Texas Supreme Court: AG May Begin Proceedings to Close Down Catholic Refugee Agency for Harboring Illegal Migrants

In Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., (TX Sup. Ct., May 30, 2025), the Texas Supreme Court held that a state trial court was in error in refusing to allow the state Attorney General to file a quo warranto action as a first step in his attempt to revoke the corporate charter of a Catholic agency serving migrants and refugees in El Paso. The Attorney General claims that the agency is sheltering migrants who have entered the country illegally. The Supreme Court observed:

Bound up in the dispute are a host of serious questions: What kind of conduct constitutes unlawfully harboring illegal aliens?  Has Annunciation House engaged in such conduct?  Under what conditions may the attorney general demand access to Annunciation House’s records?  Can harboring illegal aliens provide a valid basis for the attorney general to file a quo warranto action?  Does Texas law that protects religious liberty forbid the attorney general from proceeding against Annunciation House under these circumstances?  And more still.

Ordinarily, before this Court addresses such significant issues, the parties would have developed a full record.... This case, however, comes to the Court as a direct appeal because, very early in the litigation, the trial court held that several Texas statutes are unconstitutional.  We accordingly must address this dispute far earlier than we typically would. 

Among other defenses, Annunciation House invoked the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Rejecting that defense, the Supreme Court said in part:

... [T]he relevant government action for purposes of applying RFRA here is not the charter revocation that may or may not arrive, but only the filing of the quo warranto information.  Engaging in litigation is generally not itself the sort of burden that RFRA forecloses— RFRA purposefully provides a tool to be deployed within litigation.  In this case, it has been invoked as an affirmative defense focusing not on the mere existence of the litigation but on a potential end result of that litigation.  Undoubtedly, RFRA can be powerful however it is deployed, and its potency often may be felt quite early.  But it is not a tool to convert a proceeding focused on whether litigation may even commence into one that reaches and resolves ultimate issues.  Were we to say more about RFRA at this stage, we would have to reach issues that go well beyond the narrow question of the attorney general’s authority to file a quo warranto counterclaim—and to do so without the benefit of a sufficiently developed record or even the refining that ordinarily comes through the usual litigation and appellate process.

Here are links to the pleadings and numerous amicus briefs filed in the case. Here is a link to video of oral arguments in the case. El Paso Times reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Review of Apache's Loss of Sacred Land

By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Apache Stronghold v. United States, (Sup.Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, today filed a lengthy dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Exactly nothing in the phrase “substantial burden”—or anything else in RFRA’s text—hints that a different and more demanding standard applies when (and only when) the “disposition” of the government’s property is at issue....

... [A]t bottom, it seems the Ninth Circuit was concerned that a ruling for Apache Stronghold would effectively afford tribal members a “‘religious servitude’” on federal land at Oak Flat....  And, the argument goes, those who adopted RFRA could not have intended to afford Tribes or others that kind of power over the disposition of federal property....  But unexpressed legislative intentions are not the law. And even if we were to abandon the statutory text in favor of guesswork about unenacted congressional purposes, it is far from clear why we should make the guess the Ninth Circuit did....

While this Court enjoys the power to choose which cases it will hear, its decision to shuffle this case off our docket without a full airing is a grievous mistake—one with consequences that threaten to reverberate for generations.  Just imagine if the government sought to demolish a historic cathedral on so questionable a chain of legal reasoning.  I have no doubt that we would find that case worth our time. Faced with the government’s plan to destroy an ancient site of tribal worship, we owe the Apaches no less.  They may live far from Washington, D. C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many.  But that should make no difference. “Popular religious views are easy enough to defend. It is in protecting unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to . . . religious freedom.”

AP reports on the Court's action.

Plaintiff May Move Ahead with Claim That Iowa RFRA Protects His Religious Use of Cannabis

In Olsen v. State of Iowa, (IA Dist. Ct., May 22, 2025), an Iowa state trial court allowed plaintiff, a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, to move ahead with his suit seeking an injunction to bar enforcement of Iowa's controlled-substance laws against his religious use of cannabis.  The suit contends that his religious use of marijuana is protected by Iowa's Religious Freedom Restoration Act enacted last year. That Act contains its own definition of "compelling governmental interest." Even though in federal court litigation in 2008 plaintiff lost his claim that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempts his religious use of marijuana from federal and state controlled-substance laws, the Iowa state court rejected the state's argument that this suit should be dismissed on collateral estoppel grounds, saying in part:

The issue raised in this litigation is the same as the Petitioner’s prior actions as cited in the briefing, that being whether the compelling state interest test was met regarding the restriction of the Petitioner’s use of cannabis. This issue was central to the Petitioner’s prior cases. 

