Suit Challenges Exclusion of Religious Training from Virginia Tuition Grant Programs

Suit was filed last week in a Viginia federal district court challenging the exclusion from Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program and its National Guard Grants of educational programs that provide religious training or theological education. The complaint (full text) in Johnson v. Fleming, (ED VA, filed 5/28/2025), alleges that the exclusions violate the Free Exercise, Establishment and Equal Protection clauses.  The complaint reads in part:

297. Defendants’ religious exclusions violate the Free Exercise Clause several ways....

298. The government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it disqualifies otherwise eligible persons or organizations from receiving otherwise available government benefits “solely because of their religious character,”....

327. Because the VTAG and National Guard religious exclusions are not neutral or generally applicable, they trigger strict scrutiny....

335. So the State Council [of Higher Education] considers CIP Code 39 programs as too religious and excludes them from participation in the Tuition Assistance Grant Program. This requires the State Council to entangle itself in religious matters. 

336. The [Virginnia] Department [of Military Affairs] likewise does not deem religious majors at secular private schools and public schools to be for “religious training or theological education” and students who pursue those programs at those schools can receive a National Guard Grant. 

337. The Department favors students who pursue religious programs at secular private schools and public schools to the detriment of students who pursue religious programs at religious schools....

347. Defendants’ religious exclusions create arbitrary and irrational distinctions based on nothing more than government officials’ discretion about whether a certain program is too religious.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

Denial of Historic Preservation Grants to Churches Violates 1st Amendment

In The Mendham Methodist Church v. Morris County, New Jersey, (D NJ, Nov. 27, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court held that Rule 5.6.4 of New Jersey's Historic Preservation Grant program violates the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Rule 5.6.4 bars grants for "property currently used for religious purposes or functions."  The Rule was based on the state constitution's Religious Aid Clause which says in part: "[n]o person shall . . . be obliged to pay . . . taxes ... for building or repairing any church or ... place ... of worship....." In granting a preliminary injunction against denial of grants to plaintiff churches, the court said in part:

The Religious Aid Clause does not "zero in on any particular 'essentially religious' aspect of funding.... Therefore, Rule 5.6.4 is not narrowly tailored. It states that "[a]ny property that is currently used for religious purposes or functions is ineligible for Historic Preservation grant funding."... Plaintiff Mendham was informed in 2022 that it was ineligible for grant funding from the Fund because the application involved "the principle [sic] church building that is currently used for religious purposes."... Rule 5.6.4 does not limit funding to religious institutions to secular aspects of repair. Instead, it excludes the institutions from eligibility wholesale because they are religious institutions. Rule 5.6.4, as currently written and construed, therefore, likely violates the Free Exercise Clause.

The current construction of Rule 5.6.4 does not mean, however, that Locke [v. Davey] is not still good law, nor that any restriction on taxpayer funding of religious institutions is unconstitutional. Without deciding the issue, the Court notes that a different version of Rule 5.6.4 restricting mandated taxpayer funding of purely religious iconography or purposes may still survive under Locke. However, such a hypothetical, narrower provision is not before the Court.

9th Circuit Hears Arguments on Youth Ministry's Access to State Grants

Last week (Nov. 20) the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams (video of full oral arguments). In the case, the state of Oregon canceled $410,000 in grants to Youth 71Five when the state discovered that the Ministries only hires those that share its faith.  This violates of the state's "Certification Rule" that bars grantees from discriminating in their employment practices.  An Oregon federal district court denied the Ministries' request for a preliminary injunction.  In August 2024, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction pending appeal allowing 71Five to participate in the 2023-25 Oregon Youth Community Investment Grant Program. (See prior posting.) It also ordered an expedited schedule for briefing and arguing the appeal. That is the appeal which the 9th Circuit heard last week. World reports on the decision.

New Jersey Supreme Court Says More Facts Needed To Decide Religious Capital Grants Challenge

In ACLU of New Jersey v. Hendricks, (NJ Sup. Ct., May 2, 2018), the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to decide on the record before it whether a $10.5 million grant to a Yeshiva and a $635,000 grant to a Christian theological Seminary violate the New Jersey Constitution.  The grants were awarded by the Secretary of Higher Education under  a state program designed to subsidize capital improvement projects at institutions of higher learning. The lower court held that the grants violated the Religious Aid Clause of the state constitution that prohibits using tax monies "for the maintenance of any minister or ministry".  However, the Supreme Court said:

Rather than address a matter of constitutional importance on an insufficiently developed record, the better course is to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing to bring the relevant factual material into better focus. Among the questions to be explored are ... (1) the sectarian nature of these institutions of higher education; (2) whether, in the setting of the curriculum and training programs of these particular institutions, the grant funds will necessarily be used in the “maintenance of any minister or ministry”; and (3) the adequacy of promised restrictions, or other curbs, against sectarian use of the grant proceeds at present and into the future....

Accordingly, we will remand to the Secretary for the development of a record in accordance with this opinion.

Asbury Park Press reports on the decision.

Vermont Supreme Court: Grant For Church Repairs Is Likely OK

In Taylor v. Town of Cabot, (VT Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 2017), the Vermont Supreme Court vacated a preliminary injunction that a trial court had issued to block a municipal grant to a historic church for repairs to its building.  The grant came from funds that originated with the federal government but now belonged to the town to use consistent with federal regulations. The court held that plaintiffs have municipal taxpayer standing to challenge the grant under the state constitution's prohibition on compelled support of any place of worship (Chapter I, Article Three). In remanding the case for further proceedings, the court said in part:

The fact that the ultimate recipient of these funds is a church does not itself establish a violation of the Compelled Support Clause; the critical question is whether the funds will support worship. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist., 169 Vt. at 325, 738 A.2d at 550. In fact, denying the UCC secular benefits available to other like organizations might raise concerns under the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. To meet these concerns, plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that painting the church building and assessing its sills is more like funding devotional training for future clergy, as in Locke, than paying for a new playground surface on church property, as in Trinity Lutheran. Specified repairs to the church building itself admittedly fall somewhere between these two poles. In making their case, plaintiffs must persuade the court either that the Compelled Support Clause categorically precludes the use of public funds to pay for any repairs to a building that serves as a place of worship, without regard to the breadth and neutrality of the program pursuant to which the funding is provided, or that the specific repairs funded under this grant are prohibited. The first proposition is legally questionable; the second is not supported by the record.