concurring opinion but disagreed as to standing, saying in part:

Our Founders didn’t just permit religion in education—they presumed that there would be religion in education.

Judge Oldham, joined by Judge Willett, filed an opinion concurring in part, but expressing reservations about justiciability, saying that: "This case is a textbook offended observer case."

Judge Ramirez, joined by 6 other judges filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Although Kennedy “abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot,” it did not cite, much less purport to “abandon” or overturn, Stone—despite the opportunity to do so.... This court must follow Supreme Court precedent even if that “precedent . . . appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions.”... 

Stone is dispositive. But even if it was not, S.B. 10 independently violates the Establishment Clause under Kennedy....

The “subtle coercive pressure” Texas students will feel is precisely the type that Lee identified and that Kennedy labeled “problematic[]” under the Establishment Clause.... And S.B. 10 implicates a far greater risk of putting students “who object[]” to the Ten Commandments “in an untenable position.”... Unlike Lee, which concerned prayer only at a graduation ceremony that students were not required to attend or participate in, students’ attendance at school is mandatory, and they will be subjected to religious scripture all day every day—with no educational function....

The displays required by S.B. 10 threaten to “undermin[e] the religious beliefs that parents wish to instill in their children” and “pressure” students “to conform,” and Defendants have not satisfied strict scrutiny.... As a result, Plaintiffs have established a Free Exercise Clause violation.....

Judge Southwick, joined by 5 other judges filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

My objective here is to sift through the Establishment Clause jurisprudence left by Kennedy and determine what still applies.  The sifting leads me to conclude that, under still-binding Supreme Court precedent, the Texas statute here is violative of the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court may change the law further, but it has not done so yet.  This inferior court judge concludes we are doing so.  That is not our role....

... The school prayer cases — which I see as largely resolving the case before us and on which Stone primarily relied — are still good law....

Judge Haynes filed a brief dissent.

Judge Higginson, joined by 4 other judges filed a dissent, saying in part:

The Framers intended disestablishment of religion, above all to prevent large religious sects from using political power to impose their religion on others.  Yet Texas, like Louisiana, seeks to do just that, legislating that specific, politically chosen scripture be installed in every public-school classroom.

Our court accommodates their unconstitutional request, supplanting decades of Supreme Court precedent merely because of a single decision the majority deems outdated.  In doing so, the majority defies foundational First Amendment concepts, ignores the harms students will face, and usurps parents’ rights to determine the religious beliefs they wish to instill in their own children....

 CBS News reports on the decision.

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Religious Liberty Commission Holds Final Hearing; Chairman Rejects Church-State Separation

Yesterday, the President's Religious Liberty Commission held its final hearing, focusing on the past, present and future of religious liberty in America. The 5-hour hearing (video of full hearing) was again held at the Museum of the Bible. The Department of Justice press release reporting on the hearing lists ten witnesses who testified. The press release also quotes the Commission's Chairman:

“Today’s capstone hearing of President Trump’s Religious Liberty Commission contained more powerful testimony and discussion about how people of religion are under assault by the secular left," said Chairman Dan Patrick. "It is time to set the record straight: there is no such thing as ‘separation of church and state’ in the Constitution. For too long, the anti-God left has used this phrase to suppress people of religion in our country. During all 7 Commission hearings, witness after witness testified that the so-called ‘separation of church and state’ was used to take their God-given religious liberty rights away. Next month, the Commission will deliver our recommendations to President Trump to ensure that Americans’ religious liberty is safeguarded against evil forces seeking to suppress them in our country.”

RNS reports on the hearing. The report quotes a question that Commission Chairman Patrick directed to law professor Helen Alvaré: "Would it not be a good recommendation that every school, every university, every business, has to have that one sheet on the bulletin board about protecting people’s religious liberty, and that the separation of church and state is the biggest lie that’s been told in America since our founding?” 

Sunday, April 12, 2026

Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Challenge Creation of Taks Force to Eradicate Anti-Christian Bias

In Hall v U.S. Department of Justice, (ND CA, April 9, 2026), a California federal district court held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge on Establishment Clause grounds the Justice Department's use of Congressionally appropriated funds to create the Task Force to Eradicate Anti-Christian Bias. Concluding that plaintiff lacks taxpayer standing, the court said in part:

If a plaintiff cannot show that the challenged action “was expressly authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment,” then that plaintiff’s lawsuit “is not directed at an exercise of congressional power, and . . . lacks the requisite logical nexus between taxpayer status and the type of legislative enactment attacked.”...

