Secular Officiants Lack Standing to Bring Pre-Enforcement Challenge to Texas Law Barring Them from Performing Weddings

McCutchan v. Nicholson, (ND TX, July 2, 2025), involves a challenge to the Texas statute that sets out who may conduct marriage ceremonies in the state.  The statute limits officiants to judges, Christian clergy, Jewish rabbis or "a person who is an officer of a religious organization and who is authorized by the organization to conduct a marriage ceremony." The Center for Inquiry that certifies secular marriage celebrants along with one of its certified celebrants brings the challenge, seeking to have secular officiants recognized.  However, the state Attorney General intervened in the case and took the position that the Center for Inquiry qualifies as a "religious" organization as that term is used in the Texas statutes and that its officiants are therefore already permitted to officiate at marriages. The Attorney General argued:

CFI is not secular because it adopts clear, specific, and overt religious beliefs, namely that it “denies that a supernatural source is required for life to have and for people to be guided by values and ethics.” The rejection of God and the supernatural is a religious belief; a truly secular organization would take no stance on the issue....

However, the Court disagreed, concluding that CFI is neither a religious organization nor a religion, saying in part:

At oral argument, the Attorney General discarded the history and tradition of the Texas law, stating that Satanism and Atheism were “religion[s]” and “religious organization[s]” under the Texas Family Code. Interpreting the terms “religion” and “religious organization” to cover Satanism and Atheism not only ignores history and tradition but distorts their plain meaning and risks setting a dangerous precedent.

The court went on, though, to hold that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a pre-enforcement action against the District Attorney (one of the defendants in the case), saying in part:

Individual Plaintiff provides no examples of past enforcement, no public statements regarding enforcement of the statute, and no facts about how the District Attorney could know a secular celebrant violated the law.

This led to the court's final conclusion:

Even if the Court rules on behalf of Individual Plaintiff against Defendant Nicholson, thereby enjoining the County Clerk, his injuries would not be redressed without a favorable judgment against the District Attorney. A ruling in Individual Plaintiff’s favor, thus, would not amount to “relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.”... Accordingly, the Court rules that Individual Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because individual members of CFI lack standing, so does the organization.

Suit Challenges Refusal to Recognize Ministers Ordained Online

Suit was filed last week in a Virginia federal district court challenging Augusta County and the City of Staunton's refusal to recognize ministers of the Universal Life Church who obtained ordination online as ministers authorized to perform marriage ceremonies under Virginia Code §20-23. Instead, they are required to register under §20-25 as a civil officiant which includes posting a $500 bond. The complaint (full text) in Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Landes, (WD VA, filed 5/22/2025) alleges that this violates the 1st and 14th Amendment, saying in part:

69. The Clerk defendants violate the Establishment Clause by interpreting and applying Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 to categorically deny ULC Monastery ministers the authority to solemnized marriages as religious officiants, solely because they were ordained by and are in regular communion with the ULC Monastery and not another approved religious society. This conduct impermissibly prefers certain denominations over others.....

77. Many of plaintiff ULC ministers ... choose to exercise their religion by officiating marriage ceremonies.... The Clerk Defendants' interpretation an application of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 ... accordingly places an impermissible burden on Plaintiffs' religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise Clause....

84. ... The Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination against similarly situated individuals and prohibits state action that burdens fundamental rights, including religious freedom.  Discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive strict scrutiny....

91. Defendants' actual and threatened enforcement of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23, 20-26 and 20-28 against ULC Monastery and its ministers burdens speech based on its content and viewpoint, and is accordingly subject to strict scrutiny....

Augusta Free Press reports on the lawsuit. 

[Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.] 

3rd Circuit: District Court Did Not Show Compelling Interest in Denying Muslim Inmate Religious Accommodations

In Nunez v. Wolf, (3d Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit under RLUIPA, held that the district court had not established that the Department of Corrections had a compelling interest in denying a Muslim inmate religious accommodations so that he could consummate his marriage, have ongoing conjugal visits with his wife, engage in congregate prayer with visitors and be circumcised. The court said in part:

To be clear, we are not holding that the DOC’s denials of Nunez’s requests cannot satisfy strict scrutiny if properly supported on remand.  What we do hold is that this determination cannot be made on the current record and that, as we have now clarified the nature of its burden, the DOC should have the opportunity to supplement the record before renewing its motion for summary judgment.

