9th Circuit: Employee Adequately Alleged Religious Objections to Covid Vaccine

In Weiss v. The Permanente Group, (9th Cir., July 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a California federal district court's dismissal of Title VII and California state law claims alleging that plaintiff's employer failed to accommodate plaintiff's religious objections to the Covid vaccine mandate after initially approving her request. The court said in part:

... TPMG notified Weiss that, due to its findings and concerns about a pattern of insincere religious exemption requests among its employees, it would be conducting additional review of all previously approved exemptions...

Weiss plausibly alleged that she provided notice of her religious conflict with the Mandate in her initial request for a religious exemption. She identified herself to TPMG management as “a Christian Jew” and described specific religious doctrines that she asserted prohibited her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. These doctrines included the Torah’s prohibition against “accepting foreign material into our bodies,” Deuteronomy’s counsel against “needle wounds except for direct curative benefit,” and the professed requirement under Jewish law to “maintain [one’s] body and blood uncontaminated.” She also stated that receiving a COVID=19 vaccine would be contrary to her belief that she should not “introduce foreign substances into [her] body temple that change how [her] Creator designed it.”...   

Weiss acknowledged that she had previously received vaccinations, and she explained that her present concern arose not because the COVID-19 vaccine was different, but because her religious commitment had changed....

Judge Paez filed two unpublished partial dissenting opinions, one concluding that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's claim that TPMG's vaccination requirement and its intrusive questions about her religious and medical history constituted an invasion of privacy under the California Constitution. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a prima facie claim for invasion of privacy. The second unpublished dissent contended that the court should certify to the California Supreme Court the question of whether a health care provider’s requirement that employees obtain either a COVID-19 vaccination or an exemption constitutes a serious invasion of privacy under the California Constitution.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decision.

9th Circuit: Plan to Convince Vaccination Objectors to Reconsider Did Not Show Hostility To Religion

 In Seagraves v. Wahington State Department of Children, Youth and Families, (9th Cir., July 21, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims by 18 former employees of the Department of Children, Youth and Families who were separated from the agency after their requests for religious exemptions from the state's 2021 Covid vaccine mandate were rejected. The court said in part:

The [complaint] does not plausibly allege personal involvement by any of the Officials [named as defendants] in constitutional violations of the Employees’ free exercise, equal protection, or procedural due process rights.  All the Employees’ requests for accommodations in their current roles were denied, based on determinations that they could not perform the essential functions of their positions unvaccinated without endangering the health and safety of others in the workplace, including children and families.  Accordingly, their supposed constitutional injuries flow from this determination.  Yet the [complaint] does not allege that any of the Officials [named as defendants] personally participated in evaluating the Employees’ accommodation requests or that they played a role in denying them pre-termination hearings....

The remaining factual allegations that the Employees provided in their pleadings undermine the plausibility of their “religious animus” theory.  First consider Hunter’s August 23, 2021, email discussing DCYF’s communications plan for vaccination.  The goal of this plan was to convince as many DCYF employees as possible to get vaccinated.  Part of the plan involved addressing various potential objections to vaccination: medical safety, convenience, religious objections, and political tribalism.  This plan did not single out religiously motivated objections for special treatment.  Religious objections were included among several secular objections, and the aim of the plan was to convince DCYF employees that their concerns about vaccination were unfounded, regardless of the religious or secular character of those concerns.  That religious objections were one of several objections to address does not, without more, indicate hostility toward religion....

2nd Circuit: Supreme Court's Title VII Test Was Not Applied by Trial Court in Religious Accommodation Case

In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, (2d Cir., July 15, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a York federal district court's ruling in favor of a court officer who was denied a religious exemption from the New York State Court System's Covid vaccine mandate. The 2nd Circuit held that the district court had applied an old Title VII test developed by the 2nd Circuit instead of the test developed by the Supreme Court in its 2015 Abercrombie & Fitch case. It remanded the case for the district court to apply the correct test.  The court said in part:

In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not inform her employer of the need for accommodation in order to state a Title VII claim, but that she must demonstrate that the employer acted out of a desire to avoid offering an accommodation.  Our prior rule—which did include an employer-knowledge requirement and did not expressly require a showing of motive—was abrogated by Abercrombie.

The Western New York Daily Record reports on the decision.

