9th Circuit Rejects Christian Day Care's Challenge to Licensing Requirement

In Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson, (9th Cir., Aug. 14, 2025), Foothills, a Christian day care center, challenged a California licensing provision requiring that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their parents' choice. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulation on free exercise grounds because the state has repeatedly taken the position that the regulation does not prohibit operating a day care center with a mandatory religious curriculum, where parents are made aware of this in advance of enrollment. 

However, the court held that Foothills does have standing to challenge the general licensing requirement on the ground that some secular child day care centers are exempt from licensing. But the court rejected that claim on the merits, saying in part:

Foothills contends that the Act’s exemption of “recreation programs conducted for children by” the YMCA “or similar organizations,”...  But this provision only exempts recreation programs from the licensure requirement; it explicitly does not exempt “child day care programs conducted by” the same organizations and so creates no mechanism for granting individualized exemptions for such facilities....

Foothills points to the exception for any “child daycare program that operates only one day per week for no more than four hours on that one day.”... This exemption applies to, among other things, Sunday schools. But a program that oversees children for only four hours a week does not present a threat to children’s health and safety comparable to that of a facility that can operate up to 24 hours a day....

Foothills alleges that the Act’s exemption of certain sectarian organizations—such as the YMCA and Boy Scouts of America—from licensing gives preferential treatment to certain religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.... 

If Foothills sought to operate a recreation program, it would not be subject to the Act. And if the YMCA or the Boy Scouts sought to operate a child day care facility, they would. This exemption draws no lines based on religion....

The court also held that the required disclosure to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice does not infringe Foothills' free speech rights, distinguishing the Supreme Court case of Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra , saying in part:

 Because the Act merely requires Foothills to inform parents of their children’s rights and does not “convey a message fundamentally at odds with its mission,” the required disclosure is not controversial....

School Officials Lack Standing To Sue Advocacy Group For Interfering With Their Duties

In Oklahoma State Department of Education v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, (ED OK, Aug. 13, 2025), Oklahoma education officials, in an interesting twist, sued to enjoin the advocacy organization Freedom From Religion Foundation from interfering with Plaintiffs’ statutory authority to govern Oklahoma’s public schools. FFRF had sent letters complaining about Bible reading and prayer in classrooms in one district and appointment of a football team chaplain in another. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the suit, saying in part:

... [T]he Complaint does not explain how these letters have interfered with day-to-day operations in any real way.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint also vaguely alludes that Plaintiffs’ injury is the “chilling effect” caused by Defendant’s letters....

... [T]he Complaint does not allege that it has stopped executing its duties or ceased administration of Oklahoma’s public schools because of Defendant’s letters.2  Nor does the Complaint allege that the schools have ceased any policies or practices because of Defendant’s letters. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show an injury in fact.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Challenge to Church's Switch in Denominations Fails

In Wimber v. Scott, (CA App., July 30, 2025), a California state appellate court held that plaintiffs who were tithing congregants of a Protestant church formerly known as Vinyard Christian Fellowship and now known as Dwelling Place lack standing to sue the church's pastors and board of directors on behalf of the church for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. It also held that the First Amendment precludes granting the relief sought. Following the wishes of the church's senior pastor, the pastor and the board of directors disaffiliated the church from the Vinyard Movement and used the church's $62 million in assets to start and fund a new movement. Plaintiffs included the widow of the founder of the Vinyard Movement and a congregant who had contributed over $500,000 to the church. The court said in part:

The NRC [California Nonprofit Religious Corporations Code] limits who may bring a representative lawsuit to, as relevant here, a “member” alleging a director violated their authority (§ 9141, subd. (a)) and a “member” or “former member” alleging breach of a trust. (§ 9142, subd. (a)(1).)  

Because churches are these unique species of corporation, the NRC recognizes the church may refer to persons who are part of its congregation as “‘members.”’ (§ 9332, subd. (a).) But the NRC does not allow these individuals to assert representative lawsuits. Only those persons explicitly authorized to do so by the corporation’s articles or bylaws have the power to bring a representative lawsuit. (Ibid.) Otherwise, any one of a church’s potentially hundreds or thousands of congregants could at any time bring a representative lawsuit....

