Jury Must Decide Reason for Evangelists' Exclusion from Pride Event

In Cocchini v. City of Franklin, Tennessee, (MD TN, June 3, 2025), in an opinion covering three consolidated cases, a Tennessee federal district court held that because disputed questions of fact remain, the cases must go to trial rather than the court issuing summary judgment for either side.  At issue are claims by five Christian evangelists that they were wrongly removed, asked to leave or denied entrance to the 2023 Franklin Pride Festival in violation of their 1st Amendment free speech rights. Those who entered the Festival particularly spoke with representatives of churches that supported LGBTQ+ rights. The court concluded that plaintiffs were engaged in protected speech that did not constitute "fighting words" and that they were not attempting to make their views part of the Festival's message. The court also concluded that the city park remained a quintessential public forum even though the city had issued it a permit to use the park for the Pride Festival. The court then concluded:

... [T]here is a genuine dispute of fact on the rationale for the City and Officer Spry restricting Plaintiffs’ speech that precludes a finding of summary judgment in any party’s favor.... [A]lthough there is evidence in the record suggesting that the City and Officer Spry restricted Plaintiffs’ speech on account of the Franklin Pride staffers’ disagreement with their religious messages, Defendants present conflicting evidence that they restricted Plaintiffs’ speech based on Franklin Pride’s request that they do so to maintain their use of their permit, prevent Plaintiffs’ disruptive behavior, and enforce Franklin Pride’s ban on distributing outside materials. Any one of these content-neutral reasons for curbing Plaintiffs’ speech ... would satisfy the applicable standard.... Given this critical material dispute of fact in the record, the Court finds that the question of what motivated Plaintiffs’ exclusion from the Park must be decided by a jury.  Accordingly, both Plaintiffs’ and the City’s motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims must be denied on this ground.

Tennessee Enacts Conscience Protections for Health Care Providers

On April 24, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee signed the Medical Ethics Defense Act, SB 955 (full text). The new law provides in part:

A healthcare provider must not be required to participate in or pay for a healthcare procedure, treatment, or service that violates the conscience of the healthcare provider....

[However, this] Does not permit a healthcare payer to decline payment for a healthcare procedure, treatment, or service it is contractually obligated to pay for under the terms of a contract with an insured party. 

 Any political subdivision ... shall not reprimand or sanction a healthcare provider, nor deny or revoke, or threaten to deny or revoke, a license, certification, or registration of a healthcare provider for engaging in speech, expression, or association that is protected from government interference by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, unless the political subdivision demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the healthcare provider's speech, expression, or association was the direct cause of physical harm to a person with whom the healthcare provider had a practitioner-patient relationship within the three (3) years immediately preceding the incident of physical harm.

WBIR News reports on the new law.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply To Pastor's Defamation Suit

In Garner v. Southern Baptist Convention, (TN App., Jan. 8. 2025), a Tennessee state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to a defamation suit brought by a Baptist pastor against the Southern Baptist Convention and various of its officials and staff. At issue are oral conversations and a letter from an SBC staff member suggesting that allegations of sexual misconduct had been made against Preston Garner, a pastor at Everett Hills Baptist Church. The court said in part:

The conduct at issue is the Appellants’ purported publication of written and oral statements that Mr. Garner was “an individual with an alleged history of abuse” and that the allegation was credible, while failing to also state that “the allegation[ was] made through an anonymous online portal” and that the Appellants “had not made any inquiry into the veracity of the anonymous report, or that no evidence supported the anonymous report.”  ... [T]he Appellants in this case have not raised any argument that their conduct resulted from the application or interpretation of any religious canon.  Moreover, any argument by the Appellants that the Letter was sent as part of a pastoral disciplinary process is undercut by the concession of the SBC and the Credentials Committee that “[t]he Credentials Committee does not ‘investigate what occurred or judge the culpability of an accused individual,’ but rather only reviews ‘how the SBC church responded to sexual abuse allegations and make[s] recommendations as to whether those actions or inactions are consistent with the SBC’s beliefs regarding sexual abuse.’”

... [C]onsidering the Garners’ claims will not require the trial court to resolve any religious disputes or to rely on religious doctrine. 

The court also concluded that the Tennessee Public Participation Act applies to the lawsuit, but that plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof needed to avoid early dismissal of the case.

