In Brox v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, (1st Cir., Oct. 6, 2023), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part and vacated in part a trial court's refusal to require that plaintiffs be given a religious exemption from a state agency's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:
[T]he appellants argue that the Policy, as administered, provides medical exemptions that permit unvaccinated employees to work "in close contact with colleagues, despite the purported direct threat . . . [their] unvaccinated status poses to them" but not religious exemptions that would permit unvaccinated employees to do the same even though their unvaccinated status poses no greater threat. And, according to the appellants, the Policy, as administered, is therefore not generally applicable -- and thus is subject to strict scrutiny -- because it "prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way"....
The appellees do argue that the Policy is generally applicable -- and so not subject to strict scrutiny -- for reasons having to do with the differing statutory liability that the Authority would face in denying requests for exemption that are medically rather than religiously based. The appellees assert in that regard that an employer may show that an accommodation for religious practice would constitute an "undue hardship" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... more easily than an employer may show that an accommodation for a disability would constitute an undue hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act....
But even if we were to accept the appellees' contention about the greater leeway that an employer has under Title VII,.., the appellees do not develop any argument as to why we must conclude that, as a matter of law, the greater federal statutory liability that an employer faces for denying a medical exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate than for denying a religious exemption from one suffices in and of itself to show that, for free exercise purposes, the former exemption may be granted and the latter exemption may be denied to employees who pose comparable risks of spreading the virus without thereby rendering the mandate not generally applicable and so subject to strict scrutiny....
We thus do not see how we may rely on this ground to affirm the District Court's "likelihood of success" ruling as to the appellants' free exercise claim....
Thus, we vacate the District Court's ruling with respect to its denial of the requested injunctive relief on the appellants' free exercise claim. We leave it to the parties and to the District Court on remand, therefore, to consider the appellants' request for that relief under the applicable legal framework that we have set forth....
