Nativity Pageant Challengers May Sue Anonymously

In an order (full text) issued Monday, an Indiana federal magistrate judge allowed two individual plaintiffs in a lawsuit challenging an Indiana high school's Nativity Pageant to proceed anonymously. (See prior related posting.) Plaintiffs asked for the order "because one Doe Plaintiff is a minor, because of the history of violence and intimidation against plaintiffs in other Establishment Clause cases similar to this one, and because there is a reasonable expectation that the Doe Plaintiffs here will be the victims of harassment, injury, and other serious harm if their identities are made public."  Defendants did not object to the order.  The Elkhart Truth reports on the order.

Localities Adjusting Nativity Displays To Avoid Constitutional Problems

As the Christmas season approaches, cities and counties that traditionally placed Nativity Scenes on government property are now responding to constitutional challenges to them. Either in response to demand letters or to actual litigation, one of two types of responses is typical: (1) transfer the nativity scene to private ownership and display of  on private property; or (2) surrounding the nativity scene with numerous secular displays.

In Wadena, Minnesota, the nativity display previously placed in a public park was sold to the Wadena Ministerial Association for $25 and will be placed on a lawn across from the town's hospital.  Forum News Service reported yesterday that a town resident is also inviting others to display nativity scenes, attempting to break the record for the most creches displayed in one area.

In Franklin County, Indiana, the county avoided losing a lawsuit (see prior posting) by adopting an ordinance allowing county resident to erect their own displays on the courthouse lawn alongside the nativity scene. AP reported yesterday that the county has approved 9 displays, including one of George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson huddled around a manger holding the Bill of Rights.

UPDATE: Fox19 reports that the banner put up by Freedom From Religion Foundation proclaiming "There are no gods, no angels, no heaven or hell" was stolen from the Franklin County Courthouse grounds over the Dec. 5 weekend.

Indiana Agrees To Narrow Interpretation of Sex Offender Restriction, Alleviating Religious Freedom Issue

AP reported yesterday that the ACLU of Indiana has agreed to a judge's dismissal of a lawsuit it filed (see prior posting) challenging restrictions on serious sex offenders after the state agreed to an interpretation of the law that essentially resolves the problem.  Indiana Code § 35-42-4-14 bars serious sex offenders from entering "school property," and the ACLU feared that this had the effect of prohibiting these offenders from attending worship services in churches, mosques or synagogues located on the same property as parochial schools. However now the state agrees that the ban only applies to worship services when they are held in a building owned by a private school (or leased by it).  It does not apply to worship services in the church, mosque or synagogue's own building.

Nativity Scene Challenge Dismissed After New Law Creates Neutral Forum

In Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Franklin County, Indiana, (SD IN, Sept. 23, 2015), an Indiana federal district court dismissed a suit challenging the annual display of a nativity scene on the lawn of the Franklin County courthouse.  After the suit was filed, the county enacted a new ordinance providing a content neutral system for erecting private displays on the courthouse lawn.  The court held that this eliminated plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief.  While plaintiffs still sought nominal damages, the court held:

By seeking only nominal damages, plaintiffs concede ... that they suffered no actual injury, or at least that the injury they claim cannot be redressed by an award of actual damages; thus appearing to have no standing.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the decision.

Parties Dismiss Suit That Claimed Teacher Punished Student For Nonbelief

WANE News reports that yesterday an Indiana federal district court dismissed, upon agreement of the parties, a suit that was filed in June claiming that a Fort Wayne (IN) elementary school teacher punished a second grade student who allegedly upset classmates by telling them that he did not go to church or believe in God. (See prior posting.)  The case is A.B. v. Meyer, (ND IN). An internal school investigation found that teacher Michelle Meyer acted appropriately and that the complaint in the lawsuit did not accurately reflect what had happened.  The teacher said her concern was that the student did not care about the impact of his words on a fellow student.

