9th Circuit: Church Lacks Standing to Challenge Washington's Health Insurance Coverage Requirements

In Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kreidler, (9th Cir., March 6, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that a church which opposes abortion and some forms of contraception lacks standing to challenge Washington's Reproductive Parity Act which requires health insurance carriers to provide coverage for contraceptives and abortions. A second state statute allows insurance companies to offer employee plans that accommodate a church's religious objections, so long as employees can separately access coverage for such services from the insurer. However, plaintiff church has been unable to find a plan that accommodates its objections. The court said in part: 

Nothing in the challenged law prevents any insurance company ... from offering Plaintiff a health plan that excludes direct coverage for abortion services. Therefore, an insurance company’s independent business decision not to offer such a plan is not traceable to the Parity Act....

Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff’s alleged injury would be redressed if we struck down the Parity Act....

Plaintiff contends, in the alternative, that an employer purchasing a no-abortion plan in Washington still “indirectly facilitates” the provision of abortion services to its employees.  Plaintiff relies on but-for reasoning.  As noted above, under the conscientious-objection statute, employees can obtain coverage for abortion services through their insurance carrier, whether or not the employer has a religious objection....  So, Plaintiff’s argument goes, employees receive coverage that they would not have but for the existence of the health plan provided by their employer, even if the employer’s plan does not itself provide that coverage.... We reject this theory as well.  The general disapproval of the actions that others might decide to take does not create standing, even when some tenuous connection may exist between the disapproving plaintiff and the offense-causing action.

Judge Callahan filed a dissenting opinion.  She agreed with plaintiff's "facilitation" argument. She added in part:

Cedar Park also has standing because the Parity Act caused Kaiser Permanente to stop providing a health plan that excludes abortion coverage and the church cannot procure a comparable replacement.

2nd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL

In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (2nd Cir., Jan. 3, 2025), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought against the Anti-Defamation League by Minister Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam that alleged free speech and defamation claims. Upholding the trial court's dismissal of the First Amendment claims for lack of standing, the court said in part:

To the extent plaintiffs assert claims against defendants because third parties—Morgan State University and Vimeo—denied or rescinded plaintiffs’ access to speech platforms, those alleged First Amendment injuries are not fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions....

Plaintiffs’ remaining First Amendment claims do not state any injuries in fact....

As to the defamation claims, the court said in part:

Plaintiffs challenge a number of defendants’ statements that label plaintiffs in various ways as “anti-Semitic.”  Under New York law, these statements are nonactionable opinions....

Plaintiffs also challenge statements made by defendants interpreting Farrakhan’s own statements.  The challenged statements were either accompanied by disclosures of Farrakhan’s actual statements or were based on Farrakhan’s statements that were widely reported by the media....

Finally, plaintiffs challenge certain of defendants’ factual statements.  On de novo review, we agree with the district court that the SAC fails to sufficiently allege the falsity of those statements.  

Jonathan Turley reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Dispute Over Standing to Challenge School Gender Identity Support Policy

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire Area School District, Wisconsin, (Sup. Ct., certiorari denied 12/9/2024). In the case, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a parents' organization lacked standing to challenge a school district's policy on Gender Identity Support for students. The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the dissents of Justices Kavanaugh, Alito and Thomas.  In a dissenting opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Alito said in part:

This case presents a question of great and growing national importance: whether a public school district violates parents’ “fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of ” their children ... when, without parental knowledge or consent, it encourages a student to transition to a new gender or assists in that process. We are told that more than 1,000 districts have adopted such policies....

I am concerned that some federal courts are succumbing to the temptation to use the doctrine of Article III standing as a way of avoiding some particularly contentious constitutional questions....

Advocate reports on the Court's action.

9th Circuit Narrows Preliminary Injunction Against Idaho's Abortion Trafficking Law

 In a 2-1 decision in Matsumoto v. Labrador, (9th Cir., Dec. 2, 2024) the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals significantly narrowed an Idaho federal district court's preliminary injunction against enforcement of the state's ban on assisting a minor in various ways to obtain an abortion without her parent's consent. The majority concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed only in their challenge to one part of the law.

