Evidence of Religious Differences Between Accused and Victim Did Not Require Reversal of Murder Conviction

In State of Washington v. Darraji, (WA App., May 22, 2025), a Washington state appellate court by a 2-1 vote affirmed a second-degree felony murder conviction of defendant, an Iraqi immigrant. Defendant, Yasir, was charged with murdering his former wife, Ibthal.  The court explained:

At trial, the State’s theory was that Ibtihal’s rejection of traditional Iraqi culture and Islamic beliefs, and her embrace of American culture and Christianity, was the source of conflict between the former spouses.  Their fighting and insults escalated until Yasir strangled Ibtihal to death in her car, drove the vehicle to a different location, and lit the car on fire with Ibtihal’s body inside. 

On appeal, Yasir argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing irrelevant and inflammatory evidence of Islamic beliefs to invoke anti-Muslim bias with jurors.

The majority rejected defendant's arguments, saying in part:

The comments and questions by the prosecutor were based on evidence and introduced to show motive.  The State maintained that Yasir believed Ibtihal’s changing behaviors failed to conform to Iraqi culture and Islamic beliefs and were disrespectful, insulting, and reflected poorly on him.... The non-conforming behavior included drinking, smoking, going to bars, dating, driving, working, not covering her hair, and attending a Christian church.  While Yasir’s appeal focuses primarily on evidence of the couples’ religious differences, the State maintained that Ibtihal’s conversion to Christianity and decision to wear her hair uncovered was part of the larger picture....

The foregoing questions and comments were based on relevant evidence and reasonable inferences ... and were introduced to show motive.  An objective observer could not view these questions and comments as an appeal to bias or prejudice against Muslims or persons from Iraq.

Judge Fearing dissented, saying in part:

... [B]ecause of the divisive subject of Islam and stereotypes of Middle Eastern men, the State needed to selectively, thoughtfully, and carefully present its evidence rather than turn the trial into a contest between American culture and Christianity, on the one hand, and Iraqi culture and Islam, on the other hand....  

The State gratuitously painted victim Ibtihal Darraji as Christian and American and defendant Yasir Darraji as Muslim and un-American.  The State even went as far as suggesting Ibtihal was a martyr to Christianity.  With its testimony and arguments to the jury, the State employed the ancient, but common, practice of portraying the victim as “us” and the accused as “them” in order to assure a conviction.  I would reverse and remand for a new trial because Yasir Darraji did not receive a fair trial....    

Leader in International Neo-Nazi Group Indicted for Soliciting Hate Crimes and Mass Violence

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York announced last week the federal indictment of the leader of an international neo-Nazi group. The press release said in part:

A federal grand jury in Brooklyn yesterday returned a four-count indictment charging Georgian national Michail Chkhikvishvili, also known as ... “Commander Butcher” ... with soliciting hate crimes and acts of mass violence in New York City.  Chkhikvishvili was arrested in Chișinău, Moldova on July 6, 2024 pursuant to an Interpol Wanted Person Diffusion.... Chkhikvishvili is alleged to be a leader of the Maniac Murder Cult,... an international racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist group.  Chkhikvishvili allegedly recruited others to commit violent acts in furtherance of MKY’s ideologies, including planning and soliciting a mass casualty attack in New York City....

Beginning in approximately November 2023, Chkhikvishvili solicited [an FBI undercover agent ("UC")] ... to commit violent crimes....  Chkhikvishvili provided detailed plans and materials such as bomb-making instructions and guidance on making Molotov cocktails.... In November 2023, Chkhikvishvili began planning a mass casualty attack in New York City to take place on New Year’s Eve.  The scheme involved an individual dressing up as Santa Claus and handing out candy laced with poison to racial minorities.  The scheme also involved providing candy laced with poison to children at Jewish schools in Brooklyn.  Chkhikvishvili drafted step-by-step instructions to carry out the scheme and shared with the UC detailed manuals on creating and mixing lethal poisons and gases.  He also instructed the UC on methods of making ricin-based poisons in powder and liquid form....

Texas Man Sentenced To 37 Years in Muslim Hate Crime Murder

A Department of Justice press release reports that yesterday a Texas federal district court sentenced a defendant to 37 years in prison (with credit for time served before sentencing) for a mass shooting at a Dallas car repair business. Thirty-nine year old Anthony Paz Torres had pleaded guilty to five federal hate crime counts. DOJ explains:

 According to court documents, Torres admitted that a few days prior to the shooting, he went to Omar’s Wheels and Tires, made anti-Muslim comments, and pledged that he would come back. When he returned to the business on Dec. 24, 2015, Torres asked customers if they were Muslim. After being escorted back to his vehicle by Omar’s Wheels and Tires employees, Torres discharged his firearm in the direction of multiple employees and customers. Torres admitted that he killed one person and attempted to kill four other people at Omar’s Wheels and Tires because he believed that they were Muslim. 

Army Appeals Court: Poisoning Through Vodou Not Protected by Free Exercise Clause or RFRA

In United States v. Lindor, (ACCA, June 14, 2023), the Army Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant's claim that his murder sentence violated his free exercise rights under the 1st Amendment and RFRA.  The case involves a Staff Sergeant who, after multiple attempts, succeeded in murdering his wife through the use of rituals and poisons recommended by a Vodou practitioner in Haiti. The court said in part:

[A]ppellant's actions to summon Vodou rituals ... were consistent with his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religious beliefs.... [T]he record contains no indication that they called for any illegal activity or result.... The stipulation's derogatory references to these Vodou rituals—after all, they were categorized as "aggravation" evidence—violated the First Amendment's free exercise clause. The government, consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise, "cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices."...

However, our analysis does not end there,.... [Appellant] waived his objection to evidence of these particular spells in two ways.... First, the military judge directly advised appellant and his counsel that, if he admitted it, he would consider the stipulation of fact to decide whether appellant was guilty, and, if so, an appropriate sentence; appellant and his counsel agreed. Second, the military judge specifically asked appellant's counsel whether he had any objections to the stipulation; counsel responded, "No, Your Honor."...

Turning to appellant's violence toward RL, we view this as substantially different from the rituals about AD and government officials. We have searched for, but cannot find, any authority to support appellant's tacit argument that the First Amendment's "free exercise" clause can broadly shield one from government action to describe, prosecute, and punish conduct that unlawfully endangers another person's life...

Put plainly, we decline to characterize appellant's violent misconduct toward RL as the free exercise of religious belief.... [A]ctivities that harm others are not protected by the free exercise clause. To characterize appellant's chosen techniques to plan, express, and actuate his intent to murder RL as the free exercise of his religious beliefs would expropriate the free exercise clause of any principled, reasonable meaning. The United States Constitution's framers and the various ratifying conventions plainly and deliberately did not contemplate that one could seek protection in the clause for an act that violated another's right to be free from malicious violence.