... [A]s alleged in his FAC, Hall is challenging allegedly unauthorized actions by the DOJ. He thus cannot show that those challenged actions were “expressly authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment.”

Tuesday, April 07, 2026

Church Challenges Injunction Barring Use of Its Property for Worship Services

Suit was filed last week in a Florida federal district court by members and elders of the Coastal Family Church challenging a temporary injunction that was issued in January barring the Church from using large space it purchased in a shopping center under a condominium agreement. The owner of the remaining units in the shopping center brought suit citing the provision in the condominium agreement that prohibits use of units as "a place of public assembly." Plaintiff alleged that this includes use for church services. The trial court issued a temporary injunction barring use of the Church's unit for any public assembly while the case is being litigated. (Background.) Now, in Tilton v. Upchurch, (MD FL, filed 4/2/2026) (full text of complaint), the Church sues the judge who issued the temporary injunction, alleging that the injunction violates plaintiffs' 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The complaint alleges in part:

40. The state-court injunction, temporarily enjoining the state-court defendant from utilizing the building in Flagler-Square for religious worship services and other activities protected by the First Amendment, has “effectively barr[ed]” unnamed parties in the state-court proceeding, and Plaintiffs here, “from attending religious services, [and] strike[s] at the very heart of the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty.”...

64. As a result of the state-court injunction, Plaintiffs’ pastor faces the crippling punishment of contempt and sanction for merely attempting to exercise constitutionally protected First Amendment rights and sincerely held religious beliefs....

201. The state-court injunction’s prohibition on religious services and religious gathering at Flagler Square violates the Establishment Clause because it demonstrates blatant hostility towards Christians and churches who must worship in person....

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

California's Marriage Laws Survive Unusual 1st Amendment Challenge

In Hunter v. State of California, (CD CA, March 31, 2026), a California federal district court accepted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge in Hunter v. California, (CD CA, March 5, 2026). In the case, in an unusual challenge to the state's domestic relations law, Kathryn Rose Hunter sued challenging California's "authority to impose and maintain marital status" and "maintenance of marital records." She contended that this violates the 1st Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. According to the federal Magistrate's opinion:

Plaintiff alleges that by "authorizing" her marriages and issuing certificate as proof of her married status, the State was "participating" in her marriages, which is "equivalent to polygamy."... This violates Plaintiff's right to freely exercise of her religious belief that a marriage should only involve "two persons and God."... She asserts a right to be free of any "State-imposed marital status," but she cannot obtain a divorce "without further State involvement." ... Plaintiff contends that by conditioning marital dissolution on "further State participation, the State creates an excessive entanglement between authority and religious doctrine," violating the Establishment Clause...

The Free Exercise Clause absolutely protects the right to believe in a religion; it does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion....

California's statutes concerning civil marriage are neutral and of general applicability. They neither refer to religion nor aim to suppress religious beliefs. They do not restrict or condition civil marriage rights on affirming particular religious beliefs. They do not provide for individualized exemptions, and they operate independently of any religious ceremonies in which a couple getting married or divorced might choose to engage. Since the challenged statutes are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies.... Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with which the state must deal."... California's Family Code, which establishes a legal framework for recognizing the creation, existence, and dissolution of civil marriages, is rationally related to this legitimate government interest...

"[T]he Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings."... Courts must draw the line between what is permissible and impermissible in accordance with "the understanding of the Founding Fathers."...

State involvement in civil marriages by enacting laws that define how one becomes legally married or dissolves a legal marriage was permissible in the days of the Founding Fathers.... The California statutes at issue align with this historical tradition. They neither endorse nor coerce the practice of any particular religion....

Exclusion of Religious Training from College Grant Program Is Upheld

In Johnson v. Fleming, (ED VA, March 31, 2026), a Virginia federal district court dismissed Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause claims challenging religious exclusions from the Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program. The VTAG program provides grants to Virginia residents who attend private non-profit colleges, except for religious training or theological education. The court said so long as the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v. Davey remains good law, the claims against VTAG must fail.

The case also challenged a program that offers college grants, with similar exclusions, to Virginia National Guard members. The court did not dismiss the challenges to that program because the court had only a limited factual record about the procedures utilized to administer the program. However, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction because it is unlikely that plaintiffs challenging the program will succeed on the merits.