11th Circuit Rejects Claim That Covid Requirements Violated Employees' Religious Beliefs; Criticizes Counsel's Briefing

 In Akerlund v. Atlas Air, Inc., (11th Cir., July 10, 2026), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by four employees of Atlas Air complaining about the company's policies on masks, testing and vaccination during the Covid pandemic. The court said in part:

The plaintiffs first allege that Atlas Air created a work environment hostile to their religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII.  They say that Atlas Air’s “repeated attempts to coerce” them into getting vaccinated constituted “unwelcomed harassment.”...

... [P]laintiffs do not allege any facts indicating that Atlas Air intended to discriminate against their religious beliefs.  In fact, the allegations suggest the opposite.  Under its policy, Atlas Air exempted from its vaccine requirement employees who professed a sincere religious objection to the Covid-19 vaccine.  Instead, they had to wear a mask at work and test once a month. The plaintiffs now seem to assert that these accommodations are also hostile to their religion.  The problem with this argument is that there is nothing to back it up in the pleadings....

... [W]e have saved the worst for last.  The plaintiffs’ counsel Anthony F. Sabatini’s filings are riddled with citations to nonexistent, “hallucinated” cases.  His opening brief relies on at least eight such cases, including one purportedly decided by this Court.  After the defendants identified this problem, Sabatini acknowledged in his (untimely) proposed reply brief that those citations were “erroneous or unverifiable,” and sought to withdraw his reliance on eight listed cases.  At this point, things go from bad to worse: the eight cases Sabatini “withdrew” did not match a single one of the eight hallucinated cases in his opening brief.  And not only were they not the right cases—all eight were also hallucinated....

Whatever the merits of artificial intelligence, it is no substitute for actual intelligence....

In a separate order, this Court, through the Chief Judge, will refer the matter to the Committee on Lawyer Qualifications and Conduct.

7th Circuit: Bus Driver Gave No Religious Reasons for Rejecting Covid Vaccine

In Snyder v. Chicago Transit Authority, (7th Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the firing of a Chicago Transit Authority bus driver for refusing to comply with CTA's Covid vaccine mandate after his request for a religious exemption was denied. The court said in part:

... Snyder submitted a request for a religious exemption. He explained that he practiced “the laws of cleanliness” and adhered to dietary rules outlined in the biblical books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. He explained that the Bible instructed him to “refrain from the ingestion of unclean animals,” including “pork or derivatives, such as gelatin which are in most vaccines.” He also attached a letter from his minister explaining that vaccines were “inconsistent” with their beliefs, though individuals had discretion to choose which vaccines and immunizations they received.  

... Snyder also cited concerns about the presence of heavy metals in most vaccinations, potential long-term risks, and the rush with which the vaccine was approved....

But even accepting the religious significance of Snyder’s belief that Biblical laws prohibited him from ingesting certain ingredients, the [district] court wrote, Snyder did not connect this belief to any content in the COVID vaccine that he was religiously obligated to avoid.... The court thus concluded that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that his grounds for objecting to the vaccine were religious in nature....

2nd Circuit Reaffirms Permissibility of NY Repeal of Religious Exemptions from School Vaccination Requirements

In Miller v. McDonald, (2d Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision that New York's repeal of its religious belief exemption from required school immunizations, while keeping medical exemptions, does not violate either Amish parents' free exercise rights or their parental rights to control their children's religious upbringing.  Last year, the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor. In reaffirming its earlier decision, the Second Circuit said in part:

New York Public Health Law § 2164 is neutral on its face.  It does not target or affirmatively prohibit religious practices....  Moreover, the act of repealing the religious exemption did not “in and of itself transmute” this otherwise neutral law into one “that targets religious beliefs.”...

Nor does the legislative history reveal an anti-religious bias....

... [T]he motives of a small number of legislators cannot be attributed to the legislative body as a whole.

Plaintiffs contend that exempting students for medical reasons treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious beliefs....

Repealing the religious exemption decreases “to the greatest extent medically possible” the number of unvaccinated students and thus the risk of disease; maintaining the medical exemption allows “the small proportion of students” who medically “cannot be vaccinated” to avoid the health consequences that “taking a particular vaccine would inflict.” ... Exempting religious objectors, however, detracts from that interest.  Religious exemptions increase “the risk of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.”...

New York passed § 2164 in response to the 2018 to 2019 measles outbreak.  Legislators felt particularly concerned about the concentration of unvaccinated children with religious exemptions in the same schools....

Plaintiffs’ remaining argument is that, even if § 2164 is neutral and generally applicable, it burdens the parental free-exercise right recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and clarified in Mahmoud v. Taylor.  We conclude that it does not....

Section 2164 does not regulate what children are taught, does not require them to affirm any belief, does not expose them to state-selected instruction contrary to their parents’ faith, and does not enlist school officials to displace parental religious formation.  It imposes a health-and-safety condition on in-person school attendance to reduce the spread of communicable disease....  The burden may be serious, but it is not the kind of state interference with a child’s religious development that triggered strict scrutiny in Yoder or Mahmoud....

Mahmoud asks whether a burden is “of the same character” as the burden in Yoder, not whether it is more or less serious....  A greater burden in degree is not necessarily the same burden in kind....

Cert. Denied Over Dissent of 3 Justices in Covid Vaccine Mandate Controversy

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Doe v. Hochul , (Docket No. 24-1015, certiorari denied 6/29/2026) over a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. At issue in the case was New York's refusal to grant state healthcare workers a religious exemption from the state's Covid vaccine mandate. Justice Gorsuch dissenting said in part:

... [T]he Court of Appeals did not assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ requested accommodations.  In fact, the court took as given that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination.” ... Still, the court held, the defendants had presented a successful “undue hardship” defense as a matter of law....  More specifically, the court reasoned that granting the plaintiffs’ requested religious accommodations would have imposed an “undue hardship” on their employers because it “would have required the [employers] to violate the state [vaccine] regulation” and “subjected the [employers] to financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their operating licenses.”... 

Soon after it decided this case, the Second Circuit reiterated its understanding of Title VII’s undue hardship defense, holding that “an accommodation that would require an employer to violate” a state law necessarily “imposes an undue hardship”—and does so even when the state law is “unconstitutional as applied” to the plaintiff....

... [I]t seems to me that state law cannot control whether an employer faces an “undue hardship” for purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, just like it cannot conclusively resolve what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation”.... To hold otherwise would appear to leave States free to strip individuals of the protections guaranteed by so many federal civil rights statutes....

2nd Circuit: Denial of Covid Vaccine Religious Exemption Because of Undue Hardship Triggers Only Rational Basis Review

In Vesterman v. New York City Department of Education, (2d Cir., June 3, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a religious discrimination claim brought by a former New York Department of Education employee who was denied a religious accommodation after objecting to compliance with the Department's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

In [two prior] cases, we applied strict scrutiny and sustained the plaintiffs’ claims on a motion to dismiss where they made plausible allegations that the DOE denied an accommodation by questioning the legitimacy of their religious beliefs....  We have applied the “low threshold” of rational basis review, however, where the DOE has denied an accommodation “irrespective of [the employee’s] sincerely held religious beliefs” on the basis of “undue hardship.” ...

Here, Vesterman’s claim triggers only rational basis review because she has not alleged that the DOE improperly scrutinized her religious beliefs or otherwise denied her request in a way that was not neutral towards religion nor generally applicable to all employees.  Under rational basis review, Vesterman has failed to plausibly allege that the DOE’s rationale—that her request imposed an “undue hardship” because “unvaccinated employees cannot work in a school building without posing a direct threat to health and safety,” ... was either erroneous or pretextual.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's due process stigma-plus claim growing out of her being listed in the Department's "problem code" database. 

Adversarial Questioning of Employees Claiming Religious Accommodations Violated Title VII

In Matilde M. v. Burgum, (EEOC Federal Sector, May 15, 2026), the EEOC in an appeal from a finding by the Bureau of Indian Education, held that the Bureau had engaged in religious discrimination when it denied religious accommodations to three employees who refused on religious grounds to comply with the agency's Covid vaccine mandate. The employees cited their religious belief in the sacredness of human life and their religious practice of rejecting substances developed using human fetal cells obtained through abortion.