The Petitioner argues the legal landscape has changed since the prior rulings were issued. Collateral estoppel does not apply if controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the Petitioner's prior judgments. Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d at 831. The court finds that based on this particular argument, that the Petitioner’s should not be dismissed at this time....

In this case, the Petitioner is asserting the claim under Iowa Code Chapter 675. Although it is markedly similar to the federal RFRA and the Petitioner has made similar unsuccessful claims in the past, this court cannot conclude to a certainty that there is no possibility of success under the newly-passed Iowa RFRA. 

Plaintiff, who is litigating pro se, issued a press release announcing the decision.

Cremation of Body When Next of Kin Were Unknown Did Not Violate State RFRA

In Doe v. Marion County, Arkansas, (WD AR, May 5, 2025), an Arkansas federal magistrate judge recommended dismissing a suit brought under the Arkansas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. At issue in the case is the manner in which an Arkansas county coroner disposed of the body of plaintiff's father after the coroner was unable to locate any next of kin.  The body was cremated.  When plaintiff discovered this, she sued alleging in part that cremation violated her strongly held religious beliefs. In recommending judgment for defendants on this claim, the magistrate judge said in part:

Simply using the term "sincerely held religious beliefs" ... without stating any accompanying factual detail, is insufficient to state a plausible claim. See Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, ... (“[g]eneral references to Christianity.... fail to plausibly suggest that a plaintiff’s anti-vaccination beliefs are in fact religious”)...  While it is not for the court to determine the reasonableness of Doe’s alleged religious beliefs, we are not required to take her conclusory assertions of violation at face value....

Even if Doe had pled facts sufficient to state an ARFRA claim, Defendants have sustained their burden of showing that their actions, in accordance with state law, were in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest....  Burial is markedly more expensive, and there is no lesser restrictive means to further the government’s interest.... Requiring the state to bury all unclaimed bodies simply because an unknown family member might have a religious belief against cremation would certainly constitute an undue hardship....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

3rd Circuit: Consular Decisions Cannot Be Challenged Under RFRA

 In Calvary Albuquerque Inc. v. Rubio, (10th Cir., May 6, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision upheld a consular officer's denial of an R-1 (non-immigrant religious worker) visa to a South African minister who wanted to serve as the worship leader at an Albuquerque, New Mexico church.  Plaintiff contended that the visa denial violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but the majority concluded that it could not reverse the decision of a consular officer under the consular nonreviewability doctrine. The majority said in part:

RFRA’s cause-of-action provision plainly does not expressly authorize judicial review of consular officers’ visa decisions.  Also, whether the provision stating RFRA applies to “all Federal law” expressly authorizes judicial review of consular officers’ visa decisions is ambiguous.  Applying statutory construction tools to that clause, we conclude that RFRA does not do so.....

Calvary argues the constitutional claim exception to the consular nonreviewability doctrine applies because it brought a free exercise claim under RFRA, and RFRA is analogous to a constitutional right.... Even if a RFRA claim could qualify for the exception, Calvary has not plausibly alleged that (a) the consular officer failed to provide a facially legitimate and bona fide reason to deny Mr. Green’s visa application or (b) the officer acted in bad faith....

Judge Bacharach dissented, contending that RFRA's language authorizes review of consular decisions.

3rd Circuit Hears Arguments on Whether Religious Motivation of Founders Allows Nonprofit Corporation to Assert Free Exercise Claims

On April 9, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in United States v. Safehouse. In the case, a Pennsylvania federal district court held that a nonprofit corporation that plans to open a safe injection site for those struggling with opioid abuse cannot claim protection from federal prosecution under the free exercise clause or RFRA merely because its founders had a religious motivation. The corporation's articles do not set out any religious purpose. (See prior posting.) Courthouse News Service reports on the oral arguments.