Wednesday, April 01, 2026

Court Orders Removal of Arkansas 10 Commandments Monument from State Capitol Grounds

In Cave v. Jester, (ED AR, March 31, 2026), an Arkansas federal district court ordered the Arkansas Secretary of State to remove a Ten Commandments monument from the Arkansas State Capitol grounds. The monument was identical to the one approved by the Supreme Court in the Van Orden case. In ordering removal of the Arkansas monument, the court, in a 148-page opinion, said in part:

This case is factually distinguishable from both Van Orden and [the 8th Circuit's]  Plattsmouth [decision].  Perhaps most notably here, the Ten Commandments Monument is new, and the Orsi, Cave, and Intervenor plaintiffs did not wait many years before challenging the monument. ...

Additionally, unlike in Van Orden and Plattsmouth where the Ten Commandments monuments were funded by the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, a civic organization with the secular purpose to reduce juvenile delinquency, here the Ten Commandments Monument was funded by a GoFundMe account set up by Senator Rapert through the Foundation with major funding from Agape Church in Little Rock and PureFlix Entertainment, whose stated purpose as a “Christian Movie Studio” is “to influence the global culture for Christ through media” and whose mission is to “to strive to make a difference for His name.”...  

Also, the context of the passage of the Display Act giving rise to the Ten Commandments Monument is different from the context of the monuments in Van Orden and Plattsmouth.  The passage of the Display Act itself indicates that the Display Act favors religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.....     

Further, the Arkansas General Assembly’s stated purpose for passing the Display Act was not to commemorate the State’s religious heritage or the development of the law or any other secular idea.  Instead, the Arkansas General Assembly’s stated purpose in passing legislation to mandate the placement of a new, stand-alone monument on State Capitol grounds was “commemorating the Ten Commandments.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 22-3-221(b)(1)....

Axios reports on the decision.

Friday, March 20, 2026

High School Teacher Did Not Violate Constitution in Counseling Muslim Student Who Converted to Christianity

In Chaudhry v. Thorsen, (ND IL, March 18, 2026), an Illinois federal district court rejected Establishment Clause, substantive due process, and equal protection claims against Pierre Thorsen, a high school history teacher, brought by Muslim parents of one of Thorsen's students. According to the court:

Entering Jacobs High School, Aliya—the daughter of Chaudhry and Alvi—identified as Muslim but was actively questioning her faith. In two classes with Thorsen, she established a strong rapport with him. She trusted him enough to approach him and ask personal questions related to her faith, having conversations before and after school....  As Aliya gradually chose to convert from Islam to Christianity, Thorsen grew concerned for her well-being given the ongoing family dynamics that she professed to him. He connected her to resources in the community, some of which included his own personal connections: a neighbor, a pastor, and former students. He also, at her request, gave her a Bible from one of these connections.....

Parents suffer no legal injury when their child uses his or her own free will and independent judgment to embrace beliefs that differ from their own.... 

Thorsen’s actions weren’t coercive. He never forced Aliya to talk to him. Rather, she initiated their conversations. When they talked, he didn’t badger Aliya into changing her beliefs. Instead, he talked with her about his own beliefs while also encouraging her to speak to her parents and an imam when she expressed doubts about her religion. It may not have been appropriate for Thorsen to ... connect her with adults in the community, particularly without at least looping in Jacobs’ administration or social workers, if not Aliya’s parents. But this doesn’t violate the Constitution, because Aliya wasn’t coerced into religious activity. Inappropriateness doesn’t necessarily violate the Constitution....

Distinguishing between “historical” teachings consistent with what every high school history student should know and “theological” lessons better reserved for Sunday School is a difficult line to draw, but, wherever it is drawn, Thorsen didn’t cross it. 

As a matter of law, Thorsen’s actions didn’t impermissibly establish religion in violation of the Establishment Clause....

The leap required to get from his actions—assisting Aliya in a pre-existing religious journey—to a nefarious discriminatory intent against Muslims as a class, is far beyond the capabilities of a reasonable jury, and the Court can’t allow the claim to proceed as a matter of law.

