In Jane Doe I v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints, (AZ Sup. Ct., July 29, 2026), the Arizona Supreme Court settled important interpretive questions regarding Arizona's requirement to report child abuse to authorities and the ability of a court to inquire into a clergy member's failure to do so. At issue was the scope of the clergy exemption from Arizona's reporting law when a congregation member admits the abuse to the clergy member. The issue arose in a suit by abuse victims against the Church and clergy members. The Court summarized its holding:
We must decide if a factfinder—a court or jury—may inquire into whether a clergy member violated religious doctrine by failing to report abuse of a minor. Subsection (A) of A.R.S. § 13-3620 (the “Reporting Statute”) requires “[a]ny person who reasonably believes that a minor” is the victim of abuse to “immediately report or cause reports to be made.” The Reporting Statute, however, allows a clergy member who receives “a confession or confidential communication” to refrain from reporting the “confession” or “confidential communication” if the clergy member “determines that it is reasonable and necessary within the concepts” of the clergy member’s religion.... We hold that the First Amendment generally prohibits factfinders from inquiring into a clergy member’s application of his particular religious doctrine—absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes—in determining whether reporting should be withheld if “reasonable and necessary.”
We next determine the meaning of the terms “confession” and “confidential communication” in the Reporting Statute. We hold that “confession” means “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.” A “confidential communication” refers to “speech or correspondence that is treated as private or made in confidence, generally under circumstances that indicate the communication is intended only for the person or persons addressed.” The First Amendment, however, requires courts to exercise substantial deference to a religious institution’s own doctrinal conception of “confession” or “confidential communication.”
Finally, we resolve whether a factfinder may determine who qualifies as a “member of the clergy.” We hold that the First Amendment protects the right of a religious institution to define who is a “member of the clergy” and, absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, prohibits factfinders from inquiring into the religious institution’s designation of clergy.
12 News reports on the decision.