Appellants’ allegations demonstrate they are members of the congregation, not the corporation....

 Although the statements may constitute misrepresentations, the Scotts made the statements to the “Search Committee and the Board,” of which only Director Appellants were a part. As such, [those plaintiffs who were not directors] ... have not alleged a cause of action for fraud based on misrepresentation....

Even assuming the complaint stated sufficient facts to allege causes of action, the First Amendment would bar this case from going forward....

Appellants ask the court to impose a trust over Dwelling Place’s assets in favor of Vineyard USA and to require the Scotts to keep Dwelling Place a part of the Vineyard Movement and Vineyard USA. Even if the facts alleged in the complaint entitled Appellants to such relief, they are essentially asking the court to manage and run Dwelling Place in a manner consistent with their religious beliefs. We would have to administer Dwelling Place’s assets to further a religious doctrine to which Appellants ascribe. 

Worse, we would then potentially violate the Scotts’ religious beliefs by forcing them to minister Dwelling Place in a mode Appellants see appropriate. We will not do any of this....

We note the ministerial exception also bars Appellants’ claims....  We cannot litigate Appellants’ claims or grant the relief they seek without in some way punishing the church for its hiring of the Scotts, retention of the Scotts, or ratification of the Scotts’ decisions and actions. 

Challenge To California's Investigation of Caste Discrimination Dismissed on Procedural Grounds

In Hindu American Foundation, Inc. v. Kish, (ED CA, July 18, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed on various procedural grounds a suit contending that the California Civil Rights Department is violating the constitutional rights of Hindu Americans by "conflat[ing] a discriminatory caste system with the Hindu religion" in an investigation of Cisco Systems, Inc. Individual plaintiffs in the case include employees of Cisco.

The court first concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine requires it to dismiss the case because it would pose "a serious risk of direct interference with state court proceedings...." The court went on to find a lack of standing to pursue plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, saying in part:

In the present case, the Individual Plaintiffs do not allege that they were direct targets of the Department's enforcement action but instead allege that they learned of it through, among other things, conversation or reading about the State Action.... Plaintiffs contend in conclusory fashion that the Department's conduct has chilled their participation in "the political community," but do not identify what political community they refer to in this regard.... Instead, plaintiffs vaguely allege that the Department's conduct has led to conversations at discrete, unidentified social events.... In this way, plaintiffs' allegations merely state an abstract stigmatic injury, rather than an injury caused by direct contact with the Department's actions and are therefore insufficient to establish plaintiffs' standing to assert their claim under the Establishment Clause....

The court also found a lack of standing as to plaintiffs' Free Exercise claims, saying in part: 

Plaintiffs cannot persuasively maintain that there "exists some conflict between one of [their] religious convictions and a challenged governmental action[]" precisely because they contend that caste discrimination is not one of their religious convictions....

Because plaintiffs have not alleged that they plan to engage in religious conduct which could arguably be the target of an enforcement action brought by the Department, the court concludes that they have not shown standing to bring a pre-enforcement action pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause....

The SAC now includes allegations from the Individual Plaintiffs regarding how they feel stigmatized, however, it includes no allegations that the Department has pursued any discriminatory action against the Individual Plaintiffs....

The court similarly found a lack of standing as to plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims. It also concluded that the Hindu American Foundation lacks organizational or associational standing, saying in part:

Plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that the Foundation was forced to respond to the Department’s actions insofar as it spent any resources responding to those actions rather than on other initiatives.  The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such a theory of standing.

The Mooknayak reports on the decision.

One Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge Kentucky Abortion Ban on Religious Grounds

In Sobel v. Coleman, (KY App., July 11, 2025), a Kentucky state appeals court partially reversed a trial court's decision and held that one of the plaintiffs challenging Kentucky's abortion ban has standing to pursue her claim that the law violates her rights under Kentucky's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court said in part:

The primary argument of this case revolves around the embryos created with IVF.  During IVF, multiple eggs of a woman are fertilized.  This can lead to excess embryos that are not implanted in the woman.  These extra embryos are either frozen and stored, disposed of, or donated.  Appellants claim that the destruction of any unviable or unused embryos could lead to criminal charges relating to the death of an unborn child....