Tuesday, March 17, 2026

Court Permanently Enjoins Enforcement of Arkansas Law Requiring 10 Commandments in Every Classroom

In Stinson v. Fayetteville School District , (WD AR, March 16, 2026), an Arkansas federal district court issued a permanent injunction barring the state from enforcing Arkansas' statute that requires the posting of a particular version of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. The court, finding both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause problems with the law, said in part:

... [T]he State makes three important factual stipulations about Act 573:    

(1) “Act 573 does not direct teachers to provide instruction about the Ten Commandments or about the displays.”  

(2) “Act 573 does not require classroom instruction, and it does not require that the Ten Commandments be incorporated into public school curriculum.”  

(3) “There is no requirement for teachers, other school officials, or students to interact with, bring attention to, or even acknowledge the posters in any way.” 

In other words, the State admits there is no educational purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments—no teaching, no learning, and no curricular integration.  

The Court is “reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the State[ ], . . . when a plausible secular purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute.”... But here, a plausible secular purpose is expressly disavowed. Act 573’s purpose is only to display a sacred, religious text in a prominent place in every public-school classroom. And the only reason to display a sacred, religious text in every classroom is to proselytize to children. The State has said the quiet part out loud....

Act 573 is subject to strict scrutiny because it is denominationally preferential and burdens parent-Plaintiffs’ right to direct their children’s religious upbringing.

Arkansas Advocate reports on the court's decision.

Friday, March 13, 2026

Oklahoma AG Sues to Overturn Charter School Board's Strategic Factual Record In Rejecting Religious School

As previously reported, in May 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court split evenly, 4-4, on the constitutionality Oklahoma funding a religiously sponsored charter school. The even split was caused by Justice Barrett recusing herself, apparently because of her connection to those promoting the school. Subsequently, a new test case was created, as the National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation applied to create for a statewide virtual high school. (See prior posting.) This Tuesday, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board voted to reject the Ben Gamla School's most recent application and gave as its formal reason only that under Oklahoma law, a charter school is a public school and must be nonsectarian.  The next day, Oklahoma's Attorney General filed suit against the Charter School Board in an Oklahoma state trial court contending that there were additional unrelated reasons for rejection of Ben Gamla's application. The suit seeks a writ of mandamus to require the Board to identify and incorporate into the record other valid, non-constitutional grounds for the rejection.

The petition (full text) in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board, (OK Dist. Ct., filed 3/11/2026), alleges in part:

[T]he Board's refusal to list all of the reasons for rejecting the revised application is not coincidental. It is a deliberate decision designed to avoid issues of state law when Ben Gamla files a lawsuit seeking to overturn the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.... Oklahoma law does not permit the Board to strategically withhold valid grounds for rejection....

Presumably, if other grounds for the application denial were included, the U.S. Supreme Court might refuse to decide the federal constitutional issue posed by state funded religious schools on the ground that there were other reasons for the Board's rejection of the Ben Gamla application.

VINnews reports on the lawsuit.

Cemetery Loses Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Challenges to Permit Denial

In Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County, Minnesota, (D MN, March 11, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court dismissed claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, RLUIPA, and Minnesota law brought by a nonprofit corporation that was refused permission to establish a cemetery that would perform "green burials." While Minnesota law allowed "religious corporations" to establish private cemeteries, Steelmantown was not formed as a Minnesota religious corporation. The court, explaining its rejection of Steelmantown's 1stAmendment claims, said in part:

... [E]stablishing and operating a cemetery of any sort is not inherently or exclusively a religious practice, and Section 307.01 on its face does not “aid or oppose particular religions” or “establish[] a denominational preference.”...  The statute expressly authorizes “any private person” or “any religious corporation,” regardless of whether they adhere to any religious faith, to establish a private cemetery on land the person or corporation owns....  The statute’s reference to “any religious corporation,” meaning those incorporated under Chapter 315, establishes only a preference toward a specific type of incorporated entity, not a particular religious faith or denomination.... 

Steelmantown effectively seeks preferential treatment because of its religious beliefs that a secular but otherwise identical institution—that is, a foreign nonprofit corporation whose “identity and mission” are not “derived from religious or spiritual traditions,” ... would not receive in the same circumstances.  If anything, that outcome would appear to be closer to a violation of the Establishment Clause than the conduct Steelmantown challenges here....