Cannabis Church Sues Under Indiana's New RFRA

In a move foreshadowed two months ago (see prior posting), in Indiana the First Church of Cannabis has filed suit invoking the state's recently-enacted RFRA in an attempt to shield the Church, its founder and two of its members from prosecution for possession of marijuana.  The complaint (full text) in First Church of Cannabis, Inc. v. State of Indiana, (IN Cir. Ct., filed 7/8/2015), alleges that cannabis is the sacrament of the Church, and laws punishing possession of marijuana and visiting a place where marijuana is used substantially burden plaintiffs' exercise of religion. The Indianapolis Star reports that more than 100 people attended the Church's second service yesterday evening, but because of prosecution threats it is not using cannabis at its services until it is successful in its lawsuit. According to WTHR News, Marion County Prosecutor Terry Curry complained:

Our office and police agencies have serious public safety issues we have to address every single day. I am beyond frustrated that we are having to devote valuable time and resources to this matter solely because of an ill-advised and unnecessary law enacted by our legislature, The act serves no purpose, no purpose whatsoever, other than political posturing.

ACLU Uses Indiana RFRA In Suit Challenging New Restrictions On Sex Offenders

The ACLU of Indiana filed a lawsuit yesterday challenging the prohibition in a newly enacted state law that keeps certain registered sex offenders from attending religious services. (ACLU press release).  At issue is Indiana Code § 35-42-4-14 (eff. July 1, 2015) that bars certain registered sex offenders from entering school property.  The complaint (full text) in John Doe I v. Allen and Elkhart County Prosecutors, (IN Super. Ct., filed 7/1/2015), alleges in part:

This statute ... [bans serious sex offenders] from going to worship in churches, synagogues, mosques, or other religious buildings that are located on the same as property parochial schools or certain preschool programming. Banning sex offenders from ... church on Sunday, because there are students in a school on the same grounds on Monday, is irrational and violates the due process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.... It also violates Indiana’s newly enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Indiana Code § 34-13-9-0.7, et seq. (eff. July 1, 2015), which prohibits government from imposing a substantial burden on a person’s exercise of religion absent a compelling governmental interest and a showing that the action is the least restrictive means to further that interest.

AP reports on the lawsuit and reactions to it.

2nd Grade Teacher Sued For Intimidating Student Who Said He Did Not Believe In God

Yesterday's Fort Wayne (IN) Journal Gazette reported on a federal lawsuit filed last week by the Indiana ACLU on behalf of a 2nd grade student and his mother against the boy's teacher at Fort Wayne's Forest Park Elementary School.  According to the complaint, after the boy, identified only as A.B., had a playground discussion with a classmate whom he told he did not go to church or believe in God, the classmate complained to the teacher, Michelle Meyer. The teacher told A.B. she was very concerned about what he had done, and for three days required him to sit by himself at lunch and not talk to other students because he had offended them.  A.B. is now anxious and fearful about school, believing many teachers and students hate him, even though teachers subsequently told him he could believe what he wants.

The lawsuit only names the teacher personally as defendant, and not the school district.  According to WTHR News, the district released a statement saying that "It is clear that it is not the province of a public school to advance or inhibit religious beliefs or practices...."

Cannabis Advocate Will Be First To Test Indiana's RFRA

Indiana's controversial Religious Freedom Restoration Act goes into effect on July 1.  Bill Levin, a life-long advocate of legalizing marijuana, says he will be the first to test the law by holding the initial service of his newly created First Church of Cannabis that day.  WTHR News reported yesterday that Levin is looking for space to rent for holding the service, which he expects will attract 1000 people. Levin says: "We'll say a short prayer and go 'poof',"

Why Is Indiana's RFRA So Controversial? This Blogger's Analysis.

Since Indiana's passage of its Religious Freedom Restoration Act earlier this week (see prior posting), there has been a flood of commentary on what the Act really means and its true impact.  The commentary, some from those with a political agenda and some from those without one, ranges from the assertion that IRFRA does little to change current law to the assertion that it creates a license to discriminate against the LGBT community.  So here is my attempt to suggest some perspective on the statute.

(1)  The heart of the statute-- the substantial burden/ compelling interest/ least restrictive means requirement-- is similar to that in the federal RFRA and those of numerous other states.  What makes these tests stand out is the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions that give the tests new salience.  With Hobby Lobby and Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court has transformed the substantial burden and least restrictive means tests into geometrically more powerful tools to use to challenge refusals to provide religious exemptions.