Appellants ... claim that their Jewish faith requires them to increase their family and multiply.  They argue that restricting their access to IVF due to the unclear notion of unborn child and unborn human being violates their religion.  They also claim that their faith prioritizes the life of a mother over the life of a fetus; therefore, restrictions on abortion violate their faith.  Further, they claim that their faith does not support the idea that life begins at conception, rather that a fetus becomes a child only once it exits the mother’s body.  They claim that the laws in Kentucky surrounding abortion are Christian in nature and do not take into consideration their faith....

Ms. Kalb has taken active steps to get pregnant.  She has nine embryos in frozen storage ready for her use and she scheduled, but ultimately canceled, an embryo implantation in 2022.  Ms. Kalb’s actions show imminence in a potential injury sufficient to satisfy standing for her religious-based claims.

The Forward reports on the decision.

Secular Officiants Lack Standing to Bring Pre-Enforcement Challenge to Texas Law Barring Them from Performing Weddings

McCutchan v. Nicholson, (ND TX, July 2, 2025), involves a challenge to the Texas statute that sets out who may conduct marriage ceremonies in the state.  The statute limits officiants to judges, Christian clergy, Jewish rabbis or "a person who is an officer of a religious organization and who is authorized by the organization to conduct a marriage ceremony." The Center for Inquiry that certifies secular marriage celebrants along with one of its certified celebrants brings the challenge, seeking to have secular officiants recognized.  However, the state Attorney General intervened in the case and took the position that the Center for Inquiry qualifies as a "religious" organization as that term is used in the Texas statutes and that its officiants are therefore already permitted to officiate at marriages. The Attorney General argued:

CFI is not secular because it adopts clear, specific, and overt religious beliefs, namely that it “denies that a supernatural source is required for life to have and for people to be guided by values and ethics.” The rejection of God and the supernatural is a religious belief; a truly secular organization would take no stance on the issue....

However, the Court disagreed, concluding that CFI is neither a religious organization nor a religion, saying in part:

At oral argument, the Attorney General discarded the history and tradition of the Texas law, stating that Satanism and Atheism were “religion[s]” and “religious organization[s]” under the Texas Family Code. Interpreting the terms “religion” and “religious organization” to cover Satanism and Atheism not only ignores history and tradition but distorts their plain meaning and risks setting a dangerous precedent.

The court went on, though, to hold that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a pre-enforcement action against the District Attorney (one of the defendants in the case), saying in part:

Individual Plaintiff provides no examples of past enforcement, no public statements regarding enforcement of the statute, and no facts about how the District Attorney could know a secular celebrant violated the law.

This led to the court's final conclusion:

Even if the Court rules on behalf of Individual Plaintiff against Defendant Nicholson, thereby enjoining the County Clerk, his injuries would not be redressed without a favorable judgment against the District Attorney. A ruling in Individual Plaintiff’s favor, thus, would not amount to “relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.”... Accordingly, the Court rules that Individual Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because individual members of CFI lack standing, so does the organization.

5th Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Louisiana's 10 Commandments In Classrooms Law

In Roake v. Brumley, (5th Cir., June 20, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a Louisiana statute that requires public schools to display the Ten Commandments in every classroom. In a lengty opinion the appellate court found that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statute and that plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of succcess on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.  The court said in part:

The precedents of the Supreme Court and this court establish that, in an Establishment Clause case, a plaintiff can generally satisfy the injury-infact element of standing when he experiences—or certainly will experience—unwanted exposure to government-sponsored religious displays or exercises in the course of his regular activities....

Although the Supreme Court set aside the Lemon test in Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District],...  Kennedy did not overrule Stone [v. Graham]. Kennedy does  not mention Stone or purport to overrule the decisions (other than Lemon) on which Stone relies, i.e., Schempp or Engel. Stone remains good law andtherefore controls....

