Court Orders Action to Protect Reputation of Party Sanctioned by Rabbinical Court

In  In re Bain v. Strulovitch, (Westchester Cty. NY Sup. Ct., April 29, 2026), a New York state trial court found itself in the middle of a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court.

Samuel Strulovitch began an arbitration proceeding against Jonathan Bleier before a rabbinical court in Rockland County. At issue was ownership interests in a nursing home. Moshe Bain then filed an arbitration action in a different rabbinical court in Brooklyn claiming that he had a right of first refusal as to the nursing home. That rabbinical court issued an order restraining Strulovitch from taking any action to enforce the arbitration award issued by the Rockland rabbinical court until the Brooklyn rabbinical court issued a decision. Bain also filed suit in a New York civil court, and the court issued an injunction barring Strulovitch from taking any action to confirm the disputed Rockland County rabbinical court decision.

Despite that injunction, Strulovitch instituted another arbitration proceeding in a different Brooklyn rabbinical court, contending that the civil court's injunction did not prohibit a new suit. That rabbinical court issued a summons to Bain. According to the New York trial court:

When Bain asked Strulovitch to withdraw the proceeding, he asserted that Bain was free to ignore the summons.  According to Bain, this is simply impossible; one of the rabbis on the panel told Bain’s counsel that ignoring it may result in a “seruv,” a “letter of recalcitrance.  He may be subject to all forms of communal sanctions and societal pressures due his flagrant violation of Jewish law.”  Strulovitch’s representative reiterated the seriousness of ignoring the summons, stating to Bain that “This is serious and the lawyer cannot protect you from your hashem and your religious obligations.  If you get a siruv [sic] everyone will know that you do not listen to Beis din.”

When the parties appeared in Court on the Order to Show Cause ..  Strulovitch argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over the arbitration because it is a religious matter....

The matters that Strulovitch has raised with the Beis Din, however, are not religious, as clearly stated in the summons (hazmana)....

In this matter, the Court will only need to apply neutral principles of secular law to the issues raised herein.  There is, thus, no First Amendment reason to deny the motion....

With respect to Bain’s contention that Strulovitch violated the stay imposed by the Court because the arbitral panel issued a seruv to Bain ...,  the Beis Din replied that “‘We want to make it very clear that neither Strulowitz nor his agents requested the seruv after the TRO was issued.  The BD issued it of its own volition as a response to the chutzpah of enjoining a litigant from pursuing his Halachic rights to a Din Torah.’”  

Given this letter, ...  the Court denies the request to sanction Strulovitch.  There is no evidence that Strulovitch or any of his representatives, secular or religious, have violated the Court’s rulings. ...

To rectify the potential damage to Bain's reputation in the religious community resulting from the issuance of the seruv by the Beis Din, Strulovitch must take all steps necessary to have the Beis Din withdraw it, including withdrawing the entire proceeding.

Catholic Hospice Sues Over NY Standards for Care of Transgender Patients

Last week, Dominican Sisters who operate a home that provides palliative care for indigent, terminally ill cancer patients filed suit in a New York federal district court challenging New York's requirements for care of transgender patients. The complaint (full text) in Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne v. Hochul, filed 4/6/2026) alleges in part:

New York’s LGBTQ Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights ...  require long-term care facilities to assign patients to rooms based on stated “gender identity” rather than biological sex even over the opposition of the roommate, to permit residents and their visitors of one sex to access bathrooms set aside for those of the opposite sex, to use patients’ “preferred pronouns” even when the patient is not present, to use language and to “create communities” affirming patients’ sexual preferences, to accommodate patients’ desire for extramarital relations, and to post notices affirming compliance with these requirements....

... The Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne and Rosary Hill Home operate in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives and the teachings of the Catholic Church. They cannot comply with the Mandate without violating these sincerely held religious beliefs.....