 Idaho Code §18-623 provides:

An adult who, with the intent to conceal an abortion from the parents or guardian of a pregnant, unemancipated minor, either procures an abortion ... or obtains an abortion-inducing drug for the pregnant minor to use for an abortion by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the pregnant minor within this state commits the crime of abortion trafficking.

The majority held that the statute is not void for vagueness, nor does it burden the right of expressive association. It concluded, however, that the statute's ban on "recruiting" is an unconstitutionally overbroad regulation of protected speech. The court said in part:

 ... “[R]ecruiting” has broad contours that overlap extensively with the First Amendment. It sweeps in a large swath of expressive activities—from encouragement, counseling, and emotional support; to education about available medical services and reproductive health care; to public advocacy promoting abortion care and abortion access. It is not difficult to conclude from these examples that the statute encompasses, and may realistically be applied to, a substantial amount of protected speech....

In our view, the “recruiting” prong of Section 18-623 is neither integral nor indispensable to the operation of the statute as the Idaho legislature intended and therefore may be severed from the rest of the law. Without the “recruiting” prong, the statute criminalizes “harboring or transporting” a minor to “procure an abortion” “with the intent to conceal [the abortion] from the parents or guardian” of the minor— an intelligible crime that reaches the problems the legislature sought to rectify.

Judge Bea dissented in part. He argued that plaintiffs lack standing and therefore the district court should dismiss the suit. Idaho Capital Sun reports on the decision.

Suit Challenging Anti-Zionist Proposed Curriculum Is Dismissed

In Concerned Jewish Parents and Teachers of Los Angeles v. Liberated Ethnic Studies Model Curriculum Consortium, (CD CA, Nov. 30, 2024), a California federal district court dismissed both for jurisdictional reasons and on the merits a suit by plaintiffs who were Jewish Zionists against a group that developed a set of teaching materials that the group hoped Los Angeles Public Schools would adopt. The court said in part:

According to plaintiffs, the challenged curriculum "denounces capitalism, the nuclear family, and the territorial integrity of the lower 48 states of the United States[,]"... and is designed "to expunge the idea of Zionism, and the legitimacy of the existence of the State of Israel, from the public square[.]"... Plaintiffs allege there is "rank discrimination embedded in the LESMC," ... because the challenged curriculum, among other things, "includes statements that the existence of the State of Israel is based on ethnic cleansing and land theft, apartheid and genocide" and that "Zionism is distinct from Judaism."... Because the challenged curriculum contains anti-Zionist material, plaintiffs allege that the curriculum is antisemitic.,,,

The court held that plaintiffs' claims were not ripe for judicial review and that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. It went on to also reject plaintiffs' equal protection and free exercise challenges on additional grounds. It held first that the defendants other than the school district were not state actors for purposes of the 14th Amendment. It went on to hold:

... [I]t is clear that the [complaint] is a direct "attack on curricula" — and "absent evidence of unlawful intentional discrimination, parents are not entitled to bring Equal Protection claims challenging curriculum content."... In short, plaintiffs' equal protection claims under both the California and United States constitutions must be dismissed....

In effect, the only hardship plaintiffs allege is that the existence of the challenged curriculum — and its possible adoption — offends them. But mere offense is insufficient to allege a burden on religious exercise....

In short, plaintiffs' claim that the challenged curriculum violates the Free Exercise Clause because it is intended "to suppress public expression of, and public support for, Zionist beliefs and to prevent Zionists from acting on their sincerely held religious belief[,]" ... must be dismissed, as plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a substantial burden on their religious exercise or practice.

The court also rejected claims under Title VI and the California Education Code. It then concluded:

... [I]t must also be noted that significant First Amendment concerns underlie plaintiffs' claims and requested relief.... In effect, plaintiffs seek to litigate the propriety and legality of a potential curriculum with which they disagree. Their claims thus conflict with the First Amendment in several respects, and are largely barred on that basis as well.

Various state law claims were also stricken under California's anti=SLAPP statute.

Noticias Newswire reports on the decision.

7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Standing to Challenge Indiana Abortion Law

Last week (Oct. 24) the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, (Docket No. 23-3247). In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed The Satanic Temple's challenge under Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the state's ban on abortions. The court dismissed for lack of standing, finding that TST failed to identify any of its members who are pregnant and has no clinic of its own operating in Indiana. (See prior posting.)

State RFRA Bars Taxpayer Suit Challenging Church's Property Tax Exemption

 In In re Calvary Chapel Iowa, (IA Adm. Hearings Div., Sept. 17, 2024), an Iowa Administrative Law Judge held that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects churches from taxpayer suits challenging their property tax exemptions.  The ALJ said in part:

The issue in this case is whether as a matter of statutory (not constitutional) law individuals can use the taxpayer-standing provision of Iowa Code section 427.1 to force a religious organization into litigation and spend the time and resources to prove its entitled to its property-tax exemption already claimed by it.  Prior to the enactment of the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) the answer was an unequivocal yes (with individuals having done precisely this for at least a generation); however, with the passage of RFRA, the answer now appears to be no at least under the circumstances of this case. 

As discussed below, this is because this type of litigation imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion and because the State’s compelling interest in the appropriate administration of tax law can be met with the lesser restrictive means of having the State (with its constitutional and statutory constraints) enforce tax law.  To hold otherwise would be to allow the unaccountable political opponents of a church the option to use the power of the State to target and/or retaliate against the religious organization for the organization’s activities, thereby creating a chilling effect not only on that specific religious group but also all other similarly oriented religious organizations.  This is precisely the type of religious interference that RFRA was designed to prevent, and until the judiciary provides different guidance on the scope of RFRA, this case must be dismissed.

Christian Post reports on the decision.

6th Circuit Rules on Christian Plaintiffs' Standing to Challenge Michigan's Civil Rights Acts

In Christian Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Nessel, (6th Cir., Sept. 20, 2024), a Christian membership-based medical service ministry and two Catholic K-12 schools challenged prohibitions on sexual orientation and gender-identity discrimination under Michigan's public accommodation law (EAA) and its Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiffs had standing to seek an injunction only as to some of their challenges. The court summarized its holding:

In these three related cases, Plaintiffs allege that Michigan’s laws chill their speech and conduct in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The district court dismissed each case for want of standing, reasoning that no Plaintiff had shown that Michigan’s laws arguably proscribed its speech or conduct and that, in the alternative, there was no credible threat that Michigan would enforce its laws against any Plaintiff.

We agree only in part....

We express no view regarding the merits of any claim, the appropriate resolution on remand of the motions for preliminary relief, or what conclusions might be warranted concerning any issue after discovery.  We hold only that (a) no Plaintiff has established standing to challenge the EAA, (b) Christian Healthcare has plausibly established standing to challenge the ELCRA’s public-accommodation provision, employment provision, and the publication clauses of each provision, (c) Sacred Heart has plausibly established standing to challenge the same provisions, the ELCRA’s education provision, and the publication clause of that provision, and (d) St. Joseph has failed to plausibly establish standing.

Judge Murphy filed a concurring opinion.

Utah Supreme Court Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Law Banning Most Abortions

 In Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. State of Utah, (UT Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Utah Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, affirmed a trial court's entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of SB174, a trigger law that prohibits all abortions except for death or substantial bodily harm of the mother, lethal defect or brain abnormality of the fetus, or the mother was pregnant as a result of rape or incest. The state Supreme Court said in part:

In re J.P. discussed, among other [state constitutional] rights, the right to marry the person of one’s choosing and the right to establish a home.... The commonality these rights share is not a child, but the right to make certain intimate decisions about one’s life free from government intrusion. At this point in the litigation, we cannot say whether a restriction on the ability to choose to have an abortion infringes the rights we recognized in In re J.P., but there are serious questions regarding the scope of those rights that merit further litigation....

PPAU has standing to press its claims and the claims of its patients. 

The district court did not err when it concluded that PPAU had raised serious issues about the constitutionality of SB 174. The court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that PPAU and its patients would be irreparably harmed without the injunction. Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the balance of harms tipped in favor of enjoining SB 174 while the parties litigate its constitutionality. Nor did the court act outside the bounds of its discretion when it concluded that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Chief Justice Durrant filed a dissenting opinion, contended that Planned Parenthood lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.

Utah News Dispatch reports on the decision.