Church Ceremony Without Marriage License Was Enough to Create a Civil Marriage In New York

In L.F. v. M.A., (NY Cnty. Sup. Ct., July 9, 2024), a New York state trial court, in a divorce action, held that a ceremony at a Coptic Orthodox Church in New York was sufficient to consider the parties civilly married even though they did not obtain a civil marriage license. Defendant had contended that the ceremony was merely a family blessing, and that the parties were never married.  According to the court:

At stake is not just the status of the parties' young child in common or spousal maintenance, but potentially millions of dollars in what would be marital assets versus separate property.

In a prior decision, the court ordered the Bishop who performed the ceremony to testify about it. In the current decision, the court said in part:

... [T]he parties participated in a religious solemnized ceremony, one that so looked like a wedding that the church's Father H.H. prepared the marriage certificate, and until one day before his testimony here, never thought anything other than that the parties were married that day in that ceremony. Plaintiff believed she was married — that is undisputed. Defendant now states that he did not think he was married, but his actions during the years immediately after the ceremony paint a clear and undisputed picture that he could have only thought that he was married and not otherwise.... In reaching its determination, the Court must, and does, apply neutral principles of law, and does not reach into religious details of a ceremony within the Coptic Orthodox Church. The court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff has more than carried her burden that there was indeed a religious marriage ceremony that day, and further, that both parties so understood, as well, as did Father H.H. (and at least some of their wedding's witnesses).

First Amendment Precludes Court from Enforcing Mahr in Divorce Action

 In Omid v. Ahmadi, (CT Super., March 18, 2024), a Connecticut state trial court in a action for dissolution of a marriage refused to enforce a mahr (dowry) agreement because interpreting it would require the court to interpret religious principles.  The mahr was entered by the parties in connection with their marriage in Afghanistan. The husband who had apparently been a translator for the U.S. military during the Afghan war received a visa to the United States and then returned to Afghanistan for one month to enter an arranged marriage. Three years later he arranged for his wife to obtain a U.S. visa. One year after she came to the U.S., the parties separated. In denying the wife's request in the dissolution case for an order enforcing the mahr, the court said in part:

The parties disagree as to when the 100,000 Afghanis must be paid, and whether, as the defendant argues, the terms "prompt" and "deferred" as used in the agreement describe a general duty to pay at any time, or a specific duty to pay one amount before marriage and one amount upon divorce or death of the husband. The term "prompt" in the parties' agreement is ambiguous and would require the court to look outside the four corners of the contract....

On the basis of the foregoing, to the extent that construction of the contract language would require this court to reference Islamic religious principles to determine the meaning of the terms employed, such action would likely violate the religion clauses of the first amendment of the United States constitution. The present agreement is sparse, and its terms are ill-defined without extratextual evidence. Because this extratextual evidence involves considerations of what the terms mean under Islamic law, the agreement is unenforceable because it is likely impossible for the court to disentangle secular from religious considerations.

Interference With Contractual Relationship Created by Jewish Marriage Contract Is Not Actionable

In S.E. v. Edelstein, (OH App., March 25, 2024), an Ohio state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a suit for intentional interference with a contractual relationship brought by an Orthodox Jewish wife (Kimberly) against her father-in-law (Max) who disapproved of her marriage to his son (Elliott). The court held that the suit essentially sought damages for alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry which were barred as causes of action by Ohio Revised Code 2305.29. The court said in part:

In the complaint, it was alleged that Max had intentionally interfered with the ketubah, the supposed "contract" at issue in this case, by engaging in a continuous "campaign to undermine" Kimberly and Eliott's contractual relationship (i.e., their marriage) for nearly 20 years.  The complaint alleged that this included Max being "emotionally abusive" towards Kimberly, as well as Max making "negative and derogatory statements" about Kimberly.  This, according to the complaint, included Max criticizing Kimberly's "status as a convert to Judaism" and by frequently stating that Kimberly's and Eliott's children "were not Jewish."  The complaint also alleged that Max, "with the intent to destroy the contractual relationship between" Kimberly and Eliott, routinely disparaged Kimberly to "persuade" Eliott to "terminate his contractual relationship with [her]."...

[T]he complaint raises amatory claims of a breach of a promise to marry and alienation of affections against Max couched in terms of an intentional interference with a contractual relationship ..., loss of consortium... , loss of parental consortium ..., intentional infliction of emotional distress ...,, and malice.....  As stated previously, pursuant to R.C. 2305.29, neither Max, nor any other person, could be held liable in civil damages.... for any breach of a promise to marry or alienation of affection.  This holds true despite those claims being pled within the complaint in other, generally more suitable terms....   

Just as a rose is a rose by any other name, a non-actionable claim does not become actionable simply by masquerading as one that is....

Religious Marriage Without Marriage License and Later Annulled by Religious Court Is Still Recognized By New York

 In T.I. v. R.I., (NY Sup Ct Kings Cty, March 20, 2024), a New York state trial court held that the state would recognize a couple's marriage that was performed in a Jewish religious ceremony even though the couple did not obtain a civil marriage license and the marriage was annulled eight years later by a religious tribunal.  In a long-running dispute between the parties, there had been a prior divorce action which the parties discontinued and there had been protection orders in favor of the wife against the husband issued by the Family Court and Criminal Court. Now the husband, claiming that no marriage between them existed any longer, sought to have the wife's divorce action dismissed so that the court could not issue orders for him to pay child support, spousal maintenance or equitable distribution of property. According to the court:

The husband contends that the rabbinical court invalidated the parties' religious marriage on two Jewish religious concepts: 1) based upon "concealment" because the wife did not disclose her alleged mental health history to him prior to the religious solemnization ceremony; and 2) because the person who conducted the solemnization ceremony was not, although unknown to the parties, authorized to do so by at least some portion of the religious community....

Nothing related to the wife's request for a civil divorce requires this Court to address or assess the religious issues that the husband brought before the rabbinical court or that may have been part of the rabbinical court's determination and, as such, the husband's theory that the issue of whether the wife can seek a divorce of any marriage recognized by the State of New York is not prohibited by the First Amendment. Here, the determination of whether a marriage recognized by the State of New York exists between the parties separate and apart from any religious marriage rests not upon religious doctrine but upon neutral principles of law.

Any religious determinations and any ramification of religious doctrine made by the rabbinical court as to the parties' religious marriage are separate and apart from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over whether, based on neutral principles of law, there exists here a marriage recognized by the State between the parties....

Tennessee Governor Signs Law Allowing Potential Officiants to Refuse to Solemnize a Marriage

Yesterday, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee signed into law HB 878 (full text) which adds to the Tennessee Code section which lists who may solemnize marriages (clergy as well as various current and former public officials) language that provides:

 A person shall not be required to solemnize a marriage.

As originally introduced, the bill would have allowed refusals only by those who had objections based on conscience or religious belief.  CNN reporting on the bill notes that LGBTQ advocates criticized the bill for allowing public officials to discriminate based on their personal beliefs.

No Damages Under Illinois RFRA for Wedding Cancelled Over Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Schneider v. City of Chicago, (ND IL, Nov. 20, 2023), an Illinois federal district court dismissed a damage action brought under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act by a couple who cancelled their wedding at the Drake Hotel, losing their deposit, when the city of Chicago required proof of COVID vaccination for gatherings in large areas such as hotels and banquet halls. The couple had religious objections to receiving vaccines. The court held that because the city's Health Order included a religious exemption, plaintiffs had not alleged that the Order substantially burdened their religious practice or beliefs.  The couple contended that there was no ascertainable way for them to obtain a religious exemption from the city. The court responded:

[P]laintiffs point to nothing in their complaint or the health order itself to support a reasonable inference that the City of Chicago would not provide a religious exemption or that religious exemptions were impossible to receive. Their notion of impossibility amounts to an unreasonable interpretation of the Order—that the absence of more specific directions on how to obtain an exemption meant that no exemption was obtainable....

[A]fter two calls to the Corporation Counsel went unanswered, the plaintiffs summarily concluded that obtaining a religious exemption in time for their February 2022 wedding was “impossible.”... [T]his conclusion is not entitled to the assumption of truth....

Even if plaintiffs had been able to state a claim for violation of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, their complaint only requests money damages and those damages are prohibited by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.... . It is likely that the Illinois Supreme Court would hold that the ITIA protects local governments from damages claims under IRFRA.

Denying Inmate Permission to Marry Was RFRA Violation

In Davis v. Wigen, (3d Cir., Sept. 19, 2023), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's dismissal of a RFRA claim brought by a former federal inmate and his fiancée.  The suit was brought against a private prison that primarily houses alien inmates claiming that the prison denied all inmate marriage requests, even when the inmate met the criteria set out in Bureau of Prison policies for approval of the request.  The court, finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged that the denials imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise, said in part:

The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim because they failed to allege that Defendants pressured Plaintiffs to either refrain from conduct that their faith prescribed or participate in conduct that their faith prohibited....  Because neither Christian tradition nor doctrine requires adherents to marry, Defendants argue that the denial of Plaintiffs’ marriage request did not cause them to violate any religious precept or belief....

Here, Plaintiffs desired to marry because marriage “had profound religious significance for them” and because they “viewed their marriage as an expression of” their Christian faith.... Although marriage may not be required of every Christian, Plaintiffs allege that their desire to marry has significant religious meaning for them. They contend that marriage is an expression of their faith. By denying Plaintiffs’ marriage request, Defendants caused them to refrain from such religious expression and thereby “violate their beliefs.”...

... While not every government-imposed hurdle to the practice of sincere faith-based conduct will be a substantial burden, the more proximate the government action is to an outright bar, the more likely it is a substantial burden. We conclude, therefore, that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a substantial burden on their religious beliefs. 

NJ Anti-Discrimination Law Creates Defense for Catholic School That Requires Teachers to Follow Catholic Teachings

 In Cristello v. St. Theresa School, (NJ Sup. Ct., Aug. 14, 2023), the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed a suit against a Catholic school which had fired an art teacher/ toddler room caregiver who was unmarried and become pregnant.  The teacher's employment agreement required her to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and prohibited employees from engaging in premarital sex. The teacher sued under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) alleging pregnancy and marital status discrimination.  The court's majority opinion held that the LAD provision creating an exception for religious organizations following the tenets of its religion in establishing employment criteria gives the school an affirmative defense. The majority said in part:

Determining whether a religious employer’s employment action was based exclusively on the tenets of its religion requires application of only neutral principles of law and does not impermissibly entangle the courts in ecclesiastical matters.

Justice Pierre-Louis filed a concurring opinion taking the position that the religious tenet provision does not create an affirmative defense, but instead shifts to plaintiff the requirement to show that the purported reason for the firing was a pretext for prohibited discrimination. However here plaintiff did not show that this was a pretext.

Washington Examiner reports on the decision.

Islamic Marriage Contract Enforceable in Civil Court

In Alulddin v. Alfartousi, (AZ App., June 27, 2023), an Arizona state appeals court held that civil courts can enforce an Islamic marriage contract's dowry provision (mahr) as a valid premarital agreement without violating the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause. The court said in part:

By its plain terms, the Agreement required Husband to pay Wife a total dowry of $25,000 “when she demands it.” These clear, unambiguous contractual provisions are subject to interpretation under neutral principles of law.... Thus, the superior court did not need to assume the role of a religious court or consider ecclesiastical matters forbidden by the First Amendment to enforce the agreement as written.

... A premarital agreement is “an agreement between prospective spouses that is made in contemplation of marriage and that is effective on marriage.” A.R.S. § 25-201(1).... It “is enforceable without consideration.” ...

Husband contends that the parties did not enter into the Agreement in contemplation of marriage because under Islamic law the Agreement constituted their marriage. The record controverts this contention. The parties signed the Agreement five months before their legal marriage. Although Husband testified that it signified their cultural marriage, he also stated that they signed it on their “engagement.” Moreover, he testified that their actual marriage occurred after the execution of the Agreement....

Next, Husband asserts that he did not sign the Agreement voluntarily because it was a compulsory religious act....

Here, the superior court did not err in finding that Husband failed to meet his burden of proof. He did not present any evidence to suggest that his religion “mandated” or “compelled” him to sign the Agreement. In his prehearing statement, he described the Agreement as “customary”—not compulsory—in a Muslim marriage....

Israel's Supreme Court Says Interior Ministry Must Register Marriages Performed on Zoom Through Utah

The Times of Israel and Jerusalem Post report on yesterday's decision by Israel's Supreme Court in    Ministry of the Interior v. Brill (Israel Sup. Ct., March 7, 2023) (summary and full text of decision in Hebrew). The Court ruled that the Interior Ministry's Population and Immigration Authority must register marriages of Israelis performed online through Zoom by a Deputy Clerk in the U.S. state of Utah with the other marriage participants being located in Israel. Utah County has created a fairly simple procedure for "Marriage Ceremonies By Remote Appearance." The Supreme Court's ruling affirms decisions by two separate Israeli trial courts. The Supreme Court insisted that it was ruling only on the obligation of the Registry Clerk to register the marriage once presented with the relevant documentation and was not ruling on the marriage's validity. The Registry Clerk, the Court said, did not have authority to decide the difficult legal question of whether the marriage should be seen as having taken place in Utah or in Israel.

Previously, Israeli Jewish couples wishing to marry without leaving the country have been required to marry through the Chief Rabbinate. Civil marriage has been unavailable. Some 1200 Israeli couples have already married through Utah in ceremonies performed on Zoom. According to The Times of Israel:

The court’s ruling is a significant win for advocates of civil marriage in Israel who have campaigned for it for decades, but will be bitterly opposed by the coalition’s religious parties, which denounced the decision as soon as it was published.

The controversial ruling comes as Israel is in the midst of a bitter battle over proposed judicial reforms that, among other things, would give the Knesset (the Parliament) the power through a simple majority vote to overrule Supreme court decisions.

Bishop Must Testify in Divorce Case with Millions of Dollars at Stake

L.M. v. M.A., (NY County Sup. Ct., Feb. 6, 2023), is a decision by a New York state trial court refusing to quash a subpoena that orders a Coptic Orthodox Church Bishop to testify in a divorce action.  At issue is whether the parties to the divorce action were ever married. If they were, the wife may share in millions of dollars of assets in her claims for equitable distribution of marital property and spousal support. The court explains:

The parties here disagree about whether they were married in 2017, with plaintiff stating that they were married, and defendant stating that the Bishop "blessed" their relationship, but did not marry them. The parties agree that their infant son was baptized, as planned.... The parties also agree that Plaintiff mother L.M., who had previously been baptized by another church ... was then baptized in front of many witnesses in the church in an unplanned ceremony immediately following the child's baptism. What occurred next is the crux of the parties' dispute. Defendant father M.A. asserts that the Bishop, the subject of the instant subpoena, who had conducted the two baptisms, then proceeded to perform a family blessing. Plaintiff mother, on the other hand, claims that the Bishop offered to marry the parties ... and that he then performed the parties' previously unplanned wedding ceremony....  The Bishop performed the ceremonies in a combination of the English, Arabic and Coptic languages and most of the guests, all of whom had only been invited to the child's baptism, were not sure whether or not the final ceremony was a marriage ceremony....

As the Bishop has refused to testify as to which ceremony he performed, allegedly because his religious conviction prevents him from testifying in a civil action involving church members, and the parties and their witnesses have testified to diametrically conflicting views as to which ceremony took place, the Court and the parties have all asked the Bishop to testify. Defendant served a valid subpoena upon the Bishop and the Bishop ... has moved to quash the subpoena, stating through counsel and an affidavit from a Coptic theologian, that it is contrary to the tenets of the religion for the Bishop to testify in civilian court "brother against brother."

The court however refused to quash the subpoena, saying in part:

[T]he Court does not have a sufficient factual basis to find that either (i) Bishop A.B. personally has a religious belief that he cannot come into a civilian court to testify "brother against brother," or that (ii) even if he had such a belief, that it is applicable here, where he is not being asked to testify against a co-religionist but instead to describe a public factual event, and both parties (the only people who could plausibly be considered to be a person "against" whom he is testifying) are instead asking him to testify about those facts.....

In a lengthy discussion, the court went on to say that even if this did pose a 1st Amendment issue, there was no violation here.

Congress Gives Final Passage To Respect For Marriage Act

 Yesterday the U.S. House of Representatives gave final passage to HR 8404 the Respect for Marriage Act (full text). By a vote of 258- 169, the House accepted the amendments added to the original bill by the Senate. The bill now goes to President Biden for his signature. Biden issued a statement yesterday praising Congress' passage of the bill. The bill assures federal recognition of same-sex and interracial marriages between two individuals and requires states to recognize same-sex and interracial marriages from other states. The bill goes on to provide:

Consistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution, nonprofit religious organizations, including churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, nondenominational ministries, interdenominational and ecumenical organizations, mission organizations, faith-based social agencies, religious educational institutions, and nonprofit entities whose principal purpose is the study, practice, or advancement of religion, and any employee of such an organization, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage. Any refusal under this subsection to provide such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges shall not create any civil claim or cause of action....

 Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to deny or alter any benefit, status, or right of an otherwise eligible entity or person which does not arise from a marriage, including tax-exempt status, tax treatment, educational funding, or a grant, contract, agreement, guarantee, loan, scholarship, license, certification, accreditation, claim, or defense.

Fox4 reports on contents of the bill.

UPDATE: On Sept. 13, President Biden signed the bill into law. (White House press release.)

Texas Supreme Court: Enforceability Of Islamic Pre-Nup Must Be Decided Before Ordering Arbitration

In In re Ayad, (TX Sup. Ct., Sept. 23, 2022), the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court should determine the validity and enforceability of an Islamic Pre-Nuptial Agreement before, rather than after, ordering the parties to arbitration by a Fiqh Panel pursuant to the agreement. In a divorce proceeding, the wife challenged the enforceability of the agreement on various grounds, including that the term "Islamic Law" is too indefinite and that the Agreement is void as violating public policy. Volokh Conspiracy discusses the decision. [Thanks to Steven H. Sholk for the lead.]

England's Law Commission Urges Reform Of Law Regulating Weddings

On July 19, the Law Commission of England and Wales released a 452-page report (full text) on reform of English weddings law. The Commission summarized its recommendations:

We recommend comprehensive reform from the foundations up: an entirely new scheme to govern weddings. Our recommendations will transform the law from a system based on regulation of buildings to one based on regulation of the officiant responsible for the ceremony.

Under our recommendations, all couples, as well as all religious groups and (if enabled by Government to conduct weddings) non-religious belief groups, will have the freedom to decide where and how their weddings will take place.

Law & Religion UK has extensive discussion of the proposals.

Israeli Trial Court Rules That Government Must Recognize Online Civil Marriage Ceremony

 Times of Israel reports:

A ruling by the Lod District Court has upended the religious status quo in Israel and could augur a marriage revolution in the Jewish state.

In a decision published on Friday, Judge Efrat Fink ruled that the Population and Immigration Authority of the Interior Ministry is obligated to register as married couples who wed through an online civil marriage service carried out under the auspices of the US state of Utah.

The decision means that Israeli couples can now get married in civil ceremonies without leaving the country, granting a de facto victory to advocates in the decades-long struggle for civil marriage in Israel.

Universal Life Church Prevails In Pennsylvania Settlement Over Conducting Marriages

In Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. McGeever, (WD PA, June 6, 2022), a Pennsylvania federal district court issued an Order based on a agreed settlement by the parties. The Order bars Allegheny County court personnel from telling members of the public that Universal Life Church ministers cannot solemnize marriages in Pennsylvania. the Order reads in part:

[A] government policy or practice that applies 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1503 in a manner that denies, discourages, or otherwise chills the religious practice of the Universal Life Church and its ministers by proclaiming that Universal Life Church ministers have no legal authority to solemnize marriages under 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1503(a)(6) would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by (a) preferring certain religions over others in violation of the Establishment Clause, (b) burdening the Universal Life Church’s and its members’ religious practices in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, and (c) discriminating against the Universal Life Church and its members in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, to the extent the policy or practice treats Universal Life Church ministers less favorably than those similarly situated.

GoSkagit reports on the court order.

6th Circuit: Suit Over Marriages By Clergy Ordained Online Can Move Ahead In Part

In Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Nabors, (6th Cir., May 27, 2022), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals allowed claims against a portion of the original defendants to move ahead in the Universal Life Church's challenge to a Tennessee law that prohibits persons receiving online ordination from solemnizing marriages.  Various defendants asserted standing and sovereign immunity defenses. Summarizing its holding, the court said in part:

No plaintiff has standing to seek relief against Governor Lee, Attorney General Slatery, District Attorney General Helper, or County Clerks Crowell, Anderson, and Knowles.... As a result, those portions of the district court’s preliminary injunction that purport to bind [them] ... are VACATED. By contrast, however, we AFFIRM the district court’s determination that plaintiffs have standing to sue District Attorneys General Dunaway, Pinkston, and Jones, along with County Clerk Nabors. We also AFFIRM the district court’s denial of these officials’ sovereign immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and so we do not disturb those portions of the preliminary injunction binding [them].... Last, we REMAND what remains of this suit to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.