In DeGross v. Hunter, (WD WA, April 22, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to dismiss free speech and free exercise claims against the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families brought by a Christian couple who object to the Department's policy on sexual orientation and gender identity. The state requires prospective foster parents to agree to support a foster child's sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE), including using their preferred pronouns and chosen name. The DeGrosses were granted only a limited foster care license because they would not agree to fully implement the state's policy. The court said in part:
The DeGrosses have plausible alleged that Policy § 1520 draws distinctions based on the message the speaker conveys.... Policy § 1520 restricts certain speech by prospective parents on the topic of SOGIE, while requiring speech that aligns with the state’s perspective....
In essence, the Department has forced the DeGrosses to choose between forfeiting their freedom of speech to obtain an unrestricted license, or upholding their beliefs surrounding SOGIE, and receiving a less-favorable license subject to certain restrictions.
The DeGrosses have carried their burden to show that the Department’s enforcement of Policy § 1520 plausibly constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Thus, the DeGrosses alleged sufficient facts to show a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny....
... [T]he DeGrosses plausibly allege the Department’s policy at issue here puts the DeGrosses in an unfair predicament: they may obtain an unrestricted foster care license but only if they disavow their religious beliefs.... "[S]uch a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny." ...
... “A law is not generally applicable if it ‘invites’ the government to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions.’”...
... [T]he DeGrosses have carried their burden, at the motion to dismiss stage, to show that § 1520 is neither neutral nor generally applicable. Thus, the DeGrosses alleged sufficient facts to show a First Amendment violation of freedom of religion unless Defendants can satisfy strict scrutiny. Based on the limited record before it, the Court is unable to determine at this time whether Defendants can satisfy strict scrutiny. Thus, the DeGrosses’ freedom of religion claim survives the motion to dismiss.
The court however dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection claim.