The EEOC said in part:

After careful review, we conclude that testing and masking were a possible alternative reasonable accommodation for Complainants. And we find the Agency has not met its burden to establish by preponderant evidence that testing and masking would have imposed an undue hardship on its operations. Moreover, we find the Agency acted discriminatorily when it subjected Complainants to an unduly adversarial accommodation process....

At the barest minimum, a process to handle religious accommodation requests needs to provide employees with a non-adversarial forum.... The process the Agency imposed was adversarial to the point that we can persuasively infer an underlying discriminatory, even disdainful, motive. The Agency singled out employees with religious objections related to the use of human fetal cells for particularly disfavored treatment. They were summoned to an inquisitorial panel to be quizzed and lectured on their medical history and knowledge of other medicines derived from human fetal cells. We are persuaded that the crucible of invasive gotcha-style questioning was a thinly veiled, and discriminatory, attempt to expose supposed hypocrisy and convince Complainants to recant their objections.... 

This is not to say that an employee’s asserted religious views evade all scrutiny. Measured, non-adversarial inquiry may be appropriate to help the employer fully understand the contours and sincerity of the employee’s religious beliefs and practices. But ...the Agency’s inquiry as an employer is ... limited to whether the purported religious conflict “reflects an honest conviction.”... [T]he “veracity [i.e., the correctness] of [the employee’s] religious belief” does not meaningfully bear on the honesty of the conviction....

The EEOC issued a press release announcing the decision.

9th Circuit: Requested Religious Exemptions from Vaccine Mandate Would Have Imposed Undue Hardship

In Williams v. Legacy Health, (9th Cir., May 6, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a hospital system's refusal to grant religious exemptions from its Covid vaccine mandate to Vancouver, Washington hospital employees whose duties put them in close contact with patients or staff. The court upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII religious discrimination claims.  It concluded that granting the requested religious exemptions would have imposed "undue hardship" on Legacy Health. The court said in part:

At the time it denied Employees’ exemption requests, Legacy forecast an acute strain on its business of providing safe and effective medical care to the public. The COVID-19 Delta variant had just emerged, and Legacy predicted a surge of hospitalizations across its eight locations. In that context, Legacy reasonably sought to ensure that its employees were vaccinated. The statistical evidence available to Legacy revealed that high vaccination rates, while not a panacea, reduced overall transmission risk. Vaccination also proved highly effective at preventing infection in the healthcare setting, where other measures like social distancing were impractical or “impossible,” as one expert explained. By contrast, Legacy’s unrebutted epidemiological expert evidence showed that unvaccinated “frontline workers,” like Employees, faced a unique risk of infection—and that any infections could contribute to “significant outbreaks among patients [and] colleagues.” 

Vital Law reports on the decision.

Cert. Petition Filed in Covid Religious Exemption Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) has been filed in Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire & Rescue, (Sup. Ct., filed 4/16/2026). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims by eight firefighters that the Snohomish fire department violated Title VII and Washington state law by refusing to accommodate their requests for religious exemptions from the state's Covid vaccine mandate for all healthcare providers. (See prior posting.) The petition seeking Supreme Court review frames the Question Presented as follows:

Whether an employer can defeat a Title VII religious accommodation claim by establishing merely that it had a reasonable basis for believing that a requested accommodation would inflict an undue hardship on the employer or whether the employer must establish that the requested accommodation would have actually imposed an undue hardship.

The Center Square reports on the filing.

Coast Guard Enters Settlement in Suit Over Religious Exemptions from Covid Vaccine Mandate

This week the Coast Guard entered a Settlement Agreement (full text) with three Coast Guard members who brought a class action contending that denial of religious accommodations from the military's COVID vaccine mandate violated RFRA, the 1st amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Agreement in Jackson v. Mullin, (ND TX, Settlement Agreement filed 4/14/2026) requires the Coast Guard to remove references in personnel records of service members' decision to remain unvaccinated. The Agreement further provides in part:

2... [T]he Coast Guard will issue an internet-releasable ALCOAST general message re-emphasizing or otherwise declaring that:

a) The COVID-19 vaccination mandate was unlawful as implemented and an unfair, overbroad, and completely unnecessary burden on service members. 

b) The Coast Guard supports expressive activities, to include religious expression.  Accommodation of sincerely held religious beliefs is a pillar of the Coast Guard’s commitment to treating all service members with dignity and respect.  The Coast Guard works to support each service member’s religious practices to the broadest extent possible within the bounds of military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline, health and safety.  Discrimination on the basis of religion is contrary to the Coast Guard’s core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty....

4....  [T]he Coast Guard will post a statement of support for religious expression on its public website.... a) The statement ... shall read...:  The United States Coast Guard supports expressive activities, to include religious expression.  Accommodation of sincerely held religious beliefs is a pillar of the Coast Guard’s commitment to treating all service members with dignity and respect.  The Coast Guard works to support each service member’s religious practices to the broadest extent possible within the bounds of military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline, health and safety.  Discrimination on the basis of religion is contrary to the Coast Guard’s core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty.....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the Settlement Agreement.

9th Circuit Denies En Banc Rehearing in Vaccine Mandate Case

In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, (9th Cir., April 15, 2926), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied both a panel rehearing and an en banc rehearing in a case involving a medical center employee's claimed religious objections to both a Covid vaccine requirement and to the accommodation granted by her employer. A 3-judge panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the employee's Title VII lawsuit, concluding that her objections were secular, not religious. (See prior posting.) Her religious exemption from vaccination was conditioned, in part, on her having weekly antigen testing. She objected to that accommodation because she believed the ethylene oxide used in obtaining a nasal swab for the test was carcinogenic and her religion prohibited her from defiling her body in this manner.

In two dissenting opinions, a total of eight judges dissented from the denial of an en banc rehearing, some joining in both dissenting opinions. Judge Forrest's dissent, joined by five other judges, said in part:

Our role in assessing whether a plaintiff has shown a bona fide religious belief is a “narrow function.”... Generally, we may determine only whether the religious conflict identified by the plaintiff “reflects an honest conviction.”... This is because anything more extends beyond a judge’s competence....

The court’s reasoning gives no credence to Detwiler’s claim that she received revelation from God that informed her health choices. For those who believe that God can provide individualized guidance for daily living, whether that guidance relates to “secular” or “spiritual” matters is often a distinction without a difference—both emanate from beliefs about deity and its relationship with humanity. That is, many believers do not perceive that the spiritual and the secular are capable of neat separation as relates to matters of revelation....

Judge Tung, joined by six other judges, filed a dissenting opinion which said in part:

Detwiler properly alleged the religious basis of her objection to testing—namely, that her religion forbade her from ingesting a carcinogen, which she viewed as a defilement upon the temple of her body.  That her objection was based in part on a medical finding—that the testing is carcinogenic—did not negate her religious motivation in refusing to submit to such testing....

... [T]he panel majority misapplied Title VII’s text and precedent interpreting “religion,” misconstrued Detwiler’s allegations, and split with the holdings of several other circuits....  But perhaps most problematic, the panel majority’s approach would recast as “purely secular” a person’s religious practices whenever those practices turn also on secular considerations.  It is hard to imagine, frankly, what religious practice would not turn on secular considerations to some degree.

4th Circuit Upholds West Virginia's Compulsory Vaccination Law That Excludes Religious Exemptions

In Perry v. Marteney, (4th Cir., April 8, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that West Virginia's law that requires children attending school in the state to be vaccinated against a number of infectious diseases may be constitutionally applied to a student attending the state's online public school over the religious objections of the student's parents. West Virginia allows medical exemptions from the vaccination requirement but does not permit religious exemptions. The court rejected the parents' claim that the compulsory vaccination law is not "generally applicable", and thus must satisfy the strict scrutiny test, and also suggested that it does satisfy strict scrutiny. The majority said in part:

... [A] state’s interest in vaccinating its citizens and protecting its school children has long been recognized as of the utmost importance.... This is not just some ho-hum, every day “compelling interest.” Even under the strictest scrutiny, courts should not annul and eviscerate this fundamental state concern merely because a challenged law in some respect falls short of some perceived perfection. And much less is required of neutral and generally applicable laws....

West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law does not provide a mechanism for granting individualized exemptions. State officials do not have any discretion “to decide which reasons” for refusing vaccination “are worthy of solicitude.”... The law recognizes only one kind of exemption—medical exemptions—and clearly articulates the circumstances in which state officials can grant them....