Requiring a person to identify another by a sex other than his or her God-gifted sex would therefore require such a person to act against central, unchangeable and architectural teachings of the Catholic faith. It would contradict the teachings of the Bible concerning God’s creative sovereignty, contradict reason and truth, and betray our sacred obligation not to knowingly harm other persons, particularly the most vulnerable. The implications are so much greater than whether to utter the words “he” or “she.” Indeed, to demand that a Catholic deny another’s sex is to require him or her to affirm another religious worldview....

The complaint alleges 7 counts: Free Exercise; Religious Autonomy Doctrine; Ministerial Exception; Establishment Clause; Equal Protection; Free Speech; and Expressive Association.

NewsNation reports on the lawsuit.

NY Judge Censured for Refusing to Perform Same-Sex Wedding

In In re. Pitts-Davis, (NY Comm. Jud. Conduct, March 16, 2026), the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct censured a Syracuse City Court judge for her refusal to officiate at a same-sex wedding. According to the Opinion:

Charge I, filed subsequent to a thorough investigation by the Commission, alleged that in November 2024, respondent created the appearance of impropriety and bias against same-sex couples in that on the day before it was scheduled to occur, she asked court staff to reschedule the marriage of a same-sex couple to a different day so that she would not have to officiate, notwithstanding that she officiated the marriage of an opposite-sex couple scheduled for the same day.

The 18-page opinion describes the complicated factual situation in the case. It said in part:

Respondent engaged in serious misconduct and severely undermined public confidence in her impartiality.  However, we find on the specific facts here, that respondent’s conduct, which was influenced by being informed that day that one of her brothers was near death and was also occasioned by her “profound reevaluation” of her sincerely held religious beliefs, does not warrant removal.   We note that respondent’s misconduct involved one incident – albeit a very serious one – over the course of two days and that respondent attempted to obtain an opinion from the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics.

Syracuse.com reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit: Claims by Judge Who Was Denied Covid Vaccine Exemption Are Dismissed

In Mora v. New York State Unified Court System, (2nd Circuit, March 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a Poughkeepsie, New York, City Court Judge who in 2021 was denied a religious exemption from the New York courts' Covid vaccine mandate. This led to his being excluded from the city courthouse where he usually presided. Each of his five causes of action was dismissed on a different ground. His claim against the court system was dismissed on 11th Amendment and mootness grounds. His Title VII claim was dismissed because of the exclusion in Title VII for policymaking appointees of elected officials.

Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim against members of the Vaccine Exemption Committee was dismissed because the Committee routinely granted religious exemptions to other Catholics and people of different faiths who opposed the COVID vaccines. So Mora's religion does not seem to be the basis for the denial, and Mora did not allege facts suggesting some other discriminatory motive.

Denying Mora's Free Exercise claim, the Court said in part:

Mora’s own pleadings reflect that more than 500 other judges and employees – including Catholics with beliefs identical to Mora’s – received exemptions from the vaccine mandate.... Those allegations belie Mora’s assertion that the Individual Defendants’ denial of his exemption request was based on hostility to his religious beliefs, as opposed to his failure to follow the procedures established for religious exemptions.

Finally, the Court rejected Mora's retaliation claim, saying in part:

Mora contends that the chief administrative judge, Lawrence Marks, retaliated against him on the basis of his “religiously based refusal to vaccinate,” ... when he referred Mora to a disciplinary body....  [T]he disciplinary referral was made only after (1) Mora failed to follow the procedures required to obtain a vaccine exemption,.. and after (2) he refused to comply with the then operative vaccine mandate following the denial of his request for a religious exemption....

Child Abuse Claim Against Archdiocese Moves Ahead

In Doe XXV v. Archdiocese of New York, (NY Sup.Ct. NY Cty., Jan. 21, 2026), a New York state trial court denied a motion to dismiss a suit under the Child Victims Act in which plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused as a child by a janitor at a Catholic school operated by the Archdiocese. The court rejected defendant's free exercise defense, saying in part:

Plaintiff’s cause of action asserts liability against the Archdiocese for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Tremaroli, a janitor. The Archdiocese fails to demonstrate why the present dispute cannot be adjudicated “solely upon the application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles”....