(2)  Traditionally it was assumed that the federal RFRA would be used by minority religions to fend off broad regulations that might be enacted without a careful weighing of idiosyncratic religious practices that are important to often discrete and insular groups with comparatively small numbers of adherents.  Since Hobby Lobby and the explosion of same-sex marriage cases, it is largely the Christian majority (or a segment of it) that asserts it is the victim of the majoritarian process, seeking exemptions that have a negative impact on minority groups that have broadly been the victims of past governmental discrimination.

(3)  Since Hobby Lobby. the power of RFRA exemptions has been magnified because they can be asserted by fairly large economic enterprises whose owners have religious reservations about a regulatory requirement.  Indiana's RFRA may have expanded the reach of RFRA exemptions beyond those contemplated by Hobby Lobby.  In defining the persons protected by the law, it enumerates all sorts of business entities, including "a corporation."  It does not limit this to a "closely-held corporation" as the Supreme Court did in Hobby Lobby.  It may be that a separate clause in the Indiana law has that effect, but that is unclear.  Under Sec. 7, a business entity is covered if it

exercises practices that are compelled or limited by a system of religious belief held by ... the individuals who have control and substantial ownership of the entity, regardless of whether the entity is organized and operated for profit or nonprofit purposes.

It can be argued that only a closely held corporation would be controlled and substantially owned by the same individuals.  But this depends on whether "substantial ownership" means a substantial percentage of the business or merely that the person has a substantial amount of money invested in the company.  CEO's of publicly held corporations often own millions of dollars of the company's stock, but still own only a small percentage of the company.

(4)  Enacted as the Supreme Court is about to hear oral arguments in same-sex marriage cases, and in the wake of numerous high-profile cases on religious refusals by businesses to furnish goods and services to same-sex couples, the law has become a symbol of the clash between conservative Christian views on sexuality and the movement of expanded LGBT rights.  Some have pointed out, accurately, that Indiana's statewide public accommodation law does not include a ban on sexual orientation discrimination.  So business that wish to discriminate on that basis do not need an exemption. [corrected]

However, Indiana's statute also applies to local governmental entities in the state.  According to the Indiana ACLU, four localities have ordinances that provide enforceable protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity-- Indianapolis, Lafayette, New Albany and Tippecanoe County.  The new IRFRA will be able to be invoked as a defense in proceedings charging discrimination under these local laws.  This aspect of the law creates particular political and economic problems for the city of Indianapolis that hosts numerous national conventions and sporting events.

(5)  Indiana's new law makes it clear that IRFRA defenses can be asserted in lawsuits between private parties; not just in suits in which the government is a party.  Thus a same-sex couple suing for breach of contract when goods are initially promised and then refused might be met by a religious freedom defense. The sale of goods provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code arguably imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise of the business that discovers it has agreed to violate its own religious principles by facilitating a same-sex wedding.  (This argument is more difficult when services rather than goods are the subject of the contract, and the plaintiff relies on the common law of contracts for enforceability.  Although the statute covers not just statutes, but also "customs" and "usages" of any governmental entity.)

Affirmative relief (damages or an injunction) is only available however against a governmental entity.  And the statute specifically provides that it does not create a cause of action against a private employer by any applicant, employee or former employee.

For other commentaries on IRFRA, see Josh Blackman's Blog and the postings to which he links. And the Washington Post reports today that Indiana lawmakers now say they will act to amend IRFRA to make it clear that it does not permit discrimination against gays.

Indiana Passes RFRA Law

The Indiana General Assembly yesterday gave final approval to Senate Bill 101, the Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act. (full text).  The bill is broader than its Federal counterpart in several ways.  It explicitly protects the exercise of religion by entities as well as individuals.  Its enumeration of entities includes "a corporation", without limiting this to closely-held companies.  The bill's protections may be invoked when a person's exercise of religion is "likely" to be substantially burdened by government action, not just when it has been burdened.  The bill also permits the assertion of free exercise rights as a claim or defense in judicial or administrative proceedings even if the government is not a party to the proceedings. The relevant governmental entity has a right to intervene in such cases to respond to the RFRA claim. A remedy under the bill is only available against the government; suits by employees or applicants invoking the law against private employers are precluded.