Georgia Legislature Passes Religious Freedom Bill

On April 3, the Georgia legislature gave final passage to SB36, the Georgia Religious Freedom Restoration Act (full text). The Act requires the government to justify any substantial burden on the exercise of religion by a compelling interest implemented by the least restrictive means. The Act adds:

Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. As used in this Code section, the term "granting," used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.

If signed by Governor Brian Kemp, Georgia will be the 30th state to enact a religious freedom law.  Baptist Press reports on the bill.

UPDATE: On April 4, Govenor Kemp signed the bill.

Covid Era Mask Mandate Did Not Violate Free Exercise

In Robol v. City of Columbus, (OH App., March 20, 2025), an Ohio state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims that the city infringed his free exercise rights when during the Covid pandemic it required individuals to wear a mask in public spaces.  The court said in part:

Ordinance 1643-2020, the City’s mask ordinance, required all persons to wear a mask in public spaces.  The ordinance did not regulate, or even mention, any religious activity, religious creed, or religious affiliation.  Thus, the face mask policies Mr. Robol challenges are both neutral and generally applicable....

Despite the general applicability and neutrality of the mask ordinance, Mr. Robol nonetheless asserts the City violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause because the ordinance violated his Christian beliefs, forced him to worship a false god, and had the effect of mocking the tenets of his faith.  Though we do not question the sincerity of Mr. Robol’s interpretation of his religion, we are mindful that a government action is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally burdens religious practices.

Mr. Robol also brought a religious exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act....

Not every imposition on religious exercise is a substantial burden....

Without doubting the sincerity of Mr. Robol’s belief that wearing a face mask violates his religious beliefs, we note that Mr. Robol does not allege, much less demonstrate through Civ.R. 56 evidence, that the face mask policies imposed any more than a mere inconvenience to his religious beliefs.....

Mr. Robol argues the City’s face mask requirement violated his freedom of speech and expression because the choice not to wear a face mask is a form of expressing his opposition to the City’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The City’s mask ordinance is content-neutral, and nothing in the terms of the ordinance suggests the purpose is to regulate speech.  And we agree with appellees the face mask policy promotes an important governmental interest in controlling the spread of COVID-19 that is unrelated to the suppression of speech.....

Wyoming Enacts State RFRA

Last week, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon signed HB 0207, the Wyoming Religious Freedom Restoration Act (full text). The Act requires strict scrutiny of state action that substantially burden's a person's right to the exercise of religion. Wyoming is the 29th state to enact a similar statute. Catholic World Report covers these developments.

6th Circuit: Public Official Engaging in State Action Cannot Assert 1st Amendment Defense

In Emold v. Davis, (6th Cir., March 6, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $100,000 damage award to a same-sex couple who were refused a marriage license by Rowan County, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis who had religious objections to same-sex marriage. The court said in part:

Government officials “have private lives and their own constitutional rights.” ...  But when a public official wields the “authority of the state,” she “engage[s] in state action,” which, by definition, cannot be protected by the First Amendment....

Davis alternatively argues that her Free Exercise rights were violated by a different state action:  Kentucky’s delay in granting her a religious accommodation.  But Plaintiffs had nothing to do with the timing of the accommodation, and Davis’s argument is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claim.  Either way, Davis has been found liable for state action—not private conduct—so she cannot raise a First Amendment defense...

 As Davis sees it, a public official can wield the authority of the state to violate the constitutional rights of citizens if the official believes she is “follow[ing] her conscience.” ...  That cannot be correct.  “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights” is to place certain freedoms “beyond the reach of . . . [government] officials.”  ...  Thus, when an official’s discharge of her duties according to her conscience violates the constitutional rights of citizens, the Constitution must win out.  The Bill of Rights would serve little purpose if it could be freely ignored whenever an official’s conscience so dictates....

Davis also argues that Kentucky’s RFRA shields her from liability.  But that statute does not apply here....

Judge Readler filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  Louisville Courier Journal reports on the decision.

Utah RFRA Protects Psilocybin-Using Religious Sect

In Jensen v. Utah County, (D UT, Feb. 20, 2025), a Utah federal district court issued a preliminary injunction under Utah's Religious Freedom Restoration Act barring law enforcement personnel from interfering with the sincere religious use of psilocybin by members of a new religious group known as Singularism. The court also ordered return of items that had been seized from the group. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Utah Controlled Substances Act as applied to their psilocybin ceremonies....

