Wednesday, November 09, 2011

British Court Holds That Bishop May Be Vicariously Liable For Sex Abuse By Priest

Yesterday's Irish Examiner reports that a judge in Britain's High Court of Justice has ruled that the nature of the relationship between a priest and the Catholic Church is one that can give rise to vicarious liability of the diocesan bishop for sexual abuse committed by the priest.  In JGE v. English Province of Our Lady of Charity, (High Ct. QB Div, Nov. 8, 2011), Mr. Justice MacDuff wrote:
I am satisfied, as I have already noted, that the relationship between Father Baldwin and the Defendants was significantly different from a contract of employment; no real element of control or supervision, no wages, no formal contract and so on. But are those differences such that the Defendants should not be made responsible for the tortious acts of the priest acting within the course of his ministry? There are, it seems to me, crucial features which should be recognised. Father Baldwin was appointed by and on behalf of the Defendants. He was so appointed in order to do their work; to undertake the ministry on behalf of the Defendants for the benefit of the church. He was given the full authority of the Defendants to fulfil that role. He was provided with the premises, the pulpit and the clerical robes. He was directed into the community with that full authority and was given free rein to act as representative of the church. He had been trained and ordained for that purpose. He had immense power handed to him by the Defendants. It was they who appointed him to the position of trust which (if the allegations be proved) he so abused....
In this case, the empowerment and the granting of authority to Father Baldwin to pursue the activity on behalf of the enterprise are the major factors. In my judgment, whether or not the relationship may be regarded as “akin to employment” the principal features of the relationship dictate that the Defendants should be held responsible for the actions which they initiated by the appointment and all that went with it.
However defendant was granted leave to appeal.