Steelmantown’s claim, in essence, appears to be that its religious practices are burdened by the requirement to incorporate (or reincorporate) under Chapter 315....  But nowhere does Steelmantown allege any facts that show this requirement “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s]” any “conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet” of its religious beliefs, “meaningfully curtail[s]” its “ability to express adherence” to those beliefs, or denies it a “reasonable opportunity to engage in those activities.” ... It does not explain, for instance, why maintaining its status as a foreign nonprofit corporation under Chapter 303 is central to its ability to express its religious beliefs or engage in its religious practices.  Nor does Steelmantown allege facts that suggest the requirement “operates so as to make the practice of [its] religious beliefs more expensive.”...

Wednesday, March 04, 2026

Advocacy Group Says Military Commanders Are Describing Iran Operations in Christian Biblical Terms

The Military Religious Freedom Foundation, an advocacy organization dedicated to assuring church-state separation in the armed forces, reported yesterday that it has received numerous complaints from military personnel that, in briefings, their commanders are describing the military operations against Iran in Christian eschatological terms. According to a report on Substack by journalist Jonathan Larsen:

A combat-unit commander told non-commissioned officers at a briefing Monday that the Iran war is part of God’s plan and that Pres. Donald Trump was “anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth,” according to a complaint by a non-commissioned officer.

From Saturday morning through Monday night, more than 110 similar complaints about commanders in every branch of the military had been logged by the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF).

The complaints came from more than 40 different units spread across at least 30 military installations, the MRFF told me Monday night.

Suit Alleges Unconstitutional Exclusion of Muslim Schools from Texas School Choice Program

A Muslim parent filed suit this week in a Texas federal district court challenging the state's exclusion of accredited Islamic private schools from participation in the Texas Education Freedom Accounts (TEFA) program. TEFA is a publicly funded school choice program. The complaint (full text) in Cherkaoui v. Paxton, (SD TX, filed 3/1/2026), alleges in part:

Since TEFA's inception, Defendants have systematically targeted Islamic schools for exclusion based on their religious identity, perceived "Islamic ties," and alleged connections to organizations Governor Abbott has designated as "foreign terrorist" or "transnational criminal" entities—even where those schools are fully accredited, satisfy all statutory eligibility criteria, and have no actual connection to terrorism or unlawful activity.

The complaint contends that the state has violated the 1st and 14th Amendments, alleging in part: 

85. Defendants' exclusion of Islamic schools is not neutral or generally applicable. It is explicitly based on religious identity (schools are targeted because they are Islamic), perceived religious association (hosting community events with Islamic civil-rights organizations), and religious animus (official statements equating Islamic identity with terrorism)....

89.   By systematically excluding Islamic schools while approving hundreds of Christian, Jewish, and other non-Islamic religious schools for TEFA participation, Defendants have engaged in denominational discrimination that favors non-Islamic religions over Islam in the distribution of a public benefit. 

90. Defendants' policies and public statements evince a purpose and effect of disfavoring Islam and conveying governmental disapproval of the Muslim faith....

Texas Tribune reports on the lawsuit. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Tuesday, February 24, 2026

Hospital Justified In Firing Nurse for Praying with Patients, Discussing Holocaust With Patient

In Sanders v. Kootenai Hospital District, (D ID, Feb. 20, 2026), an Idaho federal district court rejected various claims by Claudia Sanders, a nurse at a crisis center who was fired by her employer, a publicly operated hospital. Sanders duties included triaging patients. According to the court:

Sanders alleges two incidents in which she engaged in constitutionally protected speech or activity that were the cause of her termination. First, she maintains that on January 23, 2022, she “discussed the Holocaust in general terms” with a Jewish patient and provided the patient a copy of Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning, a book written by a psychiatrist who survived the Holocaust.... Second, she contends that she has previously prayed with patients who asked her to pray.

In rejecting Sanders' free speech claims, the court said in part:

The First Amendment does not protect speech made pursuant to a government employee’s official duties....

Sanders admitted that she prayed with patients under the belief that such conduct fell within her job responsibilities....

Sanders’ January 23 discussion on the Holocaust with a patient also was made pursuant to her official duties as a NICC triage nurse....  Because Sanders’ speech owes its existence to her position, she spoke as an employee—not as a citizen. Therefore, the Court concludes that Sanders did not engage in protected speech....

... It is not unreasonable for Kootenai to consider Sanders’ statements about the Holocaust, which implied that it either did not happen or that it was a good thing ...  disruptive to its ability to serve the community...