Based on the evidence in this case, Plaintiffs have established that the government has substantially burdened their sincere religious exercise. Simply put, Plaintiffs offer a sacramental psilocybin tea to their voyagers, who then embark on a spiritual journey by which they write their own scripture. A law that categorically prohibits the possession and use of the psilocybin sacrament—thereby preventing Singularism’s adherents from pursuing their spiritual voyages and hindering them from producing their sacred scripture—substantially burdens the free exercise of Singularism and its adherents....

Defendants observe that Singularism “does not claim special access to divine truths,” instead encouraging its practitioners to more deeply “discover and define their own beliefs,” and explicitly states that “no organization, including [it], has all the answers to life’s most difficult questions.” In Defendants’ view, these features weaken Singularism’s claim to be a religion because they show that Singularism’s beliefs are not comprehensive....  As the court sees it, however, these features less so detract from Singularism’s religious nature than they illustrate Singularism’s commitment to existential humility...

From all the evidence in the record, the court is hard-pressed to find, as Defendants urge, that Singularism is essentially a drug-dealing business cloaked in a minister’s robe. To the contrary, the court is convinced that Singularism is a legitimate religion and that Plaintiffs are sincere practitioners of it. This is not a case where a group of people claim a religious right to do little more than use and distribute large quantities of drugs.... By establishing the sincerity of their religious beliefs, Plaintiffs have fulfilled their responsibility of establishing a prima facie case under the Utah RFRA, shifting the burden to the government to demonstrate that the Utah Controlled Substances Act accomplishes a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means....

Whatever legal regime a society chooses, however, it must apply its protections equally to unpopular or unfamiliar religious groups as to popular or familiar ones if that commitment to religious liberty is to mean anything. As sang Jonas Gwangwa, a South African jazz musician who was exiled by the apartheid government, “Freedom for some is freedom for none.” Indeed, the very founding of the State of Utah reflects the lived experience of that truth by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Perhaps it is ironic then that not long after enacting its RFRA to provide special protections for religious exercise, the State of Utah should so vigorously deploy its resources, particularly the coercive power of its criminal-justice system, to harass and shut down a new religion it finds offensive practically without any evidence that that religion’s practices have imposed any harms on its own practitioners or anyone else. 

7th Circuit: Visa Regulations for Temporary Religious Workers Do Not Violate RFRA or 1st Amendment

In Society of the Divine Word v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that USCIS regulations that makes the process for obtaining a immigrant worker status and subsequent permanent residence more difficult for temporary religious workers than other categories of temporary workers does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the 1st Amendment.  The court said in part:

Plaintiffs do not identify a belief or set of beliefs they have to violate because of the regulation. Instead, they offer a broader, structural argument—that the regulation places a substantial burden on their religious exercise because it allows for “undue Government interference” with their ability to “select and employ their own ministers.” Taking this claim on its own terms, it does not rise to the level of a substantial burden for purposes of stating a RFRA violation. There is no assertion that the regulation prevents Plaintiffs from practicing their religion. It does not require them to select or refrain from selecting any particular minister. And it does not otherwise pressure or coerce Plaintiffs into violating any tenet of their religion, as far as we can tell from the complaint and declarations. We agree with the district court that, at most, the regulation “requires employers to plan the timing of employment decisions based on immigration status, and potentially limits the pool of qualified applicants that plaintiffs can choose from if they fail to plan accordingly.” ... That is not a substantial burden on religious beliefs or practice....

Court Preliminarily Enjoins Enforcement Against Plaintiffs of New Guidelines for Immigration Raids at Churches

In Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D MD, Feb. 24, 2025), a Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring immigration authorities from enforcing against the Society of Friends, Baptist, and Sikh plaintiffs the January 2025 policy change on immigration enforcement at sensitive locations such as places of worship. Instead, they must comply with the previous 2021 Guidelines. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their 1st Amendment Freedom of Association claim as well as their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It concluded that enforcement of the new policy would likely significantly burden both plaintiffs' right to expressive association and their religious exercise. The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs have provided facts showing that, in light of their religious beliefs and practices relating to immigrants, they can reasonably expect to face immigration enforcement actions at their places of worship pursuant to the 2025 Policy, that such actions will likely result in declines in attendance at their worship and ministry services, and that such declines are, in fact, already occurring.... They have further demonstrated that, as a result ..., certain core religious beliefs and practices will be significantly burdened, including the beliefs that each of the Plaintiffs' religions require regular, communal worship; that at least CBF requires, as part of its religious exercise, that its congregations engage in services to support immigrants and refugees; and that, for the Quaker Plaintiffs in particular, the presence of any firearms in worship services, such as those of armed law enforcement officers, violates their faith.

