In United States v. Gaviola, (ED CA, Sept. 25, 2025), a California federal district court held that enforcement of 18 USC §2262(a)(2) does not violate the free exercise rights of a California mother who arranged for her 16-year-old son to be forcibly transferred to a religious boarding school in Missouri. The son had previously obtained a temporary restraining order against his mother prohibiting her from contacting him. He had also filed a petition to become an emancipated minor. 18 USC §2262(a)(2), which is part of the Violence Against Women Act, criminalizes causing a person to travel in interstate commerce by force, coercion, duress or fraud where that violates a state court protection order. According to the court:
Gaviola asserts that her decision to cause her child, MV, to cross state lines in order to enroll him in a Christian school “reflects her sincerely held religious beliefs and her absolute right to direct her child’s religious and moral education.”... As such, she claims that “[p]rosecuting her under 18 U.S.C. § 2262 for this conduct imposes a substantial burden on her free exercise of religion, as it effectively penalizes her for making a constitutionally protected choice.”
In rejecting her claim, the court said in part:
Section 2262 is neutral. It does not single out religion or religiously motivated conduct for special burdens; it applies regardless of the defendant’s beliefs. It is generally applicable because it uniformly prohibits all persons from violating protection orders; it does not afford discretion to grant exceptions for secular motivations (e.g., employment, education, medical reasons) while denying them for religious ones. The government’s interest—interstate enforcement of state court orders and protection of victims of domestic violence—applies equally across the board. Thus, under Smith, § 2262 is a classic example of a neutral, generally applicable law whose enforcement does not trigger strict scrutiny, even if a defendant claims her conduct was religiously motivated....
Moreover, if the Court set aside Smith and applied strict scrutiny, Gaviola’s arguments still fails....
Gaviola does not raise a claim or defense under the RFRA. However, whether under Gaviola’s interpretation of a First Amendment challenge or one under the RFRA, the “net effect” is the same: “the government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if and only if the government’s action can survive ‘strict scrutiny.’” ...
As previously discussed, the Court does not doubt the sincerity of Gaviola’s religious beliefs. The Court will also assume, without deciding, that prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(2) substantially burdens her exercise of religion. Even so, the government’s interests are compelling.
The federal government has a paramount interest in protecting victims of domestic violence, including by ensuring the enforceability of state-court protection orders and preventing their evasion through interstate travel. Enforcing § 2262—as well as other provisions of the Violence Against Women Act—advances these compelling interests, such as safeguarding children, upholding judicial orders, and deterring interstate abduction....