6th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on DOE's Interpretation of Title IX to Include Gender Identity Discrimination

Yesterday the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in State of Tennessee v. Cardona. In the case, a Kentucky federal district court barred enforcement against Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia of the Department of Education's rules that interpret Title IX's ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination against transgender students and faculty by institutions receiving federal financial assistance. Bloomberg Law reports on the oral arguments.

Court Enjoins Disciplining of Doctors Performing Certain Abortions in Tennessee

In Blackmon v. State of Tennessee, (TN Chanc. Ct., Oct. 17, 2024), a Tennessee state Chancery Court issued a temporary injunction barring the state from instituting disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff physicians for performing abortions in any of four specified medical situations. The court found that plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their challenges under the right to life, liberty or property and the equal protection clauses of the state constitution and in their vagueness challenge. The court said in part:

The question remains ... whether the Medical Necessity Exception, as currently written, serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.  Given the range of interpretations proffered through the expert declarations ..., the Court finds that the issue of which conditions, and the timing of when they present and escalate to life-threatening conditions, constitute medical emergencies within the Medical Necessity Exception is demonstrably unclear, notwithstanding the “reasonable medical judgment’ of the physician standard set forth in the Exception.  This lack of clarity is evidenced by the confusion and lack of consensus within the Tennessee medical community on the circumstances requiring necessary health- and life-saving abortion care.  The evidence presented underscores how serious, difficult, and complex these issues are and raises significant questions as to whether the Medical Necessity Exception is sufficiently narrow to serve a compelling state interest....

Plaintiff Patients, as pregnant women, claim they are similarly situated to non-pregnant women who seek and are in need of emergency medical care.  Yet because of the criminal abortion statute, pregnant women are treated differently than non-pregnant women because their access to emergency medical care is restricted....

While the court enjoined disciplinary proceedings, it held that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the state's criminal abortion statute. The Hill reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Tennesse County Sued by Woman Who Was Required to Remove Hijab for Booking Photo

Suit was filed this week in a Tennessee federal district court by a Muslim woman who was required by Knox County, Tennessee Sheriff's Office employees to remove her hijab for a booking photo. Plaintiff was arrested along with others who were participating in a pro-Palestinian demonstration on the University of Tennessee campus. The photo was subsequently posted on the Sheriff Office's public website in violation of Sheriff's Office policy. The complaint (full text) in Solliz v. Knox County, Tennessee, (ED TN, filed 10/7/2024), alleges in part:

The Defendants’ mistreatment of Mrs. Soliz and their disrespect for her religious rights has scarred her.  The Defendants’ misbehavior was also illegal.  The federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ... and... Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act—flatly prohibited the Defendants from burdening Mrs. Soliz’s free exercise of her religion in the manner they did.

Longview News-Journal reports on the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Grants Cert. in Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

The U.S. Supreme Court today granted review in United States v. Skrmetti, (Sup. Ct., Docket No. 23-477, certiorari granted 6/24/2024). (Order List.) In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision, reversed a preliminary injunction issued by a district court in a challenge to Tennessee's ban on chemical, hormonal or surgical treatment of minors for gender dysphoria. The majority rejected due process and equal protection challenges to the state law. (See prior posting.) SCOTUSblog reports on the Supreme Court's action.

6 More States Fend Off Enforcement of Title IX Transgender Discrimination Rules

Four days after a Louisiana federal district court enjoined the Department of Education from enforcing its new sex-discrimination rules under Title IX against Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana and Idaho (see prior posting), a Kentucky federal district court issued an opinion barring enforcement against Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia which were plaintiffs in the case. DOE's new rules interpret the Title IX ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination against transgender students and faculty by institutions receiving federal financial assistance. Intervenors in the Kentucky case are an organization of Christian educators and a cisgender high school girl who objects to a transgender female who was on her Middle School track team. In State of Tennessee v. Cardona, (ED KY, June 17, 2024), the court in a 93-page opinion said in part:

The Department’s new definition of “discrimination on the basis of sex” wreaks havoc on Title IX and produces results that Congress could not have intended....

For purposes of Title IX, “sex” is unambiguous.  Therefore, there is no “implicit delegation from Congress” to the Department to change or expand its meaning.... But even if the word were ambiguous, there would be significant reason for pause before assuming that Congress “had intended such an implicit  delegation.”...  Education is one of the most important functions of state and local governments and is an area where states “historically have been sovereign.” ...  Accordingly, it is unlikely that Congress would have intended to delegate the authority to deviate from Title IX’s original purpose “in so cryptic a fashion.”...