An H.B. 71 display that meets the statute’s minimum requirements is materially identical to the displays challenged in Stone....

It is also unclear how H.B. 71 ensures that students in Louisiana public schools “understand and appreciate the foundational documents of [its] stateand  national government” when it makes displaying those “foundational” documents optional, and does not require that they also be printed in a large, easily readable font.... When the Ten Commandments must be posted prominently and legibly, while the other “contextual” materials need not be visible at all, the disparity lays bare the pretext....

... [T]he question before us is whether the permanent posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms fits within, or is consistent with, a broader tradition of using the Ten Commandments in public education....

Plaintiffs presented the expert testimony of Dr. Steven Green, a religious and constitutional legal historian. Dr. Green testified that the public school system did not exist at the founding; rather, public education originated sometime around the late 1820s. Dr. Green also found no evidence that the Ten Commandments were permanently displayed in early American public schools. He testified that no state enacted a law allowing the display of the Ten Commandments in public schools until North Dakota did so in 1927, and that a court later stuck down the statute....

Judge Dennis filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to offer two additional bases for affirming the district court’s judgment. First, the Plaintiffs have standing under settled Supreme Court precedents recognizing “offended observer” standing in Establishment Clause cases.... Second, Louisiana vastly overstates both the holding and reach of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.... That decision did not undermine—much less overrule—Stone v. Graham.... Nor did it eliminate the component parts of Lemon v. Kurtzman....

Axios reports on the decision.

Churches Lack Standing to Challenge Rescission of DHS's Sensitive Locations Policy

In Mennonite Church USA v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D DC, April 11, 2025), the D.C. federal district court, in a suit by 27 Christian and Jewish denominational bodies and organizations, refused to issue a preliminary injunction to require DHS to reinstate its "sensitive locations" policy which severely limited the situations under which immigration enforcement actions could take place at churches, synagogues, mosques and other institutions of worship. The court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to rescission of the policy. The court rejected arguments by plaintiffs of injury based on the imminent risk that immigration enforcement actions will be taken at member congregations; of injury from declines in attendance at worship services and social service ministries; of needing to restrict in-person services to protect immigrants; and of cost of increased security measures.

Antisemitism Claims Against UC Berkeley Move Ahead in Part

In Louis D. Brandeis Center, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, (ND CA, March 31, 2025), plaintiffs allege that UC Berkeley has discriminated against Jewish faculty and students. The California federal district court allowed plaintiffs' free exercise, equal protection and Title VI claims to move forward. However, it dismissed plaintiffs' Sec. 1981 claim for discriminatory refusal to enter contracts. The court said in part:

The FAC [First Amended Complaint] alleges a series of events unfolding over the course of several months on campus, which are said to have been precipitated by a campus culture hostile to Jewish students and professors....  The FAC says that these events were perpetrated by students who professed to oppose Zionism, but actually intended to discriminate against Jewish students and professors because they are Jewish....  The FAC also alleges that Berkeley failed or refused to enforce its anti-discrimination policies as to its Jewish students and faculty in response to these events.... The FAC also plausibly alleges that Berkeley was deliberately indifferent to the on-campus harassment and hostile environment.... Consequently, Brandeis’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution will go forward, as will the Title VI claim.  

It bears mention that the FAC repeatedly alleges that “Zionism is a central tenet of the Jewish faith.”...  This raises concerns about whether Brandeis intends to call upon the Court to determine the articles of faith of Judaism.  If so, a serious constitutional problem would arise....

The 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim is dismissed.  The gist of this claim is that members of the plaintiff organizations who are legal academics cannot contract with certain Berkeley student organizations that adopted a bylaw barring invitations to individuals espousing Zionist beliefs....  Brandeis does not dispute it must show standing.... The complaint does not allege that any academic member has sought to contract with the organizations since adoption of the bylaw, been turned away on account of the bylaw, or has otherwise been put at a contractual disadvantage by the bylaw.