Delaware Supreme Court Dismisses Suits Challenging Prior Covid Restrictions on Houses of Worship

 In In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by two lower courts of challenges to restrictions on houses of worship imposed by orders of Delaware's governor during the early stages of the Covid pandemic. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Chancery Court over 18 months after the restrictions were lifted seeking an injunction, and when that was rejected, filed suit in Superior Court seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. The Delaware Supreme Court said in part:

Plaintiffs could not demonstrate reasonable apprehension of future conduct.  As the Court of Chancery noted below, “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues to circulate and mutate, the possibility of a future surge, much less one that will necessitate emergency measures on par with what the world experienced in the first half of 2020, is speculative at best.”  Appellants do not confront the speculative nature of the future threat they allege, and instead invoke a generalized refrain that any restriction on their religious freedom causes irreparable harm.  This argument, such that it is, does not address the Court of Chancery’s analysis or carry Appellants’ burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.  The importance of Appellants’ constitutional rights is not disputed, but it also is not dispositive.  The fact remains that, by the time Appellants filed suit, the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted, the Governor had entered into a binding agreement not to impose future restrictions targeting Houses of Worship, and the apprehension of a future pandemic and conditions like those of the early days of the emergency was hypothetical and speculative.  This Court “decline[s] to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical scenario.”...

... [T]he Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ injury could not be redressed through a prospective declaratory judgment.  In much the same way that Appellants’ irreparable harm argument crumbled because the Challenged Restrictions no longer were in effect and any future action imposing similar restrictions was speculative, the declaratory judgment sought in the Superior Court would not alter the status quo.  Moreover, Appellants’ constitutional rights would not be restored or further protected by declaratory relief because the complained-of harm had long since ceased and the threat of future harm was speculative....

The Delaware Supreme Court also concluded that a damage action against the Governor was barred by the Delaware State Tort Claims Act and qualified immunity.

States Lack Standing to Challenge FDA's Rules on Dispensing of Abortion Pill

In State of Washington v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, (9th Cir., July 24, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit the state of Idaho (and 6 other states) to intervene in a lawsuit brought by a group of states led by the state of Washington challenging the FDA's restrictions on pharmacies' dispensing of the abortion pill mifepristone. FDA regulations adopted in 2021 allow mifepristone to be dispensed by pharmacies in retail locations or by mail, but only if the pharmacy is specially certified to do so. Washington's lawsuit contends that the certification and documentation requirements are unnecessary.  Idaho, on the other hand, wants the court to order the FDA to go back to earlier requirements that only allowed mifepristone to be dispensed in person by a physician and did not allow it to be obtained directly from pharmacies. The court concluded that because Idaho seeks fundamentally different relief that does Washington, it must establish its own standing in order to intervene. The court concluded that Idaho did not have separate standing, saying in part:

Idaho first alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will cause the state economic injury in the form of increased costs to the state’s Medicaid system.  At oral argument, Idaho stated that this is its “strongest basis” for standing.  Even taking Idaho’s highly speculative allegations as true, the complaint does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact because it depends on an attenuated chain of healthcare decisions by independent actors that will have only indirect effects on state revenue....

Idaho next alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its sovereign interest in law enforcement by making illegal mifepristone use harder to detect.  This allegation is insufficient to convey standing because nothing in the 2023 REMS impairs Idaho’s sovereign authority to enact or enforce its own laws regulating chemical abortion....

Finally, Idaho alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its “quasi-sovereign interest” in maternal health and fetal life.  Idaho cannot sue FDA on this basis because the allegations concern the interests of individual citizens—not the separate interests of the state itself....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Court Says States Lack Standing to Challenge EEOC's New PWFA Abortion-Accommodation Rule [CORRECTED]

In States of Tennessee et. al. v. EEOC, (ED AR, June 17, 2024), an Arkansas federal district court held that 17 states that are plaintiffs in the case lack standing to challenge an EEOC Final Rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.  At issue is the Rule's requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation for employees' elective abortions. The court said in part:

[The states] press dual theories of injury -- sovereign harms and economic harms. The sovereign harms, the States say, are twofold: the rule will abridge their ability to regulate abortions and their interests in maintaining a pro-life message in dealing with state employees. The economic harms are the rule-related compliance costs the States say they will incur in response to potential enforcement....

The sovereign harms are not imminent because there is no credible threat of enforcement. ...

Even assuming an injury in fact, though, the States' sovereign-injury theory still fails for lack of causation and redressability. ...

Unlike in situations involving private employers, the EEOC cannot bring enforcement actions against state employers....  If an agreement isn't reached within thirty days after a charge is filed, the EEOC "shall take no further action and shall refer the case to" the Department of Justice"....

That leaves the alleged economic harms. The States don't claim any sunk costs. They only say that their compliance costs are imminent.. This economic-harm theory fails for two reasons.

First, the challenged costs-- those resulting only from rule-related compliance activities associated with illegal, elective abortions are neither concrete nor particularized. ...

Second, even assuming some concrete and particularized compliance costs related to illegal, elective abortions, these costs are not fairly traceable to any threat of enforcement....

Beyond the intense controversy surrounding abortion, there are no signs that this is a major questions case. Chevron's general rule applies.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post incorrectly said this was decided by a Tennessee federal district court. 

A Louisiana federal district court has just reached the opposite conclusion (see prior posting.) [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

6th Circuit: DOE's Interpretive Letter on Title IX Should Have Gone Through Notice and Comment Procedure

In State of Tennessee v. Department of Education, (6th Cir., June 14, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that a "Dear Educator" Letter and accompanying Fact Sheet from the Department of Education interpreting Title IX should be set aside because they amount to a legislative rule which did not go through the required notice and comment procedure.  At issue are documents from DOE interpreting Title IX's ban on sex discrimination as covering discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in education programs and activities that receive federal financial aid. The suit challenging these documents was brought by 20 states whose policies on separate sex programs are based on biological sex.  In a footnote, the majority added:

We are aware that the Federal Register recently published a final rule amending the Department of Education’s Title IX regulations.... This new rule does not moot this case for two reasons.  First, the final rule does not go into effect until August 2024.  Second, the final rule does not cover everything that is covered by the documents, like housing and athletics.

Judge Boggs dissented, contending that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, saying in part:

... [T]he Interpretation, “Dear Educator” Letter, and Fact Sheet ,,, are interpretative rules or policy statements, which are generally not final for purposes of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.....

I agree that the Documents are intended to have in terrorem effect on states and school districts such as the plaintiffs.  They clearly can be interpreted as desiring a change in voluntary policies by recipients of federal funding.  However, the same could be said of a major Presidential address or a Secretarial campaign targeting the States with speeches and public statements.

Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL Dismissed

 In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (SD NY, April 5, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed defamation claims asserted by Louis Farrakhan against the Anti-Defamation League. The court describes Farrakhan's allegations:

The [complaint], which details nearly a century's worth of grievances, alleges several instances of defamation and, as against the ADL, various violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. At their core, plaintiffs' claims are that by repeatedly referring to plaintiffs as antisemitic, defendants have defamed them and created a chilling effect on their religious practices. Plaintiffs seek $4.8 billion in damages as well as a declaratory judgment that the term "anti-Semite" is defamatory per se and that the ADL is a quasi-governmental actor that violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin defendants from calling them antisemitic or taking any steps to urge third parties to disassociate with them.

A number of claims were dismissed on standing grounds, finding that Farrakhan did not allege concrete injuries traceable to ADL. Farrakhan's defamation claims were dismissed because Farrakhan, a public figure, did not plead actual malice. Others were dismissed because they were merely statements of opinion or Farrakhan had not alleged facts showing falsity.

2nd Circuit: Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Challenge Zoning Law That Accommodates Jewish Worship Sites

In Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Village of Chestnut Ridge, New York, (2d Cir., April 5, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that neither the organizational nor the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to the Village's 2019 zoning law applicable to places of worship.  According to the court:

... [A]t the urging of the Orthodox Jewish Coalition of Chestnut Ridge ..., the Village began the process of amending its zoning laws so that places of worship could more easily be built in Village neighborhoods, accommodating the need of Orthodox Jewish observers “to pray within walking distance of their homes.”...