The Perrys first argue that West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law is not generally applicable for another reason: it does not apply to other groups that pose a similar hazard to public health....  [T]he vaccine mandate does not apply to: (1) children educated outside of the school system (i.e., educated at home, in learning pods, or in microschools); (2) adults working in schools; or (3) children attending school who have been granted a medical exemption. 

It is certainly true that West Virginia’s vaccine mandate could sweep more broadly than it does. But a law does not lack general applicability merely because it makes classifications.... Classifications only pose a constitutional concern if they treat “comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.” 

... [T]he Perrys do not allege that K.P.’s desire to attend the Virtual Academy is religiously motivated, so this is merely an instance of West Virginia treating some secular activity more favorably than other secular activity....

The burden imposed by West Virginia’s compulsory vaccination law is not remotely “of the same character” as those imposed in Yoder and Mahmoud. ... The law is a public health measure, not an instrument of ideological indoctrination. It does not expose children to values or beliefs that might be hostile to their parents’ religious beliefs. It does not require that school instruction extoll the virtues of vaccines. All the law requires is that, in the interest of protecting others, children get themselves vaccinated before attending school. The need for some to protect the health and well-being of all was not present in Yoder or Mahmoud.

Judge Neimeyer dissented, saying in part:

The injunction entered here [by the district court] hardly affects West Virginia’s compelling interest in preventing the spread of infectious disease, as the injunction treats virtual students the same as other West Virginia students not physically attending a school while, at the same time, preserving the Perrys’ free exercise rights....

To be sure, West Virginia absolutely has a compelling state interest to prevent the spread of infectious disease in order to protect the health and safety of the public, as the district court acknowledged and the majority emphasizes.  But the School Officials have failed to show that the law’s failure to make an exception for virtual students with a sincere religious objection to complying with the mandatory vaccination law is consistent with narrow tailoring when students similarly situated with regard to the risk addressed need not comply at all....

2nd Circuit: Claims by Judge Who Was Denied Covid Vaccine Exemption Are Dismissed

In Mora v. New York State Unified Court System, (2nd Circuit, March 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a Poughkeepsie, New York, City Court Judge who in 2021 was denied a religious exemption from the New York courts' Covid vaccine mandate. This led to his being excluded from the city courthouse where he usually presided. Each of his five causes of action was dismissed on a different ground. His claim against the court system was dismissed on 11th Amendment and mootness grounds. His Title VII claim was dismissed because of the exclusion in Title VII for policymaking appointees of elected officials.

Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim against members of the Vaccine Exemption Committee was dismissed because the Committee routinely granted religious exemptions to other Catholics and people of different faiths who opposed the COVID vaccines. So Mora's religion does not seem to be the basis for the denial, and Mora did not allege facts suggesting some other discriminatory motive.

Denying Mora's Free Exercise claim, the Court said in part:

Mora’s own pleadings reflect that more than 500 other judges and employees – including Catholics with beliefs identical to Mora’s – received exemptions from the vaccine mandate.... Those allegations belie Mora’s assertion that the Individual Defendants’ denial of his exemption request was based on hostility to his religious beliefs, as opposed to his failure to follow the procedures established for religious exemptions.

Finally, the Court rejected Mora's retaliation claim, saying in part:

Mora contends that the chief administrative judge, Lawrence Marks, retaliated against him on the basis of his “religiously based refusal to vaccinate,” ... when he referred Mora to a disciplinary body....  [T]he disciplinary referral was made only after (1) Mora failed to follow the procedures required to obtain a vaccine exemption,.. and after (2) he refused to comply with the then operative vaccine mandate following the denial of his request for a religious exemption....

Supreme Court Denies Review of RFRA Claims by Military Who Refused Covid Vaccine

The Supreme Court yesterday denied certiorari in Doster v. Meink, (Docket No.25-446, cert. denied 2/23/2026) and Poffenbarger v. Meink, (Docket No. 25-448, cert. denied 2/23/2026). (Order List.) Both cases involve Air Force members who on religious grounds refused to comply with the military's Covid vaccine mandate. In Doster, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed RFRA claims by 18 members of the Air Force as moot. (Full text of opinion.) In Poffenberger, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals denied a claim under RFRA for compensatory relief on sovereign immunity grounds. (Full text of opinion). Military Times reports on the Supreme Court's action.

7th Circuit: "Moral" Objections Not Protected By Title VII

 In Bowlin v. Board of Directors, Judah Christian School, (7th Circuit, Feb. 13, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that moral objections that are not also religiously based are not protected by Title VII. The court said in part:

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Illinois required all school employees to either receive a vaccination or undergo weekly testing for the virus. Plaintiffs—three employees at different Illinois grade schools—refused to receive a vaccination, citing their religious beliefs. When the schools offered weekly testing as an accommodation, Plaintiffs claimed the testing also violated their moral consciences and refused. As a result, they were either placed on unpaid leave or terminated....

Although “a ‘religious’ objection can sound in both religious and non-religious terms,” ... here, Plaintiffs do not moor their objections to the testing requirement to any religious beliefs. Their only relevant allegation is that their “moral consciences … prevent them from submitting to health care procedures which they, competent adults, do not believe are medically necessary.” This, on its own, fails to plausibly allege that the request is “based in part on an aspect of [Plaintiffs’] religious belief or practice” because Plaintiffs do not identify what belief or practice the testing would violate.,,,

Nevertheless, even assuming Plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Defendants violated their religious beliefs, their claim still fails because the accommodation they request would require Defendants to violate the law, thereby imposing upon them an undue hardship,,,, 

HRD reported on the decision.

1st Circuit Upholds Denial of Religious Exemptions from Covid Vaccine

In Brox v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, (1st Cir., Jan. 9, 2026), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals rejected First Amendment free exercise claims by 12 employees of a Massachusetts state government board. Th employees sought religious exemptions from the Authority's vaccination policy. The court agreed with the trial court that the vaccination policy was neutral and generally applicable, so that it is subject only to rational basis review.  Appellants had argued that the policy was not generally applicable because it prohibits religious conduct while permitting comparable secular conduct. The court said in part:

The question is not whether the risks associated with one individual who for religious reasons is unvaccinated are comparable to those associated with an individual who remains unvaccinated due to health concerns.... Rather, the Supreme Court instructs that we consider and compare the risks presented by groups of different sizes in different settings..

... [T]he district court did not err in finding that the two exemptions were not comparable for Free Exercise purposes. 

First, unlike the religious exemption, the medical exemption furthers the Authority's asserted interest in protecting the health and safety of its employees and customers. ...

Second, not only does the medical exemption further the Authority's asserted interests while the religious exemption does not, but also the risks associated with each exemption are not comparable to one another.  We have previously observed that "medical exemptions are likely to be rarer, more time limited, or more geographically diffuse than religious exemptions, such that the two exemptions would not have comparable public health effects."...

Having not persuaded us that the Policy fails rational basis review, the appellants have not established that they are likely to succeed on the merits, and we need not address the remaining preliminary injunction factors....

RFRA Challenge to Connecticut Removal of Religious Exemption from School Vaccines Survives

In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. State of Connecticut Department of Education, (CT Super, Dec. 16, 2025), a Connecticut state trial court dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds a number of state constitutional and statutory challenges to Connecticut's removal of religious exemptions from its school vaccination requirements. The court dismissed plaintiffs' free exercise, equal protection, right to education, substantive due process, and right to equal educational opportunity claims. However, the court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity in Connecticut's Religious Freedom Law allows a challenge under that statute to move forward.

7th Circuit: Plaintiff Must Allege More Than Conclusory Statements of Religious Belief to Get Religious Exemption

In Troogstad v. City of Chicago, (7th Cir., Dec. 9, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of free exercise claims by a Chicago Fire Department employee who was denied a religious exemption from the city's Covid-19 vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

Troogstad alleges “the gene-altering aspect of mRNA vaccinations violates his beliefs as a Christian.” But he failed to allege facts about how taking the vaccine violated his religious beliefs. He misses that step....

.... While the pleading of a violation of the Free Exercise Clause need not be overly exacting, in numerous rounds of pleading ... Troogstad did not move beyond conclusory statements. A complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations; mere conclusions generally will not suffice.... Troogstad’s failure to allege facts about how his religious beliefs as a Christian conflict with the vaccine requirement—after numerous opportunities to satisfy this pleading standard—dooms his Free Exercise claim.

For the same reason, the court upheld the dismissal of plaintiff's claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act.