In a statement (full text) after the bill passed yesterday, Governor Mike Pence said he strongly supports the bill and will sign it. Meanwhile, Gen Con, a major gaming convention held each year in Indianapolis, wrote the governor (full text) asking him to reconsider, saying that legislation that could lead to discrimination against its attendees will factor into its decision on whether to hold the convention in Indiana in future years.

Indiana County Fights Creche Suit By Enacting Open Forum Law

The Batesville (IN) Herald-Tribune reports that last week the Franklin County, Indiana Commissioners passed Ordinance 2015-02 to create a public forum on the county courthouse grounds permitting displays, demonstrations, exhibits, rallies and other expressive activities without regard to viewpoint under a neutral permit process.  The action was taken in response to a lawsuit filed against the county last month challenging the constitutionality of a life size Nativity Scene displayed on the courthouse lawn. (See prior posting.)

UPDATE: According to WLWT, on Feb. 10 plaintiffs dropped the lawsuit.

Indiana Supreme Court Interprets Civil Rights Commission Jurisdiction Over Educational Matters Narrowly

In Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. v. Bridgewater, (IN Sup. Ct., Jan. 6, 2015), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state's Civil Rights Commission exceeded its authority when it adjudicated disability discrimination and retaliation claims growing out of a dispute between members of a group ("FACES") created to provide homeschool high schoolers with Catholic educational, spiritual, and social enrichment. A family filed a discrimination complaint with the Civil Rights Commission when FACES refused to make health-related dietary accommodations for their daughter at an "All Souls' Day Masquerade Ball" dinner-dance. The complaint led to the family's being expelled from FACES.

The Indiana Civil Rights Law, Sec. 22-9-1-3(l), bars discriminatory practices only when they relate to "the acquisition or sale of real estate, education, public accommodations, employment, or the extending of credit." The Supreme Court said:

The dinner-dance at which Mrs. Bridgewater contends that FACES failed to accommodate her daughter's food allergy furthered ... Catholic spiritual and social enrichment. It was not an occasion for the teaching of academic subjects as part of the student's curriculum.... The alleged disability discrimination thus occurred at a quasi-religious social function, not an educational one. To expansively interpret "relating to . . . education," ... to apply to this dinner would convert almost every occasion of parental guidance and training into an activity "related to education." This would eviscerate the function of "related to education" as a legislative prerequisite for the Commission's enforcement powers.

Justice Rucker dissented.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the decision.

State Freedom of Conscience Clause Does Not Cover Environmentalist Who Refuses To Mow Lawn

In Gul v. City of Bloomington, (IN App., Dec. 22, 2014), an Indiana state appellate court rejected constitutional and statutory challenges to a city ordinance that prohibits grass in yards from being over 8 inches tall.  Environmentalist Alexander Gul claimed, among other things, that the citation he received for for refusing to mow his lawn violated his free expression rights and his freedom of conscience protected by the Indiana constitution. The court recounts:

Gul allows his yard to grow naturally and does not apply chemicals, mow, water, or fertilize it. He explains that his decision to maintain a natural yard is a statement of his sincerely held environmental belief that the overuse of chemicals, water, and lawnmowers to maintain a traditional lawn is harmful to the environment.

Bloomington officials disagree and view Gul’s yard as merely overgrown.

Rejecting Gul's under the state constitution's conscience clause, the court said:

... we find that Article 1, Section 3 was intended to apply to religious, rather than non-religious, matters of conscience. But even if it includes non-religious matters of conscience, it protects only the right to hold one’s own opinions, and does not protect the right to act on one’s own opinions in contravention of the law. 

Suit Challenges Creche On Indiana Courthouse Lawn

The Freedom from Religion Foundation, through the Indiana ACLU, filed suit in federal district court yesterday challenging the constitutionality of a life-size city-owned Nativity Scene on the lawn of the Franklin County Courthouse in Brookville, Indiana. The complaint (full text) in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Franklin County, Indiana, (SD IN, filed 12/16/2014), (which includes a photo of the display) says that while the city also displays a series of plastic reindeer on the lawn, they are not part of the same display and are barely visible during the day when they are not lighted. Both the ACLU and FFRF have issued press releases announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

UPDATE: Under an agreement reached by the parties on Dec. 19, the Nativity Scene will remain up only until the day after Christmas, and FFRF will drop its request for a preliminary injunction. According to a press release by Thomas More Society, litigation on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction will now continue on a more normal time schedule.

State Trooper Sued Over Proselytizing After Traffic Stop

Huffington Post reported yesterday on a federal lawsuit filed last month against an Indiana State Police Trooper for proselytizing a driver after stopping her for a traffic violation. The complaint (full text) in Bogan v. Hamilton, (SD IN, filed 9/23/2014), alleges that after stopping driver Ellen Bogan and issuing her a warning ticket for speeding, Trooper Brian Hamilton asked Bogan whether she had a home church and had accepted Jesus as her savior. He then gave her a pamphlet from a Cambridge City, Indiana Baptist church. The suit asks for damages alleging that the trooper's coercive questioning and proselytizing violated the First Amendment.

State Antidiscrimination Law Applies To Selection of Members of Catholic High School Basketball Team

In Cardinal Ritter High School, Inc. v. Bullock, (IN App., Sept. 5, 2014), an Indiana Court of Appeals held that the Indiana Civil Rights Law applies to alleged racial discrimination by a Catholic high school in selecting members of its basketball team. The Act, by its terms, applies to discriminatory practices relating to education. The court held that this does not offend the school's free exercise rights. However the court vacated and remanded the case because the administrative law judge who heard the testimony retired, and the findings of fact were written by a different ALJ who never heard the testimony or saw the witnesses in person.

7th Circuit Invalidates Same-Sex Marriage Bans In Indiana and Wisconsin

Yesterday the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Baskin v. Bogan, (7th Cir., Sept. 4, 2014), affirmed district court decisions striking down same-sex marriage bans in Indiana and Wisconsin. The unanimous opinion, written by Judge Posner in his unquely cogent style, takes on and counters each argument in favor of same-sex marriage bans put forward by each state. He particularly emphasizes the protection-of-children argument on which Indiana relied exclusively:

The challenged laws discriminate against a minority defined by an immutable characteristic, and the only rationale that the states put forth with any conviction—that same-sex couples and their children don’t need marriage  because same-sex couples can’t produce children, intended or unintended—is so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously. To the extent that children are better off in families in which the parents are married, they are better off whether they are raised by their biological parents or by adoptive parents. The discrimination against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore unconstitutional even if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened scrutiny, which is why we can largely elide the more complex analysis found in more closely balanced equal-protection cases.

He derides Indiana's arguments, summarizing them as follows:

Heterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go figure.

Moving to Wisconsin's ban, Judge Posner, quoting (among others) Justice Holmes and John Stuart Mill, counters each of four additional justifications the state puts forward for banning same-sex marriage-- tradition, the need to move cautiously, respect for the democratic process and damage to traditional marriage. Posner describes the last of these as an argument that "allowing [homosexuals] to marry degrades the institution of marriage (as might happen if people were allowed to marry their pets or their sports cars)...."  He summarizes:

the grounds advanced by Indiana and Wisconsin for their discriminatory policies are not only conjectural; they are totally implausible.

As reported by the New York Times, yesterday's decision was handed donw only nine days after the court heard oral arguments in the case.

7th Circuit: Indiana Must Allow Secular Humanists To Solemnize Marriages

In Center For Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, (7th Cir., July 14, 2014), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Indiana's statute specifying who may solemnize marriages unconstitutionally discriminates among religious and ethical beliefs.  It allows religious officials of various religious groups to perform marriages, but not equivalent officials of secular groups like humanist societies. Also, unlike some states, Indiana law does not give humanist officials the option of officiating by becoming notaries. The court instructed the district court to issue an injunction allowing certified secular humanist celebrants to solemnize marriages without risk of criminal penalty. Religion News Service reports on the decision.

7th Circuit Stays District Court's Invalidation of Indiana's Same-Sex Marriage Ban

In Baskin v. Bogan, (7th Cir., June 27, 2014), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a stay pending appeal of a federal district court' decision striking down Indiana's laws barring same-sex marriage. (See prior posting.) Fox59 reports on the appellate court's action and reactions to it.