The court also rejected other defenses raised by the Archdiocese, saying in part: 

The Archdiocese further argues that it owed Plaintiff no duty under theories of negligent hiring, retention and supervision because the Archdiocese did not directly hire, retain or supervise Tremaroli. The Court disagrees.  

Generally, an element of negligent hiring, retention and supervision is that the defendant was the employer of the alleged tortfeasor. However ... agency relationships between a junior organization and a senior organization may impute liability onto a senior organization when the senior organization could also have been responsible for the hiring, retention or supervision of an employee....

Tremaroli was ... employed as a janitor at the Church; however, his employment as conditional upon the authority of the pastor, who was appointed to the Church by the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese has thus failed to eliminate triable issues of fact that it lacked an employer/employee-like relationship with Tremaroli....

In any event, issues of fact also exist as to the Archdiocese’s notice of Tremaroli’s propensity for abuse or actual abuse of children....

Thus, if certain employees at the Church or School were “acting on the . . . Archdiocese defendants’ behalf” when they learned of the subject abuse, their knowledge would be imputed to the Archdiocese....

Divorce Action Should Be Dismissed Because Couple Were Never Validly Married in the Coptic Church

In Funti v. Andrews, (NY App., Jan. 6, 2026), a New York state appellate court held that a divorce action should be dismissed because the parties, who had not taken out a marriage license, were never validly married in the first place. New York Domestic Relations Law provides parties are validly married even when they did not take out a marriage license if the marriage has been "solemnized in the manner heretofore used and practiced in their respective societies or denominations...." The trial court had concluded that the parties were married after analyzing the Coptic ceremony they were part of on the day their child was baptized. (See prior posting.) The appeals court held, however, that the court instead should have relied upon the undisputed testimony of a Coptic bishop that detailed the requirements for a valid Coptic wedding. The appellate court said in part:

We find that this case falls squarely in the ... category of cases where the court can make a determination about what is required for a ceremony to be solemnized in the manner used and practiced in a given religious denomination without becoming entangled in a religious dispute. There is no dispute in this case about what the requirements are for a marriage to be solemnized in the Coptic Church. Bishop David laid out what the requirements are for solemnization, which were affirmed by defendant’s expert....

Since the record in the present case contains undisputed evidence of what the Coptic Church requires for a valid marriage, a determination of whether the ceremony was properly solemnized does not require inquiry into religious doctrine, but only into the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 12.... 

... [W]e now apply the facts to the neutral standard provided by the Bishop’s undisputed testimony about what is required for a ceremony to be properly solemnized in the Coptic Church. 

Based on the neutral standard provided by the Bishop’s undisputed testimony, we find as a matter of law that the parties’ ceremony was not solemnized under the Domestic Relations Law....

Finally, even assuming that the parties’ alleged marriage could not be evaluated using neutral principles of secular law because plaintiff disputed what is required for a marriage to be properly solemnized in the Coptic Church, defendant’s motion should still have been granted. In this alternative scenario ...  a determination as to whether the parties were married in a religious ceremony could only be made by “analyzing the various and customary rites, customs, and practices of the [Coptic] religion,” and thus would improperly involve the court in a religious matter.... Any finding as to whether there was a solemnized marriage sufficient to meet the requirements of Domestic Relations Law §§ 12 and 25 could thus offend the First Amendment, which ... prevents civil courts from engaging in an analysis of religious doctrine...

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Magistrate Says Claims Against School for Ignoring Antisemitism Should Not Be Dismissed

In In re Claims of Avi Polischuk as Parent of D.P. v. Massapequa Union Free School District, (ED NY, Jan. 5, 2026), a New York federal magistrate judge recommended that the parent of a Jewish middle school student be allowed to move ahead with claims that the school ignored antisemitic actions directed at his son by other students.  The court described the antisemitic incidents:

... D.P. was being harassed by another student, Defendant S.W. on the basis of his religion. Specifically, in the school lunchroom S.W. asked D.P. if he was Jewish and then yelled "Heil Hitler" at him.... This treatment escalated to a physical attack on November 9, 2023, during which S.W. stabbed D.P. multiple times with a pencil causing physical injuries and resulting in S.W.'s suspension for a "short" and "insufficient" period. ...

This assault, however, is not the only example of antisemitism within the District. As far back as 2017 a swastika and the word "Hitler" were spray painted on a public school.... On a separate occasion ...Plaintiff was told by another family that District students "hurled antisemitic statements" at their son, and despite the parents' complaints, the District did nothing.... Still another set of parents reported that when their daughter passed around her yearbook for signatures, it came back with a swastika on it.... A complaint was made by the parents and again nothing was done....

The magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to give rise to an Equal Protection claim under Section 1983 as well as to a claim under Title VI, under the New York State Human Rights Law, and a claim for negligence, but that municipalities are not liable for punitive damages for violations of these provisions.

Bishop Held Personally Liable for Failure of Catholic Hospital's Pension Plan

The Pillar this week reported on an interesting jury award in litigation over the failure of a Catholic hospital's pension plan.  The report says in part:

Albany’s retired Bishop Edward Scharfenberger filed for bankruptcy this month, shortly after a New York court assigned him personal liability for the failure of a shuttered Catholic hospital’s pension plan.

In a December 12 judgement, Scharfenberger, who led the Albany diocese from 2014 until October of this year, was assigned 10% personal liability in a $54 million judgement for compensatory damages against the former board of St. Clare’s Hospital, which closed in 2008.

The bishop immediately filed for bankruptcy protections, with his personal assets estimated to cover between 2 and 5 percent of his liability for the hospital pensions.

The ruling is unique in that it held personally liable the bishop, as well as his deceased predecessor Howard Hubbard and deceased former diocesan vicar general, but not the Diocese of Albany as a corporation.

The ruling could end up reshaping the landscape of Catholic institutions in America — and will almost certainly trigger a national rethink about bishops’ involvement with Catholic institutions.

[Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.] 

Ministerial Exception Does Not Apply to Hostile Work Environment Claims Where Religious Doctrine Is Not Implicated

In Boliak v. Reilly, (NY App., Dec. 18, 2025), three employees of a Catholic high school brought hostile work environment claims alleging that the school's principal regularly subjected them to vulgar, sexist, ageist, racist and homophobic remarks and epithets. One of the employees also brought a defamation claim. A New York state appellate court held that the trial court improperly dismissed the hostile work environment claims under the ministerial exception doctrine, saying in part:

... [I]n the absence of controlling caselaw, we follow the 9th Circuit's approach and find that the ministerial exception should not be extended to apply to conduct such as unlawful harassment simply because such conduct is perpetrated by a religious employer.... [T]here is no First Amendment reason to permit the ministerial exception to shield a religious institution from its "obligation to protect its employees from harassment when extending such protection would not contravene the Church's doctrinal prerogatives or trench upon its protected ministerial decisions"....

Here, plaintiffs are correct that there is no religious justification for Father Reilly's appalling conduct, and analyzing their hostile work environment claims would not require the Court to improperly interfere with religious doctrine or defendants' personnel decisions. Accordingly, plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims should not have been dismissed on the basis of the ministerial exception....

The Court, however, held that the defamation claim was properly dismissed, saying in part:

The comments made by Father Reilly and defendant Gregory Manos about Boliak are not subject to the ministerial exception because they do not implicate matters of religious doctrine and practice.... However, the comments are nevertheless subject to a qualified privilege, as they were made by Father Reilly and Manos in furtherance of a common interest of a religious organization.... The record shows that the alleged defamatory statements were privileged because Manos and Father Reilly made them to each other and to others charged with supervision of Boliak....

HRD reports on the decision.

Firing of Synagogue Religious Teacher for Anti-Israel Blog Post Is Upheld By NY's Top Court

In Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, (NY Ct. App., Dec. 16, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals (New York's highest court) affirmed the dismissal of a suit alleging that plaintiff was fired from her position with a synagogue in violation of §201-d of New York's employment discrimination law. That section prohibits, among other things, discharging an employee because of the person's legal recreational activities. Plaintiff was fired from her teaching position at a Reform synagogue less than three weeks after she began because of a blog post critical of Israel and Zionism that she co-authored. Plaintiff claimed that her firing was because of blogging which is a lawful recreational activity. The majority opinion by Judge Halligan, joined by 4 other judges, held that her suit should be dismissed under the ministerial exception doctrine. The opinion said it was unnecessary to decide whether of not blogging is a "recreational activity" under §201-d.

Judge Rivera filed a concurring opinion relying on the exclusion in §201-d for activities that create a material conflict of interest relating to the employer's business interest.

Judge Troutman concurred in the result for the reasons stated by the appellate court below, namely that plaintiff was not discharged for the activity of blogging, but for the content of the blog post.

2nd Circuit: Information About Abortion Pill Reversal Is Protected Speech

In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. James, (2d Cir., Dec. 1, 2025), the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court's preliminary injunction barring New York's attorney general from taking enforcement action to prevent the plaintiff religious organizations from disseminating information regarding abortion pill reversal. Finding, on the record before it, that plaintiffs' speech is fully protected by the 1st Amendment, the court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that the speech at issue is noncommercial based on the uncontroverted evidence in the current record demonstrating that the speech is religiously and morally motivated, the NIFLA plaintiffs receive no remuneration or financial benefit for engaging in it, and the NIFLA plaintiffs do not provide APR themselves, but rather provide the public with information about APR and access to third-party providers who can offer APR.  Put simply, in this context, these combined elements of the speech at issue here do not transform it into commercial speech for First Amendment purposes. 

To hold otherwise could potentially subject a sweeping range of non-profits to regulation of their speech for providing the public with information and resources concerning critical services.  This could include, depending, of course, on the particular facts and context of each situation, a reproductive rights group in a state with abortion restrictions that provides information about out-of-state organizations that will help women obtain the procedure for free; an LGBT rights group in a state with gender-affirming care restrictions that provides free information about out-of-state organizations that will help individuals seeking hormone therapy to obtain it; or a group that matches immigrants with organizations providing access to employment, English language classes, or immigration legal services.

Reuters reports on the decision.

Village's Zoning Law for Places of Worship Is Unconstitutional

In Lubavitch of Old Westbury, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Old Westbury, New York, (ED NY, Oct. 30, 2025), a New York federal district court granted partial summary judgment to a Lubavitch organization that wants to build a Chabad House on land in Old Westbury. Plaintiffs allege that the Village has thwarted their efforts by enacting a discriminatory Places of Worship zoning law. The court said in part:

On a full summary judgment record, the case for the facial infirmity of the POW [Places of Worship] Law has been strengthened. ... The record now available demonstrates many more ways in which the POW Law treats religious development less favorably than comparable secular land uses.  Thus, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion, denies defendant’s motion, and declares the POW Law facially invalid under the United States Constitution....

Given the irresponsible and misleading arguments lodged by defense counsel in its filings, which border on contumacious, the Court considered striking the defendant’s motion.  However, considering the seeming interminability of this case, the motion will be resolved if only to avoid further delay.  Furthermore, despite weighty submissions, defendant’s motion can be easily dispatched....

It has been almost seventeen years since this matter was filed.  In its last major decision in this case, this Court declared as follows: 

The allegations raise serious issues of constitutional magnitude, and this matter has lingered far too long.  That ends now. Counsel will be expected to work diligently to bring this matter to resolution—in whatever form that might occur—with all deliberate speed....

Two more years of litigation, and the matter remains at this unsatisfactory juncture: the Court has now determined that the Village enacted a discriminatory law in violation of the United States Constitution.  Plaintiffs still have been unable to construct their Chabad.  Still more legal battles, costs and delays lie ahead.

It would behoove all involved to work together to reach a satisfactory resolution of this matter.  Given its history, the undersigned cannot reasonably hold out much hope.  

In a footnote, the court described the difficult issues on computation of damages that remain:

... [C]ounsel represents that “from 1999 to 2020 [plaintiffs] lost more than $15 million in pledged donor commitments,” while “Rabbi Konikov’s lost earnings and benefits . . . exceed $5 million.”...  As these figures include a time frame that predates the filing of litigation by nearly a decade, may well include speculative matters and, at a high level, would suggest double-counting, it is clear that, should the litigation proceed to that stage, the risks and costs will be substantial.   

Title VII Suit Alleges Failure to Accommodate Religious Refusal to Work Alone with a Woman

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by an HVAC technician who alleges that his firing violated Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law. The complaint (full text) in Ostapa v. Trane U.S. Inc,, (ND NY, filed 10/14/2025), alleges that Plaintiff's employer, Trane Technologies, for the first time hired a female technician to work out of the same office as plaintiff. The complaint goes on in part:

13. Paul is a devout Christian. He attended Bible College in Ukraine before emigrating to the United States and is a member in good standing of the Southern Baptist Convention, a fundamentalist Christian denomination. 

14. Paul’s Christian faith and sincerely held religious beliefs dictate that he is not to be alone with a woman other than his wife. The origin of this religious doctrine is the biblical story of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife found in Genesis 39....

Plaintiff's manager agreed to accommodate plaintiff's beliefs by not assigning a female to work alone with plaintiff. Subsequently, however, a dispatcher reported plaintiff to the HR department and he was ultimately fired. The complaint alleges that the firing constituted a failure to accommodate and retaliation in violation of Title VII, as well as a violation of New York law.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court GVR's Battle Over Health Insurance Abortion Coverage

In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Harris, (Sup. Ct., June 16, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of New York's highest court and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission. At issue in the case that was gvr'd today was whether the "religious employer" exemption to the state's requirement that health insurance policies cover medically necessary abortion services is too narrow.  The exemption is only available to entities whose purpose is to inculcate religious values and that primarily employ and serve persons who share their religious tenets. (See prior posting.)

Wedding Photographer Gets Temporary Injunction Excusing Her from Photographing Same-Sex Engagements and Weddings

In Carpenter v. James, (WD NY, May 22, 2025), a New York federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to a wedding photographer who objects to same-sex marriage, enjoining enforcement against her of provisions of New York's public accommodation law that would require her to offer her services for same-sex engagements and weddings and would prevent her from posting her policies on social media. The court said in part:

In light of the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in 303 Creative, and for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.  The Court will issue a narrow injunction barring Defendants from applying New York’s public accommodation laws “peculiarly to compel expressive activity” with which Plaintiff disagrees.... Beyond that “peculiar” circumstance, however, Plaintiff remains fully obligated to comply with New York’s public accommodation laws, and she remains subject to all remedies and penalties for their violation.  Conversely, except to the limited extent directed herein, New York’s public officials remain fully empowered to police the public marketplace to ensure that “gay couples [are not] treated as social outcasts . . . inferior in dignity and worth.”

The case was on remand from the Second Circuit. (See prior posting.)

Muslim Woman Sues Over Violation of Her Religious Rights in Jail

The New York chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations yesterday announced the filing of a federal lawsuit by a Muslim woman who alleges violation of her free exercise rights by Orange County, New York sheriff officers and jail officials.  The complaint (full text) in Green v. Orange County, (SD NY, filed 4/24/2025), alleges in part:

On February 2, 2024, a group of predominantly male officers at the Orange County Sheriff’s Office forced Ms. Green to remove her hijab twice: first, for post-arrest processing photographs and second, for her jail identification card. 

6. They also prohibited Ms. Green from wearing her hijab for more than 12 hours as she awaited arraignment....

9.  While incarcerated in the Orange County Jail, officials required Ms. Green to carry and present her identification card with a photo of her uncovered without her hijab for several months—which, for Ms. Green, was akin to being naked. 

10. Orange County Jail officers also confiscated Ms. Green’s hijab and purposefully broke her misbahah, or prayer beads, during a targeted cell sweep in late August 2024....Without her hijab, Ms. Green was unable to pray for herself or her family, including her six daughters, her mother (who passed away in November 2024), and her sister (who had been recently diagnosed with a brain tumor)...

13. In addition ... Defendants have failed to accommodate Ms. Green’s dietary requirements as a Muslim, often leaving her no choice but to go without food for extended periods of time.....

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Sex Discrimination Claim by Pastor Applicant

In Turman v. Abyssinian Baptist Church, (SD NY, March 31, 2025), a New York federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of a state-law sex discrimination and breach of contract suit in which plaintiff contends that she was not advanced to the final round of the application process to become a senior pastor because she is a woman. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the church had waived the ministerial exception defense when it included a non-discrimination statement in the notice and job description for the senior pastor position. The court said in part:

To be sure, one might question the propriety of an organization holding itself out as an equal opportunity employer and reaping the public relations benefits of that self-description, only to turn around and say that it is immune from liability under antidiscrimination statutes when someone alleges that the organization has unlawfully discriminated.  But in this case specifically, mindful of the presumption against waiver and having carefully evaluated the antidiscrimination statement on the job posting, the Court concludes that the statement on the job posting does not clearly demonstrate that Abyssinian waived its First Amendment rights....

... [E]mployment discrimination claims against churches require special solicitude.  By their very nature, these claims routinely pose a substantial entanglement concern.  Accordingly, courts routinely apply the ministerial exception to bar them at the motion to dismiss stage....

... There is no way for this Court to resolve Dr. Marshall Turman’s employment discrimination claim without becoming entangled with Abyssinian’s ecclesiastical innerworkings....

Dr. Marshall Turman “cannot evade the ministerial exception by asserting a contract claim based upon the same underlying facts as her statutory discrimination claims,”....  The ministerial exception, therefore, bars Dr. Marshall Turman’s contract claim, and it is dismissed....

Dr. Marshall Turman also seeks to hold Grant, as the chairperson of the Pulpit Search Committee, individually liable for employment discrimination....  But because the ministerial exception prevents this employment discrimination suit from proceeding against Abyssinian, it also requires this Court to dismiss the claims against Grant.  That is, because the First Amendment prohibits religious organizations from being sued under antidiscrimination laws regarding ministerial roles, it similarly prohibits those organizations’ agents from being sued under the same laws.....

New York County Clerk Refuses to File Texas Default Judgment Against Doctor Who Sent Abortion Pills to Texas Woman

New York state's Shield Law (EXECUTIVE 837-x) provides in part:

No state or local government employee ... shall cooperate with ... any out-of-state individual or out-of-state agency or department regarding any legally protected health activity in this state, or otherwise expend or use time, moneys, facilities, property, equipment, personnel or other resources in furtherance of any investigation or proceeding that seeks to impose civil or criminal liability or professional sanctions upon a person or entity for any legally protected health activity occurring in this state... 

Invoking this provision, an Ulster, New York County Clerk yesterday refused a request by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton to enforce in New York a Texas default civil judgment against a New York physician charged with providing abortion medication to a woman in Texas. Ulster County Clerk Taylor Bruck's statement (full text) reads in part:

Today, I informed Texas State Attorney General Ken Paxton that the Ulster County Clerk’s Office will not be filing a summary judgment against a New Paltz physician who is facing charges in Texas for providing mifepristone via telehealth to a Texas resident. The judgment in question seeks a civil penalty exceeding $100,000 due to the doctor’s failure to appear in court. 

As the Acting Ulster County Clerk, I hold my responsibilities and the oath I have taken in the highest regard. In accordance with the New York State Shield Law, I have refused this filing and will refuse any similar filings that may come to our office...

The case will provide an interesting test of the extent of exceptions to the federal Constitution's "full faith and credit" clause which generally requires one state to enforce judgments of another state's courts.

Texas Tribune Reports on these developments.

School's Gender Support Policy Did Not Violate Parent's Free Exercise or Due Process Rights

In Vitsaxaki v. Skaneateles Central School District, (ND NY, March 20, 2025), a New York federal district court rejected free exercise and due process challenges to a school district's policy of referring to students by their preferred names and pronouns without informing parents that the district is doing so.  The court said in part:

Mrs. Vitsaxaki asserts that her free exercise of religion was substantially burdened when she was unable to direct the upbringing and education of her child to “counteract” the school district’s implicit messaging that “people can change their sex.” ...

Mrs. Vitsaxaki asserts that the district’s actions taken pursuant to the Policy— permitting Doe to use a preferred names and pronouns and to receive school counseling regarding gender identity questions—were in direct contradiction of her religious views concerning gender and biological sex....

... [A] Policy that permits students to use preferred names and pronouns cannot be said to promote or endorse a religious message nor establish a particular religious practice.  Nor does Mrs. Vitsaxaki allege that it does.  Mrs. Vitsaxaki merely alleges that the choices available to students who choose to take advantage of the Policy runs afoul of her own religious beliefs....

... [T]he Court is satisfied that the Policy, which enables students to use their preferred name and/or pronouns is rationally related to the school district’s legitimate interest in promoting a safe learning environment for its students. ...

Rejecting plaintiff's claim that the school infringed her parental rights, the court said in part: 

... [W]ithin the Second Circuit, the scope of parental rights has been limited in the education context.  Most recently, ..., the Second Circuit held that “there is not a parental right, absent a violation of the Religion Clauses, to ‘direct how a public school teaches their child.’”  ...

... Mrs. Vitsaxaki’s verified complaint—and copies of the Policy...—describe a Policy that operates more like a civility code that extends the kind of decency students should expect at school: such as being called the name they ask to be called.  This strikes at the heart of the subject and manner of instruction a school district is entitled to implement for its students....

... Mrs. Vitsaxaki does not plausibly allege that the district diagnosed or treated Doe or that the district violated her right to make healthcare decisions on Doe’s behalf.   

Simply put, she remained free to exercise her parent rights at home.

2nd Circuit Rejects Amish Challenge to Removal of Religious Exemption from School Vaccine Requirements

In Miller v. McDonald, (2d Cir., March 3, 2025), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York state's removal of a religious belief exemption from its school immunization law did not violate the 1st Amendment free exercise rights of Amish parents or Amish schools. The court held that the public health law is neutral on its face and its legislative history does not reveal an anti-religious bias. It also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the law is not generally applicable, saying in part:

Plaintiffs contend that exempting students for medical reasons treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious beliefs.....

Repealing the religious exemption decreases “to the greatest extent medically possible” the number of unvaccinated students and thus the risk of disease; maintaining the medical exemption allows “the small proportion of students” who medically “cannot be vaccinated” to avoid the health consequences that “taking a particular vaccine would inflict.” ...  Exempting religious objectors, however, detracts from that interest.  Religious exemptions increase “the risk of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.”...   

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that § 2164 is anything but neutral and generally applicable.  The district court therefore did not err in applying rational basis review. As noted, Plaintiffs have conceded that the law satisfies rational basis review....

[Plaintiffs] claim that the school immunization law mandates two impossible options: inject their children with vaccines, forcing conduct against their religious beliefs, or forego educating their children in a group setting, requiring them to sacrifice a central religious practice.  True, Plaintiffs have shown that § 2164 burdens their religious beliefs and practices; but those burdens are not equivalent to the existential threat the Amish faced in Yoder.  Unlike in Yoder, compliance with § 2164 would not forcibly remove Amish children from their community at the expense of the Amish faith or the Amish way of life. 

Moreover, Yoder’s holding is limited by the state’s interest in protecting public health....