In Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, (LA Sup. Ct., March 22, 2024), the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that a 2021 Louisiana statute that revived child sex abuse claims that had previously been time barred violates the Louisiana Constitution. The statute gave victims a 3-year window to file claims. The court said in part:
Essentially, plaintiffs alleged they were sexually molested by a Roman Catholic priest at various times between 1971 and 1979. At the time of the alleged abuse, plaintiffs ranged in ages from eight to fourteen.
Defendants responded by filing several exceptions, including a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the general one-year liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1)....
The definite nature of accrued prescription has been repeatedly recognized in our jurisprudence, which makes it clear that, unlike statutes of limitations at common law, under civilian principles, prescriptive periods that have accrued act to extinguish the civil obligation to which they apply....
Guided by Louisiana’s civil law tradition, we decline to upend nearly a half of a century’s jurisprudence that recognizes the unique nature of vested rights associated with liberative prescription, which inure to the benefit of both plaintiffs (protecting an accrued cause of action) and defendants (protecting a defense of accrued liberative prescription). Therefore, despite the sickening and despicable factual allegations in this case, we must conclude that La. R.S. 9:2800.9, as amended by the revival provisions, cannot be retroactively applied to revive plaintiffs’ prescribed causes of action. To find otherwise would divest defendants of their vested right to plead prescription in violation of Art. I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution.
However the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the one-year prescriptive period had tolled.
Justice Crichton filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Griffin.
Chief Justice Weimer dissented, saying in part:
Given Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting its citizens who were sexually abused as minors and in providing them with the ability to seek redress in the courts, and the narrowly tailored nature of the relief provided–the legislation revives, for a short period of time, for a narrow category of tort victims, actions otherwise prescribed–I would find that the revival provision is consistent with the due process guarantee. Under the due process clause, no rights–not even fundamental ones–are absolute. The due process clause simply offers protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the government. The revival provision at issue is not arbitrary (in fact, in this case it is arguable that the “arbitrary and unreasonable” conduct was the alleged sexual abuse perpetrated upon children by those in society who were placed in positions of authority). And, the provision has been demonstrated to have a substantial relationship to public safety, morals and welfare.
Justice Crain also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice McCallum dissented without opinion.
Balls and Strikes reported on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]