Kootenai was also justified in terminating Sanders for engaging in prayer with patients. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a compelling interest in avoiding the appearance of taking a position on questions of religious belief when the restriction applies to government employees engaging in religious speech while providing state-sponsored services.... 

... Sanders promoted religious messages while working with patients on Kootenai business, raising a legitimate Establishment Clause concern.....

The court also rejected Sanders' claims of wrongful termination, defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and tarnishing of her reputation.

Sunday, February 22, 2026

5th Circuit En Banc: Challenge to Louisiana Classroom 10 Commandments Mandate Is Not Ripe

In Roake v. Brumley, (5th Cir., Feb. 20, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc by a vote of 11-7 vacated on jurisdictional grounds a preliminary injunction that had barred schools from complying with a Louisiana law mandating the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. (See prior posting.) The majority held that the case was not ripe, saying in part:

Asking us to declare—here and now, and in the abstract—that every possible H.B. 71 display would violate the Establishment Clause would require precisely what [prior Supreme Court precedent] ... forbids: the substitution of speculation for adjudication. It would oblige us to hypothesize an open-ended range of possible classroom displays and then assess each under a context-sensitive standard that depends on facts not yet developed and, indeed, not yet knowable. That exercise exceeds the judicial function. It is not judging; it is guessing. And because it rests on conjecture rather than a concrete factual record, it does not cure the ripeness defect—it compounds it....

Judge Ho filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Plaintiffs contend that their constitutional objection to the Louisiana Ten Commandments law “may properly begin and end” with Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 

That’s telling, because Stone turns entirely on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)—and everyone agrees that Lemon is no longer good law after Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507, 534 (2022)....

Later Supreme Court opinions have further affirmed that passive religious displays are not coercive....

Plaintiffs present no historical evidence that remotely suggests that our Founders would have regarded a passive display of the Ten Commandments as an impermissible “establishment of religion.” ...

Judge Dennis, joined by Judges Graves, Higginson, Douglas and Ramirez, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Here, the legislative record demonstrates that a religious objective dominated. Sponsors repeatedly invoked teaching children “what God commands,” lamented the decline of Christianity, and openly framed opposition to H.B. 71 as an “attack on Christianity.” Another co-sponsor touted the law as a religious counterbalance to secular education....

...  Stone remains controlling because Louisiana vastly overstates Kennedy’s significance. Kennedy repudiated only the endorsement test—an offshoot of Lemon’s second prong—and left intact the broader framework of Establishment Clause doctrine: the requirement of a secular legislative purpose, the prohibition on policies whose primary effect advances religion, and the concern about excessive entanglement between church and state....

Judge Haynes filed a brief dissenting opinion.

Judge Higginson, joined by Judges Dennis, Graves, Douglas and Ramirez filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

We know from Louisiana lawmakers the chosen scriptural text was not happenstance. The legislators had definitive religious motivation when they selected a Protestant version of the Decalogue to display....

... Jewish plaintiffs and organizations voice that it violates their faith to make Jewish children stare at a Protestant “misappropriat[ion]” of their most sacred text....

Judge Ramirez, joined by Judges Stewart, Dennis, Graves, Higginson and Douglas, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part: 

Because H.B. 71 provides sufficient information about the mandatory classroom religious displays, and requires no other materials to be displayed, “no additional factual development” is required to determine the statute’s facial invalidity....

Louisiana’s argument that the court must know what other materials may accompany each Ten Commandments poster to evaluate H.B. 71’s constitutionality also ignores the nature of Plaintiffs’ facial claims—that H.B. 71’s minimum requirements render it unconstitutional in all applications.

Louisiana Illuminator reports on the decision.

Friday, February 20, 2026

Mayor's Statements About Prayer Event Sponsors May Have Violated Establishment Clause

Johnson v. City of Seattle, (WD WA, Feb. 18, 2026), is a suit by promoters of a worship event held in a Seattle park. According to the court:

Plaintiffs allege that ... a large group of protestors came to the park to agitate, disrupt, and assault Plaintiffs for the views, message, and content of their event....  [S]hortly after the event had begun, event organizers were approached by the police and told to shut down the event because of violent protestors that the police could not control....  Two protestors attacked the event’s stage, ripped down the fabric banners and kicked over equipment, and other protestors exposed body parts, engaged in lewd behavior in front of minor children, threw urine-filled water balloons, sprayed attendees with pepper spray and tear gas, and harassed Plaintiffs with curse words and violent threats....

On the same day, Mayor Harrell issued a press release stating that Plaintiffs’ event was an “Extreme Right-Wing Rally”, and that Plaintiffs were responsible for the violence that had been perpetrated against them.... Plaintiffs allege that they were blamed for deliberately provoking the reaction “by promoting beliefs that are inherently opposed to our city’s values, in the heart of Seattle’s most prominent LGBTQ+ neighborhood.”.... Mayor Harrell issued another press release ... which contained statements from the City’s “Christian and Faith Leaders” condemning Plaintiffs for their event and blaming them for the violence perpetrated against them.... According to the City’s faith leaders, Plaintiffs targeted the LGBTQ+ community....

The court refused to grant plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, saying in part:

Here, the dearth of allegations of intended future conduct, threat of future enforcement, or self-censorship, clearly does not satisfy a pre-enforcement injury in fact.

However, the court allowed plaintiffs to continue their lawsuit seeking other relief, including their Establishment Clause claim which defendants had asked the court to dismiss. The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs ... argue that the statements made by Defendant Harrell after the event was shut down are laden with hostility toward religion, and the condemning statements made by other religious sects and cited in the second press release demonstrates Defendants’ preference for other religions.... These statements were made in formal press releases from the “Office of the Mayor.”... Official expressions of hostility directly connected to Plaintiffs and their event, combined with the supporting hostile statements made by City religious leaders that are officially approved by the City, can have the effect of showing that the City is failing its duty of neutrality, invalidating the facial neutrality of an ordinance....

Wednesday, February 18, 2026

Suit Challenges Colorado's Blaine Amendment

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court challenging the Colorado Constitution's ban on use of state funds to support any religious school as violative of the Free Exercise, Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The challenge was brought by a Board of Cooperative Education Services (BOCES), a private entity which contracts with schools to provide them innovative educational services. BOCES can receive and administer state and federal education grants. The complaint (full text) in Education Re-Envisioned BOCES v. Cordova, (D CO, filed 2/13/2026), focuses on the inability of BOCES to contract with religious schools, alleging in part:

24. The Colorado Department of Education (CDE) provides funding to ERBOCES for these contract schools....

33. In August 2025 ... ERBOCES entered a contract with Riverstone Academy to provide tuition-free education to the parents and children of Pueblo County, Colorado.  

34. After ERBOCES contracted with Riverstone, it submitted its annual request for state funding to CDE. ERBOCES included Riverstone Academy’s students in its request.  

35. In response to its funding request, ERBOCES received a letter from CDE stating that Colorado law requires ERBOCES to refuse to contract with any religious school....  

36. Specifically, the letter informed ERBOCES that providing funding to Riverstone Academy would violate the Colorado Constitution and Colorado statutory law because Riverstone is a Christian school....

73. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits.” Carson, 596 U.S. at 778....

76. State provisions prohibiting aid to “sectarian” institutions date back to the 1870s and were enacted out of hostility to certain religious groups. Such provisions were “born of bigotry” against religion, especially the Catholic church.....  

77. Colorado’s Blaine amendment shares this “shameful pedigree.”...

93. To the extent the Colorado Constitution and any implementing statutes require school districts and BOCES to scrutinize contract school applicants’ curricula to determine if they are religious, they violate the Establishment Clause. ...

Christian Post reports on the lawsuit.

Saturday, January 31, 2026

Court Refuses to Enjoin Coinage Containing "In God We Trust" Motto

In Clayman v. Bessent, (SD FL, Jan. 8, 2026), a Florida federal district court denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from designing or producing any coins or currency containing the "Divine Name" of God. Plaintiff contends that the national motto on coins and currency violates the Establishment Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. His complaint focuses on a proposed new coin that would carry the likeness of Donald Trump and the motto In God We Trust. The court said in part:

The United States of America will celebrate its 250th anniversary this year on July 4, 2026. The Declaration of Independence refers to "Nature's God." The Pledge of Allegiance refers to "one Nation under God." 4 U.S.C. § 4. The use of the word God on coins began in 1864 on the two-cent coin. "In God We Trust" began to appear on U.S. paper currency in 1957, as required by Public Law 84-140. By statute, all coins must contain the "in God we trust" language. See 31 U.S.C. § 5112. In light of this history, statutory authority, and case law, there is simply no basis for this Court to grant the broad injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff.