5th Circuit: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Exists In Lutheran Church's Suit Against Concordia University

 In Lutheran Church- Missouri Synod v. Christian, (5th Cir., June 4, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that in a suit by the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (LCMS)-- an entity incorporated under Missouri law-- against Concordia University and its Board of Regents, LCMS was the proper plaintiff for purposes of determining whether the parties to the lawsuit are citizens of different states. Concordia had claimed that an unincorporated association, also known as the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (Synod) is the real party in interest and had to be joined as a party to the lawsuit. The Synod is a resident of Texas, the same state as the residence of Concordia University and its regents. If it became a party, this would destroy complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants so that the suit would have to be brought in state court rather than federal court.

LCMS sued Concordia after Concordia's Board of Regents voted change its governing documents to reject LCMS's authority over it. According to the court: "The Synod manages Church spiritual affairs like supervising doctrine and religious practice and governing the church body.  LCMS manages the Synod’s civil affairs including its property, bank accounts, contracts, assets, and employees.  In the same vein, LCMS is the Church’s legal representative and is the proper party to litigation...." 

Judge Jones in the court's main opinion wrote that the church autonomy doctrine requires courts to respect the Church's internal governance structure. She described the district court's erroneous conclusion that the suit should be dismissed in part as follows:

[The district court] reached this result only by overlaying a secular corporate law interpretation on the church’s spiritually crafted governance documents, and then imposing Texas unincorporated association law on the Lutheran Church, whose special status has been recognized by Missouri law for more than a hundred years.  The district court’s ruling quintessentially violated the church autonomy doctrine....

Judge Jones continued, in part:

... [T]he Synod and LCMS are designed as separate but integrated entities based on the Lutherans’ interpretation of Biblical Scripture.  By imposing its own interpretation, the district court changed the meaning of the governing documents. Regardless, “change” is not the line at which the church autonomy doctrine begins to apply.  Second, the district court essentially denied the Church’s self-identity, rooted in the “two kingdoms” doctrine, by finding that LCMS does not represent the Synod or does not share the same interest as the Synod.  Yet “matters of religious ‘faith and doctrine’ are ‘closely linked to . . . matters of church government.’” ...

 Though the Synod has legal interests, LCMS formally and fully represents these interests....

Chief Judge Elrod filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I agree with much of Judge Jones’s reasoning.  However, I believe that this is a straightforward case that can be decided by relying upon the Church’s corporate documents and declarations.  The district court opinion focuses on one subsection of the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod’s Policy Manual to arrive at a conclusion that conflicts with both the best reading of the Church’s corporate documents as well as the Church’s own understanding of its structure.  This was error. When considering the documents together and in context, it is clear that the LCMS is the real party to the controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction....

Judge Graves filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Synod’s status as a necessary party to the suit is evident just from the Church’s briefs—its own representations—where it states that “the Church makes its universities [like Concordia] ‘agencies’ of the Synod, subject to the Synod’s ecclesiastical governance and LCMS’s civil oversight.”... 

One other reason to be concerned with this application of the church autonomy doctrine is that it may lead to disparate treatment among differently structured religious groups. Groups that do not have a corporate representative like LCMS may be unable to disentangle their ecclesial bodies from litigation, and may be less likely to take their disputes to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The church autonomy doctrine should not apply differently according to how a religious group is organized....

St. John's Challenges Jurisdiction of NY PERB Over Its Relations with Its Faculty Union

St. John's University filed suit this week in a New York federal district court challenging on 1st Amendment grounds jurisdiction of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board over the University's relations with it faculty's union. The complaint (full text) in St. John's University v. Connick, (ED NY, filed 6/1/2026), alleges in part:

1. For over 150 years, St. John’s University operated as an institution of Catholic and Vincentian higher education—a Mission-driven religious institution founded by the Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent de Paul to provide the youth of New York with intellectual and moral formation rooted in the Gospel and the teachings of St. Vincent de Paul....

5. New York’s Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”), however, seeks to subject St. John’s to a regime of mandatory collective bargaining that impermissibly entangles the government (and the faculty Union) in its internal governance of religion- and Mission-related matters....

6. Under St. John’s expired collective bargaining agreement with the faculty Union, faculty committees controlled significant aspects of hiring, tenure, promotion, discipline, and curricular decisions—the very decisions that define how St. John’s carries out its Mission.  

7. When St. John’s sought to reassert its First Amendment right to govern itself in accordance with its Catholic and Vincentian identity by withdrawing recognition from the faculty Union, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with PERB—asking the state agency to force this religious institution back to the bargaining table under New York’s State Employment Relations Act (“SERA”). ...

10. The First Amendment, the church autonomy doctrine, the prohibition against excessive government entanglement with religion, the ministerial exception, and the Free Exercise Clause all forbid precisely what PERB seeks to do here: transfer St. John’s authority to govern its religious affairs and to fulfill its sacred educational Mission from its religious leaders to PERB and the faculty Union.

EWTN News reports on the lawsuit.

Children's Minister May Not Sue Church for Wrongful Discharge

In Elmore v. Mount Vernon Baptist Church, (WV App, May 27, 2026), a West Virginia state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a suit by the former Children’s Minister at Mount Vernon Baptist Church claiming that she was unlawfully terminated by a vote of the Board of Deacons and subsequently a vote of the congregation. Plaintiff contends that she was terminated because she reported another employee for suspected child abuse and accused the church's male youth minister of sexually harassing her daughter. The majority said in part:

We find it unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute over the extent to which the “ministerial exception” recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court bars Ms. Elmore’s claims in this matter. As noted, the circuit court found that Ms. Elmore’s claims stemming from her termination were also barred by respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of religion under the SCAWV’s decision in Gillespie v. Elkins Southern Baptist Church....

While it is true that the SCAWV recognized that the Gillespie petitioner alleging wrongful discharge did not assert that his termination violated a substantial public policy, the Court further explained that it could not have addressed the merits of his claim even if he had....

Chief Judge Greear filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I fully concur with the majority’s decision holding that Ms. Elmore’s claims are barred. I write separately because I would resolve this case under the “ministerial exception” recognized in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

Certiorari Denied in Interlocutory Appeal of Church Autonomy Ruling

The Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Conference of Catholic Bishops v. O'Connell, (Docket No. 25-849, certiorari denied 5/26/2026) (Order List). Plaintiff in the case charged the USCCB with fraudulent solicitation of donations, claiming that it misrepresented where money donated to Peter's Pence Collection would go. USCCB sought dismissal of the suit on church autonomy grounds. The district court refused. A 3-judge panel of the DC Circuit held that the district court's ruling could not be appealed until the district court had rendered a final decision in the case. Subsequently (over a lengthy dissenting opinion) the 3rd Circuit denied en banc review. (See prior posting.).

Certiorari Denied in Unification Church Dispute

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon, (Docket No. 25-634, certiorari denied 3/9/2026) (Order List). In the case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a long-running schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church. (See prior posting.) The Petition for Certiorari identified the Question Presented as:

Where necessary to resolve a church-property dispute, does the First Amendment prohibit courts from examining church-related facts to determine who leads the church?

Cert. Denied In Church Autonomy Case

 The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in McRaney v. North American Mission Board, (Docket No. 25-807, certiorari denied 2/23/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision, held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil courts from adjudicating tortious interference, defamation and infliction of emotional distress claims by a Baptist minister who was fired from his position as Executive Director of the Baptist Convention of Maryland/ Delaware. (See prior posting.) First Liberty Institute issued a press release commenting on the Court's action.

Child Abuse Claim Against Archdiocese Moves Ahead

In Doe XXV v. Archdiocese of New York, (NY Sup.Ct. NY Cty., Jan. 21, 2026), a New York state trial court denied a motion to dismiss a suit under the Child Victims Act in which plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused as a child by a janitor at a Catholic school operated by the Archdiocese. The court rejected defendant's free exercise defense, saying in part:

Plaintiff’s cause of action asserts liability against the Archdiocese for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Tremaroli, a janitor. The Archdiocese fails to demonstrate why the present dispute cannot be adjudicated “solely upon the application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles”....

The court also rejected other defenses raised by the Archdiocese, saying in part: 

The Archdiocese further argues that it owed Plaintiff no duty under theories of negligent hiring, retention and supervision because the Archdiocese did not directly hire, retain or supervise Tremaroli. The Court disagrees.  

Generally, an element of negligent hiring, retention and supervision is that the defendant was the employer of the alleged tortfeasor. However ... agency relationships between a junior organization and a senior organization may impute liability onto a senior organization when the senior organization could also have been responsible for the hiring, retention or supervision of an employee....

Tremaroli was ... employed as a janitor at the Church; however, his employment as conditional upon the authority of the pastor, who was appointed to the Church by the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese has thus failed to eliminate triable issues of fact that it lacked an employer/employee-like relationship with Tremaroli....

In any event, issues of fact also exist as to the Archdiocese’s notice of Tremaroli’s propensity for abuse or actual abuse of children....

Thus, if certain employees at the Church or School were “acting on the . . . Archdiocese defendants’ behalf” when they learned of the subject abuse, their knowledge would be imputed to the Archdiocese....

Supreme Court Review Sought In Church Autonomy Case

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court this week in McRaney v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 1/6/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision, held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil courts from adjudicating tortious interference, defamation and infliction of emotional distress claims by a Baptist minister who was fired from his position as Executive Director of the Baptist Convention of Maryland/ Delaware. The certiorari petition frames the Question Presented as follows:

In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the “church autonomy doctrine” provides a defendant “immunity” from claims by a plaintiff who never worked for the defendant, never served as a minister for the defendant, and never submitted to the authority of the defendant with respect to any ecclesiastical or secular matter.   

The Question Presented is:  Does the church autonomy doctrine apply to, and foreclose, civil law claims which are not disputes about the internal affairs or self-governance of a religious institution?

[Thanks to Scott Gant for the lead.]

9th Circuit: Church Autonomy Doctrine Allows Churches to Hire Only Co-Religionists Even for Non-Ministerial Positions

In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Washington v. Brown, (9th Cir., Jan. 6, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Washington's Law Against Discrimination against a Christian ministry that gives hiring preference to co-religionists for non-ministerial positions. The court said in part:

The freedom of religious institutions to establish their own doctrine and faith is so fundamental that they may categorically hire and fire their ministers without regard to anti-discrimination laws—even if the termination is for non-religious reasons.  Simply, the government has no business in policing who spreads the word on behalf of churches, synagogues, mosques, religious organizations, and other similar institutions.  

But the church autonomy doctrine is not so narrowly drawn.  The First Amendment may also shield religious institutions’ hiring of non-ministerial employees when it involves matters of faith and doctrine.  For example, a religious institution may decide that its religious mission is best served by hiring only employees who adhere to and follow its religious beliefs—even for those not acting in ministerial roles. The religious institution may also believe that it can more effectively promote its view of moral and spiritual well-being if its own employees do not lead lives contrary to the institution’s teachings....

But unlike with the ministerial exception, the church autonomy doctrine only protects Union Gospel’s non-ministerial hiring decisions based on religious beliefs.  So Union Gospel cannot discriminate on any other ground.  And our decision is limited to religious organizations like Union Gospel.  We do not consider the scope of the doctrine on other types of entities run by religious institutions, such as businesses or hospitals....

Yakima Herald Republic reports on the decision. 

Church Autonomy Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Catholic School Employee's Discrimination Claim

In MoChridhe v. Academy of Holy Angels, (MN App. Dec. 1, 2025), a Minnesota state appellate court rejected an employment discrimination claim by a former media specialist/librarian at a Catholic school. The school refused to renew her contract when she disclosed that she was undergoing gender transition to present as a female. The school based its decision on MoChridhe's refusal to abide by the "Guiding Principles for Catholic Schools and Religious Education Concerning Human Sexuality and Sexual Identity." The court said in part:

Does the First Amendment protect a religious employer from discrimination claims by a terminated non-minister employee if the termination was based on a religious reason?  Given the facts alleged in MoChridhe’s complaint and the absence of any binding precedent suggesting otherwise, we discern no basis to conclude that the broader religious protections of the First Amendment church autonomy doctrine are not available to the religious employer in that situation....

... [C]onsideration of MoChridhe’s claims would require consideration of the Archdiocese’s religious reason for the employment decision, would interfere with the Archdiocese’s internal decision to require compliance with the Guiding Principles in the school setting—which relates to the church’s mission to educate young people in its faith— and would foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.  The potential inapplicability of the ministerial exception does not change that conclusion, and there is no precedent indicating that it must...

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Bar Wage-and-Hour Claim

In Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App., Nov. 21, 2025), a California state appellate court held that neither the ministerial exception doctrine nor the church autonomy doctrine bars a wage-and-hour claim for past services by an employee who is a "minister" under the ministerial exception doctrine. The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not apply because plaintiff's wage claims do not raise an ecclesiastical concern. The court said in part:

 ... Lorenzo only challenges the Center’s failure to pay her a minimum wage and overtime wages for work that she has already performed as part of the Center’s commercial activities.  She does not challenge the Center’s decision to terminate her employment or seek reinstatement.  Despite this, the Center asserts that the enforcement of California’s wage-and-hour laws would inevitably result in excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Religion Clauses solely because Lorenzo is a minister.  But the Center does not explain why, and its omission is telling. ...

“[T]he aspect of the church-minister employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its representatives”—is not “present” in every employment claim....  For example, not every aspect of a minister’s compensation is “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”...  Indeed, “[t]he constitutional rationale for protecting some of a church’s [autonomy to choose its representatives] . . . does not apply . . . where what is at issue is not who the [church] will select to educate its youngest students, but only whether it will provide the people it has chosen with meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime pay.”...

...[T]he Center has not pointed to and we have not come across anything in the history of the Religion Clauses to suggest that a minister’s compensation, much less the minimum compensation that a minister should receive to subsist, was a concern of the founders....

Award of Attorney's Fees Not Barred by Church Autonomy Doctrine

In Coronado-Arrascue v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Colorado Springs, (CO App., Nov. 13, 2025), a Colorado state appellate court held that the dismissal on church autonomy grounds of a priest's defamation suit against his former diocese does not preclude the award of attorney's fees by the court to the Diocese. The court said in part:

[Plaintiff] contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the award.  In support of this contention, he reasons that because the court determined that the church autonomy doctrine divested it of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the substance of his claims, it follows that the church autonomy doctrine also divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Diocese’s request for an award of fees and costs.  Second, Coronado-Arrascue contends that resolving the Diocese’s request for fees and costs would require the court to become “excessively entangled” with religion in violation of the church autonomy doctrine.  We reject both contentions....

... [T]he unambiguous language of section 13-17-201 and section 13-16-113(2) provides that an award of fees and costs is mandatory regardless of whether a complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  ...

 So, regardless of the court’s decision on the merits of Coronado-Arrascue’s claims, its assessment of whether there was a basis to award the Diocese its fees and costs was a separate determination.

... [I]t wasn’t necessary, as Coronado-Arrascue claims, for the court to “probe internal ecclesiastical matters” to determine whether there was a basis to award fees and costs.  Rather, the court was only required to examine the face of his complaint to determine whether the substance of Coronado-Arrascue’s claims were pleaded in tort.

[Thanks to John Melcon for the lead.]

En Banc Review Rejected on Denial of Interlocutory Appeal of Church Autonomy Issue

In O'Connell v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, (DC Cir., Nov. 6, 2025), the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, over one dissent, denied en banc review of a panel's refusal to allow an interlocutory appeal of a ruling in which the district court refused to dismiss a case against the Conference of Bishops (USCCB). Plaintiff in the case charged the USCCB with fraudulent solicitation of donations, claiming that it misrepresented where money donated to Peter's Pence Collection would go. USCCB sought dismissal of the suit on church autonomy grounds. The district court refused. A 3-judge panel of the DC Circuit in O'Connell v. U.S. Conference of Bishops, (DC Cir., April 25, 2025), held that the district court's ruling could not be appealed until the district court had rendered a final decision in the case. The panel said in part:

... [I]t seems clear that the [Supreme] Court confirmed the church autonomy doctrine is not jurisdictional; it is an affirmative defense. And, like any other defense, a defense based on church autonomy can be adequately addressed after trial.

In last week's decision, the DC Circuit en banc agreed. While no opinion for the majority accompanied the Order denying en banc review, two of the Court's judges, Judge Walker and Judge Edwards, each filed a separate opinion concurring in the decision. Judge Edwards said in part:

Indeed, the idea that there could be collateral order review in a case of this sort would mean that there could be a constant stream of interlocutory review petitions every time a litigant merely asserts a religious privilege during trial (which could happen every time the district court issued an evidentiary or discovery order). You could have interlocutory review after interlocutory review after interlocutory review, endlessly. This makes no sense in light of the final decision rule, especially given that a religious organization always retains the right to appeal any final judgment (or preliminary injunction) issued against it before it is required to take any contested action. 

Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit has ever expanded the collateral order doctrine to categorically cover alleged denials of a church autonomy defense.

Judge Rao filed a 31-page dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The district court erred by invoking neutral principles of law to reject a church autonomy defense. Instead, the district court was required to assess whether the Catholic Church’s administration of Peter’s Pence, a major giving initiative, was within the constitutionally protected sphere of church autonomy. Because the solicitation and expenditure of religious donations clearly implicate matters of faith, doctrine, and internal governance, O’Connell’s lawsuit should have been dismissed....

... [T]he Religion Clauses protect a sphere of church autonomy from state interference. Because such interference can include the very process of judicial inquiry, the church autonomy defense is best understood as a constitutional immunity from suit....

The facts of this case typify the stakes for religious liberty when a church autonomy defense is denied. O’Connell, an individual congregant, challenges the Catholic Church’s use of his donation and asks the Bishops to disclose lengthy donor lists, records of amounts received, and the ways in which contributions made under Peter’s Pence were deployed. Describing the litigation demonstrates how it plainly encroaches on the heartland of matters committed to the Church’s exclusive sphere, including ecclesiastical decisions about how to solicit, manage, and use religious donations. Without immediate interlocutory review, the Bishops have no meaningful route to protect their independence from judicial intrusion into matters of faith, doctrine, and internal governance. Requiring the Bishops to go forward with this litigation comports with neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court’s precedents....

5th Circuit: Baptist Mission Board Can Claim Church Autonomy Defense

In McRaney v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., (5th Cir., Sept. 9, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil courts from adjudicating tortious interference, defamation and infliction of emotional distress claims by a Baptist minister who was fired from his position as Executive Director of the Baptist Convention of Maryland/ Delaware (BCMD). In that position he was to implement a strategic partnership between the North American Mission Board (NAMB) and BCMD. NAMB became dissatisfied with the way that plaintiff was carrying out the evangelical mission of the strategic partnership agreement, and plaintiff claims that NAMB was behind his firing by BCMD.

The court said in part:

... [T]he church autonomy doctrine prohibits far more than civil judges telling religious institutions what to believe or how to worship. To help clarify the wide-ranging scope of the doctrine, we identify some areas where church autonomy has barred judicial interference. These include (a) the selection and dismissal of clergy and faith leaders (the so-called “ministerial exception”); (b) the meaning of religious beliefs and doctrines; (c) the determination of religious polity, such as membership, matters of discipline and good standing, and the identification of the “true church” amidst internecine disputes; and (d) internal church communications regarding any of the aforementioned activities....

... [T]he church autonomy doctrine has numerous features of a jurisdictional bar. It limits the powers of federal courts. It immunizes ecclesiastical organizations from suit, not just liability. And, when it is denied, it gives rise to an immediate appeal. But ... the fact that some religious questions are beyond our judicial power does not mean that all church-autonomy disputes are properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). Nor does it preclude federal courts from rendering judgment on the merits in cases like this one. ...

On the merits, the church autonomy doctrine bars all of McRaney’s claims against NAMB. Although his claims are facially secular, their resolution would require secular courts to opine on “matters of faith and doctrine” and intrude on NAMB’s “internal management decisions that are essential to [its] central mission.”... 

At the outset, McRaney argues that the church autonomy doctrine cannot apply in this case because “NAMB is not a church,” “BCMD is not a church,” and “[t]here is no Baptist church; only Baptist churches.” ... He argues his case “does not involve an intra-church dispute in any respect, nor is it about church governance.”... Our dissenting colleague agrees..... On the dissent’s view, the church autonomy doctrine only protects religious entities “in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals”....  Having branded Baptists ecclesial anarchists, the dissent subjects the NAMB and BCMD’s actions to searching judicial scrutiny—as if this were just an ordinary employment dispute. 

We respectfully disagree....

The church autonomy doctrine is triggered by the subject matter of the dispute, not the organizational structure of the disputants. The subject matter of this dispute is an evangelism project. Its stakes are eternal not judicial. And it matters not one bit that the particular evangelicals before us happen to be Baptists from different non-hierarchical congregations instead of soul-saving Presbyterians from a singular hierarchical one.   ...

Judge Ramiriz filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

William McRaney sued a board of an organization for which he did not work, alleging interference with contract, interference with prospective business relations, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because his secular claims against a third-party organization do not implicate matters of church government or of faith and doctrine, I respectfully dissent....

Because they do not implicate matters of faith and doctrine, McRaney is entitled to continue pursuing his secular claims regarding NAMB’s pre- and post-termination conduct....

Baptist News Global reports on the decision.

UPDATE: On October 28. 2025, the court on its own motion filed a revised opinion. The link in the post above leads to the revised opinion, while the quotes in the post are from the original opinion.

10th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Fraud Claims Against LDS Church

In Gaddy v. The Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (10th Cir., Aug. 26, 2025), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a RICO suit against the Latter-Day Saints Church. Plaintiffs, who for many years had made tithing payments to the Church, contended that the Church had made misrepresentations about the Church's history and origins. The court said in part:

On their fraudulent misrepresentations RICO theory, Plaintiffs make several attacks on the factual accuracy of what the Church teaches its members.  Plaintiffs claim that key historical events for the religion occurred differently than how the Church describes them canonically.  Allegedly, by preaching false statements about its own history, the Church engaged in a “pattern of racketeering.”  ... Had Plaintiffs known of these alleged misrepresentations, they say, they would not have committed to the Church....

We conclude that the church autonomy doctrine applies to Plaintiffs’ allegations about the Church’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions about its history, because the dispute about the accuracy of the Church’s representations is ecclesiastical, not “purely secular.” ... Plaintiffs’ allegations require a court to dive into deeply religious waters to assess whether foundational events for a religion occurred the way the religion teaches....

Plaintiffs’ second RICO theory [is] ... fraudulent misuse of tithing funds....  We conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference of causation between any of the challenged misrepresentations or omissions by the Church about how it would use tithing payments and the alleged harm Plaintiffs suffered....  As a result, we need not decide whether the church autonomy doctrine precludes the adjudication of this theory....

Judge Phillips filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I write separately because I would also decide that the church autonomy doctrine does not apply to Plaintiffs’ second civil RICO theory—that the Church fraudulently used tithing payments for commercial purposes....  [I]t “does not apply to purely secular decisions, even when made by churches.”

Deseret News reports on the decision.

Challenge to Church's Switch in Denominations Fails

In Wimber v. Scott, (CA App., July 30, 2025), a California state appellate court held that plaintiffs who were tithing congregants of a Protestant church formerly known as Vinyard Christian Fellowship and now known as Dwelling Place lack standing to sue the church's pastors and board of directors on behalf of the church for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. It also held that the First Amendment precludes granting the relief sought. Following the wishes of the church's senior pastor, the pastor and the board of directors disaffiliated the church from the Vinyard Movement and used the church's $62 million in assets to start and fund a new movement. Plaintiffs included the widow of the founder of the Vinyard Movement and a congregant who had contributed over $500,000 to the church. The court said in part:

The NRC [California Nonprofit Religious Corporations Code] limits who may bring a representative lawsuit to, as relevant here, a “member” alleging a director violated their authority (§ 9141, subd. (a)) and a “member” or “former member” alleging breach of a trust. (§ 9142, subd. (a)(1).)  

Because churches are these unique species of corporation, the NRC recognizes the church may refer to persons who are part of its congregation as “‘members.”’ (§ 9332, subd. (a).) But the NRC does not allow these individuals to assert representative lawsuits. Only those persons explicitly authorized to do so by the corporation’s articles or bylaws have the power to bring a representative lawsuit. (Ibid.) Otherwise, any one of a church’s potentially hundreds or thousands of congregants could at any time bring a representative lawsuit....

Appellants’ allegations demonstrate they are members of the congregation, not the corporation....

 Although the statements may constitute misrepresentations, the Scotts made the statements to the “Search Committee and the Board,” of which only Director Appellants were a part. As such, [those plaintiffs who were not directors] ... have not alleged a cause of action for fraud based on misrepresentation....

Even assuming the complaint stated sufficient facts to allege causes of action, the First Amendment would bar this case from going forward....

Appellants ask the court to impose a trust over Dwelling Place’s assets in favor of Vineyard USA and to require the Scotts to keep Dwelling Place a part of the Vineyard Movement and Vineyard USA. Even if the facts alleged in the complaint entitled Appellants to such relief, they are essentially asking the court to manage and run Dwelling Place in a manner consistent with their religious beliefs. We would have to administer Dwelling Place’s assets to further a religious doctrine to which Appellants ascribe. 

Worse, we would then potentially violate the Scotts’ religious beliefs by forcing them to minister Dwelling Place in a mode Appellants see appropriate. We will not do any of this....

We note the ministerial exception also bars Appellants’ claims....  We cannot litigate Appellants’ claims or grant the relief they seek without in some way punishing the church for its hiring of the Scotts, retention of the Scotts, or ratification of the Scotts’ decisions and actions. 

Challenge To Narrow Religious Exemption in Maryland Employment Law Is Dismissed In Part

In General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Horton, (D MD, June 18, 2025), a Maryland federal district court denied a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the Maryland Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious exemption in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that the exemption is limited to claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission of the religious entity. As summarized by the court, plaintiffs allege in part:

(1) the exemption violates Plaintiffs' church autonomy rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment; (2) it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it excessively entangles government with religion; (3) it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (4) it violates the Establishment Clause by discriminating against Plaintiffs based on their denomination; (5) it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to expressive association; (6) it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to assembly; and (7) it violates the right to due process of law under the Fifthand Fourteenth Amendments because it is unconstitutionally vague.

In a 43-page opinion, the court found that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of any of these claims. However it refused to dismiss outright three of plaintiff's claims, saying in part:

... [T]he Court recognizes that Plaintiffs are in good faith seeking an extension of the law in Count 1 [church autonomy], and that on Count 3 [free exercise], Plaintiffs have a different interpretation of the law on the issue of the applicable level of scrutiny that is not strictly foreclosed by precedent. Ordinarily, a court should refrain from dismissing outright a claim asserting a novel legal theory that can better be assessed after factual development....

... [T]he Court finds that under its view of the legal landscape, Plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim of a violation of the right to expressive association. Nevertheless, as with Counts 1 and 3, where Plaintiffs are seeking an extension of the law to have claims based on expressive association apply to the employment context, and further factual development is arguably warranted before full disposition of this claim, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied as to this claim.

9th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments Over Religious Exemptions from Washington Antidiscrimination Law

On June 3, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (video of full arguments) in Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown. In the case, a Washington federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to a religious organization that operates a homeless shelter and thrift stores. The injunction bars the state's attorney general from enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) against plaintiff for limiting all its hiring to coreligionists who adhere to the organization's religious tenets and behavior requirements. In 2021 the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the exemption in the WLAD for non-profit religious organizations to apply only to hiring for ministerial positions. (See prior posting.) Washington State Standard reports on the oral arguments.

Defamation Suit by Russian Orthodox Church Priest Dismissed Under Church Autonomy Doctrine

 In Belya v. Kapral, (SD NY, March 31, 2025), a New York federal district court dismissed a defamation suit brought by a former priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia. According to the court:

Plaintiff Alexander Belya was once a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR for short). During his time with ROCOR, Belya led one of the order’s churches in Miami. In 2019, word came down from Moscow that Belya had been elevated to Bishop of Miami, an announcement that came as a surprise to ROCOR’s senior clergy. They hadn’t elected Belya, a necessary step in the elevation of any American bishop. Sensing foul play, they investigated and sent a letter to the Synod—the executive committee of ROCOR’s highest leadership council— about the situation. The letter informed the Synod that Belya’s election never happened and that two prior letters to Moscow, which purported to confirm Belya’s election, were “irregular” and lacked the usual markers of sacred church communications.  

News of the ROCOR letter got out and went viral in the religious press. The reports accused Belya of old-fashioned forgery. With his reputation ruined, Belya is now suing everyone who drafted and signed the ROCOR letter, as well as ROCOR itself. Belya says the letter defamed him by implying that he forged the two earlier letters about his election to bishop, an allegation that the religious press picked up and ran with....

First, putting aside the constitutional issues that dominate the parties’ briefing, Belya’s claims fail on routine state-law grounds. Second, even if Belya’s claims could otherwise proceed, a trial in this case would drag the Court and jury into matters of faith, spiritual doctrine, and internal church governance—precisely what the church-autonomy doctrine is designed to prevent.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

10th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments in Fraud Suit Against LDS Church

Yesterday, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full arguments) in Gaddy v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. In the case, a Utah federal district court dismissed a Second Amended Complaint in a class action lawsuit brought by former members of the LDS Church. The suit alleged that the Church has fraudulently misrepresented its founding to its members while its leaders did not have a sincere religious belief in the narrative. It also alleged that the Church made fraudulent misrepresentations about the use of money received from members' tithing. (See prior posting.) Courthouse News Service reports at greater length on the oral arguments.