9th Circuit: Church Lacks Standing to Challenge Washington's Health Insurance Coverage Requirements

In Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kreidler, (9th Cir., March 6, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that a church which opposes abortion and some forms of contraception lacks standing to challenge Washington's Reproductive Parity Act which requires health insurance carriers to provide coverage for contraceptives and abortions. A second state statute allows insurance companies to offer employee plans that accommodate a church's religious objections, so long as employees can separately access coverage for such services from the insurer. However, plaintiff church has been unable to find a plan that accommodates its objections. The court said in part: 

Nothing in the challenged law prevents any insurance company ... from offering Plaintiff a health plan that excludes direct coverage for abortion services. Therefore, an insurance company’s independent business decision not to offer such a plan is not traceable to the Parity Act....

Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff’s alleged injury would be redressed if we struck down the Parity Act....

Plaintiff contends, in the alternative, that an employer purchasing a no-abortion plan in Washington still “indirectly facilitates” the provision of abortion services to its employees.  Plaintiff relies on but-for reasoning.  As noted above, under the conscientious-objection statute, employees can obtain coverage for abortion services through their insurance carrier, whether or not the employer has a religious objection....  So, Plaintiff’s argument goes, employees receive coverage that they would not have but for the existence of the health plan provided by their employer, even if the employer’s plan does not itself provide that coverage.... We reject this theory as well.  The general disapproval of the actions that others might decide to take does not create standing, even when some tenuous connection may exist between the disapproving plaintiff and the offense-causing action.

Judge Callahan filed a dissenting opinion.  She agreed with plaintiff's "facilitation" argument. She added in part:

Cedar Park also has standing because the Parity Act caused Kaiser Permanente to stop providing a health plan that excludes abortion coverage and the church cannot procure a comparable replacement.

2nd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL

In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (2nd Cir., Jan. 3, 2025), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought against the Anti-Defamation League by Minister Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam that alleged free speech and defamation claims. Upholding the trial court's dismissal of the First Amendment claims for lack of standing, the court said in part:

To the extent plaintiffs assert claims against defendants because third parties—Morgan State University and Vimeo—denied or rescinded plaintiffs’ access to speech platforms, those alleged First Amendment injuries are not fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions....

Plaintiffs’ remaining First Amendment claims do not state any injuries in fact....

As to the defamation claims, the court said in part:

Plaintiffs challenge a number of defendants’ statements that label plaintiffs in various ways as “anti-Semitic.”  Under New York law, these statements are nonactionable opinions....

Plaintiffs also challenge statements made by defendants interpreting Farrakhan’s own statements.  The challenged statements were either accompanied by disclosures of Farrakhan’s actual statements or were based on Farrakhan’s statements that were widely reported by the media....

Finally, plaintiffs challenge certain of defendants’ factual statements.  On de novo review, we agree with the district court that the SAC fails to sufficiently allege the falsity of those statements.  

Jonathan Turley reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Dispute Over Standing to Challenge School Gender Identity Support Policy

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire Area School District, Wisconsin, (Sup. Ct., certiorari denied 12/9/2024). In the case, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a parents' organization lacked standing to challenge a school district's policy on Gender Identity Support for students. The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the dissents of Justices Kavanaugh, Alito and Thomas.  In a dissenting opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Alito said in part:

This case presents a question of great and growing national importance: whether a public school district violates parents’ “fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of ” their children ... when, without parental knowledge or consent, it encourages a student to transition to a new gender or assists in that process. We are told that more than 1,000 districts have adopted such policies....

I am concerned that some federal courts are succumbing to the temptation to use the doctrine of Article III standing as a way of avoiding some particularly contentious constitutional questions....

Advocate reports on the Court's action.

9th Circuit Narrows Preliminary Injunction Against Idaho's Abortion Trafficking Law

 In a 2-1 decision in Matsumoto v. Labrador, (9th Cir., Dec. 2, 2024) the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals significantly narrowed an Idaho federal district court's preliminary injunction against enforcement of the state's ban on assisting a minor in various ways to obtain an abortion without her parent's consent. The majority concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed only in their challenge to one part of the law.