The major questions doctrine assumes that Congress speaks clearly when it delegates to an agency the authority to make “decisions of vast economic and political significance.”...

The court also concluded that the new rules violate teachers' free speech rights, saying in part:

... [P]rivate and public institutions, as well as the students, faculty, and staff therein, will be forced to convey a particular message that may contradict moral or religious values....  For example, the Final Rule’s definition of harassment will likely compel “students and teachers to use ‘preferred’ rather than accurate pronouns.” ...

It is unclear how the Government’s articulated position can be seen as anything less than a tacit endorsement of a content-based heckler’s veto So long as the offended individuals complain with sufficient vigor, the refusal to abide by preferred pronouns can be deemed harassment and exposes a recipient of Federal funds to liability under Title IX....

The court also focused on parental rights and privacy rights, saying in part:

Although the Final Rule gestures at retaining a certain role for parents, it does not provide that parental opposition to their child’s selective gender identity requires schools to exempt that student from Title IX’s new mandate.  To the contrary, it implies that Title IX could supersede parental preferences about a child’s treatment depending on the case.

... [D]espite society’s enduring recognition of biological differences between the sexes, as well as an individual’s basic right to bodily privacy, the Final Rule mandates that schools permit biological men into women’s intimate spaces, and women into men’s, within the educational environment based entirely on a person’s subjective gender identity.  This result is not only impossible to square with Title IX but with the broader guarantee of education protection for all students.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Tennessee Passes Law Banning Religious and Ideological Discrimination by Banks and Insurance Companies

The Tennessee legislature this week gave final approval to HB 2100 (full text) which prohibits banks and insurance companies from denying or cancelling services based on a customer's religious beliefs, practices or affiliations or the customer's political opinions, speech or affiliations. The bill also bans financial institutions and insurance companies from discriminating against customers based on a number of other factors such as firearm ownership, failure to meet environmental standards, or support of the government in combatting illegal immigration, drug trafficking or human trafficking. However, the bill permits financial institutions or insurance companies that claim a religious purpose to provide or deny service based on a customer's religious beliefs, exercise, or affiliation. The bill now goes to Governor Bill Lee for his signature. ADF issued a press release on the passage of the legislation.

Satanic Temple Sues School Board Over Discriminatory Rental Fees for Satan Club

The Satanic Temple filed suit this week in a Tennessee federal district court complaining that the Memphis-Shelby County School Board is placing hurdles in the way of its renting space for use by an After-School Satan Club. The complaint (full text) in The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Shelby County Board of Education, (WD TN, filed 3/19/2024), alleges in part:

160. ... MSCS has demonstrated a widespread custom and practice of unnecessarily delaying approval or denial of the Satanic Temple’s rental applications....

169. ... MSCS is unconstitutionally discriminating against the Satanic Temple on the basis of its disfavored viewpoint and the content of its speech by charging the Temple a discriminatory hourly rental rate for its monthly ASSC meetings and ... an arbitrary and exorbitant security fee while not charging the same rates or security fees to the Good News Club....

170. ... MSCS’s discriminatory actions are ... arising from disagreement with, and hostility toward, the viewpoint and/or content of the Satanic Temple’s speech, as well as hostility towards the Satanic Temple’s religion by school board members, MSCS administrators, MSCS officials, community members and others....

196. The Satanic Temple’s before- and-after school clubs are a vital part of its religiously motivated mission to provide a safe, inclusive, and welcoming club for students whose parents are members of the Satanic Temple, as well as other students who may not feel welcomed or comfortable at other available before- or after-school religious clubs.

197. MSCS’s widespread custom and practice of discriminating against the Satanic Temple and attempting to constructively block and deter the ASSC from meeting ... substantially burdens the Satanic Temple’s exercise of its sincerely held non-theistic religious belief.

Freedom From Religion foundation issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Tennessee Legislature Passes Healthcare Sharing Ministries Exemption

Yesterday the Tennessee legislature took the final procedural steps needed to send HB 1163, Healthcare Sharing Ministries Freedom to Share Act (full text) to the Governor for his signature. It exempts from state insurance regulation tax-exempt plans under which members who share a common religious or ethical belief provide for the medical or financial needs of other members through their financial contributions.