CBS News reports on the decision.

Title VII Applies to Liberty University's Firing of Transgender Employee

In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, Feb. 21, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. In an extensively reasoned 70-page opinion, the court rejected several defenses asserted by the University. First the University contended that §§702 and 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of transgender status when that is consistent with the employer’s religious belief. Those section allow a religious employer to discriminate "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." The court said in part:

Having determined that no source of law—from statutory text to legislative history to precedent—answers the question before us, the Court is left to weigh the imperfect arguments above, alongside the potential legal and social consequences of our decision. Drawing upon all of these considerations, we conclude that Sections 702 and 703 must be narrowly construed so as to permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s espoused religious belief or practice, such that religious employers have no license to discriminate on the basis of any other protected class. Where a religious employer discriminates on the basis of any other protected class in a but-for fashion, a statutory violation occurs, even if the decision was religiously motivated....

To decide that sex discrimination is acceptable so long as it is religiously motivated would allow employers to achieve all manner of discrimination under the banner of religion. So long as the religious institution can show that its view—despite directly implicating sex, race, or national origin—is a sincerely held religious belief, the religious institution would have free license to discriminate at will and evade the scrutiny of civil law. Not only would this subject potentially thousands of people to discrimination..., but it would supply religious institutions with a power not afforded to secular institutions, thereby generating favorites under the law and raising Establishment Clause questions....

The court also rejected the University's RFRA defense, concluding first that RFRA applies only to suits in which the government is a party. It added:

And even if Liberty were entitled to raise RFRA as a defense, we find that Title VII likely passes strict scrutiny....

On the record before us, enforcing this statute in Zinksi’s case merely requires Liberty to maintain an employee who has not followed the university’s Doctrinal Statement to the letter, i.e., an employee who has sinned. It does not require Liberty to change its belief, to endorse Zinksi’s behavior, or to allow Zinksi to spread a new message within the organization.... The minimal inroad on religious liberty here is easily justified by the exceedingly compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we find that Liberty’s brief argument as to burden is insufficient to show substantial burden at this stage of litigation. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply, and our analysis can come to an end.....

The court rejected the ministerial exception defense, saying in part that "nothing in the record suggests that Zinski was a minister." The court also rejected the University's freedom of expressive association claim, saying in part:

... [W]e must defer Liberty’s claim that it opposes transgender identification and seeks to avoid any promotion of transgender status as an appropriate form of behavior. However,... we cannot conclude that Zinksi’s presence at Liberty would “force the organization to send a message” that Liberty accepts transgender conduct as a “legitimate form of behavior.”... Zinksi is an IT employee who has limited to no interactions with students, has no role in influencing or promoting Liberty’s value system, and has no role in Liberty’s religious curriculum or programming. The only inference that we can draw for Liberty is that Liberty may be seen as a hypocrite for employing a transgender person when it opposes transgender identity; but the same could be said for Liberty’s employment of any other type of person who “sins” despite Liberty’s opposition to sin in general....

Finally, the court rejected the University's ecclesiastical abstention defense, saying in part:

Zinski’s complaint asks the Court to determine whether Title VII prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution, like Liberty, has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law and must be fired.

27 Religious Denominational Groups Sue DHS Over Rescission of Sensitive Locations Policy

Yesterday, 27 Christian and Jewish denominational bodies and organizations filed suit in a D.C. federal district court challenging the rescission by the Department of Homeland Security of its "Sensitive Locations Policy." The policy severely limited the situations under which immigration enforcement actions could take place at churches, synagogues, mosques and other institutions of worship, as well as at various other locations. The complaint (full text) in Mennonite Church, USA v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D DC, filed 2/11/2025), says in part:

1. [Plaintiffs] bring this suit unified on a fundamental belief: Every human being, regardless of birthplace, is a child of God worthy of dignity, care, and love. Welcoming the stranger, or immigrant, is thus a central precept of their faith practices....