 Idaho Code §18-623 provides:

An adult who, with the intent to conceal an abortion from the parents or guardian of a pregnant, unemancipated minor, either procures an abortion ... or obtains an abortion-inducing drug for the pregnant minor to use for an abortion by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the pregnant minor within this state commits the crime of abortion trafficking.

The majority held that the statute is not void for vagueness, nor does it burden the right of expressive association. It concluded, however, that the statute's ban on "recruiting" is an unconstitutionally overbroad regulation of protected speech. The court said in part:

 ... “[R]ecruiting” has broad contours that overlap extensively with the First Amendment. It sweeps in a large swath of expressive activities—from encouragement, counseling, and emotional support; to education about available medical services and reproductive health care; to public advocacy promoting abortion care and abortion access. It is not difficult to conclude from these examples that the statute encompasses, and may realistically be applied to, a substantial amount of protected speech....

In our view, the “recruiting” prong of Section 18-623 is neither integral nor indispensable to the operation of the statute as the Idaho legislature intended and therefore may be severed from the rest of the law. Without the “recruiting” prong, the statute criminalizes “harboring or transporting” a minor to “procure an abortion” “with the intent to conceal [the abortion] from the parents or guardian” of the minor— an intelligible crime that reaches the problems the legislature sought to rectify.

Judge Bea dissented in part. He argued that plaintiffs lack standing and therefore the district court should dismiss the suit. Idaho Capital Sun reports on the decision.

Suit Challenging Anti-Zionist Proposed Curriculum Is Dismissed

In Concerned Jewish Parents and Teachers of Los Angeles v. Liberated Ethnic Studies Model Curriculum Consortium, (CD CA, Nov. 30, 2024), a California federal district court dismissed both for jurisdictional reasons and on the merits a suit by plaintiffs who were Jewish Zionists against a group that developed a set of teaching materials that the group hoped Los Angeles Public Schools would adopt. The court said in part:

According to plaintiffs, the challenged curriculum "denounces capitalism, the nuclear family, and the territorial integrity of the lower 48 states of the United States[,]"... and is designed "to expunge the idea of Zionism, and the legitimacy of the existence of the State of Israel, from the public square[.]"... Plaintiffs allege there is "rank discrimination embedded in the LESMC," ... because the challenged curriculum, among other things, "includes statements that the existence of the State of Israel is based on ethnic cleansing and land theft, apartheid and genocide" and that "Zionism is distinct from Judaism."... Because the challenged curriculum contains anti-Zionist material, plaintiffs allege that the curriculum is antisemitic.,,,

The court held that plaintiffs' claims were not ripe for judicial review and that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. It went on to also reject plaintiffs' equal protection and free exercise challenges on additional grounds. It held first that the defendants other than the school district were not state actors for purposes of the 14th Amendment. It went on to hold:

... [I]t is clear that the [complaint] is a direct "attack on curricula" — and "absent evidence of unlawful intentional discrimination, parents are not entitled to bring Equal Protection claims challenging curriculum content."... In short, plaintiffs' equal protection claims under both the California and United States constitutions must be dismissed....

In effect, the only hardship plaintiffs allege is that the existence of the challenged curriculum — and its possible adoption — offends them. But mere offense is insufficient to allege a burden on religious exercise....

In short, plaintiffs' claim that the challenged curriculum violates the Free Exercise Clause because it is intended "to suppress public expression of, and public support for, Zionist beliefs and to prevent Zionists from acting on their sincerely held religious belief[,]" ... must be dismissed, as plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a substantial burden on their religious exercise or practice.

The court also rejected claims under Title VI and the California Education Code. It then concluded:

... [I]t must also be noted that significant First Amendment concerns underlie plaintiffs' claims and requested relief.... In effect, plaintiffs seek to litigate the propriety and legality of a potential curriculum with which they disagree. Their claims thus conflict with the First Amendment in several respects, and are largely barred on that basis as well.