In sum, even if it could be argued that the challenged law improperly promotes religion, Plaintiffs point to no cognizable harm that is actual or imminent.  They claim that the Village spent tax money in passing the law yet fail to allege how those funds were anything more than a routine use of the Village’s planning budget....  They claim that they will be directly exposed to newly authorized religious structures without asserting that they have even seen one of those structures or when and where they might ever do so in the future.  And while they contend that the law denies them the same opportunity as religious groups to host large gatherings, they do not assert that they have any particular interest in holding such events....  Ultimately, even if Plaintiffs have a sincere objection to the challenged law, our Article III standing doctrine requires them to first establish a real stake in their challenge before bringing it in federal court.

2nd Circuit En Banc: Athletes Have Standing To Sue Under Title IX Over Transgender Girls on Girls' Teams

In Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc., (2d Cir., Dec. 15, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that four cisgender female track and field athletes (plus two intervenors) have standing to sue a Connecticut high school athletic conference under Title IX for allowing transgender girls to compete in girls' track and field meets. Plaintiffs claimed that this deprived them of equal athletic opportunity. the court summarized its holding as follows:

We do not consider whether Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims have any merit or whether they would be entitled to the relief that they seek as a matter of equity, but rather whether the district court has jurisdiction to hear their claims in the first instance. We conclude that it does.... Plaintiffs have established Article III standing at this stage in the litigation. They have pled a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact that is plausibly redressable by monetary damages and an injunction ordering Defendants to alter certain athletic records. Second, the district court was not required to determine whether Defendants had adequate notice of a Title IX violation to be liable for monetary damages before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims.

This majority arose from splintered views expressed in 8 separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part from each other and spanning 142 pages. NBC News reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit: Jewish School Prevented From Purchasing Site Meets Standing and Ripeness Requirements To Sue

In Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland v. Town of Clarkston, (2d Cir., Dec. 8, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an Orthodox Jewish school that was prevented by town officials and a citizens' group from purchasing property on which to build met the standing and ripeness requirements to bring suit under RLUIPA, civil rights laws and state tort law. The court said in part:

ABY argues on appeal that its claims were ripe because nothing more than de facto finality is required for us to review them, and that such finality attached when the Zoning Board informed ABY that it would not entertain its appeal. ABY also argues that the district court erred in holding that ABY failed to satisfy the traceability requirement of Article III standing as to its tortious interference claim because it adequately pleaded that the Town Defendants’ conduct caused its contractual injuries. We agree with ABY and, therefore, we REVERSE the judgement of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

6th Circuit Hears Arguments on Standing to Challenge Gender Identity Ban in Health Care

On Wednesday, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of appeals heard oral arguments in American College of Pediatricians v. Becerra. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, a Tennessee federal district court dismissed for lack of standing a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services that barred discrimination on the basis of gender identity in the furnishing of health care. The court also concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an HHS rule requiring grant recipients to recognize same-sex marriages. (See prior posting.) 

Hindu Organization Lacks Standing to Challenge State's Caste Discrimination Charges

In Hindu American Foundation, Inc. v. Kish,(ED CA, Aug. 31, 2023, a California federal district court held that a national education and policy organization that promotes religious freedom for Hindu Americans lacks standing to sue the California Civil Rights Department for asserting in enforcement actions that the caste system and caste discrimination is part of Hindu teachings and practices.

... [P]laintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts that, if proven, would show that plaintiff is “sufficiently identified with and subject to the influence” of the individuals it seeks to represent in this lawsuit.... Indeed, it is unclear even which specific individuals plaintiff seeks to represent in this action because its complaint merely alleges that it seeks to protect the constitutional rights of “all Hindu Americans” and “all Americans of faith.”...

See prior related posting.  Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Challenge To Maine's Past Covid Restrictions on Churches Is Dismissed

In In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Super., Aug. 28, 2023), a Delaware Superior Court dismissed a suit challenging now-rescinded restrictions that limited the number of attendees and the activities in houses of worship during the Covid pandemic. The court concluded that the governor had qualified immunity from damage claims because at the time it was not clearly established that these types of restrictions violated the U.S. Constitution. The State Tort Claims Act gives the governor immunity from damage actions for violation of the Delaware Constitution. The court also concluded that there is no case or controversy to give it jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment and that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims, saying in part:

The Court can have no influence on the alleged past harm caused by the Restrictions when they have already been terminated years ago.

WDEL News reports that plaintiffs plan an appeal to the state Supreme Court.