In United States v. Gallagher, (MD TN, Jan. 5, 2024), a Tennessee federal district court ruled on the extent to which defendants can refer to their religious activities or beliefs and to the First Amendment in their upcoming criminal trial for violation of the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act. Defendants are charged criminally with barricading the entrance to a Mt. Juliet, Tennessee abortion clinic in a so-called "rescue" operation. The court said in part:
It does not appear to be disputed that these defendants’ actions were motivated, at least in part, by their religious objections to the intentional termination of pregnancies. The Government argues, however, that evidence of those motivations would be “totally extraneous” to the “nature of the” charged offenses and should, therefore, be excluded.... The Government’s argument, however, is in significant tension with the FACE Act itself, which affirmatively places the defendants’ states of mind at issue by criminalizing only “intentional” acts taken “because [the victim] is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1). The defendants’ subjective motivations are, therefore, an unavoidable aspect of this case, and it is not clear to the court that those motivations can be accurately represented without at least some incidental reference to the details of their beliefs—which happen, in this instance, to be based in religion....
The court has already ruled that, as a matter of well-settled law, religious motivations are not a defense to a violation of either the FACE Act or the conspiracy statute.... The court, however, will not go so far as to wholly forbid the discussion of the defendants’ religious beliefs for the limited purpose of establishing or refuting intent or purpose....
... The defendants cannot turn an ounce of relevance into a gallon of irrelevant political messaging. The court, however, will not bar discussion of the defendants’ views altogether.
... When the defendants prayed or discussed their religious views, those specific actions were protected by the First Amendment. But if, in the next breath, they turned to discussing a plan to unlawfully obstruct the entrance of a clinic, then that conspiracy was just as illegal as it would have been if it had been the sole topic of conversation. Similarly, if they engaged in activities that would, in isolation, be protected by the First Amendment, but they did so while also violating the FACE Act through physical obstruction or intimidation, then the non-criminal components of their actions are no shield against prosecution for the criminal ones. Any argument to the contrary would be improper and will be barred.
The court also ruled that defendants may not present evidence or arguments at trial on various other matters including jury nullification, selective prosecution, potential sentences and good character. (See prior related posting.)