Various state law claims were also stricken under California's anti=SLAPP statute.

Noticias Newswire reports on the decision.

7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Standing to Challenge Indiana Abortion Law

Last week (Oct. 24) the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, (Docket No. 23-3247). In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed The Satanic Temple's challenge under Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the state's ban on abortions. The court dismissed for lack of standing, finding that TST failed to identify any of its members who are pregnant and has no clinic of its own operating in Indiana. (See prior posting.)

State RFRA Bars Taxpayer Suit Challenging Church's Property Tax Exemption

 In In re Calvary Chapel Iowa, (IA Adm. Hearings Div., Sept. 17, 2024), an Iowa Administrative Law Judge held that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects churches from taxpayer suits challenging their property tax exemptions.  The ALJ said in part:

The issue in this case is whether as a matter of statutory (not constitutional) law individuals can use the taxpayer-standing provision of Iowa Code section 427.1 to force a religious organization into litigation and spend the time and resources to prove its entitled to its property-tax exemption already claimed by it.  Prior to the enactment of the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) the answer was an unequivocal yes (with individuals having done precisely this for at least a generation); however, with the passage of RFRA, the answer now appears to be no at least under the circumstances of this case. 

As discussed below, this is because this type of litigation imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion and because the State’s compelling interest in the appropriate administration of tax law can be met with the lesser restrictive means of having the State (with its constitutional and statutory constraints) enforce tax law.  To hold otherwise would be to allow the unaccountable political opponents of a church the option to use the power of the State to target and/or retaliate against the religious organization for the organization’s activities, thereby creating a chilling effect not only on that specific religious group but also all other similarly oriented religious organizations.  This is precisely the type of religious interference that RFRA was designed to prevent, and until the judiciary provides different guidance on the scope of RFRA, this case must be dismissed.

Christian Post reports on the decision.

6th Circuit Rules on Christian Plaintiffs' Standing to Challenge Michigan's Civil Rights Acts

In Christian Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Nessel, (6th Cir., Sept. 20, 2024), a Christian membership-based medical service ministry and two Catholic K-12 schools challenged prohibitions on sexual orientation and gender-identity discrimination under Michigan's public accommodation law (EAA) and its Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiffs had standing to seek an injunction only as to some of their challenges. The court summarized its holding:

In these three related cases, Plaintiffs allege that Michigan’s laws chill their speech and conduct in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The district court dismissed each case for want of standing, reasoning that no Plaintiff had shown that Michigan’s laws arguably proscribed its speech or conduct and that, in the alternative, there was no credible threat that Michigan would enforce its laws against any Plaintiff.

We agree only in part....

We express no view regarding the merits of any claim, the appropriate resolution on remand of the motions for preliminary relief, or what conclusions might be warranted concerning any issue after discovery.  We hold only that (a) no Plaintiff has established standing to challenge the EAA, (b) Christian Healthcare has plausibly established standing to challenge the ELCRA’s public-accommodation provision, employment provision, and the publication clauses of each provision, (c) Sacred Heart has plausibly established standing to challenge the same provisions, the ELCRA’s education provision, and the publication clause of that provision, and (d) St. Joseph has failed to plausibly establish standing.

Judge Murphy filed a concurring opinion.

Utah Supreme Court Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Law Banning Most Abortions

 In Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. State of Utah, (UT Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Utah Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, affirmed a trial court's entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of SB174, a trigger law that prohibits all abortions except for death or substantial bodily harm of the mother, lethal defect or brain abnormality of the fetus, or the mother was pregnant as a result of rape or incest. The state Supreme Court said in part:

In re J.P. discussed, among other [state constitutional] rights, the right to marry the person of one’s choosing and the right to establish a home.... The commonality these rights share is not a child, but the right to make certain intimate decisions about one’s life free from government intrusion. At this point in the litigation, we cannot say whether a restriction on the ability to choose to have an abortion infringes the rights we recognized in In re J.P., but there are serious questions regarding the scope of those rights that merit further litigation....

PPAU has standing to press its claims and the claims of its patients. 