7. ... Consistent with their call to welcome and serve all people, many have undocumented congregants and many offer social service ministries— such as food and clothing pantries, English as a Second Language (“ESL”) classes, legal assistance, and job training services—at their churches and synagogues that serve undocumented people.  An immigration enforcement action during worship services, ministry work, or other congregational activities would be devastating to their religious practice. It would shatter the consecrated space of sanctuary, thwart communal worship, and undermine the social service outreach that is central to religious expression and spiritual practice for Plaintiffs’ congregations and members.

8. The rescission of the sensitive locations policy is already substantially burdening the religious exercise of Plaintiffs’ congregations and members.  Congregations are experiencing decreases in worship attendance and social services participation due to fear of immigration enforcement action.  For the vulnerable congregants who continue to attend worship services, congregations must choose between either exposing them to arrest or undertaking security measures that are in direct tension with their religious duties of welcome and hospitality. Likewise, the choice that congregations currently face between discontinuing social service ministries or putting undocumented participants at risk of arrest is no choice at all: Either way, congregations are forced to violate their religious duty to serve and protect their immigrant neighbors.

The suit alleges that the rescission of the policy violates plaintiffs' free exercise rights under RFRA as well as their 1st Amendment rights to expressive association.

The Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection issued a press release announcing the lawsuit. 

[Caption of lawsuit corrected.]

DC Circuit Revives Contempt Proceedings in RFRA Suit Against Fire Department

In Calvert v. Potter, (DC Cir., Jan. 28, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded to the district court a suit by a group of D.C. firefighters who claim that the D.C. Fire Department violated an injunction issued in 2007 vindicating their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The injunction required the Department to allow firefighters who wore beards for religious reasons to work in field operations. However, 13 years later the situation became more complex, as the D.C. Circuit explained:

As COVID-19 spread in March 2020, the Department implemented a new facial hair policy and mandated the use of masks during patient contact. The Department transferred the four bearded firefighters it still employed to administrative roles “due to concerns about their ability to properly wear N95 respirators with facial hair.”...

The district court denied the motion for civil contempt.... The court declined to hold the Department in contempt because it “acted in a reasonably cautious way, under unprecedented and extraordinary circumstances, to keep plaintiffs and the public it served as safe as it could.”...

The Court of Appeals rejected the district court's conclusion: 

Good-faith compliance may be relevant to mitigation at the remedies stage, but the court lacks discretion to excuse civil contempt based on the contemnor’s good faith. ... 

The firefighters had a private right to enforcement of the original injunction, which protected their religious freedom and permanently forbade the Department from enforcing the 2005 facial hair policy against them. The district court had no general discretion to excuse civil contempt.... 

Instead, the court was required to determine whether the Department violated the firefighters’ rights under the 2007 injunction.... Even if the Department’s behavior was reasonable in light of the pandemic, good faith and lack of willfulness is not a defense to civil contempt....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Quaker Organizations Sue Over New Immigration Enforcement Policy

Yesterday three organizations of Quaker congregations along with two individual congregations filed suit in a Maryland federal district court challenging the Department of Homeland Security's recent change in policy that allows immigration agents to conduct enforcement operations in houses of worship and at religious life-cycle ceremonies.  The complaint (full text) in Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D MD, filed 1/27/2025), alleges that the policy change violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the 1st Amendment's protection of expressive association and the Administrative Procedure Act.  The complaint alleges in part:

89. A diversity of worshippers is an essential component of the Quaker value of “experience[ing] God in a broader, more encompassing way,” as “one’s life experience affects how one hears the spirit and what conclusions one might draw.”... Deterring immigrants from worshipping in-person with a Quaker meeting would therefore directly interfere with Plaintiffs’ religious exercise by lessening their “ability to hear God and what God is trying to tell [them].” ...

90. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Quaker beliefs make it essential that they “encourage others for whom [that] path is meaningful to join.”... But DHS’s new policy, by opening meeting houses to immigration-enforcement activities, inhibits Plaintiffs from doing just that.... Knowingly putting a person in harm’s way or subjecting them to the possibility of a violent encounter with an armed law-enforcement officer would violate Quaker beliefs in peace and nonviolence....

