In re Gothard, (TX App., Feb. 22, 2024), is a mandamus action that is essentially an appeal of a trial court's refusal to dismiss civil conspiracy claims against Institute in Basic Life Principles and its founder, William Gothard. Plaintiffs claimed that ILBP is a cult that "teachers distorted and heretical Christian doctrines" that led to their sexual abuse by their father and brother. The Texas state appellate court rejected Relators', i.e. defendants', First Amendment defenses, saying in part:
Gothard maintains that religious teachings and the publication thereof are constitutionally protected. IBLP contends the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars RPIs’ cause of action. It argues that the “alleged religiously motivated conduct of IBLP is the advocacy and publication of religious beliefs.” According to Relators, if RPIs’ claim is considered valid, any religious leader who speaks on religious topics and publishes his beliefs could be subject to a civil cause of action if a listener or reader improperly applies those beliefs in sexually abusing another person or committing some other unlawful act. ...
But the First Amendment does not bar all claims against religious bodies.,,, A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government....
The relevant question is whether it appears certain that resolution of [plaintiffs']’ claims will require the trial court to address purely ecclesiastical questions.... IBLP represents that its teachings and materials are based on scriptures from the Bible, none of which “advocate sexual abuse or any other form of sexual immorality.” Accordingly, by its own admission, IBLP’s teachings and materials do not advocate sexual abuse and consequently, the intentional tort of sexual assault that underlies the civil conspiracy claim is not rooted in religious belief. ....
Because sexual assault is not part of Relators’ belief system, we cannot definitively say, based on the record before us, that this is a situation in which religious beliefs are so intertwined with a tort claim so as to unconstitutionally burden Relators’ rights and embroil the court in an assessment of those religious beliefs.