Tennessee Governor Signs Law Allowing Potential Officiants to Refuse to Solemnize a Marriage

Yesterday, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee signed into law HB 878 (full text) which adds to the Tennessee Code section which lists who may solemnize marriages (clergy as well as various current and former public officials) language that provides:

 A person shall not be required to solemnize a marriage.

As originally introduced, the bill would have allowed refusals only by those who had objections based on conscience or religious belief.  CNN reporting on the bill notes that LGBTQ advocates criticized the bill for allowing public officials to discriminate based on their personal beliefs.

County Revises Policy on Religious Head Coverings in Booking Photos in Settlement of Suit by Muslim Woman

In a Settlement Agreement (full text) in Johnston v. Rutherford County, Tennessee, (MD TN, 1/18/2024), the county has agreed to pay $100,000 in damages to a Muslim woman who authorities required to remove her hijab for a booking photo. Sophia Johnston was stopped by police for having a taillight out and was arrested when it turned out she had a 6-year-old outstanding warrant for failing to appear on charges of driving with a suspended license. (Background.) In the Settlement Agreement, the county also agreed to delete from its records photos and video of Johnston without her hijab. Johnston will have a booking photo wearing her hijab retaken. Under the Agreement, the county has also adopted a new policy on Religious Accommodations for Head Coverings During Booking Process (full text) and has updated its Detention Center Protocols (full text) to allow booking photos to be taken with religious head coverings so long as the head covering is first removed for a search.  WZTV News reports on the settlement.

Court Limits Discussion of Religion in Trial for Blocking Abortion Clinic Entrance

In United States v. Gallagher, (MD TN, Jan. 5, 2024), a Tennessee federal district court ruled on the extent to which defendants can refer to their religious activities or beliefs and to the First Amendment in their upcoming criminal trial for violation of the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act. Defendants are charged criminally with barricading the entrance to a Mt. Juliet, Tennessee abortion clinic in a so-called "rescue" operation. The court said in part:

It does not appear to be disputed that these defendants’ actions were motivated, at least in part, by their religious objections to the intentional termination of pregnancies. The Government argues, however, that evidence of those motivations would be “totally extraneous” to the “nature of the” charged offenses and should, therefore, be excluded.... The Government’s argument, however, is in significant tension with the FACE Act itself, which affirmatively places the defendants’ states of mind at issue by criminalizing only “intentional” acts taken “because [the victim] is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1). The defendants’ subjective motivations are, therefore, an unavoidable aspect of this case, and it is not clear to the court that those motivations can be accurately represented without at least some incidental reference to the details of their beliefs—which happen, in this instance, to be based in religion....

The court has already ruled that, as a matter of well-settled law, religious motivations are not a defense to a violation of either the FACE Act or the conspiracy statute.... The court, however, will not go so far as to wholly forbid the discussion of the defendants’ religious beliefs for the limited purpose of establishing or refuting intent or purpose.... 

... The defendants cannot turn an ounce of relevance into a gallon of irrelevant political messaging. The court, however, will not bar discussion of the defendants’ views altogether.

... When the defendants prayed or discussed their religious views, those specific actions were protected by the First Amendment. But if, in the next breath, they turned to discussing a plan to unlawfully obstruct the entrance of a clinic, then that conspiracy was just as illegal as it would have been if it had been the sole topic of conversation. Similarly, if they engaged in activities that would, in isolation, be protected by the First Amendment, but they did so while also violating the FACE Act through physical obstruction or intimidation, then the non-criminal components of their actions are no shield against prosecution for the criminal ones. Any argument to the contrary would be improper and will be barred.

The court also ruled that defendants may not present evidence or arguments at trial on various other matters including jury nullification, selective prosecution, potential sentences and good character. (See prior related posting.)

Supreme Court Review Sought in Tennessee's Ban on Medical Treatment of Minors for Gender Dysphoria

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court this week in L.W. v. Skrmetti, (Sup. Ct., filed 11/1/2023). In the case, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision, reversed a preliminary injunction issued by a district court in a challenge to Tennessee's ban on chemical, hormonal or surgical treatment of minors for gender dysphoria. The majority rejected due process and equal protection challenges to the state law. (See prior posting.) ACLU issued a press release  announcing its filing of the petition seeking review of the 6th Circuit's decision.

Tennessee Sues to Restore Title X Grant Without Making Abortion Referrals

Tennessee's Attorney General this week filed suit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services seeking to restore Tennessee's $7 million annual Title X family planning grant which had been cancelled because of the state's abortion referral policy.  The complaint (full text) in State of Tennessee v. Becerra, (ED TN, filed 10/24/2023), challenges the HHS rule that requires Title X grantees to furnish information and nondirective counseling on abortion if pregnant clients request it.  Tennessee was only willing to make referrals and provide counseling as to procedures that are legal in Tennessee,  HHS takes the position that where, as in Tennessee, abortion is outlawed, out-of-state referrals would be required. the suit contends that the HHS rule violates various provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. It asks the court, among other things, to:

Enjoin Defendants from withholding Title X funds from Tennessee for refusing to offer counseling and referrals (including out-of-state) for abortions that are otherwise illegal under Tennessee law.

Catholic World Report reports on the lawsuit.

6th Circuit Upholds TN and KY Laws Barring Gender Transition Treatment For Minors

 In L.W. v. Skrmetti, (6th Cir., Sept. 28, 2023), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, reversed preliminary injunctions issued by district courts in challenges to statutes in Tennessee and Kentucky prohibiting chemical, hormonal or surgical treatment of minors for gender dysphoria. The majority rejected due process and equal protection challenges to the state laws, saying in part:

No one in these consolidated cases debates the existence of gender dysphoria or the distress caused by it. And no one doubts the value of providing psychological and related care to children facing it. The question is whether certain additional treatments—puberty blockers, hormone treatments, and surgeries—should be added to the mix of treatments available to those age 17 and under. As to that, we return to where we started. This is a relatively new diagnosis with ever-shifting approaches to care over the last decade or two. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for anyone to be sure about predicting the long-term consequences of abandoning age limits of any sort for these treatments. That is precisely the kind of situation in which life-tenured judges construing a difficult-to-amend Constitution should be humble and careful about announcing new substantive due process or equal protection rights that limit accountable elected officials from sorting out these medical, social, and policy challenges.

Judge White dissented, saying in part:

The statutes we consider today discriminate based on sex and gender conformity and intrude on the well-established province of parents to make medical decisions for their minor children. Despite these violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority concludes that the statutes are likely constitutional and reverses district court orders enjoining the statutes. I respectfully dissent.

6th Circuit Stays Injunction Against Tennessee's Ban on Treatment of Transgender Youth

In L.W. v. Skrmetti, (6th Cir., July 8, 2023), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision stayed a district court's preliminary injunction against Tennessee's ban on providing puberty blockers and hormone therapy for minors suffering from gender dysphoria. Chief Judge Sutton's majority opinion first held that the district court had abused its power by issuing a state-wide injunction in the case. It went on to hold that plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on their due process or equal protection challenges, saying in part:

Life-tenured federal judges should be wary of removing a vexing and novel topic of medical debate from the ebbs and flows of democracy by construing a largely unamendable federal constitution to occupy the field....

Parents, it is true, have a substantive due process right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”.... But the Supreme Court cases recognizing this right confine it to narrow fields, such as education ... and visitation rights.... No Supreme Court case extends it to a general right to receive new medical or experimental drug treatments.....

Gender-affirming procedures often employ FDA-approved drugs for non-approved, “off label” uses. Tennessee decided that such off-label use in this area presents unacceptable dangers.... Many medical professionals and many medical organizations may disagree. But the Constitution does not require Tennessee to view these treatments the same way as the majority of experts or to allow drugs for all uses simply because the FDA has approved them for some....

Equal protection.... The Act bans gender-affirming care for minors of both sexes. The ban thus applies to all minors, regardless of their biological birth with male or female sex organs. That prohibition does not prefer one sex to the detriment of the other.....

The plaintiffs separately claim that the Act amounts to transgender-based discrimination, violating the rights of a quasi-suspect class. But neither the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized transgender status as a quasi-suspect class. Until that changes, rational basis review applies to transgender-based classifications....

These initial views, we must acknowledge, are just that: initial. We may be wrong. It may be that the one week we have had to resolve this motion does not suffice to see our own mistakes. In an effort to mitigate any potential harm from that possibility, we will expedite the appeal of the preliminary injunction....

Judge White dissented in part, agreeing that the injunction was too broad, but concluding that plaintiffs would likely succeed on their Equal Protection challenge because the law discriminates on the basis of sex.

Politico reports on the decision.

Court Says Dobbs Decision Does Not Undercut Freedom of Access To Clinic Entrances Act

In United States v. Gallagher, (MD TN, July 3, 2023), a Tennessee federal district court became the first court to rule on whether the Supreme Court's Dobbs decision affects the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances ("FACE") Act.  In the case, eleven co-defendants sought dismissal of their indictments for violating FACE. They first argued that since Dobbs held abortion is not entitled to heightened protection under the 14th Amendment, Congress' reliance in enacting the law on its 14th Amendment Section 5 enforcement powers is undercut. The court responded in part:

While the question of how section 5 applies to the FACE Act may be of some abstract or academic interest, however, it is of limited practical importance, given that section 5 is only one of two powers on which Congress relied in enacting the FACE Act, the other of which—the power to regulate interstate commerce—was not at issue in Dobbs.

Later in its opinion, the court rejected defendants' argument that Dobbs effectively created a carveout of abortion services from commerce clause coverage. It also rejected defendants' argument that they could not be prosecuted under 18 USC §241 for conspiring to prevent the exercise of a federal right. The court said "§ 241 does not require that the right in question be constitutional, only that it be federal. FACE is, of course, a federal statute...."

The court also rejected defendants' argument that the government is engaged in impermissible selective enforcement because it has not brought enough prosecutions under the FACE Act against individuals who have interfered in the operation of anti-abortion “crisis pregnancy centers.”

It went on to reject defendants' free speech arguments, saying in part:

Nor is the FACE Act being applied in an unconstitutional manner to these particular defendants based on their viewpoints or participation in First Amendment-protected activities, as would be required for a so-called “vindictive prosecution” defense. “...

Because there is no actual evidence of any such improper motive, the defendants engage in a sleight of hand, whereby they have treated any statement by the Department of Justice indicating a desire to safeguard access to abortion as evidence of a desire to punish these defendants for Dobbs. The defendants, though, are not the center of the moral or political universe. A desire to safeguard access to abortion is a desire to safeguard access to abortion—not an affront directed at them. More importantly, safeguarding access to abortion is, particularly under Dobbs, an entirely appropriate thing for legislatures and executives to do, if that is the course they choose. Indeed, it is harder to imagine a more fulsome endorsement of the elected branches’ power to set abortion policy than Dobbs...

Moving to defendants' Free Exercise/ RFRA claims, the court said in part:

The boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause are a topic of much disagreement.... The defendants’ argument, however, goes to something much more fundamental. Although the defendants go to great lengths to make this issue more complicated than it is, they ultimately ask a straightforward question: Does the Free Exercise Clause grant individuals who are acting out of religious motivations freedom to commit actions that otherwise would be crimes against the person or property of others through physical invasion, intimidation, or threat? The answer is similarly straightforward: No, it does not....

The defendants argued that RFRA requires that the state have a compelling interest to substantially burden religious exercise, and that after Dobbs there cannot be a compelling interest in protecting access to abortion. The court responded in part:

... [T]he Supreme Court has never held that a “compelling interest” depends upon something being considered a fundamental right. They are different constitutional concepts, performing different jurisprudential functions.

Preliminary Injunction Issued Against Tennessee's Ban on Gender-Affirming Treatment for Minors

In L.W. v. Skrmetti,(MD TN, June 28, 2023), a Tennessee federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of SB1 insofar as it bans health care personnel from providing or offering minors puberty blockers or hormone treatments for gender dysphoria. (Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the law's ban on gender-affirming surgery.) The court concluded that plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their due process claim, saying in part:

The Court ... agrees with Plaintiffs that under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, parents have a fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children, which naturally includes the right of parents to request certain medical treatments on behalf of their children....

It similarly found that plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their equal protection claim, saying in part:

Defendants’ argument that SB1 does not discriminate based on transgender status is unpersuasive....

The Court is satisfied that current precedent supports the finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause....

[T]he Court finds that SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex, which in turn provides an alternative basis for the application of intermediate scrutiny.

ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision. [Posting updated to clarify scope of holding.]