The district court did not err when it concluded that PPAU had raised serious issues about the constitutionality of SB 174. The court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that PPAU and its patients would be irreparably harmed without the injunction. Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the balance of harms tipped in favor of enjoining SB 174 while the parties litigate its constitutionality. Nor did the court act outside the bounds of its discretion when it concluded that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Chief Justice Durrant filed a dissenting opinion, contended that Planned Parenthood lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.

Utah News Dispatch reports on the decision.

Delaware Supreme Court Dismisses Suits Challenging Prior Covid Restrictions on Houses of Worship

 In In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by two lower courts of challenges to restrictions on houses of worship imposed by orders of Delaware's governor during the early stages of the Covid pandemic. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Chancery Court over 18 months after the restrictions were lifted seeking an injunction, and when that was rejected, filed suit in Superior Court seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. The Delaware Supreme Court said in part:

Plaintiffs could not demonstrate reasonable apprehension of future conduct.  As the Court of Chancery noted below, “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues to circulate and mutate, the possibility of a future surge, much less one that will necessitate emergency measures on par with what the world experienced in the first half of 2020, is speculative at best.”  Appellants do not confront the speculative nature of the future threat they allege, and instead invoke a generalized refrain that any restriction on their religious freedom causes irreparable harm.  This argument, such that it is, does not address the Court of Chancery’s analysis or carry Appellants’ burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.  The importance of Appellants’ constitutional rights is not disputed, but it also is not dispositive.  The fact remains that, by the time Appellants filed suit, the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted, the Governor had entered into a binding agreement not to impose future restrictions targeting Houses of Worship, and the apprehension of a future pandemic and conditions like those of the early days of the emergency was hypothetical and speculative.  This Court “decline[s] to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical scenario.”...

... [T]he Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ injury could not be redressed through a prospective declaratory judgment.  In much the same way that Appellants’ irreparable harm argument crumbled because the Challenged Restrictions no longer were in effect and any future action imposing similar restrictions was speculative, the declaratory judgment sought in the Superior Court would not alter the status quo.  Moreover, Appellants’ constitutional rights would not be restored or further protected by declaratory relief because the complained-of harm had long since ceased and the threat of future harm was speculative....

The Delaware Supreme Court also concluded that a damage action against the Governor was barred by the Delaware State Tort Claims Act and qualified immunity.

States Lack Standing to Challenge FDA's Rules on Dispensing of Abortion Pill

In State of Washington v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, (9th Cir., July 24, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit the state of Idaho (and 6 other states) to intervene in a lawsuit brought by a group of states led by the state of Washington challenging the FDA's restrictions on pharmacies' dispensing of the abortion pill mifepristone. FDA regulations adopted in 2021 allow mifepristone to be dispensed by pharmacies in retail locations or by mail, but only if the pharmacy is specially certified to do so. Washington's lawsuit contends that the certification and documentation requirements are unnecessary.  Idaho, on the other hand, wants the court to order the FDA to go back to earlier requirements that only allowed mifepristone to be dispensed in person by a physician and did not allow it to be obtained directly from pharmacies. The court concluded that because Idaho seeks fundamentally different relief that does Washington, it must establish its own standing in order to intervene. The court concluded that Idaho did not have separate standing, saying in part:

Idaho first alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will cause the state economic injury in the form of increased costs to the state’s Medicaid system.  At oral argument, Idaho stated that this is its “strongest basis” for standing.  Even taking Idaho’s highly speculative allegations as true, the complaint does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact because it depends on an attenuated chain of healthcare decisions by independent actors that will have only indirect effects on state revenue....

Idaho next alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its sovereign interest in law enforcement by making illegal mifepristone use harder to detect.  This allegation is insufficient to convey standing because nothing in the 2023 REMS impairs Idaho’s sovereign authority to enact or enforce its own laws regulating chemical abortion....

Finally, Idaho alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its “quasi-sovereign interest” in maternal health and fetal life.  Idaho cannot sue FDA on this basis because the allegations concern the interests of individual citizens—not the separate interests of the state itself....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]