91. Quakers have held a religious commitment against violence for hundreds of years.... For many Quakers, “[t]he presence of a weapon in a Quaker meeting would be absolutely unacceptable.”... The presence of armed immigration officers at meeting houses—which the new policy allows—would thus significantly hamper Plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their faith.... Importantly, even the threat of armed government agents at meeting houses—which has existed since the moment DHS announced its new policy—does the same.

Axios reports on the lawsuit.

No Qualified Immunity Defense to RFRA Claim Is Available

In Swanson v. Flores, (SD CA, Jan. 6, 2025), a California federal district court refused to dismiss a suit for damages brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act by plaintiff who was a civilian employee of the Marine Corps against her former supervisor. She contends that defendant first ordered her to stop her faith-based discussions with coworkers in her office. Subsequently he ordered her to remove a Bible and religious calendar that she kept on her desk. Plaintiff contends that she maintains her religious beliefs by sharing them with others who have similar religious views and that these orders substantially burdened her ability to practice her sincerely held religious beliefs. The court held that plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for relief.

The court also rejected defendant's claim of qualified immunity, saying in part:

With no binding authority, this Court finds that the only RFRA defense Congress intended is that stated in the statute, i.e., the defense that the government was acting to further a compelling interest and was doing so by the least restrictive means.

Catholic Doctors Sue HHS Over Interpretation of EMTALA's Impact on State Abortion Bans

Suit was filed last week in a Tennessee federal district court by an organization of Catholic physicians challenging a July 2022 Memorandum and accompanying Letter from the Department of Health and Human Services that stated that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act pre-empts state abortion bans when an abortion is needed for emergency care. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Medical Association v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, (MD TN, filed 1/10/2025) alleges in part:

2. The Memorandum and Letter ... exceed Defendants’ statutory authority, were promulgated without procedure required by law, and are arbitrary and capricious, all in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Mandate also violates the rights of doctors under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment....

169. CMA’s members exercise their religious beliefs in practicing medicine by caring for patients generally, and in caring for patients in situations subject to EMTALA. CMA’s members exercise their religious beliefs in treating pregnant women and their unborn children with respect and dignity, and in opposing involvement in the direct and intentional killing of unborn children in abortion. 

170. The Mandate substantially burdens the exercise of CMA’s members’ sincerely held religious beliefs. 

171. The Mandate imposes significant pressure on CMA’s members to practice medicine in way that would violate their beliefs because of the threat of investigations, fines, and other punishments and impairments.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

Indiana Supreme Court Lets Preliminary Injunction Against Abortion Ban When It Violates Religious Beliefs Stand

Last week, the Indiana Supreme Court, by a vote of 3-2, refused to review at this stage in the litigation a preliminary injunction entered by lower courts in a suit claiming that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act is violated when plaintiffs are prohibited by Indiana's abortion law from obtaining an abortion that their religious beliefs direct them to obtain. (See prior posting.) In Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Anonymous Plaintiff 1, (IN Sup. Ct., Dec. 10, 2024), the Order denying the petition to transfer the case to the Supreme Court was not accompanied by a majority opinion. However, Justice Molter joined by Justice Rush filed a concurring opinion saying in part:

This case involves an unusual preliminary injunction—the trial court temporarily enjoined state officials from enforcing the State’s abortion law, but only for a particular group of women who are not pregnant and therefore are not seeking an abortion. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court didn’t exceed its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction while the case continues to be litigated. But the panel also directed the trial court to narrow the preliminary injunction on remand. So thus far, this case is not stopping the defendants from doing anything. And we don’t yet know if it ever will, including because the defendants may ultimately prevail in the lawsuit....

I conclude the more prudent course is for the Court to review the case after a final judgment rather than following a preliminary injunction, which remains a work in progress and subject to more deferential appellate review. In essence, it is better that we review the trial court’s final answer rather than its first guess....

Justice Slaughter, joined by Justice Massa, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Our denial of transfer means the trial court’s “final answer” will lack the benefit of our current thinking. By saying nothing, we may leave the misimpression that the injunction’s only vulnerability is its scope. As my colleagues acknowledge, this case “presents transfer-worthy issues with previously undecided questions of statewide importance”.

Indiana ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision.