In Hadez v. City of Springfield, Illinois, (CD IL, Aug. 28, 2026), a state trial court had ordered plaintiff to cease residing in structures on his property that inspectors found to be unsafe and in violation of the city's Building Code. The structures lack toilets, a sewage system, running water and smoke alarms. Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction from an Illinois federal district court granting him emergency occupancy of his property. He argues that the city's land use regulations impose a substantial burden on his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment. According to the court:
Plaintiff claims he is an adherent of the Celestican Church of Christ and holds sincere religious beliefs that require him "to live off-grid in a faith-based tiny-home or POD structure on real property that he owns or controls.".... Plaintiff states that Scripture teaches him Jesus was a carpenter and he acquired the vacant lot at 1705 E. Carpenter Street as an "intentional act of religious exercise and devotion." ... Plaintiff is allegedly homeless due to the state court injunction and order.
Rejecting plaintiff's petition, the court said in part:
... [T]he City's Zoning and Building Codes are facially neutral ordinances that pertain to public safety, welfare, and the single family nature of the residence. The ordinance does not treat Plaintiff's exercise of his religion differently from any other activity that he might do in his home.... The City is not simply prohibiting Plaintiff from exercising his faith at the property. It is prohibiting him from doing anything at the property while residing there based on health and safety concerns. If Plaintiff's home was built in compliance with the City's Codes, the City would not be seeking to enjoin Plaintiff from living on the property and Plaintiff could practice his religion at his home. Plaintiff has not shown how a structure that meets the City's Code would substantially burden his religious practice. The fact that he might incur significant costs in bringing his property up to code is not enough to show that the regulation imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiff's religious exercise.